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1  Introduction 1 
1 Introduction 
In its “Advanced information on the Prize in Economic Sciences 2002”, the 
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2002, p. 21) writes: 
 
“Experimental evidence indicates that certain psychological phe-
nomena – such as bounded rationality, limited self-interest, and imperfect 
self-control – are important factors behind a range of market outcomes. 
[…] A challenging task in financial economics is to consider the extent to 
which the effects of systematic irrationality on asset prices will be weeded 
out by market arbitrage.” 
 
This passage expressively describes an ongoing debate among researchers 
whether and under which conditions individual biases transfer to asset market outcomes 
and therefore contribute to market-wide anomalies (e.g., De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 
p. 548), Shleifer (2000), Hirshleifer (2001)), or whether those individual errors are 
eliminated by market forces that are able to produce collectively unbiased market prices 
(e.g., Rubinstein (2001)). A number of researchers have contributed to this discussion to 
date by balancing the pros and cons of forces (e.g., arbitrage, learning, and competition) 
and institutional factors that may or may not cause markets to drive out individual bi-
ases (see Kluger and Wyatt (2004)).1 The growing field of behavioral finance research 
is characterized by its skepticism about the neoclassical approach of efficient markets in 
which rational agents derive their decisions by “simply” trading off risk and return of a 
given investment opportunity. Contrary to the neoclassical perception, the behavioral 
approach acknowledges the existence and persistence of individual biases in human 
behavior. “Rational” behavior can be characterized (i) by judgments that are consistent 
with the laws of statistics and probability like, for instance, Bayes’ rule, and (ii) by 
choices that are in line with expected utility. A bias, by contrast, is defined a systematic 
inconsistency of judgments and/or choices compared to a normative benchmark, in 
which “systematic” means that this deviation is predictable in direction. A “market out-
come” is defined to be “irrational” if it is incompatible with collective behavior ex-
                                                 
1  See Arrow (1982), Blume and Easley (1982), Russell and Thaler (1985), De Long et al. (1990), 
Camerer and Ho (1999), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Fama (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrah-
manyam (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001), Gervais and Odean (2001), and 
Bossaerts (2002). 
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pressed by rational individuals (Camerer (1992, p. 239)). By now, there is great demand 
for empirical work that clarifies which of the individual cognitive biases, if any, influ-
ence investor behavior and whether these biases are only marginal phenomena by some 
sporadic investors or whether they have a significant impact on prices. The present the-
sis aims to contribute to this question. 
Among other biases, recent psychological experiments have documented a rather 
fundamental cognitive bias: the judged probability distribution of a continuous variable, 
such as the closing price of a stock index, can depend on the particular intervals into 
which the variable’s possible values are divided, a phenomenon called “partition-
dependence.” In particular, judged probabilities seem to reflect reliance on a diffuse or 
“ignorance“ prior probability of 1/N for each of the N intervals into which the state 
space is partitioned, plus an adjustment up or down for specific likelihood of each 
event. This implies that “unpacking” an interval [I1, I2] into two separate sub-intervals 
[I1, I1+x) and [I1+x, I2] increases the total judged probability from adding the two sub-
intervals which is in stark contrast to what normative theory of rational decision making 
predicts. 
However, economists are instinctively skeptical of psychology experiments that 
use simple abstract or hypothetical events, modest (or no) performance-based financial 
incentives, and little opportunity for learning, to establish limits on rational behavior. 
This skepticism has led to several studies testing whether individual biases shown in lab 
experiments persist under larger incentives, and persist in market trading in both lab and 
field settings (e.g., Fehr and Tyran (2005), Camerer and Fehr (2006), and DellaVigna 
(2009)). The present thesis continues in this tradition by testing, for the first time, 
whether partition-dependence affects prices in experimental and field “prediction mar-
kets” for three types of naturally-occurring event domains (financial, sports, and 
weather outcomes). In prediction markets, people typically trade a set of “all-or-
nothing” contingent claims on actual events. A claim pays off if and only if its associ-
ated event occurs. The price of the contingent claim is thought to reflect the market’s 
collective probability judgment about the event’s likelihood (Manski (2006), and 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007)). 
Common skeptical concerns about the generalizability of psychology experi-
ments to economic settings are addressed in the experiments of this thesis. All three 
studies include prediction-market bets on actual events, with substantial payoffs linked 
to choices and outcomes, and trading takes place over time periods lasting from ten 
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minutes to several weeks, which provide a substantial opportunity for learning. Taking 
advantage of the complementarities of lab and field methods, a lab experiment, a field 
experiment, and some analysis of naturally-occurring field data will be reported. 
A wide range of data was deliberately collected to contribute to the ongoing de-
bate about the importance of psychological phenomena in asset markets. On the one 
hand, one may argue that the effects reported here are not terribly surprising; one may 
further argue that it would be highly surprising if the behavioral effects found in the lab 
did not influence market prices. On the other hand, for example, Levitt and List (2008, 
p. 910) recently wrote that: 
 
“To be empirically relevant, the anomalies that arise so frequently 
and powerfully in the laboratory must also manifest themselves in naturally 
occurring settings of interest. Further exploring how markets and market 
experience influence behavior represents an important line of future in-
quiry.” 
 
So the type of individual-to-market generalization studied here is “an important 
line of future inquiry” and it can be assumed that there is still ongoing controversy and 
more data are therefore welcome. 
In addition, these results may interest both psychologists and economists. For 
psychologists, the magnitude and persistence of these effects in prediction markets says 
something about their psychological nature: Are they transient slips of the mind that are 
quickly displaced by effortful thought, and erased by competition? Or do the concrete 
boundaries of a presented partition persistently influence cognition? For economists, 
partition-dependence is a particular type of framing effect—the way in which an event 
is described or “framed” influences its judged likelihood. This phenomenon attacks a 
basic principle of rationality that Arrow (1982) referred to as extensionality and Tversky 
and Kahneman (1986) called description invariance: “The chosen element depends on 
the opportunity set from which the choice is to be made, independently of how that set 
is described” (Arrow (1982, p. 6)). In fact, there are already examples of empirical 
large-scale effects in economic field data that are consistent with a partition-dependent 
1/N bias, in personal and corporate resource allocation, and racetrack odds.  
Some background about both prediction markets and partition-dependence is 
useful to present before proceeding to the details of what was found.  
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Prediction markets. The assets (or shares) used in the presented experimental 
studies are usually referred to as “winner-take-all” contracts (or “all-or-nothing” con-
tracts, or contingent claims) in prediction markets studies (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
(2004)). Scientists are interested in prediction markets because the examination of trad-
ing activity in these markets is useful to generate important insights into the general 
effectiveness of markets and trading institutions. Under reasonable assumptions, the 
prices from prediction market assets can be interpreted as market generated collective 
probability estimates of the occurrence of these events (Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007)). 
The first large-scale prediction markets were created in 1988 at the University of Iowa 
(Forsythe et al. (1992), and Berg and Rietz (2006)), to trade assets linked to political 
events. The Iowa markets were inspired by lab evidence that simple abstract experimen-
tal markets can aggregate diverse information well (see Plott and Sunder (1982), and 
Sunder (1995)). Over the years, prices in the Iowa markets have been shown to forecast 
political outcomes more accurately than many polls about 75% of the time, in hundreds 
of elections. Around 2001, websites emerged where people can trade contingent claims 
on a wider range of event domains including political, financial and entertainment 
events, such as “American Idol” outcomes and when Osama Bin-Laden will be captured 
(Intrade: http://www.intrade.com, see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)). Firms have also 
created internal markets to predict outcomes of corporate interest, such as new product 
sales (Chen and Plott (2002), and Ho and Chen (2007)). In marketing research, predic-
tion markets have been used in the form of preference markets to elicit consumer pref-
erences for new products and product features (Dahan, Soukhoroukova, and Spann 
(2007), and Dahan et al. (2007)).  
Partition-dependence. It is now well established in the psychology literature that 
limited attention and awareness can lead to reliance on judgmental heuristics, which can 
deviate systematically from normative logical standards (see Kahneman, Slovic, and 
Tversky (1982), and Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman (2002)). 
An early example is “fault-tree bias” (which set the stage for later studies). A 
fault tree is a hierarchical display with branches showing possible mechanical explana-
tions for an observed system failure (such as an airplane crash or a car failing to start). 
Increasing levels of detail are shown further down the tree branches. Engineers often 
create fault trees and assign likelihoods to the branches representing possible causes of a 
system failure to spot likely flaws and improve designs.  
1  Introduction 5 
Normatively, when statistically important branches are omitted from a fault tree, 
the subjective probability assigned to those fault branches should be reassigned to a 
residual “all other causes” branch. However, experiments showed that the increase in 
“all other causes” probability is too small when large fault tree branches are omitted, 
even when the subjects are highly knowledgeable about likely faults. For instance, when 
experienced auto mechanics were asked to estimate the relative frequency of six catego-
ries of reasons why a car might fail to start (battery, starting system, fuel system, igni-
tion system, engine, mischief, all other problems) the mean proportion assigned to “all 
other problems” was .060. However, in another treatment where three of these catego-
ries (starting system, ignition system, mischief) were pruned from the original tree the 
proportion assigned to “all other problems” was only .215, about half the value of .441 
which would have been expected based on the responses given to the unpruned tree 
(Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978, Experiment 6: Experts)). 
Four psychological mechanisms have been proposed for bias of this sort: (i) en-
hanced psychological “availability” of explicitly mentioned categories,2 resulting in 
higher judged probability; (ii) “ambiguity” or vagueness about omitted branches;3 (iii) 
an ecologically valid belief that the presented fault tree conveys information about like-
lihood, because omitted branches are likely to be rare (“credibility”);4 and (iv) a bias 
toward an ignorance prior of 1/N on each of the N identified events.5 Which mechanism 
is driving the bias is important because different mechanisms imply different limiting 
conditions, moderators and “de-biasing” techniques. 
Fox and Clemen (2005) distinguish among these explanations by asking partici-
pants to judge the likelihood of chance nodes of decision trees that had been partitioned 
in one of two different ways. In one study expert members of the Decision Analysis 
Society (DAS; an international association of professional decision analysts and leading 
scholars of decision analysis) were asked to assess the probabilities that the total num-
ber of members of their society would fall into different ranges five years in the future. 
(The current number was 764.) Fifty-eight of 169 contacted members participated 
(34%). They were randomly assigned to either a low group or a high group. The low 
                                                 
2  See Tversky and Kahneman (1973), Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978), van der Pligt, Eiser, 
and Speark (1987), Dubé-Rioux and Russo (1988), Russo and Kolzow (1994), and Ofir (2000). 
3  See Hirt and Castellan (1988). 
4  See Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978), and Dubé-Rioux and Russo (1988); see also Sher and 
McKenzie (2006). 
5  See Fox and Clemen (2005). 
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group was asked to assign likelihoods of membership falling in each of the intervals   
[0, 400], [401, 600], [601, 800], [801, 1000], [1001+]. The high group was asked the 
likelihoods for the membership intervals [0, 1000], [1001, 1200], [1201, 1400], [1401, 
1600], [1601+]. The judged probability that future membership will reside in the upper 
interval (>1000) was 10% in the low group, for whom that interval was represented by a 
single event. The comparable judgment was 35% in the high group, for whom the high-
est (>1000) interval was partitioned into four separate events. 
This example is notable because the subjects are highly expert and responded 
self-selectively. The first three psychological mechanisms described above (“availabil-
ity”, “ambiguity”, and “credibility”) cannot explain the difference in judgments between 
the low and high partition groups. The categories cover all possible ranges of events 
(i.e., there is no “all other numbers of members” interval), categories are not ambiguous, 
and participants were told about both possible partitions so that no information was con-
veyed by a single partition structure. Only the remaining explanation, a natural bias to-
ward an ignorance prior across the categories, can explain the effect. A pure ignorance 
prior over presented categories would yield 1/N judgments of 20% and 80% in the low 
and high groups, respectively. The actual results of 10% and 35% are partway between 
those 1/N judgments and a common subjective probability for the interval (>1000) that 
is partition-independent. 
Other experiments have shown substantial robustness of partition-dependence to 
many variables. Partition-dependence was exhibited in controlled learning environment 
(See, Fox, and Rottenstreich (2006)), using “linguistic priming”,6 in solving probability 
puzzles, such as a version of the Monty Hall three-door problem (Fox and Levav 
(2004)), in valuation of insurance policies (Johnson et al. (1993)), and with incentive-
compatible payoffs (Fox and Rottenstreich (2003), Fox and Levav (2004), and Fox and 
Clemen (2005)). Partition-dependence has also been shown when resources, rather than 
probability, are allocated to categories. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) show bias toward 
                                                 
6  Linguistic priming means that different wordings of the same event can influence the subjective sali-
ence of alternative partitions of the state space. For example, when subjects are asked the likelihood that 
“tomorrow General Motors’ (GM’s) stock price will rise by more than any other stock in the DJIA” their 
judgments are higher than when the event is phrased “Tomorrow in the DJIA, the stock whose price will 
rise by the greatest amount will be General Motors (GM).” The first phrasing, by mentioning the target 
event at the outset, frames a partition into the target event and its complement (“GM stock will be the 
highest” or “GM stock will not be the highest”) and an ignorance prior of 1/2, whereas the second phras-
ing, by mentioning the equivalence class at the outset suggests a partition of the state space into 30 stocks 
and an ignorance prior of 1/30 (Fox and Rottenstreich (2003); see also Fox and Levav (2004)). 
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1/N in experimental 401(k) investment decisions and in an empirical analysis of retire-
ment savings plan data. Langer and Fox (2005) show partition-dependence more explic-
itly, in allocations among investments in simple gambles with incentive-compatible 
payoffs. Other experiments on risky choice are showing that splitting positive-outcome 
events into sub-events seems to increase preference for those choices (e.g., Humphrey 
(1996)). Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo (2007) find in archival data that corporations allo-
cate less capital to divisions when there are more divisions under the same corporate 
parent, consistent with a 1/N bias (see also Scharfstein and Stein (2000)). They also find 
experimental evidence that experienced managers are statistically biased toward 1/N in 
their hypothetical capital allocations even though they are not aware of their bias. Many 
studies with many years of data in different countries show a favorite-longshot bias in 
horse race betting odds: Unlikely winners (longshots) are generally overbet and favor-
ites are underbet, which is consistent with a bias toward 1/N probability for every horse 
(e.g., Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006)).7 Fox, Ratner, and Lieb (2005) show 1/N bias in 
experiments allocating money to beneficiaries, consumption to time periods, and 
choices to menus of options that are grouped by different attributes.8 
Note that the basic phenomenon underlying partition-dependence is the tendency 
of concrete, salient categorization to influence attention, thought, and judgment even 
when the categorization is exogenously imposed and serves no normative purpose. 
(Many of the earlier experiments, and those reported in the present work, make clear 
that the partitions are imposed exogeneously by telling subjects that some have one par-
tition and other subjects have a different one; so any effect of alleged information con-
veyed by the presented partitions should be the same in the two groups.) 
This effect of salience based on how possible outcomes are described is ubiqui-
tous in human communication, because complicated ranges of outcomes are rarely cate-
gorized naturally. Instead, a discrete categorical structure is invariably chosen, or im-
plicitly conveyed by the choice of words. For example, in February 2003, a month be-
fore the onset of the Iraq war, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said “It is un-
                                                 
7  However, Plott and Roust (2005) find that in some lab settings with parimutuel betting on abstract 
events, the favorite-longshot bias is a disequilibrium phenomenon which disappears when some institu-
tional changes are made.  
8  Note that in many cases, allocating resources equally could be optimal (e.g., consumption smoothing 
over time when utility of consumption is time-separable and concave). But the point of these studies is 
that the way in which categories are unpacked or combined influences allocations, which is not optimal. 
For instance, allocating consumption equally among months will produce (slightly) different results than 
allocating consumption equally among weeks. 
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knowable how long that conflict [the war in Iraq] will last. It could last six days, six 
weeks. I doubt six months” (Page (2003)). Rumsfeld’s wording invites consideration of 
a partition of possible war lengths into intervals of [0, 6 days], (6 days, 6 weeks], (6 
weeks, 6 months], and (6 months+). Partition-dependence then anchors beliefs around 
the idea that the war was likely to last 6 weeks. If Rumsfeld had worded his sentence 
differently (e.g., “six months, six years, or six decades”), it could have established a 
different partition, with a different public perception of likely outcomes, with different 
political ramifications. 
In most cases, partition-dependence is difficult to entirely expunge because talk-
ing about continuous variables often leads to a division of possible outcomes into lumpy 
natural-language categories. So if partition-dependence is prominent when there are 
clear historical frequencies lurking behind the cognitive walls of the presented partition, 
as in the naturally-occurring event domains used in the experiments of the present thesis 
(financials, sports, and weather), then it might be even more prominent when “unknow-
able” distributions such as the length of a war are divided into discrete numerical inter-
vals. Tversky and Koehler (1994, p. 565) note that “the need to consider unavailable 
possibilities […] is perhaps the fundamental problem of probability assessment”. They 
suggest that immunity of judgments to a particular partition is “normatively unassailable 
but practically unachievable”, because people “cannot be expected to think of all rele-
vant conjunctive unpackings or to generate all relevant future scenarios”.  
Economic theorists have also recognized the importance of cognitive availability 
that underlies partition-dependence and begun to model it formally. Dekel, Lipman, and 
Rustichini (1998, p. 524) note that “an unforeseen contingency is not necessarily one 
the agent could not conceive of, just one he doesn’t think of at the time he makes his 
choice.” Interest in “unforeseen contingencies” is generated by potential applications 
like simplified employment contracts and the desire for flexibility when it may be diffi-
cult to imagine all future events or judge their likelihood (Kreps (1979)). Ahn and Ergin 
(2007) show that partition-dependence revealed by choices can be modeled by allowing 
subjective probability to be non-additive in a particular way.9  
It is important to note that partition-dependence often contributes to a tendency 
to overweight low-probability events and underweight high-probability events, but is 
                                                 
9  Their paper contains a particularly thoughtful review of the psychological literature motivating their 
axiomatization.  
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not necessarily precisely the same phenomenon. Partition-dependence predicts that in an 
N-event partition, events with expressed probabilities lower than 1/N are likely to be 
overweighted. Since partitions of the here presented lab and field studies involve 3 or 4 
sub-events, overweighting should occur even when probabilities are fairly large (less 
than .25). Most other evidence of overweighting, however, comes from events with 
probabilities that are quite low (e.g., below .10). For example, in a comparison of pre-
diction markets forecasts of S&P 500 stock index futures and probabilities inferred from 
option prices, only probabilities of about .02 seem to be overweighted (Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2004, Table 4)). It is quite possible that details of trading microstructure, 
some influence of extreme optimism, and other forces are responsible for overweighting 
of very low probabilities while partition-dependence is more basic and spans a fuller 
range of probabilities.  
To tie together the two strands of prediction markets and partition-dependence, it 
is important to stress that partition-dependence creates a challenge for the design of pre-
diction markets. In these markets, continuous variables such as political vote shares, 
movie box office grosses, new product sales, timing of event occurrences, and values of 
macroeconomic indicators, must be necessarily partitioned into numerical intervals by 
the market designers. Unlike categorical markets, such as the winner of the Academy 
Award for Best Film or the winner of the Super Bowl, there is typically no natural parti-
tion for events with continuous distributions. If the way in which partitions are con-
structed matters for actual prediction-market prices, this could affect the quality of the 
resulting market-wide estimates (as shown in chapter 5). Designers should treat parti-
tion-dependence as a cognitive constraint that must be understood and anticipated in the 
design, much as website screen displays and menu features are chosen to satisfy design 
goals based on an understanding of visual and motor activity.  
A well-designed prediction market will eliminate ambiguity in the definition of 
events, and can control for the information conveyed by the partition choice if traders 
know how partitions are created. However, the natural bias toward 1/N in the assess-
ment of interval probability cannot necessarily be designed away. Indeed, in naturally-
occurring prediction markets, only a single partition for an event is always used. So 
without experiments in the spirit of those presented here that compare market prices for 
different partitions of the same state space, there is no way to know for sure whether 
there is a bias toward 1/N in a competitive market setting.  
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Organization of the thesis and preview of results. Part of the present thesis is in-
cluded in a recent working paper which is joint work with Colin Camerer, Craig Fox, 
and Thomas Langer.10 However, the scope of this thesis goes beyond that of the men-
tioned working paper as it presents more detailed analyses throughout, intensely ex-
plores the potential impact of market participants’ self-perceived competence on the 
obtained results, and studies partition-dependence in a modified lab market design to 
further examine the robustness of the effect size under conditions which are potentially 
more “de-biasing” than those in the basis setup.  
The next chapter is to describe the fundamental concepts that underlie the subse-
quent studies and to give a comprehensive literature review. The chapter explains the 
basic principles of prediction markets and focuses on the theoretical background of 
these markets. In particular, it is discussed (i) under which circumstances prediction 
markets are able to produce efficient and accurate outcomes, (ii) whether and under 
which conditions a market price from “winner-take-all” prediction markets can be inter-
preted as the aggregate, market-derived probability for the occurrence of a future state 
of the world, and (iii) which hypotheses have been derived that give reason to assume 
that individual judgment errors could be eliminated in asset market outcomes. In addi-
tion, the chapter identifies partition-dependence as a violation of the description invari-
ance principle in uncertain situations and reviews the explanations that have been pro-
posed for this phenomenon. Support theory is presented as a descriptive model of belief 
and judgment under uncertainty that is able to capture partition-dependence and related 
phenomena formally. Furthermore, the chapter describes the basic principles of experi-
mental methods, in particular experimental asset markets and reviews the experimental 
literature on asset markets with focus on the conditions under which these markets 
prove able to aggregate and disseminate information well. This is useful to understand 
the market microstructural design features that were chosen in the experimental studies 
that follow.  
The subsequent three chapters report analyses of three types of data. In chapter 
3, short-run experimental markets (two 10-minute trading periods) are described for 
three naturally-occurring event domains in which one can compare judgments and 
prices for different partitions of the same numerical interval. These data largely repli-
                                                 
10  Working paper: Sonnemann, Ulrich, Colin F. Camerer, Craig R. Fox, and Thomas Langer, 2008, 
Partition-dependent framing effects in lab and field prediction markets, Working paper, University of 
Muenster, Caltech, UCLA. Sonnemann et al. (2008) 
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cate the magnitude of partition-dependence reported in many psychology experiments 
(like the canonical Fox-Clemen study mentioned above) and demonstrate the persis-
tence of partition-dependence in short-run prediction market prices. Second order analy-
ses are carried out to further explore the role of competence on the effect size and the 
trading behavior of differently knowledgeable participants. Beyond this, in an informa-
tion treatment of this study the experimental design is modified to favor the conditions 
under which partition-dependence potentially could be reduced. Chapter 4 describes a 
longer-run experiment conducted on the web, lasting several weeks. Subjects traded 
assets linked to team victories in the NBA Playoffs and to FIFA World Cup soccer goal 
scoring. There is noticeable partition-dependence but its magnitude is smaller than in 
the first lab study. The longer-run study is supplemented by analyzing additional second 
order competence effects in subjective probability judgments provided by the partici-
pants. Chapter 5 describes data from naturally-occurring markets for numerical values 
of important statistics that macroeconomists follow, called an “economic derivatives 
market”, created by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank. A structural model of these 
data, which assumes that observed prices mix a 1/N ignorance prior belief with other 
information, allows to back out a de-biased distribution that predicts more accurately 
actual outcomes than observed prices and suggests some degree of partition-
dependence. Chapter 6 summarizes the results and provides a brief outlook for future 
research.  
All three analyses have strengths and weaknesses that are partly compensated for 
by the other studies (i.e., they are scientific complements). The lab experiments are the 
easiest to run and replicate, and they provide an initial estimate of whether partition-
dependence exists and persists in the short-run and how partition-dependence is influ-
enced by the competence of traders that comprise these markets. However, lab experi-
ments make no statement on whether the effects would persist in the longer run. The 
field experiments on the NBA Playoffs and soccer World Cup involve a longer span of 
trading and self-selection of traders who know a lot about the event domains and follow 
them closely (if not fanatically). The field data on economic derivatives do not compare 
different partitions for the same variable, as this is possible in the controlled lab envi-
ronment, but they involve higher implicit stakes and attract more sophisticated (and 
highly-paid) participants than can ordinarily be used in the lab.  
All three studies show evidence of partition-dependence. They provide an exam-
ple in which a simple observation first discovered in straightforward psychology ex-
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periments is robust to market learning opportunities, and varies in the span of trading 
and the sophistication of traders. These results do not imply that partition-dependence 
can never be eliminated under any conditions. The results simply establish that some 
conditions that might eliminate partition-dependence do not appear to do so, although in 
some cases (e.g., the first lab study) evidence of partition-dependence also seems to 
decrease over time. 
2  Fundamental concepts and literature review 13 
2 Fundamental concepts and literature review 
2.1 Prediction markets 
2.1.1 Basic principles 
2.1.1.1 Definition 
“Prediction markets”11 are incentive-based markets which are in principal de-
signed to gather and aggregate information on specific uncertain future events, which is 
then used to obtain predictions on these events from resulting market outcomes (Berg 
and Rietz (2003)).12 Many of the market microstructure characteristics in prediction 
markets are similar to those in common financial asset markets. Unlike financial asset 
markets, though, prediction markets offer a kind of virtual stocks13 whose terminal pay-
off depends on the realization of an uncertain future event, such as the outcomes of po-
litical elections, corporate sales figures, or sports events (Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)). 
The number of traders who participate in these markets varies from only a few traders to 
hundreds and thousands of participants in some field prediction markets. Recent studies 
suggest that it is possible to obtain excellent forecasts of future “states of the world” 
from trading activity in prediction markets and resulting market prices.14 Remarkably, 
these predictions are found to be even more accurate than those derived from opinion 
polls or expert judgments what is mainly attributed to the fact that prediction market 
traders back their expectations and opinions by their own money, or to put it differently, 
traders have to put their money where their mouths are. With respect to Eugene Fama’s 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH; Fama (1970), see also, e.g., Fama (1991)), a predic-
tion market is truly efficient, if the market price is the best predictor of an event’s out-
come. This, in turn, implies that no combination of available polls, surveys, expert opin-
ions or other information can be used to improve on the market-generated forecasts.  
                                                 
11  Henceforth, the terms “information markets”, “decision markets”, and “event futures” are used as 
synonyms. The terms “electronic markets” and “virtual markets” are also sometimes used to refer to pre-
diction markets. 
12  While this definition captures the core aspects of prediction markets, it is worth mentioning that no 
commonly accepted definition has been established so far (see Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007)). 
13  The terms “assets”, “contracts”, and “claims” are also commonly used in place of “virtual stocks”. 
14  The forecast accuracy of prediction markets will be further discussed in subsection 2.1.2. 
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It is generally assumed that the market mechanism of competitive asset mar-
kets15 (including prediction markets) is able to efficiently aggregate and disseminate 
information that is widely dispersed among traders who comprise these markets. Ac-
cording to this suggestion, the full range of individual information is reflected in market 
outcomes, particularly in the prices of assets.16 Further, these markets provide (poten-
tial) traders with economic incentives for information production and for divulging their 
true beliefs. 
 
2.1.1.2 Applications 
Some of the first significant prediction markets were the Iowa Electronic Mar-
kets (IEM) run by the University of Iowa in 1988. These markets aimed to predict the 
outcome of U.S. presidential elections (Forsythe et al. (1992)). The IEM markets were 
small-scale, real-money event futures markets, open 24 hours a day, using a continuous, 
double-auction trading mechanism (CDA).17 Since then, they have been used to predict 
presidential electoral results in the U.S., but have also extended the variety of their mar-
kets to other elections.18 This development has also attracted other researchers to set up 
political stock markets in different countries and to analyze market behavior and fore-
casts.19 Besides, commercial providers of prediction markets like Tradesports, Betfair or 
Intrade have developed. These platforms offer a great diversity of markets and assets 
that particularly refer to “underlyings“ in the domains of politics, financials, climate and 
weather, and sports.20 These markets can be considered as financial and sports betting 
markets. Some providers of prediction markets use a virtual currency instead of real 
money, among them Newsfutures, Foresight Exchange or the Hollywood Stock Ex-
change (HSX).21 Whereas Newsfutures and Foresight concentrate on political, financial, 
                                                 
15  A market is called “competitive” if it consists of many buyers and many sellers, each of whom indi-
vidually does not exert much influence on the market price, see Camerer (1992). 
16  Other market outcomes are, e.g., trading volumes or bid/ask quotes. 
17  Traders invest their own funds in the IEM markets; however, the maximum investable amount is 
typically limited to $500 per trader. Effectively, stakes generally average to less than $50. 
18  See Berg, Forsythe, and Rietz (1996), Berg, Forsythe, and Rietz (1997), Forsythe et al. (1992), 
Forsythe et al. (1994), and Forsythe, Rietz, and Ross (1999). 
19  Experience gathered from political stock markets in other countries is reported for Germany 
(Beckmann and Werding (1996), and Kuon (1991)), Canada (Antweiler and Ross (1998), Forsythe et al. 
(1995), and Forsythe et al. (1998)), Austria (Murauer (1997), and Ortner, Stepan, and Zechner (1995)), 
and Sweden (Bohm and Sonnegard (1999)). 
20  URLs: http://www.tradesports.com, http://www.betfair.com or http://www.intrade.com. 
21  URLs: http://us.newsfutures.com/home/home.html, http://www.ideosphere.com, 
http://www.hsx.com. 
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current events, and sports markets, the HSX offers contracts on the success of movies, 
movie stars and awards (like opening weekend performances, total box office returns 
and who will win Oscars). Another appealing application were the “economic deriva-
tives” markets, set up in 2002 by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank which allow insti-
tutional traders like banks, pension funds, etc. to take direct positions on the outcome of 
influential macroeconomic indicator releases such as non-farm payrolls, ISM manufac-
turing index, U.S. initial jobless claims and retail sales. Furthermore, there have been 
corporate applications of prediction markets like employees trading on internal trading 
platforms to predict future printer sales at Hewlett Packard (Chen and Plott (2002)) or 
adherence to delivery dates at Siemens Austria (Ortner (1997), and Ortner (1998)). 
Forecasts from these internal prediction markets turned out to be more accurate than 
target figures derived from the managerial planning process. Berg, Neumann, and Rietz 
(2008) successfully used prediction markets to forecast the post-IPO market capitaliza-
tion in Google‘s auction-based initial public offering. In marketing research, prediction 
markets have been used in the form of preference markets to elicit consumer prefer-
ences for new products and product features (Dahan, Soukhoroukova, and Spann 
(2007), and Dahan et al. (2007)).22  
 
2.1.1.3 Types of contracts 
An important feature credited to prediction markets is their presumed ability to 
yield insights into the “market’s” expectations about probabilities, means and medians 
for certain events, and also uncertainty about these parameters. Basically, three different 
types of assets are used in prediction markets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)). First, 
consider so-called “winner-take-all” contracts23 that offer the prospect of receiving a 
predefined payoff, say $1, if and only if (iff) the associated (or “underlying”) event oc-
curs, and nothing otherwise. For example, one can think of a “winner-take-all” contract 
referring to the event that “candidate X wins the next presidential election” or that “the 
Dow Jones year-end closing price falls within the interval [6,200; 6,400]”. Under rea-
sonable assumptions, the price of a winner-take-all contract can be interpreted as mar-
                                                 
22  Preference markets, however, do not predict actual outcomes, nor are they based on external informa-
tion. Rather, they aim to elicit expectations of others’ preferences, using individual self preferences and 
insights about others (Dahan, Soukhoroukova, and Spann (2007)). 
23  This type of contracts is also named “all-or-nothing” contracts. They are in fact binary options, i.e., 
options with a discontinuous payoff (see Hull (2009, p. 561)). 
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ket-derived probability p(y) that an event y will occur.24 Second, there are so-called “in-
dex” contracts, whose payoffs are proportionally linked to the outcome of a specific 
target value. For instance, there could be a contract paying $0.01 for each percentage 
point of votes reached by a party Z in the next elections for the German “Bundestag”. 
Prices of index contracts reflect a market-derived expected value E[y] of outcome y.  
 
Table 2.1:  Contract types: Estimating uncertain quantities or probabilities (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
(2004, p. 110, Table 1)). 
 
 
Third, there are so-called “spread” betting contracts whose price is fixed at, say 
$1, and whose predefined payoff is, for instance, $2, if a particular event occurs and 
nothing otherwise.25 The concrete definition of the associated event, however, is subject 
to the market participants’ beliefs about this event and usually refers to a certain spread, 
like whether, in the next election, a party will receive a vote share that exceeds a certain 
value by y’ percent, or like whether a team will win a soccer game by more than y’ 
goals. Accordingly, the size of the spread is subject to variations. In an even-money bet 
like the one described above, the spread reveals the market’s expectation about the me-
dian outcome, since, assuming risk neutrality, this contract is only a fair gamble if the 
expected probability of occurrence is one half (i.e., the median). Note that spread bet-
ting contracts can also be used to elicit any other percentile of a distribution: if, for ex-
                                                 
24  In subsection 2.1.4.3, this issue will be discussed in further detail. Note that the notation in this sub-
section is adopted from Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004). 
25  This example represents an even-money bet, in which the owner either doubles (payoff $2) or loses 
(payoff $0) her initial stake ($1), depending on which state of the world finally occurs. 
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ample, a contract that costs $2, pays $3 if the spread is exceeded and $0 otherwise, it 
discloses the market’s perception of which spread is representative for the 2/3 percentile 
of the distribution. Table 2.1 summarizes the most commonly used contract types in 
today’s prediction markets, and what kind of market expectation they reveal. 
Additionally, winner-take-all contracts are suited to evaluate the uncertainty 
about the market-implied expectations. By partitioning the state space of an underlying 
event into a multiplicity of individual winner-take-all contracts, each of which repre-
senting a tiny interval of the whole state space, one can obtain almost the entire prob-
ability distribution of the market’s expectations. Moreover, offering non-linear index 
contracts, e.g. two contracts paying “y” and “y2”, respectively, would produce informa-
tion on E[y] and E[y2], which, in turn, can be used to calculate the standard deviation or 
standard error of E[y]. 
 
2.1.1.4 Selected market design issues 
In their survey article, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) also discuss results on some 
market design issues. These include the matching mechanism of buyers and sellers, and 
the use of real-money or virtual-money incentives. 
Matching. In principle, one can distinguish between two major matching mecha-
nisms. First, a continuous double auction (CDA) is characterized by the fact that bidders 
place bid quotes stating their maximum willingness to pay for a given asset, and sellers 
place ask quotes stating their minimum willingness to accept (i.e., their limit prices). A 
(bilateral) trade between a buyer and a seller occurs whenever a bid quote is at least as 
high as an existing ask quote, or an ask quote is at least as low as a standing bid quote. 
Usually, matching of quotes follows a strict price and time priority. In an oral continu-
ous double auction all bidding behavior is publicly observable and can be attributed to 
individual traders. Contrariwise, in most computerized environments, a trader’s identity 
remains undisclosed and the order book information is limited to the best bid/ask quote 
and the current market price of each asset. Second, in a parimutuel market algorithm, 
which is commonly used in horse-race betting, “bettors” wager a certain amount to one 
of the available alternatives. All bets are then collected in a pot and finally (after sub-
tracting potential overhead, commission, or fees) divided among the “winners” (propor-
tionally according to their stakes). Thus, the final payoff (per dollar wagered) is not 
fixed until the true state of the world is finally known and depends on the amount in-
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vested by all other bettors. However, in most cases indicative payoffs are published 
while the market is open; these indicative payoffs reflect the potential outcome, if no 
further bets were placed.  
Incentives. Since the basic idea of prediction markets is that traders put “their 
own money where their mouths” are, thereby adding weight to their opinions, it seems 
obvious to use real-money, performance-linked financial incentives to compensate trad-
ers. In that case, traders invest their own money with the prospect of earning substantial 
profits, and the risk of suffering real losses. It seems reasonable to assume that the use 
of real-money stakes constitutes a strong motivation for the participants to think thor-
oughly on their decisions and, as the case may be, gather new information, while par-
ticipants in virtual-money prediction markets may be tempted to pursue risk-enhancing 
strategies or simply may not be serious enough in their trading actions. However, many 
attempts have been made so far to use artificial incentives like play-money, non-cash 
prizes or just a ranking of traders. With play-money one can possibly circumvent prob-
lems that may arise in the context of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), 
namely participants’ individual perception of reference points and a different perception 
of gains and losses. This circumstance may induce or enforce behavioral biases like 
overweighing of small probabilities or risk seeking in situations where participants face 
potential losses, etc. Whereas these biases, in many cases, may consistently describe 
how people behave in natural-occurring situations, they may negatively affect market 
outcomes in terms of prediction accuracy.26 These behavioral biases may potentially be 
alleviated in a setting in which the participants trade with virtual-money. Up to now, 
empirical evidence on real- vs. play-money is mixed: In a study of the 2003 NFL foot-
ball season, Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) find that play-money markets were just as 
accurate as real-money markets. Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) compare the forecast 
accuracy from NewsFuture (play-money) markets to that from TradeSports (real-
money) markets and find that for popular sports events both markets predict similarly 
well. In other domains, though, like financials (DJIA forecasts) or the occurrence of 
specific political events, real-money markets turn out to perform significantly better. 
Eventually, it seems that there is still a lack of trustworthy data to understand the extent 
                                                 
26  For a discussion of how individual biases may affect market outcomes in prediction markets, see 
section 2.3.3. For a discussion of the predictive accuracy of prediction markets, see the next subsection 
(2.1.2). 
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to which (real) money makes predictions more accurate. The question of forecast accu-
racy in prediction markets is addressed in the following subsection. 
 
2.1.2 Forecast accuracy 
Much of the academic interest in prediction markets is attracted by the fact that 
predictive efficiency and accuracy of these markets seem to be very high according to a 
significant number of studies so far. Berg et al. (2008) summarize the results from a 
total of 49 markets of their political IEMs, covering 41 elections in 13 countries. With 
respect to the absolute market accuracy they find no obvious biases in the market fore-
casts of index contracts (“vote shares”) and, on average, considerable accuracy. With 
regard to the relative accuracy they find that market predictions are at least as accurate 
and stable as large-scale poll results in the majority of cases,27 a few times worse, but 
often better, albeit only slightly. In terms of the mean absolute difference (MAD) be-
tween index contract prices and actual vote shares in the week prior to the elections, 
market-derived forecasts erred by around 1.5 percentage points, while poll data (like the 
final Gallup poll) were wrong by around 1.9 percentage points. Note that polls and pre-
diction markets use fundamentally different mechanisms to accomplish their forecasts. 
Polls ask the question: “For which party/candidate would you vote, if election were be-
ing held today?” to a representative subsample of citizens eligible to vote. Afterwards, 
these results are sometimes adjusted using statistical methods to correct for potentially 
biased answers (e.g., strategic response behavior, demand effects, etc.; see Morgan and 
Stocken (2008)). In contrast, prediction markets implicitly answer the question: “Who 
will everyone vote for on election day?”, and traders do self-select to trade on this ques-
tion, and may do so regardless of their age, eligibility to vote, or other demographic 
characteristics. Forsythe et al. (1992) analyze the relationship between prediction mar-
kets and polls and conclude that polls are obvious information channels for market trad-
ers, but market prices do not follow poll results; hence, the availability of poll data in-
fluences market prices only marginally, if at all. Wolfers and Leigh (2002) show that 
prediction markets can even predict well in local elections where no polls are conducted 
(or where the results remain unpublished).  
                                                 
27  With regard to the relative accuracy, they restrict the sample to a subset of national elections, in 
which poll data was available. 
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Hollywood Stock Exchange contracts have been successful in predicting open-
ing weekend box office returns. Furthermore, its predictions were about as precise as 
expert panels in foreseeing Oscar winners (Pennock, Nielsen, and Giles (2001)). A 
comparison of mean economic derivatives predictions and “consensus estimates” based 
on professional analysts’ forecasts shows that both are on a par with respect to their 
forecast performance, either measured as the correlation with actual outcomes, or in 
terms of average absolute forecast errors (Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2006)). Besides the 
large number of promising results in terms of market efficiency and accuracy, Wolfers 
and Zitzewitz (2008) also report some evidence for prediction markets remaining sus-
ceptible to behavioral anomalies like bubbles, the existence of irrational equilibriums 
and excess volatility which may affect forecast accuracy adversely. 
Overall, as Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) conclude, prediction markets that tend 
to produce efficient forecasts of unknown future events, are to a great extent driven by 
the fact that they provide (i) incentives for a truthful revelation of private information, 
(ii) incentives for producing and collecting information, and (iii) by the fact that they 
offer a functioning algorithm to aggregate different opinions in market prices.  
 
2.1.3 Arbitrage strategies 
Much research in the field of prediction markets so far has also focused on ex-
ploiting possible arbitrage strategies. In this respect, a number of different arbitrage 
strategies have been analyzed (Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)). One of these strategies 
refers to cross market or cross asset arbitrage, i.e., exploiting price differences across 
two different markets or related assets at a given point in time. Arbitrage is possible, if 
the ask price (posted offer to sell an asset) in one market is lower than the bid price 
(posted offer to buy an asset) for the same asset in another market. Another strategy 
strives to make use of predictable price patterns in prediction market prices, if they ex-
ist. However, it seems as if prediction market prices do not systematically follow a spe-
cific price path, what makes it a hard task to derive profitable trading strategies based on 
past price movements. A third strategy aims to take advantage of potential deviations 
from rationality. In fact, those deviations have been observed in prediction markets. A 
prominent example is the “favorite-longshot bias” in horse racetrack betting and other 
sports betting prediction markets. It is reflected in the fact that assumed underdogs 
(longshots) are likely to be overpriced compared to their actual chance of winning (ob-
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jective probability), and assumed favorites, by contrast, are likely to be underbet. This 
phenomenon is well-documented in horse racetrack betting (Thaler and Ziemba (1988)). 
Empirical evidence finds this bias to become more pronounced, as objective probabili-
ties decrease, so that it is particularly evident in prediction securities that are linked to 
small-probability events. Thus, the favorite-longshot bias is consistent with the behav-
ioral finding that people tend to overestimate very small probabilities, and to underrate 
probabilities close to certainty. This can lead to negative abnormal returns from betting 
on longshots, which is partially offset by returns from betting on favorites, though still 
negative. In general, it cannot be ruled out that prediction markets on small probability 
events suffer from cognitive biases. However, it remains unclear to which extent, if at 
all, these deviations could be exploited by profitable arbitrage strategies.  
 
2.1.4 Theoretical background 
2.1.4.1 Hayek hypothesis 
This subsection deals with the fundamental question of why markets, and in par-
ticular prediction markets, should be able to produce efficient outcomes and accurate 
predictions of future states of the world.  
A particular characteristic of financial markets is the information value of bids, 
offers, and market prices. Hayek (1945) was one of the first to introduce a view of 
prices inherently being transmitters of information, besides its role of just being an ac-
counting unit. This characteristic is essential for the ability of markets to aggregate 
widely dispersed information. Pursuing profit motives is what leads individual agents to 
reveal their information. According to this idea, prices for scarce resources reflect all 
relevant information that is necessary to act upon economic principles. Prices do not 
reflect a good’s attributes per se, but signalize its relative valuation among all other 
goods in an economy. Thus, the pricing system is a means of communication that is 
used to aggregate and pass on decentralized knowledge. Competitive markets in con-
junction with a frictionless price system are assumed to be best suited for (i) efficiently 
aggregating the knowledge dispersed throughout the economy, (ii) for economizing 
resources, and (iii) for ideally reacting to changes. 
Hayek (1946) emphasizes that a “competitive rational expectations equilibrium” 
is not a given fact, but rather the outcome of a dynamic competitive process. Based on 
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these considerations, Smith (1982a, p. 167) shaped the expression “Hayek hypothesis” 
by characterizing it as follows: “Strict privacy together with the trading rules of a mar-
ket institution are sufficient to produce competitive market outcomes at or near 100% 
efficiency.” Beckmann and Werding (1994) identify three main propositions of the 
Hayek hypothesis: The first proposition claims static Pareto efficiency, i.e., competitive 
markets result in allocations that leave no room for further gains from trade, and prices 
that reflect all available information. This proposition underscores the static efficiency 
of competitive market equilibriums and can be found in most textbook versions. The 
second proposition focuses on the coordination function of competitive markets. The 
coordination function guides the actions of individual agents in a way such that they 
make their decisions as if they possessed the full set of information available to the 
economy, while, in fact, each individual is only endowed with a diminutive fraction of 
this set of information. In rational expectations theory (e.g., Grossman (1981)) the pos-
sibility of knowledge transfer between two or more individuals is explicitly considered, 
which was not yet the case in classical models of the Walrasian auctioneer. Information 
exchange via the market mechanism starts with an agent’s individual belief about the 
future state of the world. These expectations are then reflected in market outcomes for 
goods or assets like bid and ask quotes submitted by this individual. These market out-
comes, in turn, send signals to all other market participants and stimulate them to recon-
sider and, if necessary, adjust their own beliefs. Adjusted expectations, again, are incor-
porated in market variables by (modified) bid/ask quotes and trades that, at the same 
time, produce new signals to all other traders. This cycle of implied interaction contin-
ues until equilibrium is reached, i.e., until no one feels any more prompted to adjust her 
expectations or to participate in any further trades. With the second proposition it be-
comes clear that the pricing system contributes to information revelation on the one 
hand, but at the same time facilitates information aggregation as well. The third propo-
sition deals with competition as a discovery process, i.e., the prospect of receiving fi-
nancial incentives serves as a strong motivation for individuals to gather and acquire 
new information and, by this means, to contribute to an efficient market outcome. In 
this context, price signals offer an informative basis for the direction of where to look 
for new information. The second, but even more the third proposition, hence, include a 
dynamic view in achieving a state of equilibrium.28 
                                                 
28  For a more detailed discussion of the three propositions of the Hayek hypothesis and, in particular, 
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2.1.4.2 Information paradox and the “no-trade theorem” 
In their discussion of the Hayek hypothesis, Beckmann and Werding (1994) 
highlight the discrepancy of the static and the dynamic part of Hayek’s hypothesis. Be-
sides, they particularly stress the conflict between prices always reflecting all available 
information, and prices that motivate people to seek for new information at the same 
time. This controversy results in a public goods dilemma in which people are free-riding 
on each other’s information-gathering activities. This dilemma goes back to Grossman 
(1976), and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who introduce (and resolve) their well-known 
information paradox. The paradox refers to Eugene Fama’s efficient market hypothesis 
whose core message is that a “market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available 
information is called ‘efficient.’” (Fama (1970, p. 383)). By contrast, Grossman (1976), 
and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that markets are unable to be efficient, if prices 
are always expected to fully reflect available information. In a situation of competitive 
market equilibrium, everyone feels comfortable with his or her current holdings and 
nobody intends to participate in any further trade. Now, if market prices reacted instan-
taneously and completely to the arrival of new information, there would be no incen-
tives at all for market participants to seek for new information, because they could not 
expect to earn any excess returns from doing so. Rather, every investor could expect to 
yield a return that equals the average return of the market, regardless of whether or how 
hard they tried to discover new information. This holds particularly true if information 
seeking is not costless, as the marginal benefit from information search would even be 
negative. Consequently, no one is any longer willing to accumulate new information. 
But then, in turn, there is no way of how the pricing mechanism could incorporate news 
in prices—which finally means that markets cannot be efficient if information is costly. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) resolve their paradox by introducing increased “noise” 
which reduces the information content of the price system, but attracts people to become 
informed, since noisy prices offer potential profits from gathering information. In equi-
librium the marginal gains from exploiting noise are exactly offset by the marginal costs 
of information, so that the informativeness of the pricing system, at the end, is unaf-
fected by noise traders.29  
                                                                                                                                               
their mutual compatibility, see Beckmann and Werding (1994, pp. 7-13). 
29  Another solution was introduced by Kyle (1989) who relaxes the assumption of perfect competition 
and assumes that each trader takes into account the effect that his or her demand would have on the equi-
librium price. 
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A closely related question is whether information is diverse enough to offer pos-
sible trading opportunities, since the motivation of agents to trade is an essential prereq-
uisite of prediction markets to work well. Abstracting away from motivations such like 
the pure thrill and excitement of trading and/or gambling per se, there must be some 
“disagreement” in traders’ beliefs or preferences that motivate two agents to trade 
“against” one another. This discrepancy may be enforced if traders are overconfident 
about the quality of their information or their ability to process outcome-related infor-
mation, or simply if they have priors that substantially differ. It is worth mentioning 
that, while trading activity in prediction markets may be inspired by traders’ heteroge-
neous prior beliefs, those who set up the markets are typically interested in extracting 
the information that these traders possess.30 In this context, it seems important to distin-
guish between individuals’ non-common prior beliefs (initial opinions) and different 
information about the event’s realization (outcome). Prior beliefs are subjective and 
thus assumed to be uncorrelated with the outcome. Information, in turn, has an objective 
nature and is correlated with the outcome. Both components have some influence on 
traders’ heterogeneous beliefs (Ottaviani and Sørensen (2007)). According to Sunder 
(1995, p. 445), it is an important premise for market prices being able to fulfill an in-
formational role that information is asymmetrically distributed among individuals. As 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) point out, the problem of “[H]ow to attract uninformed 
traders?” is one important question among others about prediction markets which is not 
finally answered yet, but plays an important role in determining whether current opti-
mism about prediction markets is justified. The need for “uninformed” traders (noise or 
liquidity traders) seems odd at first glance, but well functioning prediction markets de-
pend to some extent on the existence of uninformed order flow. Otherwise, with only 
rational traders in the market (i.e., traders with rational expectations), trading activity 
could collapse according to the “no-trade theorem” (Milgrom and Stokey (1982)): In 
their general model of voluntary trade, they focus on analyzing price adjustments as a 
reaction to the arrival of new information. Given that the initial allocation of assets was 
ex ante Pareto-optimal among traders,31 and given that all traders had common priors, 
then all traders’ posterior beliefs would become the same after the market opened, and 
                                                 
30  As Aumann (1976, p. 1238) notes, “reconciling subjective probabilities makes sense if it is a question 
of implicitly exchanging information, but not if we are talking about ‘innate’ differences in priors.” 
31  This situation may have been achieved, for example, by a preceding trading round on complete, com-
petitive markets. 
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no active trading would occur in equilibrium. In particular, obtaining any piece of new 
private information cannot generate any motivation to trade. The general idea behind 
their theorem is as follows: if there is common knowledge about the structure of a mar-
ket (including the way how traders obtain information), then any bid or offer immedi-
ately reveals a bidder’s private information and will be incorporated into market prices 
even before anyone accepts the initial bid or offer. This, in turn, means that even though 
a trader may possess private information, she is not able to exploit it profitably, unless 
there are some noise traders in the market. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) propose a sim-
ple modification of the familiar Kyle (1985) model,32 in which they explain trading ac-
tivity by the attendance of uninformed outsiders. Demand of outsiders is either driven 
by hedging or entertainment motives, or by the existence of manipulators who try to 
influence market prices.  
 
2.1.4.3 Interpretation of prices as market-derived probabilities 
The issue whether and under which conditions market prices from a winner-
take-all prediction market can be interpreted as market-derived probability for the oc-
currence of an event deserves somewhat more attention. In Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
(2004, p. 109), the authors argue that winner-take-all contracts are in fact state-
contingent claims, whose prices represent a market-derived estimate of a certain event’s 
probability assuming risk neutral market participants. They further argue that risk neu-
trality, in most cases, is a reasonable assumption given the small amounts of money 
usually wagered in these markets. Admittedly though, if agents exhibit some sort of 
risk-aversion or risk-proneness, probabilities and state prices can differ. Manski (2006) 
challenges the (lack of) theoretical foundation behind the approach of interpreting pre-
diction market prices as “market probabilities”; in particular, he doubts market prices to 
coincide with traders’ mean belief. Based on a simple model, assuming that traders are 
risk-neutral price takers who have heterogeneous beliefs and limited trading budgets, 
he shows that prediction markets are not able to fully aggregate information. According 
to this malfunction, he casts doubt on the common practice of extracting probabilities 
                                                 
32  The Kyle (1985) model is characterized by the existence of three different types of traders: a single 
risk neutral insider, random noise traders, and competitive risk neutral market makers. The insider earns 
positive profits by exploiting her monopoly power optimally in a dynamic context, where noise trading 
provides a veil which hides her trading from market makers. 
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from prediction market prices. In a response to earlier versions of Manski’s paper, 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) present a formal analysis in which they derive sufficient 
conditions under which winner-take-all contract prices are consistent with traders’ 
“mean beliefs”. The authors identify the degree of risk aversion and the distribution of 
beliefs to be the key factors driving trading activity in prediction markets. Their basic 
model rests upon the following assumptions: heterogeneity in traders’ beliefs,33 beliefs 
being independent from individual wealth levels, traders who are price-takers and who 
try to maximize their subjective expected utility (SEU), and the absence of any hedging 
motives. Under a log utility function, they endogenously model each trader’s individual 
demand for assets. Under this framework, it can directly be derived that equilibrium 
market prices (i.e., when demand equals supply) do, in fact, equal the mean of beliefs 
among traders. Let y be a trader’s initial wealth, and define qj a trader j’s belief that an 
event will occur.34 Then, with log utility, each trader optimizes his or her demand, x, for 
a winner-take-all contract (paying $1 if the event occurs and nothing otherwise) that 
trades at a given price P:  
 
( ) ( )PxyLogqPxyLogqSEU jjjjjx ⋅−⋅−+−⋅+⋅= )1()1(max  (2.1)
 
That is, with subjective probability qj, initial wealth y is increased by xj times the 
difference between the payoff of $1 and the price that was paid for each contract (= 
profit), and with complementary probability (1 – qj), initial wealth is reduced by xj times 
the price paid (= loss). Differentiating subjective expected utility with respect to the 
demand for contracts, x, yields:35 
 
                                                 
33  See subsection 2.1.4.2. Possible sources of belief heterogeneity are uncommon priors among traders 
(possibly due to the fact that the event under consideration could not be observed frequently enough in the 
past), information asymmetries (however, no-trade theorems—like those derived by Milgrom and Stokey 
(1982)—would doubt that any trade occurred under the latter condition), or behavioral biases like anchor-
ing and insufficient updating of beliefs (see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007)). 
34  Note that the notation corresponds to that used by Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007). 
35  Equation (2.2) has some quite intuitive implications. As Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) point out, 
demand is positive (negative) when a trader thinks the event is more (less) likely than indicated by the 
current price (q > P, q < P, respectively), and demand is zero, when the price equals belief. In addition, 
demand is decreasing in risk: for prices around 0.5 (indicating greatest possible uncertainty about whether 
the event occurs or not) the denominator is reaching its maximum of 0.25, thus demand is getting smaller 
for any given expected return. 
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Equilibrium requires supply to equal demand, thus:36 
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Recall that—in the simple baseline model—beliefs (q) are assumed to be uncor-
related with individual wealth levels (y), hence (2.3) implies: 
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Thus, aggregate demand and supply is simultaneously satisfied, if and only if the 
price of the prediction market contract equals the average of all traders’ beliefs, i.e. 
their subjective probability assessments. 
Relaxing the assumption of beliefs being independent from individual wealth 
levels yields the intuitively appealing result that prediction market prices are a wealth-
weighted average of beliefs among market participants. Based on equation (2.2), and 
with traders that obey a distribution F(q, y), where E[q, y] ≠ 0, it follows: 
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As can be seen from equation (2.7), in this situation the equilibrium market price 
reflects the mean of traders’ beliefs, weighted by each trader’s individual wealth in rela-
                                                 
36  G(y) and F(q) are to denote the distributions of wealth levels and beliefs, respectively. 
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tion to the overall wealth that exists in that market. As Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) 
note, the wealth-weighted average of beliefs may even be a better predictor of probabil-
ity in recurrent or long-run prediction markets, if it is assumed that wealth is accumu-
lated over time by those traders who had accurate beliefs in the past. One of the implica-
tions of assuming a log utility function is demand being linear in beliefs, i.e. for market 
participants with a given wealth level, demand rises linearly with their beliefs (cf. equa-
tion (2.2)). This implication is central, but not necessary, for the congruence of market 
prices and the (weighted) mean of beliefs. In a special case, equilibrium prices corre-
spond to mean beliefs, too, if distributions of beliefs and thus demand functions are 
symmetric. According to Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007, pp. 6-7), this symmetry condi-
tion does not appear to be implausible for beliefs being distributed around 5.0
__
=q , “as 
long as traders are not affected by framing issues.” 
For other cases, in which demand is not linear in beliefs, Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
(2007) demonstrate that prediction market prices are nonetheless reasonably close to the 
mean of market participants’ beliefs in a great multitude of different models. That is, for 
most plausible parameter variations of their model, they confirm that all-or-nothing con-
tracts reflect “the central tendency of the distribution of beliefs of traders” very well. All 
of their model variations result in a monotonic transformation of prediction market 
prices to the mean of traders’ beliefs. Most importantly, they criticize Manski’s repre-
sentation to be just a special case of their model in a sense that it focuses on some mis-
leading assumptions: due to the risk neutrality assumption in Manski’s line of argumen-
tation, traders always invest (divest) their complete funds (assets), if individual beliefs 
are greater (smaller) than the current market price. Hence, demand does not evolve 
endogenously. As a result, the equilibrium market price turns out to reflect a particular 
quantile of the budget-weighted distribution of traders’ beliefs rather than the market’s 
“mean belief”. To conclude, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) do not deny that prices may 
be biased in some cases and under some conditions, but provide some convincing evi-
dence for the fact that they typically do produce valuable estimates of average beliefs 
about an event’s probability of occurrence, by this means suggesting that winner-take-
all prediction markets, after all, are in fact able to aggregate information accurately.  
Gjerstad (2005) also contributes to this discussion and confirms that—for coeffi-
cients of relative risk aversion in close proximity to those obtained from empirical evi-
dence and for plausible distributions of beliefs—equilibrium prices turn out to be pretty 
close to traders’ mean beliefs. In his analyses, he considers a two-asset (i.e., two possi-
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ble states of the world) all-or-nothing prediction market where arbitrage conditions are 
assumed to hold.37 In a risk neutral case, where beliefs are symmetrically distributed 
around its mean, he finds equilibrium prices to be biased toward the price of one half, 
i.e. the equilibrium price levels off between the true mean of traders’ beliefs and an ig-
norance prior of 0.5. When market participants express constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) in their expected utility functions, the aforementioned bias shrinks as the coef-
ficient of relative risk aversion increases (i.e., as people become more risk-averse). In-
terestingly, there is no bias when the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals one, and 
the bias is reversed for coefficients of relative risk aversion above one. Within a range 
of typical estimates for this coefficient (0.5 to 1.5), Gjerstad (2005) demonstrates nu-
merically that market predictions are close to the mean of the distribution of traders’ 
beliefs. However, his finding may contribute in explaining the favorite-longshot bias, 
where underdogs (having a probability of winning below 0.5) are overbet, and favorites 
(having a probability of winning above 0.5) are underpriced.  
Ottaviani and Sørensen (2007) present a theoretical approach to analyzing the 
aggregation of information and beliefs in prediction markets, which also contributes to 
the question of interpreting prediction market prices as probabilities. Assuming risk 
neutral traders,38 who are restricted to invest only part of their wealth in the market 
(which makes this situation different from that in Manski’s line of reasoning), they fo-
cus on the role of information incorporation into the market price. Their prediction mar-
ket design is a simple two-state setup with two Arrow-Debreu contingent claims. They 
demonstrate that the resulting equilibrium price is a generalized average of the partici-
pants’ posterior beliefs which, in turn, are a combination of their prior heterogeneous 
beliefs and the information that is disclosed through the trading process. Their main 
finding is that the market price underreacts to pre-trade information. If there is informa-
tion that appears to increase the probability of an event, the market price of the corre-
sponding asset will increase, but the price adjustment will be smaller compared to the 
rational benchmark of a Bayesian probability updating process, so that the effect of in-
formation is understated. This finding is driven by a certain wealth effect which arises 
due to the fact that traders with heterogeneous beliefs take speculative net positions. 
                                                 
37  In the given context, this in particular means that prices for the two assets sum to $1 (which equals 
the sure payoff that is received from a bundle consisting of both assets). 
38  Although assuming risk neutral traders in a first step, they show that their results extend to the case of 
risk-averse participants with decreasing absolute risk aversion (see section 5 of their paper). 
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Ottaviani and Sørensen’s result can be seen as a further account of the favorite-longshot 
bias, since information that “supports” the favorite is insufficiently incorporated in the 
market price, so that the contract turns out to be underpriced. Information, in turn, 
“against” the longshot is also inadequately incorporated in the market price, so that the 
contract still remains overbet. 
 
2.1.4.4 Individual judgment errors and market outcomes 
With respect to the main focus of the present work and the results of prediction 
markets to date in terms of forecast accuracy and efficiency the questions arise of (i) 
how individual errors in information processing may affect market outcomes and thus 
produce false equilibriums, and (ii) whether markets are able to result in efficient equi-
libriums in spite of traders who are subject to individual biases, thus eliminating indi-
vidual errors, and if so, under which conditions this may happen. 
With reference to the first question, anomalies in markets like bubbles or false 
equilibriums are often preceded by individual errors in information processing. This, in 
turn, is closely related with traders’ formation of beliefs and expectations in a world of 
uncertainty. A problem with the formation of expectations may arise if traders, for 
whatever reason, do not rely on their own beliefs and expectations, but rather trust in 
what they expect others to expect, or to put it in the oft-quoted words of Keynes (1936, 
p. 156):  
 
“Or, to change the metaphor slightly, professional investment may 
be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to 
pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being 
awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the av-
erage preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor 
has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which 
he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom 
are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of 
choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, 
nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We 
have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to antici-
pating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there 
are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.” 
 
One possible explanation for situations in which traders may disregard their own 
beliefs and are geared to the beliefs of others, is that they have reason to assume the 
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market to possess better information on the future state of the world than they selves 
have. If this is, however, not the case (possibly due to institutional constraints like short 
selling restrictions that prevent the market prices to reveal the true state), this can result 
in bubbles or false equilibriums. Market variables then may become self-fulfilling. 
With respect to the second question, Duh and Sunder (1986), Camerer (1987), 
Camerer (1992), Ganguly, Kagel, and Moser (1994), Anderson and Sunder (1995), and 
Ganguly, Kagel, and Moser (2000), among others, asked whether individual judgment 
errors transfer to the outcomes of experimental market environments or whether and 
under which circumstances the effectiveness of market forces is able to correct these 
biases in equilibrium prices. In general, one may argue that agents in a market setting 
are more likely to avoid mistakes because they have the prospect of earning an incen-
tive-compatible compensation based on their decisions. In a market, experience can be 
expected to be high if traders self-select and if there are learning opportunities. Besides, 
one may argue that market institutions can produce rational market outcomes despite the 
fact that traders who build the market are individually biased. The following discussion 
aims to explain how aggregate rational behavior may arise from mostly irrational peo-
ple, but also what problems may result. For formal representation, assume the market 
outcomes to be whatever kind of average of biases in individual judgments and actions 
(with bi denoting a measure of bias for the ith individual), weighted by each trader’s 
market impact and/or activity wi, and thus resulting in an average market bias of Σbi ⋅ wi 
(cf. here and below Camerer (1987), and Camerer (1992, pp. 240-244); see also Fehr 
and Tyran (2005)).39 
Cancellation hypothesis. One of the arguments in favor of why markets could be 
a rational, undistorted combination of individual opinions is based upon the conjecture 
that unsystematic, random errors of irrational agents may cancel out, thus resulting in 
rational equilibrium market prices (the “cancellation hypothesis”). If individual judg-
ments are randomly distributed around the rational benchmark judgment, then the error 
terms bi should be independently distributed around zero and the expected value of in-
dividual errors will be zero [E(bi) = 0]. By consequence, the average market error will 
tend toward zero [Σbi ⋅ wi = 0], too, given that there are enough traders, each of whom is 
exerting not too much of impact on the market. The cancellation hypothesis, however, 
should not apply to most psychological biases, since these distortions, by definition, 
                                                 
39  In the following, the notation is adopted from Camerer (1992). 
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appear to be systematic in the sense that the deviations from a normative benchmark are 
parallel (i.e., the biases bi being positively correlated). For that reason, bias in the mar-
ket average may even cumulate and thus may even be more pronounced than in individ-
ual judgments.  
Learning hypothesis. Another argument is based on the conjecture that traders 
who are less rational may implicitly learn from rational agents by observing their ac-
tions, quotes and trade prices (the “learning hypothesis”). In formal notation, this would 
imply that bj → bi if bi = 0 and finally would result in Σbi ⋅ wi = 0. In some markets, 
traders can straightforwardly learn how to avoid mistakes by mimicking the actions of 
rational traders. In other markets, though, like markets for durable goods in which 
trades are very rare, learning is unlikely to occur. Alternatively, biased agents may buy 
advice from rational agents to avoid errors. Consequently, this may lead to reduced 
market-wide biases. However, learning may be a difficult task. It is often hard to reflect 
and learn from someone’s own experience, but it may be even harder to learn from oth-
ers. Additionally, biased traders must be aware of their error-proneness, must be able to 
identify the actions of their rational counterparts, if at all this behavior is observable. 
Finally, learning requires unbiased traders to be successful, since it seems unlikely that 
erring traders will imitate actions that turn out to be unsuccessful (even if they are cor-
rect with respect to a normative benchmark). With buying advice there is the problem of 
how much information is sufficient to make wise decisions. Moreover, buying advice 
suffers to some extent from quality uncertainty, since ex ante the value of information is 
hard to assess and in many cases, there is not enough history to evaluate the quality of 
advice.  
Evolutionary hypothesis. Furthermore, there is the possibility of biased traders 
being driven out of the market by insolvency that results from permanently trading 
against unbiased traders at unfavorable prices (the “evolutionary hypothesis”). By con-
sequence, only rational traders will “survive”, while biased agents go bankrupt over 
time, resulting in unbiased market outcomes in the long run; this means, if bi ≠ 0, then 
wi → 0 over time, and thus Σbi ⋅ wi = 0. However, it may take a very long time before 
poorly performing traders will be squeezed out of the market. Also, it may not hold un-
der all circumstances that rationality is the best reply to irrational behavior. If there are, 
for instance, many “noise traders” in the market, then “the market can stay irrational 
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longer than you can stay solvent.”40 Moreover, in an open economy it may happen that 
exterminated traders are replaced by market participants who are in almost the same 
manner susceptible to systematic judgment or choice distortions, thereby hindering fully 
rational traders to prevail.  
Smart few hypothesis. Finally, it may be argued that only a few unbiased traders 
is enough to result in rational market outcomes, as long as these traders have sufficient 
capital under disposal to exploit arbitrage opportunities41 (the “smart few hypothesis”). 
After all, unbiased traders must exert more influence on market prices and must be more 
active than biased traders to generate equilibrium prices that turn out to be less biased 
than average individual judgments. Or, to put it more formally, an activity-weighted 
market average will be less biased [Σbi ⋅ wi ≈ 0] than the average individual, if more 
active traders are less error-prone than less active market participants, thus σ2(bi) and wi 
being negatively correlated [ρ(σ2(bi), wi) < 0]. It is essential for this argument to hold 
that people who make fewer errors are (i) aware of their relative “unbiasedness”, are (ii) 
endowed with sufficient funds to exploit flawed prices by arbitrage, and are (iii) allowed 
to trade as much as they want.  
Forsythe et al. (1992), Forsythe, Rietz, and Ross (1999), and Oliven and Rietz 
(2004) deal with the issue of individually biased traders in the Iowa Electronic Markets 
and their potential impact on market dynamics. They find considerable judgment biases 
among traders (e.g., over-optimism and wishful thinking with respect to the preferred 
candidate) that affect trading behavior on average and lead to obviously flawed trades.42 
In accordance with the “smart few hypothesis” they argue, though, that this is not nec-
essarily irreconcilable to the very precise estimates generated by these markets, since 
those traders who usually set bid and ask quotes at the “surface” of the order book gen-
erally turn out to be less biased than the average trader. In the same line Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2004) argue that all market participants being rational is no necessary condi-
                                                 
40  This quote is attributed to John Maynard Keynes. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) take the same line in 
their prominent article titled “The limits of arbitrage”. 
41  These arbitrage opportunities refer to a “statistical arbitrage”, a strategy which aims to exploit a sta-
tistical mispricing of one or more assets based on the expected value of these assets (and which relies on 
the law of large numbers). 
42  In their political stock markets they identified two behavioral anomalies: the “assimilation-contrast 
effect” and the “false-consensus effect”. The assimilation-contrast effect “states that an individual’s pref-
erence for an outcome biases his or her interpretation of information about the likelihood of the outcome 
occurring”, the false-consensus effect “states that individuals tend to overestimate the extent to which 
their views are representative of the population” (Forsythe et al. (1992, p. 1154)). These psychological 
phenomena can result in a well-pronounced “wishful thinking bias” (Oliven and Rietz (2004, p. 339)). 
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tion for markets to be efficient, as long as marginal trades are driven by some rational 
agents. And it is these less biased traders who ensure that market prices, too, are rather 
unbiased. This idea also came into the literature as the “marginal trader” hypothesis 
(Forsythe et al. (1992), and Forsythe, Rietz, and Ross (1999)) and is explained in some 
more detail in the following. The “marginal trader” hypothesis states that even in the 
presence of some individually biased agents, it is the less error prone traders who 
mainly account for the best bid and ask quotes and therefore set market prices, which 
then turn out to be consistent with rational expectations predictions, or to put it differ-
ently, it is the marginal traders who drive market prices and thus predictions, not the 
average traders. Thus, the marginal traders can be thought of as a group of arbitrageurs 
who trade when market prices do not coincide with rational forecasts of future events. 
This definition implies that there are at least some agents who do not suffer from judg-
ment biases, who realize that they are bias-free while others err, and who are motivated 
by monetary incentives to exploit the mispricing in a competitive market environment. 
From a theoretically perspective, it seems unlikely that there is a single trader in such a 
market who has enough information on objective forecasts and the biasedness of others. 
However, Forsythe et al. (1992, p. 1157) consider it possible that some traders have “a 
sufficient intuitive grasp to play the arbitrageur’s role successfully.” To operationalize 
their hypothesis, they define a set of trading activity-related criteria to identify marginal 
traders empirically in their markets. In detail, they classify those traders as marginal 
traders who frequently submit limit orders at quotes which are close to the current mar-
ket prices. Non-marginal traders, by contrast, are traders who are quite inactive and 
place market orders, or limit orders far away from the current price level.43 Technically 
speaking, a trader is considered as acting like a marginal trader if, at the end of a trading 
day, she either has got a pending bid or ask quote in the order book that deviates from 
the last market price of that day not more than two cents, or if she placed at least one 
limit order that was accepted by another trader on the same day. Finally, a trader is clas-
sified as marginal trader, if she meets at least one of the two criterions for at least three 
days during the relevant trading period (which, in that case, was 21 days). The authors 
themselves admit that their definition of a marginal trader is somewhat arbitrary, on 
                                                 
43  A limit order is an order for which the initiator specifies an upper or lower reservation price at which 
she is just about ready to buy or sell the asset. A market order, on the contrary, is an order for which the 
initiator seeks immediate execution at whatever best price is currently available, thus accepting any given 
price. 
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which can be agreed. Nonetheless, they find their results to be essentially the same 
when applying slightly modified definitions of a marginal trader. Ultimately, they iden-
tify a subset of 22 out of 192 participants (11.5%) to fulfill the marginal trader condition 
in their market. The main difference between marginal and non-marginal traders is that 
the former invested more money in the market than the latter (more than twice as much 
in terms of total investments); they also traded more shares and accessed the market 
more often than non-marginal traders. The authors find this result to be supportive for 
their hypothesis that judgment bias is generally reduced as the investment exposure in-
creases. They also find that marginal traders yielded higher returns, were able to learn in 
later stages of the market and, as opposed to the remaining traders, did not show any 
clues of judgment bias in their transactions. This result is mainly attributed to the facts 
that (i) marginal traders seemed able to differentiate between “news” and “no news”, 
i.e., they could better assess the relevance of new information, and (ii) that they did not 
suffer from “wish-fulfillment”. Summarizing their conclusions, one can say that market 
forces and arbitrage motives are well-suited to produce efficient (i.e. unbiased) market 
outcomes, since market prices are not set by the average investor, but rather by mar-
ginal traders who tend to be less prone to behavioral judgment biases, thus supporting 
the Hayek hypothesis. Oliven and Rietz (2004) also contribute to the “marginal trader” 
discussion in their analysis of Iowa Electronic Markets data. They find that marginal 
traders constitute a more rational subset of traders who (i) self-select into the role of 
market makers (that is, they set quotes on both sides of the order book) and who are (ii) 
able to produce superior estimates. Other traders, who are prone to behavioral biases, in 
contrast, act as price-takers and thus provide the market makers with liquidity and prof-
its. Instructively, the authors point out that behavioral biases in fact seem to transfer 
from individual choice situations to the market setting which can be seen from the fact 
that systematic mistakes by biased agents can be observed in their data. Yet, these errors 
do not necessarily impact prices. In this vein they conclude (Oliven and Rietz (2004, p. 
350)) “that efficient forecasts from prediction markets do not rely on a representative 
sample of traders.”  
The “marginal trader” hypothesis, though, has been challenged by some re-
searchers. In Brüggelambert (1999) and Brüggelambert (2004), for instance, the author 
tests for the existence of marginal traders in a number of virtual election markets in 
Germany during the period 1990–1998, applying essentially the same criteria as did 
Forsythe et al. (1992). In fact, it was possible to identify people who met the marginal 
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trader condition in his dataset. While most of the characteristics of a marginal trader 
(e.g. higher stakes, higher trading frequency, etc.) also applied to Brüggelambert’s mar-
ginal traders, they did not yield significantly higher returns than the rest of the popula-
tion. Rather, it was the “political insider” who earned abnormal returns; the term “po-
litical insider” aims to describe participants who were exceptionally interested and more 
experienced in political topics than others, thereby profiting from lower information 
costs. Hence, the author criticizes the identification of marginal traders to be somewhat 
arbitrary.44 In the end, abnormal returns had not been earned by marginal traders ex-
ploiting other traders’ behavioral biases, but rather by political insiders taking advan-
tage of existing information asymmetries. From his point of view, it is the institutional 
framework that is mostly relevant to the degree of market efficiency achievable by “ra-
tional” traders. Hence, it largely depends on the institutional framework and the cost of 
information production, whether a political insider is able to act rationally, thereby ac-
counting for efficient market prices. With respect to the analyzed election markets in 
Germany, he finds that even political insiders are not in a position to make market-
derived forecasts more accurate than opinion polls.  
In his widely-known book “The wisdom of crowds”, Surowiecki (2005, pp. 288-
290) doubts, although intuitively appealing, the existence of a single or a small group of 
marginal investor(s). He argues that in most markets, particularly in the context of large 
financial markets, a small group of rational investors is unlikely to have sufficient mar-
ket impact to stem against the erring “crowds”. According to the author, it is more likely 
that the mass of people, if they disagree, prevail over a small number of marginal trad-
ers acting rationally. He emphasizes the applicability of this argument to markets such 
as the IEM, in which the maximum possible amount of money invested by a single 
trader is restricted to a $500 stake. Besides, he criticizes the approach of ex post classi-
fying some traders as the smart ones to be misleading (unless these traders can be as-
sumed to be more rational in general), since, by chance, there will almost always be 
some agents who are right, and others who are not. Being correct only by chance, how-
ever, is not consistent with the concept of the marginal investor. Further, if marginal 
traders were responsible for prices to be unbiased, then another puzzle would arise in 
pari-mutuel markets45 (which turn out to be quite accurate in practice as well): under a 
                                                 
44  Even more controversially, he criticizes the marginal trader-identifying characteristics in some ways 
tautological, since, by definition, it is the marginal traders who are the most active investors in a market. 
45  For a description of a pari-mutuel market mechanism, see subsection 2.1.1.4. 
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pari-mutuel market regime, there is no explicit marginal trader who could influence 
prices based on directly observable trades. Therefore, Surowiecki does not attribute the 
accuracy of predictions from these markets to the “wisdom” of a small group of mar-
ginal traders, but rather to the “collective intelligence of the traders as a whole”; hence, 
he doubts most of the agents to underlie behavioral biases, which otherwise would 
transfer to the market outcomes. Institutional constraints like short selling restrictions 
may add to the conjecture that just a few participants are not enough to correct biased 
prices. Obviously though, external validity of this line of reasoning is subject to the 
relative strength of marginal traders and non-marginal traders, their respective endow-
ments as well as the characteristics of the market design in a given market.  
To summarize, the above mentioned arguments provide an informative basis on 
possible ways in which market aggregation may mitigate individual errors. However, as 
was figured out, it depends on the concrete market environment whether rational expec-
tations equilibriums can be reached—in particular, institutional constraints like short 
selling or budget restrictions, the auction mechanism, etc. may hinder rational traders 
from incorporating their unbiased views into market prices. 
 
2.2 The description invariance principle and partition-dependence 
2.2.1 Preliminaries 
Normative theory of rational decision making under risk or uncertainty is built 
on a logical deduction of expected utility theory (EUT; von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944)) and subjective expected utility theory (SEU; Savage (1954)).46 In either case, 
decisions that are considered as rational from a normative perspective are derived by 
maximizing (subjective) expected utility.47 While expected utility theory applies to de-
                                                 
46  Note that most decision problems can be represented in a decision matrix that is composed of “acts”, 
“states”, “probabilities”, and “consequences”. An act ai ∈ A is an action or option that the decision maker 
may choose to take. All of the available acts are linked to a set of certain consequences xij ∈ X. Each set 
indicates—for a given act—which outcome will occur in different future states of the world sj ∈ S. Sub-
sets of the state space S are called events. Each event arrives with (objective or subjective) probability pj, 
Σ pj = 1. Thus, for act ai, state sj, and consequence xij, we obtain ai(sj) = xij (see Fox and See (2003, pp. 
273-274); notation borrowed from this source). 
47  According to the subjective expected utility theory, a decision maker maximizes the following ex-
pression: ∑
=
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1
)()()( , with u(xij) = utility of outcome xij, and p(sj) = subjective probability 
that state sj will obtain (Fox and See (2003, p. 274)). 
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cisions under risk, subjective expected utility theory applies to decisions under uncer-
tainty. To point out the difference between risky and uncertain decision problems, it can 
be said that, in classical decision theory, “risk” refers to a situation in which objective 
probabilities for all future states of nature are available, whereas “uncertainty” refers to 
a situation in which the decision maker herself has to think of subjective probabilities, 
because objective probabilities are not available.48 Thus, in uncertain situations decision 
makers have to weigh the perceived attractiveness of each potential outcome (utility) by 
its perceived likelihood (subjective probabilities or beliefs). Both expected utility theory 
and subjective expected utility theory owe their great significance to the fact that they 
rely on some intuitively appealing axioms. This means, accepting a set of reasonable-
seeming propositions, a decision maker inevitably has to maximize his or her (subjec-
tive) expected utility to behave in accordance with rational decision theory.  
In expected utility theory, these axioms are: cancellation, transitivity, domi-
nance, and (description) invariance.49 Cancellation50 refers to the possibility of elimi-
nating any state of the world from further consideration that yields the same outcome 
for all available actions. Thus, the choice between different alternatives only depends on 
states that yield different outcomes for different actions. The cancellation axiom is cen-
tral to the representation of preference between prospects as the maximization of ex-
pected utility. Transitivity of preferences refers to the possibility of representing prefer-
ence by an ordinal utility scale u in a sense that, if an action ai is preferred to another 
action aj (ai f  aj) and action aj is preferred to ak (aj f  ak), then action ai is also pre-
ferred to ak (ai f  ak), thus the utility of each option does not depend on the outcomes of 
any other option, but can rather be determined on its own. Dominance simply asserts 
that—among two alternatives—an alternative that is preferable in one state of the world 
and at least as preferable in all other states is under all circumstances preferred (i.e. 
dominant) to the other alternative. Finally, and most important in the context of the pre-
sent work, (description) invariance assumes that different characterizations of the same 
                                                 
48  “Ambiguity”, in contrast, is used to describe a situation in which the decision maker is not even able 
to determine subjective probabilities. 
49  See, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1986), or Tversky (1996). After the axiomatic foundation of ex-
pected utility theory had first been introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern, these axioms were 
further developed by numerous scientists. One of these axiomatic systems includes: complete ordering 
(i.e., completeness and transitivity), continuity, and independence (see Eisenführ and Weber (2003, pp. 
211-217) whose classification is based on Herstein and Milnor (1953)). Although most of these axiomatic 
systems slightly differ, almost all of them lead to the same criterion of expected utility. 
50  The cancellation axiom is often also referred to as the “independence axiom”. 
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choice problem should not at all influence subjective probability judgments nor prefer-
ences of the decision maker. In other words, the preference between different options 
should not depend on their respective description. Hence, different representations of a 
certain decision problem, which in effect are logically equivalent, should result in the 
same choices regardless of how (un-)consciously a decision maker reflects on the given 
decision problem. 
Subjective expected utility theory is built on a similar set of axioms. One of 
these axioms—called the “sure-thing principle”—is central to the applicability of sub-
jective expected utility. Basically, the “sure-thing principle” is congruent with the can-
cellation/independence axiom of expected utility theory and states that preference be-
tween two actions should not be influenced by a common consequence which—in a 
certain state—is exactly the same for the two actions.51 Although normatively appeal-
ing, the descriptive validity of the cancellation/independence axiom and the “sure-thing 
principle” have early been challenged by some prominent counterexamples (e.g., Allais 
(1953), and Ellsberg (1961)) and transitivity was found to be questionable in many de-
cision problems, too (e.g., Bell (1982), Fishburn (1982), Fishburn (1984), and Loomes 
and Sugden (1982)).52 Dominance and (description) invariance, in turn, had been gener-
ally accepted for a long time and were considered to be essential for (subjective) ex-
pected utility theory. However, it turned out that even the latter two principles do not 
provide an accurate descriptive model of choice behavior in most cases. 
 
2.2.2 Violations of the description invariance principle 
2.2.2.1 Violations in risky situations 
An early example that demonstrates a violation of the invariance principle stems 
from McNeil et al. (1982). The authors studied the preference between different medical 
treatments of lung cancer. Respondents received statistical information on two methods 
of treatments (radiation therapy and surgery), but statistical information was presented 
either in terms of mortality rates (mortality frame) or in terms of survival rates (survival 
                                                 
51  To be more precise, the “sure-thing principle” is implied by expected utility theory (see Fox and See 
(2003, pp. 277-278)). 
52  By contrast, Birnbaum and Schmidt (2008) who analyze violations of transitivity in individual choice 
experiments using an error model find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that their participants exhibited 
a transitive preference order in repeated presentations of the same choices. 
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frame). From a logical point of view, both descriptions included exactly the same in-
formation and normatively, the preference for one or the other treatment should be the 
same irrespective of how the problem was framed. However, there was a considerable 
difference in the number of respondents who favored the radiation therapy over surgery 
depending on which of the two descriptions they faced (only 18% of participants fa-
vored radiation therapy in the survival frame against 44% in the mortality frame).53 Ob-
viously, the way in which the statistical information was described or “framed” influ-
enced respondents’ preferences. In this case the difference in answers has to be unambi-
guously attributed to the different framings of statistical information, suggesting that 
subjects did not transfer the given representation of the problem to whatever standard 
canonical representation. If there was such a canonical or natural representation of a 
decision problem (like a cumulative probability distribution of a random variable), the 
invariance principle is assumed to be more likely to hold than if such a description is 
not available. But most real-life decisions neither do entail such a canonical description 
of the problem, nor does this description intuitively come to a decision maker’s mind. 
For that reason, these decisions remain susceptible to inherent violations of (descrip-
tion) invariance.  
 
2.2.2.2 Violations in uncertain situations 
Whereas the just mentioned example included preferences based on objective 
probabilities (through the presentation of statistical information), the invariance princi-
ple may also be hurt in decision problems under uncertainty, in particular when it 
comes to individually judged probabilities. In real-life situations, people are—implicitly 
or explicitly—required to make subjective probability judgments day in, day out. This 
includes, for example, probability assessments of the outcome of a trial, the results of a 
surgery, the occurrence of an insured event, stock market up- or downturns, the success 
of a business venture, the winner of the next basketball game, or whether to take along 
an umbrella in the morning, to name just a few. While Savage denied direct judgments 
of likelihood in favor of measuring subjective probability and utility simultaneously 
from observed preferences, some psychologists lend credence to direct expressions of 
                                                 
53  The subject pool initially consisted of a large group of clinic patients. However, results were gener-
ally confirmed when asking experienced physicians or statistically sophisticated business students.  
2  Fundamental concepts and literature review 41 
subjective probabilities (beliefs) and trust in using them to predict willingness to act 
under uncertainty (see, e.g., Spetzler and Staël Von Holstein (1975), Kahneman, Slovic, 
and Tversky (1982), and Clemen and Reilly (2001, in particular Chapter 8)).  
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) document the sensitivity of judged 
probabilities to the specific representation of the decision problem in the context of fault 
trees. Fault tree analysis is used to identify the concrete cause(s) of a technical error. A 
fault tree is a graphical representation of conceivable error sources for a given (typically 
technical) problem with more detailed information in each “branch” of the “tree”. Al-
though fault trees appear in many different formats, they all have in common that possi-
ble error sources are organized into functional categories. For instance, a fault tree may 
be used by car mechanics to detect why a car could fail to start. Possible reasons, i.e. 
branches of the tree, are: “battery charge insufficient”, “starting system defective”, “fuel 
system defective”, “ignition system defective”, “other engine problems”, “mischievous 
acts or vandalism”—each of them providing further sub-categorization—, and a residual 
category capturing “all other problems”. Fault trees do not only serve as a kind of 
“checklist” for possible causes of defect, but are also used to estimate failure rates for 
complex systems in situations in which historical data are unavailable. In those cases, 
experts assign probabilities to each of the available failure categories; combining these 
probabilities then yields an overall failure rate. However, one might suspect that the 
resulting overall failure probability depends to a great extent on (i) how the different 
categories are presented and arranged, on (ii) whether relevant categories are omitted 
and thus implicitly subsumed under the “all other problems” category, and also on (iii) 
whether categories are implicitly combined with other categories. The grouping of cate-
gories, in some cases, is subject to some arbitrariness. This suspicion motivated 
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) to conduct a series of fault tree experiments 
that addressed these “arbitrary” aspects systematically. Different fault trees of the above 
mentioned car starting failure problem were presented to both professional automobile 
mechanics and laypeople, asking them to judge the probability of each of the listed error 
causes to be the actual source of the technical problem. The basic design of an (un-
pruned) fault tree with possible reasons why a car might fail to start is shown in Figure 
2.1. 
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Figure 2.1:  (Unpruned) fault tree with possible reasons why a car might fail to start as used by 
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978); taken from Fox and Clemen (2005, p. 1418, 
Figure 1). 
One of these experiments (Experiment 1) included two treatments, both of which 
provided a different number of failure categories in a fault tree: one treatment included 
six explicitly mentioned failure causes plus an additional “all other problems” category 
(i.e., a total of seven branches, see Figure 2.1); in the other treatment three of the cate-
gories (e.g., “fuel system defective” and two other categories) were collapsed and im-
plicitly moved to the “all other problems” category. “Pruning” the fault tree like this 
resulted in three explicitly mentioned failure causes plus the residual category (i.e., a 
total of four branches).54 It turned out that, on average, judged probabilities in the dif-
ferent treatments did not match, or in other words, judged probabilities were inconsis-
tent with respect to the likelihoods assigned to a certain failure cause. Concretely, 
judged probability of the “all other problems” category in the pruned tree treatment did 
not fully absorb the probabilities of the pruned branches (as measured by the judgments 
of those subjects who faced the unpruned tree).55 Rather, it seemed as if the difference 
in probability assessment for the “all other problems” branch was distributed among the 
explicitly mentioned categories, thereby significantly increasing judged probabilities of 
the remaining components. Higher expertise based on a self-rating of subjects did not 
alter the results. This pattern has subsequently come into the literature as the “pruning 
bias” (see, e.g., Russo and Kolzow (1994)).  
                                                 
54  The pruned tree treatment was further divided into two sub-treatments which differed in that each of 
them regrouped three different failure causes (out of a total of six causes) to the residual category. Sub-
jects were not informed about the number of categories included in the other treatment. 
55  Judged proportion of the “all other problems” category increased from .078 (unpruned treatment) to 
.140 (pruned tree 1) and .227 (pruned tree 2), respectively. Assuming insensitive answers though, one 
would have expected proportions of .468 (pruned tree 1) and .611 (pruned tree 2), respectively, depending 
on which branches had been removed from the tree. In a variation of this experiment, the authors find that 
focusing subjects’ attention to the question which failure causes are missing in the tree only partially 
improves their awareness.  
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Another experiment (Experiment 5) presented by Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichten-
stein (1978) examined possible effects from splitting and fusing certain branches of the 
“car won’t start” fault tree. In this context, splitting and fusing means that the same 
amount of information is presented either as two independent branches of the fault tree 
where it was originally presented as a single branch (splitting), or information is pre-
sented as a single branch where it was originally presented in two different branches 
(fusing), always keeping the overall amount of information constant. For example, in 
one of the treatments the “ignition system defective” branch was split into “ignition 
system defective” (including “coil faulty” and “spark plugs defective”) and “distribution 
system defective” (including “distributor faulty” and “defective wiring between compo-
nents”, cf. Figure 2.1). This kind of splitting resulted in a fault tree containing seven 
branches plus the residual category (i.e., a total of eight branches). In another treatment 
the “starting system defective” and “ignition system defective” branches were fused to 
build a single branch, thus resulting in a fault tree containing only five branches plus the 
“all other problems” category (i.e., a total of six branches). When subjects were asked to 
judge proportions of failure causes, it turned out that a set of problems was found to be 
more important when it was presented as two branches than when it was presented as 
one, compared to the mean data from the unpruned tree judgments in the abovemen-
tioned experiment (Experiment 1). On the other hand, a failure cause was perceived to 
be less important when it was listed as a single branch than when it was listed as two 
separate branches, compared to the unpruned tree treatment in the experiment described 
above. The increase in allocated proportions, comparing the sum of split branches to the 
comparable fused branch, amounted to about one-third.56 Thus, the more “pieces” into 
which a group of failure pathways is arranged, the more important this group overall 
appears.  
Evidence from psychological experiments like those conducted by Fischhoff, 
Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) suggests that the particular choice of categories into 
which a decision problem is divided (i.e., “framed” or “partitioned”) may substantially 
affect subjective probability assessments over categories. It appears that human limita-
tions of memory and information processing capacity can lead to subjective probabili-
ties that are poorly calibrated or internally inconsistent. It is important to stress that 
                                                 
56  Note, though, that the calculation of this difference is based on fault trees offering a different overall 
number of branches (six versus eight branches compared to the seven-branch unpruned tree from the 
aforementioned experiment). 
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these patterns seem to be sort of a more general phenomenon that does not only apply to 
qualitative descriptions of discrete categories of events, but also applies to quantitative 
accounts of continuous variables which are typically represented by a number of exclu-
sive, but collectively exhaustive intervals of a dimensional state space. Fox and Clemen 
(2005, Study 5), for instance, asked members of the Decision Analysis Society (DAS, a 
group of academics and practitioners who study decision analysis) to judge probabilities 
concerning the total number of members of their society five years in the future. Mem-
bers, who self-selected to take part in this study, were randomly grouped into one out of 
two treatments, a low partition group (that included the following intervals: [0, 400 
members], [401, 600], [601, 800], [801, 1000], [1001+]), and a high partition group 
(that included the following intervals: [0, 1000 members], [1001, 1200], [1201, 1400], 
[1401, 1600], [1601+]). As a result, the median judged probability that the future mem-
bership number will fall into the upper interval (>1000) was 10% in the low partition 
group, in which this interval was represented by one out of five intervals, and the sum 
of judgments was 35% in the high partition group, in which this interval was repre-
sented by four out of five intervals. The fact that different representations of the state 
space (like the low partition and the high partition) lead to differences in judged prob-
ability for a given event (“more than thousand members five years in the future”) is in-
consistent with normative theories of rational judgment and decision making. This phe-
nomenon usually is referred to as “partition-dependence”.57 Partition-dependence 
means that judged probabilities vary systematically with the number and the way a 
given state space is (deliberately or unconsciously) partitioned into single events. Gen-
erally speaking, partition-dependence can be conceived a particular manifestation of a 
framing effect, as this is the case, for instance, with the reference point in prospect the-
ory that divides possible outcomes into gains and losses (Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), and Tversky and Kahneman (1986)). As with 
framing effects, people seem to accept the partition at hand and seem to be somehow 
insensitive to the question of how and why it came to the presented partition. Accord-
ingly, people seem to “anchor” on the number and the concrete boundaries of events. 
Partition-dependence thus is in stark contrast to what rational decision theory assumes 
in terms of “description invariance”. Whereas this subsection was mainly to reveal the 
                                                 
57  Robustness of partition-dependence in psychological studies was further documented by Fox and 
Rottenstreich (2003), Fox and Levav (2004), Fox, Bardolet, and Lieb (2005), Fox and Clemen (2005), 
Fox, Ratner, and Lieb (2005), and See, Fox, and Rottenstreich (2006). 
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basic phenomenon, the next subsection addresses possible psychological accounts that 
have been presented to explain why it comes to violations of description invariance and 
partition-dependence. 
 
2.2.3 Explanations for violations of description invariance 
While Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) identified the “availability” 
heuristic to be the most suitable explanation for the demonstrated phenomena, further 
assertions have been developed in a series of replications and extensions of the fault tree 
experiments, among them “ambiguity” and “credibility” (see, e.g., Fox and Clemen 
(2005, p. 1419) for a brief survey). Fox and Rottenstreich (2003), and Fox and Clemen 
(2005) add the “anchoring and insufficient adjustment” explanation based on an “igno-
rance prior” of judged frequencies or probabilities. In the following, these four explana-
tions will be discussed in some further detail. 
Availability. The “availability” heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman (1973)) may 
result in a cognitive bias that is reflected in the fact that judged probabilities of a cate-
gory or an event depend on how easily a decision maker can think of certain instances 
or scenarios that match the category or event under consideration. In cases in which 
people are asked to judge probabilities, availability refers to the ease with which a per-
son can retrieve occurrences or construct scenarios that correspond to the category or 
event at hand. By consequence, explicitly mentioning a particular category in the fault 
tree experiments increases its salience to the respondent, so that this category becomes 
mentally more “available” and thus increases a person’s judgment of probability. Ac-
cordingly, “availability” provides a mechanism by which occurrences with higher sali-
ence may appear more likely than they actually are in terms of objective probability. 
Besides Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978), the availability mechanism has been 
proposed by a number of researchers, including van der Pligt, Eiser, and Speark (1987), 
Dubé-Rioux and Russo (1988), Russo and Kolzow (1994), and Ofir (2000).  
Ambiguity. Another explanation of the pruning bias in fault trees is “ambiguity” 
with respect to the mapping of specific problems to existing categories as proposed by 
Hirt and Castellan (1988). Consider, for example, the category “battery charge insuffi-
cient” which, in the original Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) fault tree, ex-
plicitly includes “faulty ground connections”, “terminals loose or corroded”, and “bat-
tery weak”. If this category is pruned from the fault tree, a respondent who faces the 
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pruned version of the tree and who thinks of specific causes, like “faulty ground con-
nections” or “loose connection to alternator,” could just as well assign these causes to 
the branch labeled “ignition system defective” (including the more specific constituent 
“defective wiring between components”) or to the residual “all other problems” branch. 
This ambiguity about the affiliation of specific failure causes to available categories 
may even be greater, the less knowledgeable a respondent feels within a particular do-
main. Most notably, though, this could result in judged probabilities of omitted failure 
causes being distributed amongst some of the available categories instead of being fully 
subsumed under the “all other problems” category as hypothesized. This can explain 
why the residual catchall category does not fully capture judged probability of pruned 
categories. 
Credibility. A “credibility” mechanism may also contribute to explaining the 
pruning bias (Dubé-Rioux and Russo (1988), and Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein 
(1978)). It is assumed that respondents in fault tree experiments rely to some extent on 
the fault tree itself, believing that the way in which the tree was designed by the ex-
perimenter conveys some information about the most relevant failure causes that come 
into question. If people effectively believe that a particular composition of the presented 
fault tree contains some information on important failure causes, simply because these 
causes were included in the fault tree, then they may suppose that each of the explicitly 
mentioned causes in effect has some significant likelihood of occurrence, while the “all 
other problems” category is perceived to just cover negligible problems with small 
probability of occurrence. In this context, the credibility mechanism is closely related to 
a “demand effect”,58 in which participants consider the experiment to be an implicit 
conversation with the experimenter. This includes subjects expecting this kind of im-
plicit dialogue to follow some general conversational norms. In particular, it implies the 
anticipation that any message transferred from the experimenter to the participants con-
tains some meaningful information. Transferred to the fault tree experiment this means 
that participants expect the experimenter to having designed the fault tree such that each 
of the explicitly mentioned branches represents a meaningful and non-trivial failure 
cause. Hence, respondents may feel constrained to assign some significant probability to 
explicitly listed branches, whereas the “all other problems” category may seem to be of 
                                                 
58  In general, a “demand effect” in experimental economics describes a phenomenon in which subjects 
try to behave in a way they believe the experimenter expects or wants them to act (or the opposite), thus 
the demand effect refers to subjects who attempt to help (or hinder) the experimenter. 
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little importance. Russo and Kolzow (1994) experimented with the credibility of fault 
trees by varying and emphasizing the (fictitious) source of the presented tree using dif-
ferent cover stories. However, they did not find a noteworthy effect on the size of the 
pruning bias. 
Against the background of previous research results, Fox and Clemen (2005, 
p. 1419) argue that, among the three aforementioned accounts (“availability”, “ambigu-
ity”, and “credibility”), the availability heuristic is the most persuasive explanation for 
the observed pruning bias and related phenomena. In some instances, though, even the 
explanatory power of the availability account seems to be overstrained. As an example, 
they cite one of the Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) variations of the fault 
tree experiments. As stated above, in their “splitting and fusing branches” version of the 
experiment the authors split some of the categories into two separate groups, and fused 
some of the categories to form a single group. However, the overall amount of informa-
tion was kept constant in all cases. This means that the three to five constituent prob-
lems subsumed under each of the main categories (e.g., “faulty ground connections”, 
“terminals loose or corroded”, and “battery weak” for the main category “battery charge 
insufficient”) were preserved and rearranged with the main categories when splitting or 
fusing the branches. Keeping the overall amount of information constant, though, gen-
erally implies the same level of availability for each of the listed component problems. 
If availability was the only reason for the pruning bias, then one would expect judged 
probabilities of combined categories to match the sum of judged probabilities of corre-
sponding split categories, since the ease with which a person can retrieve occurrences or 
construct scenarios that correspond to these categories should be the same. In other 
words, possible failure causes were not brought “out of sight”, they were just arranged 
differently. In fact, though, the authors observed a well pronounced pruning bias even in 
this version of their experiments, thus availability is unlikely to be solely responsible for 
the bias.  
With respect to description-dependence expressed in probability judgments for 
dimensional spaces (where different intervals are presented for evaluation), none of the 
three abovementioned accounts seems to be suited as an exclusive explanation. Re-
member the example of members of the Decision Analysis Society assessing probabili-
ties that the future number of members of their society will fall into particular ranges. 
Availability of instances or scenarios that match the event under consideration can be 
excluded, because the categories cover all possible intervals of events (i.e., there is no 
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“all other membership numbers” category). In addition, in such a case there is no ambi-
guity about the categories since they are represented by concrete numerical intervals. 
And credibility with respect to the conveyance of some meaningful information about 
likely intervals of future membership numbers from the experimenter to the respondents 
is also invalid, because both the low and the high group partitions were introduced to 
the participants (and they self-allocated to one of the partitions by whether the last digit 
of their primary home telephone number was even or odd). For that reason, Fox and 
Rottenstreich (2003), and Fox and Clemen (2005) bring forward another explanation 
which they call the “anchoring and insufficient adjustment” account. It focuses on an 
“ignorance prior” heuristic based on the number of available categories on the main top 
level.  
Anchoring and insufficient adjustment of an ignorance prior. Fox and Clemen 
(2005) argue that respondents who are asked to assign probabilities to branches of fault 
trees or events proceed in two subsequent steps. In the first step, it is assumed that they 
notionally distribute probabilities evenly across all available (main) categories. This 
leads to a uniform distribution of probability: If there are N branches (including the “all 
other problems” category) in the tree, then, without considering its informative value, 
each branch initially receives a probability of 1/N, called the “ignorance prior”. That 
means, by default and in the absence of any obvious alternative, people apply the so-
called “principle of insufficient reason” which had been ascribed to Leibniz and Laplace 
(Fox and Clemen (2005, p. 1420)). 1/N allocations seem to be a general phenomenon 
and have been documented, for instance, for employees allocating retirement savings 
among potential investments in defined contribution plans (Benartzi and Thaler (2001)). 
In this context the phenomenon is referred to as naïve diversification, but it is also ob-
served within a broader context, whenever it comes to the allocation of some scarce 
resource (probability, attribute weight, or money) over a fixed set of possibilities 
(events, attributes, or investments) (see Fox, Bardolet, and Lieb (2005), and Langer and 
Fox (2005)). The 1/N allocation then serves as an anchor for further considerations. In 
the second step, people adjust 1/N probabilities by deliberately thinking about the dif-
ferent categories which are presented. That is to say, based on the uniform distribution, 
people reassign probabilities from branches which they think are rather unlikely to 
branches which they think are more likely to occur. Yet, it usually turns out that this 
adjustment happens to be insufficient in most cases (see, e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and 
Tversky (1982), or Epley and Gilovich (2001)). According to this account, judged prob-
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abilities generally tend to be too close to 1/N at the end. Hence, (objective) probabilities 
which are below 1/N tend to be overestimated, and (objective) probabilities which are 
above 1/N tend to be underrated. This result is consistent with the favorite-longshot bias 
observed in horse racetrack betting and other sports betting markets (cf. subsection 
2.1.3). To repeat, the favorite-longshot bias refers to a phenomenon in sports betting 
where odds of extreme underdogs (i.e. unlikely winners = longshots) tend to be overbet, 
whereas odds of likely winners (i.e. favorites) tend to be underbet (see, e.g., Thaler and 
Ziemba (1988)). However, there is a subtle difference between the ignorance prior bias 
and the favorite-longshot bias: partition-dependence based on the ignorance prior pre-
dicts that in an N-event partition, events with expressed probabilities lower than 1/N are 
likely to be overweighted. Overweighting should occur even when probabilities are 
fairly large (e.g., around .25 in a four-fold partition). By contrast, overweighting in the 
favorite-longshot bias refers to events with probabilities that are quite low (e.g., below 
.10). So with partition-dependence, the direction of the bias does not depend on whether 
a certain category or a particular event is an extreme “underdog” or a “favorite”, but 
rather depends on the relationship between the objective probability for a category or an 
event and 1/N. It is quite possible that details of trading microstructure, some influence 
of extreme optimism, and other forces induce overweighting of very low probabilities 
(favorite-longshot bias) while partition-dependence is more basic and spans a fuller 
range of probabilities. 
The anchoring and (insufficient) adjustment account is suited to explain the 
pruning bias in fault trees and other partition-dependence related phenomena. To illus-
trate, consider the following situation: if there are seven categories (counting “all other 
problems”), as in the original (unpruned) fault tree, judged probability of each failure 
cause is expected to be biased toward 1/7 (14.3%). If, for instance, three of the branches 
are pruned from the tree and subsumed under the “all other problems” branch, this re-
sults in a four-branch tree (counting “all other problems”). Judged probability for each 
of the remaining categories is then assumed to be biased toward 1/4 (25%). Leaving 
aside the effects of adjusting probabilities in the second step, the ignorance prior of the 
residual failure category then only raises from 1/7 to 1/4 (an absolute increase of 3/28 ≈ 
10.7%). This value should be compared to the value of 4/7 (57.1%) that would have been 
attributed if probabilities of the three removed failure causes had been completely sub-
sumed under the “all other problems” category. By this mechanism, the ignorance prior 
account can explain why judged probability of the “all other problems” category in the 
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pruned tree treatment did not fully absorb judged probabilities of the pruned branches in 
the Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) experiments. The ignorance prior account 
is also suited to explain the median judgment differences in the Decision Analysis Soci-
ety example mentioned above: Applying an ignorance prior over presented intervals 
would yield an 1/N judgment of 20% for each of the five intervals. With respect to the 
target event “number of members > 1000” this implies an ignorance prior probability of 
20% in the low partition group, where this event was represented by one out of five 
categories, and an ignorance prior probability of 80% (4 × 20%) in the high partition 
group, where the target event was represented by four out of five categories. The actual 
results of 10% and 35%, respectively, are partway between those 1/N judgments and a 
common subjective probability for the interval (> 1000) that is partition-independent. 
Note that the expression “partition-dependence” basically refers to the finding 
that judged probabilities systematically depend on the concrete way in which a state 
space is (deliberately or unconsciously) partitioned into single events, thus referring to a 
judgmental phenomenon. However, in the psychological literature it seems as if the ex-
pression “partition-dependence” is mainly used to refer to description-dependence with 
respect to the “anchoring on the ignorance prior and insufficient adjustment” account, 
thus placing more emphasis on this particular explanation (or cause) of the judgmental 
phenomenon. 
 
2.2.4 Support theory 
2.2.4.1 The model 
All of the previously discussed findings show that alternative descriptions of the 
same category or event may lead to different subjective judgments of probability (“de-
scription-dependence”/“partition-dependence”). As was demonstrated, it seems as if the 
observation of description-dependence can be extended from the narrow domain of fault 
trees (judgments of the relative frequency of various categories of fault in a system) to 
the more general domain of judged probabilities of uncertain events. In formal analysis, 
the pruning bias and related description-dependence biases that arise in the context of 
subjective judgments of probability are captured by “support theory”. Support theory is 
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a descriptive model of belief and judgment under uncertainty.59 It was first developed 
by Tversky and Koehler (1994), and Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997) to account for 
the empirical findings that  
 
(i) different descriptions of the same event can lead to subjective probability judg-
ments that differ systematically (as demonstrated in Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lich-
tenstein (1978)),  
 
(ii) judged probability of a conjunction, p(A ∪ C), sometimes exceeds judged prob-
abilities of its marginal totals, p(A) and p(C) (known as the “conjunction fal-
lacy”, see Tversky and Kahneman (1983)),  
 
and, mainly relevant in the context of the present work, 
 
(iii) judged probability of an event is sometimes less than the sum of judged prob-
abilities of separately judged constituent events (Teigen (1974, Experiment 2 on 
heights of students), and Tversky and Fox (1995)). 
 
To repeat, support theory is in contrast to the normative Bayesian school which 
assumes the degree of belief to be represented by an additive probability measure and 
which further assumes validity of the so-called extensionality principle or description 
invariance (i.e., “[e]vents with the same extension are assigned the same probability.” 
(Tversky and Koehler (1994, p. 547))).  
The general idea of support theory can be described as follows: When people are 
asked to make subjective probability statements on a given event, they typically bring to 
mind some—but usually not all—of its constituent elements. They then notionally esti-
mate the probability of each of these elements, and aggregate these into a combined 
value for the event under consideration. Accordingly, judged probability depends on (i) 
how many and what kind of elements people can recall when they are asked to judge 
probabilities, and (ii) how the aggregation into a combined value works in detail. 
                                                 
59  Cf. here and in the following, as well as for a brief survey of support theory, e.g., Fox and See (2003, 
pp. 288-290). 
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Let T be a state space with a minimum of two different future states of the world 
that may occur (and of which it is known that exactly one state will in fact occur).60 
Subsets of T are then called events. The main principle of support theory is that judged 
probabilities do not directly refer to the events under consideration, but rather refer to 
specific descriptions of these events. Descriptions of events are referred to as “hypothe-
ses”. Accordingly, denote H a set of hypotheses describing the events in T. Then each 
hypothesis A ∈ H is assumed to represent a unique event A’ ⊂ T. It is important to stress 
that different hypotheses (e.g., A and B) may correspond to the same event, thus A’ = B’ 
(i.e., this is a many-to-one relation).61 Eventually, different hypotheses of the same 
event can lead to different probability judgments, depending on the particular degree of 
explicitness of its description. This fact is taken into account by the supposition that 
each hypothesis A is linked to a (non-negative) support value s(A) which represents the 
strength of evidence (or: degree of support) for that hypothesis. In other words, prob-
ability judgments are mediated by individual judgments of evidence or support. The 
support function s is a vehicle to represent how a judge summarizes the recruited evi-
dence in favor of an event, given the specific description of this event. However, the 
support function is assumed not to be directly observable. Support itself is either the 
result of effortful reasoning and/or calculation by the judge, or is derived by applying 
heuristics of information processing, thus being susceptible to associated biases. In par-
ticular, these heuristics may include representativeness, availability, or anchoring and 
adjustment (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982)). To repeat, availability refers to the 
ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind (e.g., by recalling con-
crete occurrences in the past or by imagining plausible instances). With representative-
ness, the support for a given hypothesis depends on how characteristic this description 
appears for a certain stereotype. Finally, the mechanism of anchoring and adjustment is 
employed if people initially focus on a certain value or distribution and then derive their 
estimates by adjusting the anchor. It is assumed that people generally “accept” the re-
spective form of a given judgment or decision problem (i.e., the respective framing) as 
it is presented to them. In particular, people do not seem to intuitively transform the 
                                                 
60  In the following, the notation is adopted from the original work of Tversky and Koehler (1994), and 
Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997). 
61  If H is finite and if it contains at least one hypothesis for each event, then A is elementary if A’ ∈ T. A 
is null if A’ = ∅. A and B are exclusive if A’ ∩ B’ = ∅. If A and B are in H, and they are exclusive, then 
their explicit disjunction (A ∨ B) is also in H. ∨ is assumed to be associative and commutative so that 
(A ∨ B)’ = A’ ∪ B’ (Tversky and Koehler (1994, p. 548)). 
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given decision frame into a representation of whatever canonical classes. Accordingly, 
the initial value or distribution that serves as a starting point to further think about the 
judgment is strongly influenced by the concrete representation of the problem. And 
since adjustments are found to be typically insufficient, different starting points can 
cause different judgments, which are then biased toward the initially set anchor. 
In formal notation, define (A, B) an evaluation frame consisting of a pair of ex-
clusive hypotheses: the focal hypothesis A that needs to be assessed, and the alternative 
hypothesis B (A, B ∈ H). In its general form, support theory then expresses the judged 
probability62 p(A, B) that a focal hypothesis A occurs (instead of its complement B) by: 
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This expression is interpreted as relative support or balance of evidence for a 
certain hypothesis against its alternative (Tversky and Koehler (1994)). Support theory 
incorporates two further assertions:  
 
(i) Unpacking an aggregate hypothesis A into an explicit disjunction of mutually 
exclusive constituents, e.g. A1 ∨ A2 ∨ A3, leads to increased support for that hy-
pothesis despite the fact that both descriptions refer to the same event, thus 
A’ = (A1 ∨ A2 ∨ A3)’. Unpacking a hypothesis means explicitly mentioning 
(some of) its components as part of the description like, for example, unpacking 
the hypothesis “Tomorrow, there will be precipitation in the city of Münster” 
into “Tomorrow, there will be rain, snow, or hail in the city of Münster”.63 The 
rationale behind this assertion is that unpacking a hypothesis may remind people 
of possibilities which they otherwise might have missed, and/or increases the sa-
lience of listed subcomponents. 
 
(ii) Separately evaluating constituent hypotheses (e.g. A1, A2, and A3) also yields a 
higher total support than evaluating the aggregate focal hypothesis A. Thus, as-
                                                 
62  In formal terms, a person’s probability judgment is a mapping p from an evaluation frame to the unit 
interval. 
63  Assuming, without being a meteorologist, that any form of precipitation can either occur as rain, 
snow, or hail. 
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sessing the three constituent hypotheses “Tomorrow, there will be rain in the 
city of Münster” plus “Tomorrow, there will be snow in the city of Münster” 
plus “Tomorrow, there will be hail in the city of Münster” generally results in 
even more overall support than the above mentioned unpacked (but jointly 
evaluated) hypothesis “Tomorrow, there will be rain, snow, or hail in the city of 
Münster.”  
 
In formal terms, (i) and (ii) can be expressed by the following (assuming that A1 
and A2 are a partition of A, i.e., they are exclusive and exhaustive constituents, or to put 
it more formally, A is an implicit disjunction of the coextensional explicit disjunction 
A1 ∨ A2, thus A’ = (A1 ∨ A2)’): 
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To clarify the terminology, the inequality on the left hand side of (2.9), 
s(A) ≤ s(A1 ∨ A2), is called implicit subadditivity of support values, whereas the inequal-
ity on the right hand side, s(A1 ∨ A2) ≤ s(A1) + s(A2), is termed explicit subadditivity 
(Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997)). The inequality s(A) ≤ s(A1) + s(A2), which follows 
from expression (2.9), is referred to as generic subadditivity. 
Since the theory postulates the vehicle of “support” as an intermediary step be-
tween hypotheses and probability judgments, the features of the support function can be 
transferred to judged probability. With respect to the (sub-)additivity expressed in 
judged probabilities, equation (2.8) implies binary complementarity (i.e. additivity) at 
the highest level; that is, judged probabilities for the focal hypothesis A, and its simple 
negation B (the complement) sum to one:  
 
p(A) + p(B) = 1 (2.10)
 
Equation (2.10) indicates that judged probabilities for the two complement hy-
potheses “Tomorrow, there will be precipitation in the city of Münster” and “Tomor-
row, there will be no precipitation in the city of Münster” sum to unity. Contrariwise, 
equation (2.8) in conjunction with the inequalities expressed in (2.9) imply subadditivity 
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of judged probabilities at lower levels, that is, judged probability of hypothesis A is less 
than (or equal to) the sum of judged probabilities of its disjoint components: 
 
p(A) ≤ p(A1) + p(A2) (2.11)
 
That is to say that not only support, but also judged probabilities for separately 
assessed hypotheses “…rain…” plus “…snow…” plus “…hail…” are expected to be (at 
least as high, but typically) greater in sum than judged probability for the focal hypothe-
sis (i.e., asking for “…precipitation…” in Münster). Expression (2.11) directly corre-
sponds to generic subadditivity in support values and is the most central subject matter 
of analysis in the present work. For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned 
that implicit subadditivity (inequality (2.12)) and explicit subadditivity (inequality 
(2.13)) directly transfer to the level of judged probabilities, too: 
 
p(A) ≤ p(A1 ∨ A2) (2.12)
 p(A1 ∨ A2) ≤ p(A1) + p(A2) (2.13)
 
Expression (2.12) refers to implicit subadditivity by unpacking a hypothesis A 
into an explicit disjunction of constituent hypotheses as described above and states 
that—at the level of probabilities—judgments tend to be (equal or) greater when a hy-
pothesis A is explicitly broken down into its alternatives like “Tomorrow, there will be 
rain, snow, or hail in the city of Münster”. Expression (2.13), in turn, refers to explicit 
subadditivity and hypothesizes that—also at the level of probabilities—the sum of 
judgments may even be greater when subcomponents are judged separately. To summa-
rize, unpacking of a given hypothesis may increase (but—according to support theory’s 
original form—may not decrease) its overall judged probability.  
With respect to the ignorance-prior (and insufficient adjustment) account intro-
duced in subsection 2.2.3 above, Fox and Rottenstreich (2003) demonstrate how parti-
tion-dependence can be modeled within the framework of support theory. Imagine, for 
instance, a focal hypothesis A that refers to the probability that “Sunday will be hotter 
than any other day of the next week,” and its alternative hypothesis B that implies the 
probability that “Sunday will not be hotter than any other day of the next week.” Trans-
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forming the probability of the focal hypothesis A, which results from equation (2.8), 
into odds form64 yields: 
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The odds form presented in equation (2.14) can be rewritten as: 
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NA and NB denote the number of elements in the (subjective) partition of the fo-
cal and the alternative hypotheses, respectively, s*(A) and s*(B) represent the support 
values that result from evaluative assessment (adjustment), (1 – λ) is the relative contri-
bution of the ignorance prior, and λ is the relative contribution of adjusted support val-
ues.65 Thus, support is divided into two components: one component reflecting the igno-
rance prior and another component reflecting assessed support values. If λ = 1, then the 
judgment completely relies on the evaluative assessment of the focal hypothesis against 
its alternative hypothesis. If, in turn, λ = 0 (complete ignorance), then the judgment is 
determined only by the ignorance prior term of the equation. Transferred to the binary 
partition of the “Sunday will/will not be hottest day” example, R(A, B) = 1 if λ = 0, thus 
judged probability is one half. Whereas support theory assumes that subadditivity is 
driven by the fact that support is subadditive in general (which leads to subadditive 
probability judgments), the Fox and Rottenstreich (2003) model is interesting, because 
it demonstrates that subadditivity can also arise from the ignorance prior and the way in 
which it interacts with support (regardless of whether recruited support is subadditive or 
not) (see Clemen and Ulu (2008)). 
 
                                                 
64  Note that odds, in the present form, indicate relative probabilities, i.e. p/(1–p), not absolute probabili-
ties. If, for instance, the probability of a given event is one half, then odds are 1:1; if probability is 1/7, 
then odds are 1:6. 
65  When using the logarithm of R, (1 – λ) and λ can be interpreted as weights on the two components in 
a linear model (Fox and Rottenstreich (2003)). 
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2.2.4.2 Further empirical evidence 
As noted above, description-dependence does not only apply to qualitative de-
scriptions of events, but also applies to quantitative accounts of continuous variables 
which are typically represented by different intervals of a state space. Thus, the assump-
tions and conclusions underlying support theory do also transfer to partition-dependence 
in the context of dimensional spaces.66 Tversky and Fox (1995), for instance, report 
subadditivity of probability judgments when groups of Stanford students and football 
fans were asked to assign probabilities to various intervals into which an uncertain 
quantity might fall (such as the victory margin in the next Super Bowl, the absolute per-
formance of the Dow Jones Industrial Average over a given period of time, or future 
San Francisco temperature). Their results demonstrate that, by unpacking a particular 
event into separately judged components, subjects’ judgments happen to be substan-
tially subadditive, which holds across all event domains, thereby providing evidence in 
favor of support theory (and its validity for quantitative descriptions of events). The 
notion that subadditivity holds for quantitative hypotheses is informative, because fail-
ures of retrieval as a possible account can be largely ruled out in these cases: while 
memory restrictions may lead people to overlook one or more component hypotheses in 
qualitative settings, this is most unlikely to happen with respect to events of metric-
scaled intervals.  
A variety of different studies reviewed and discussed by Tversky and Koehler 
(1994), and Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997) gave reason to develop and to bring for-
ward the theoretical framework of support theory. Among these studies, Fox, Rogers, 
and Tversky (1996, Study 2) found subadditivity and binary complementarity in judg-
ments of professional option traders and support staff at the Pacific Stock Exchange and 
Chicago Board Options Exchange. They asked option trader professionals to judge the 
probability that the closing price of, say, Microsoft stock would fall within a particular 
range two weeks in the future. On the one hand, subadditivity showed when four dis-
joint intervals, spanning the complete set of possible future prices, were presented for 
evaluation, as the sums of assigned probabilities were typically greater than one. In par-
                                                 
66  Clemen and Ulu (2008) have a slightly different view. They note that partition-dependence, although 
not inconsistent, is not implied by support theory (p. 836). They present a model in which judged prob-
ability is characterized by a linear combination of ignorance prior and support components. According to 
the authors, their evidence suggests “additivity of the support function for continuous variables.” (p. 837). 
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ticular, when the four intervals were presented in the form of different target events,67 it 
turned out that judged probability for a packed interval, p(A1 ∪ A2), was generally lower 
than the sum of separately judged probabilities for the unpacked events, p(A1) + p(A2). 
On the other hand, binary complementarity appeared within the same subject pool when 
binary partitions were presented, since in that case the sums of assigned probabilities 
were close to one. These results are not only striking because they are in line with the 
predictions of support theory, but also because the participants were experts whose 
every-day business is to make probability assessments on future stock market develop-
ments. In another study, subadditivity was also documented in odds of British book-
makers (Ayton (1997)): Consistent with support theory, bookmakers’ odds for general 
hypotheses were subadditive, i.e., they were smaller than the sum of odds offered for an 
explicitly unpacked, but logically equivalent, disjunction of events that was subsumed 
by the general hypothesis. Thus, support theory generally seems to be suited to accom-
modate major violations of the normative assumption of descriptive invariance that is 
observed in human behavior.  
Evidence from Fox, Rogers, and Tversky’s professional option traders, Ayton’s 
analysis of bookmakers’ odds, combined with the Decision Analysis Society example 
introduced in subsection 2.2.2.2, experimental evidence suggests that even experts are 
susceptible to partition-dependence in judging probabilities. However, since the “igno-
rance prior” account implies adjustments of 1/N probabilities, this gives reason to as-
sume that the partition-dependence bias could be less pronounced when knowledgeable 
people have more information on events than others and when they can use this infor-
mation to adjust ignorance prior probabilities more accurately (Fox, Bardolet, and Lieb 
(2005)). Evidence from Fox and Clemen (2005, Study 4) supports the conjecture that 
partition-dependence interacts with competence and knowledge. The authors asked 
MBA students in a decision models class to evaluate the probability that the Jakarta 
Stock Index (which was supposed to be quite unfamiliar to the subject pool) and the 
NASDAQ index (which, by contrast, was supposed to be very familiar to the subject 
pool) would close in some particular intervals at the end of the year. Results reflected 
both pronounced partition-dependence and a pronounced competence effect: Judgments 
for the unknown Jakarta Stock Index almost perfectly coincided with the ignorance 
                                                 
67  “Different target events” means that the four price intervals were presented either separately or com-
bined (i.e., by implicitly packing two adjacent intervals to form a single interval). 
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prior probabilities (reflecting λ = 0 in terms of the model presented in equation (2.15)) 
and suggests that respondents hardly adjusted 1/N probabilities. By contrast, judgments 
for the more familiar NASDAQ index reflected substantial adjustments of the ignorance 
prior (reflecting λ > 0), resulting in a reduced (but still pronounced) bias of partition-
dependence.  
On the whole, empirical evidence so far suggests that both generic subadditivity 
as well as explicit subadditivity appear to be robust phenomena of considerable size, 
whereas evidence for implicit subadditivity is somehow mixed.68 Thus, it should not be 
neglected to mention that some recent research (see, e.g., Sloman et al. (2004)) provides 
evidence for reverse subadditivity (called superadditivity), where unpacking does not 
necessarily increase overall judged probability, depending on whether explicitly listed 
subcategories represent rather typical (characteristic) or atypical (uncharacteristic) in-
stances of the event under consideration. According to the narrow interpretation con-
jecture (NIC), atypical examples of an event with weak support may draw a judge’s 
attention to some special cases at the expense of more meaningful and/or representative 
exemplars, to which one would have attached more importance in a situation in which 
the problem was described as an implicit hypothesis. Thus, overall support for the un-
packed description can be reduced such that p(A) ≥ p(A1 ∨ A2), which represents implicit 
superadditivity. Hence, probability judgments may be mediated by an anchoring and 
adjustment process in such a way that people anchor on (atypical) unpacked instances 
and then adjust insufficiently for other instances. In this context, it also seems to play a 
role, whether the unpacked descriptions of events do explicitly list all possible elements 
                                                 
68  Besides the studies mentioned in the course of the present work, additional evidence in favor of ge-
neric and/or explicit subadditivity is presented or reviewed, for example, in Fox and Tversky (1998) [dif-
ferently (un-)packed prospects that pay a certain amount if a particular team, division, or conference 
would win the 1995 NBA championship], Brenner and Rottenstreich (1999) [sums of judgments for com-
plementary hypotheses are close to one when the hypotheses are singletons, and are less than one when 
one of the hypotheses is a disjunction], Redelmeier et al. (1995) [subadditivity in diagnoses of medical 
doctors], Fox (1999) [expert sports fans predicting game outcomes], Fox and Birke (2002) [attorneys 
forecasting trial outcomes], Johnson et al. (1993) [willingness to pay for hypothetical insurance policies]. 
Mixed evidence for implicit subadditivity results from studies by Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997) [(i) 
forecasting a trial outcome (implicit subadditivity existent) vs. the winner of the next presidential election 
(no effect), (ii) “homicide by an acquaintance or homicide by a stranger” (implicit subadditivity existent) 
vs. “daytime homicide or nighttime homicide” (no effect)], Fox and Tversky (1998) [unpacking the teams 
from the Eastern Conference (implicit subadditivity existent) vs. unpacking the teams from the Western 
Conference (no effect)], Fox and Birke (2002) [judgments by experienced attorneys], Fox and See (2003) 
[strong implicit subadditivity in judgments of the probability that various categories of teams would win a 
conference basketball championship vs. no effect when scenarios were unpacked into disjunctions of 
dimensional subhypotheses], Fox and Clemen (2005) [no effect from unpacking events into obvious con-
stituents], or Koehler, Brenner, and Tversky (1997) [implicit subadditivity due to unpacking the alterna-
tive hypothesis]. 
2  Fundamental concepts and literature review 60 
of the packed description, or whether some elements are collapsed into a residual “all 
other members” category (Sloman et al. (2004, p. 581)). Tackling another issue in the 
context of description-dependence, Bilgin and Brenner (2008) analyze whether the tem-
poral distance (and thereby the degree of abstractness) from the time when a probability 
judgment is elicited to the moment when the respective uncertainty is resolved has an 
impact on the degree of description-dependence. They find unpacking to have a greater 
impact on the degree of description-dependence in probability judgments for uncertain-
ties that are resolved in the distant rather than the near future (applies similarly to both 
sub- and superadditive hypotheses). Therefore, temporal distance can additionally be 
regarded as an influencing factor on the size of unpacking effects. However, the last-
mentioned findings should rather apply to qualitative hypotheses than to quantitative 
settings which are the object of investigation in the course of the present work.  
 
2.3 Experimental asset markets 
2.3.1 Basic principles 
In chapters 3 and 4 of the present work, experimental asset markets (in this case: 
experimental prediction markets) are used as a research method to examine whether the 
partition-dependence bias persists or diminishes in a competitive market setting. While 
carrying out experiments is the obvious research method in most natural sciences, and 
also has a long tradition in other social sciences, particularly in (cognitive) psychology, 
this method of research was first made popular in economics by Vernon L. Smith and 
other researches69 since the 1960s. Smith was awarded the Bank of Sweden Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 2002 “for having established labora-
tory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of 
alternative market mechanisms.”70 The introduction of experimental methods in eco-
nomics is a remarkable innovation, because until then it was generally assumed that 
economists are obliged to exclusively make use of naturally-occurring field data (as 
                                                 
69  Among them were (in alphabetical order): Colin Camerer, Robert Forsythe, Daniel Friedman, Teck 
Ho, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, Charles Plott, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder; this list is not ex-
haustive, though. 
70  Cf. here and below, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2002). 
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used in chapter 5 of the present work) to test their theories. The possibility of conduct-
ing experiments in a controlled laboratory environment was widely neglected by then.  
A major benefit of using laboratory experiments is the practicability of the ce-
teris paribus condition which allows controlling for all other variables by holding them 
constant over different treatments while analyzing variations in the variable under in-
vestigation. While establishing a controlled laboratory environment is considered quite 
easy in most natural sciences, it originally seemed a hard task to control for important 
factors in economics (Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985, p. 8)).71 The development of 
experimental economics as a “new” research area, however, fostered ways in which it is 
now possible to experimentally study the behavior of economic agents in economically 
relevant settings (like, e.g., negotiations, product- or asset markets, etc.) in a laboratory. 
Experimental economics aims to generate an economically relevant but self-contained 
situation in which agents mostly behave as if they acted in a real-world setting, while 
the experimenter is in a position to control for variables like financial endowment, level 
and type of information, opportunities to communicate with other participants, etc. This 
makes it possible to isolate the focal (or: treatment) variable(s) and to analyze its impact 
on any dependent parameter, e.g., the result of a negotiation, the demand and supply of 
goods or assets, or market prices, thereby testing predictions from economic theories. 
Experiments generally may be conducted either in a laboratory setting (lab experiment) 
or in the field (field experiment). Laboratory and field experiments may appear in the 
form of individual (choice) experiments, game theory experiments, or (asset) market 
experiments. These types of experiments found their way into economics in a blend of 
different research areas: decision making, bargaining, coordination, social preferences, 
public goods, learning, auctions, as well as market mechanisms and market institutions. 
Smith dedicated most of his work especially the last two mentioned fields of research, 
auctions and markets. While experiments in cognitive psychology mainly focus on ana-
lyzing individual behavior, auctions and (asset) market experiments aim to study market 
outcomes, i.e., the results from individuals implicitly interacting with each other via 
bids, offers, prices, demand, and supply. 
Being a pioneer Smith also made substantial contributions to methodological 
(or: design) issues in carrying out experiments in economics (Smith (1976), see also 
                                                 
71  Interestingly, whereas this quote comes from the 12th ed. (1985) of their famous “Economics” text-
book, such a remark no longer exists in the latest edition (18th ed., 2005). 
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Smith (1982b)).72 Procedural aspects which are most different compared to experi-
ments, e.g., in cognitive psychology, are monetary incentives and repeated trials. Mone-
tary incentives are considered important to reimburse subjects for their decision costs 
and to motivate them to think thoroughly about their decisions in an economic sense.73 
On the one hand, when financial compensation is applied subjects can be paid a flat 
(i.e., fixed) reward for participating which may help in recompensing them for their 
decision costs. On the other hand, it is more preferable to pay subjects an incentive-
compatible performance-based compensation to stimulate them to think carefully about 
their actions and decisions.74 Offering performance-based rewards is the obvious way of 
compensation in asset market experiments, since payoffs can be directly linked to sub-
jects’ portfolio performance. However, it seems at least as important as the concrete 
shape of the payoff function to offer subjects the prospect of earning an adequate com-
pensation that is perceived not to be negligible small.75 Repeated trials, in turn, are con-
sidered important to give participants the opportunity to get acquainted with the ex-
perimental setting and to learn from (implicit) interactions with other subjects. Repeti-
tion of trials is of particular importance when testing equilibrium theories which is often 
the case in economics. The later trials then give reason to assume that initial confusion 
(if it existed) has calmed down and adjustment processes have been completed.76  
Other methodological issues include, e.g., the question of providing participants 
with instructions (scripts) and how they should look like (vs. forcing subjects to ad-lib), 
or the question of honesty (vs. deception) (Hertwig and Ortmann (2001)). Instructions77 
aim to describe the experimental set-up, explain the role of different agents and their 
                                                 
72  For how-to instructions on conducting experimental methods in economics (in particular on experi-
mental asset markets), see, e.g., Friedman and Sunder (1994). 
73  This assumes that people are self-interested and mainly motivated by money (Camerer (1997)). 
74  Other means of (non-monetary) payment are points, credit points (for students), virtual money, non-
cash prizes and the like. 
75  Other issues that arise with incentivizing subjects include the questions of whether (i) one should pay 
all participants or only a few randomly selected subjects, (ii) whether all decisions (or trials) should fi-
nally be compensated or only part of it (keeping the overall amount of compensation (that is paid to all 
participants as a whole) constant in each case), and (iii) how to deal with the risk of losses. 
76  Usually, repeated trials are run under a “stationary replication” condition, i.e., the setting is re-
established as it originally was at the beginning of the previous trial, including initial endowments, the set 
of possible actions and decisions, etc. The only thing a subject can preserve is her experience from the 
earlier trials. Camerer compares the “stationary replication” condition with the movie “Groundhog Day” 
in which Phil Connors, a famous TV-weatherman, is captured in a seemingly never-ending 24-hours time 
loop, re-experiencing the same day again and again: “The endless looping of experience, while boring, 
turns out to be ideal for learning since different actions can be tried while everything else is held equal.” 
Camerer (1997, p. 319, fn. 2). 
77  In most cases, instructions are handed out to all participants and are read out aloud by the experi-
menter at the beginning of an experimental session. 
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mutual relationship, the set of possible actions/decisions and their consequences, and 
the composition of subjects’ compensation through the payoff function. Economists 
usually (not always) employ an abstract context for their experimental set-up. Creating a 
rich and illustrative storyline around the general hypotheses, by contrast, bears the risk 
of generating non-monetary utility and possibly distracts subjects from focusing their 
attention to financial incentives (Camerer (1997)). Hence, carefully elaborated instruc-
tions are an important design feature in experimental economics to create a level-
playing field for all participants, to enhance replicability of results and comparability 
across sessions. Honesty is considered to be an incontestable basic principle in experi-
mental economics, whereas it is not, e.g., in psychology. In simple terms, honesty 
means not to actively claim something as being true, when the experimenter knows it is 
false (Camerer (1997)). Being honest to the subjects is a basic prerequisite to build and 
preserve his or her good reputation as a scholar, but is also considered as a public good 
that helps the whole branch of experimental research to maintain its trustworthiness. In 
addition, honesty is necessary to ensure that subjects make their decisions based on the 
financial compensation they can expect to earn, rather than based on a psychological 
reaction to assumed deception, i.e., subjects may suspect manipulation if it is present 
(Davis and Holt (1993, pp. 23-24)). However, being honest with respect to the true pur-
pose of a study may result in unintentional strategic behavior by the subjects or may 
cause demand effects. Besides, for some purposes one may be tempted to deceive sub-
jects in order to simulate (and study) situations which rarely occur in natural settings.  
However, experimental methods in the lab have to defend against different ob-
jections (see, e.g., Falk and Fehr (2003)). These include, e.g., a subject pool bias, or the 
concern that subjects may not take their task seriously enough due to stakes which are 
too low, or a lack of generality due to a (relatively) small subject sample size. First, sub-
ject pool bias means that experimental results may be biased by the fact that most ex-
periments use student subjects. Students are easy to recruit, (typically) have a fine grasp 
with respect to the experimental script, and (usually) have low opportunity costs. How-
ever, results may not be representative for the cross-section of the true population and 
thus may fail to accurately predict real-life behavior. Hence, recent studies also use non-
student subjects, recruited by characteristics such as their experience, profession, etc., or 
to make the sample as representative of a given population as possible. Evidence to date 
on subject pool differences is mixed (see Falk and Fehr (2003) for a brief discussion), 
thus the question of subject pool bias has not been finally answered yet. Second, as dis-
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cussed above, choosing a poorly calibrated compensation scheme and/or insignificant 
stake levels may not motivate experimental participants to think carefully about what 
decisions to take. In a meta-level study, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) review a multitude 
of experiments with no, low, or high performance-based financial incentives to analyze 
the effects of stake size. They find that variance in results is reduced as payments are 
increased, whereas virtually no effect is observed on mean performance. On the whole, 
higher incentives contribute to improved performance, but at the same time strongly 
interact with other treatment variables. Interestingly, the authors note that, in their sam-
ple of reviewed studies, violations of rationality could not be eliminated in replication 
studies merely by offering increased incentives. Third, small sample sizes may limit the 
statistical significance of lab experiments. Although this, too, is certainly a relevant is-
sue, one can (to some extent) increase sample size by recruiting additional subjects or 
put particular effort on recruiting a representative sample of participants (which is 
closely related to the subject pool bias concern) to circumvent these concerns. 
A more general critique of experimental methods, which founds on the philoso-
phy of science, challenges internal and external validity of these methods (Falk and 
Fehr (2003)). Internal validity refers to the question of whether it is possible to infer 
causalities from the concrete experimental data. This is mainly a question of properly 
applying the experimental toolbox, i.e., to use appropriate experimental controls, a well 
thought-out experimental protocol, and correct methods of data analysis. External valid-
ity, in turn, refers to the question of whether it is possible at all to generalize conclu-
sions gained from experimental data to the field. On the one hand, external validity de-
pends on whether one accepts the methodical technique of induction (however, this ar-
gument applies to all empirical methods and results).78 On the other hand, external va-
lidity depends on whether one is able to exactly capture those conditions in the experi-
ment which prevail in a natural setting (however, to some extent experiments deliber-
ately abstract from reality, as this is common practice in economic models).  
Harrison and List “see the beauty of lab experiments within a broader context—
when they are combined with field data, they permit sharper and more convincing infer-
ence.” (Harrison and List (2004, p. 1009); they also present a general discussion of field 
experiments; see also List (2006), and List and Reiley (2008) for surveys on field ex-
                                                 
78  The principle of induction states that results can be transferred to new situations as long as the most 
central underlying conditions remain unchanged (Falk and Fehr (2003)). 
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periments). While lab experiments offer the greatest possible degree of control over 
variables on the one hand, and empirical research on field data promises best answers to 
the question of how people do actually behave in natural-occurring environments on the 
other hand, field experiments can be positioned somewhere in-between. With respect to 
the methodological relationship between lab and field experiments, Harrison and List 
(2004, p. 1010) argue that field experiments are not “simply less controlled variants of 
laboratory experiments,” but are effective complements instead. Field experiments can 
generate exogenous variation in the variables of interest which is an advantage com-
pared to conventional empirical economics. This allows establishing causality rather 
than pure correlation. Compared to lab experiments, in turn, field experiments give up 
some of the control that a laboratory experimenter may have over her environment. In 
return, field experiments gain validity from increased realism (List and Reiley (2008)). 
Defining field experiments (literally, experiments in the field) would concentrate on the 
natural environment in which people are used to take their actions. The “natural envi-
ronment,” in turn, can be interpreted with respect to a number of different dimensions: 
e.g., self-selected (and maybe more experienced) subjects (instead of students recruited 
from a single class),79 the exchange of privately held goods by subjects (instead of an 
exogenously allocated initial endowment), less-intrusive instructions (instead of scripts 
describing abstract conditions in great detail), or a familiar home environment (instead 
of an artificial laboratory), to name just a few. With field experiments, it is possible to 
observe people’s choices and decisions in an experimental setting and with significant 
control, while these people, acting in a more or less natural and/or familiar environment, 
at the same time do not feel unnaturally controlled.80 
With respect to the relationship between theory and data, Camerer (1997) char-
acterizes experiments in economics as a means of operationalizing and testing a general 
theory in a specific (artificial) context. Against the background of the great importance 
of (prediction) market institutions and (prediction) market mechanisms in the context of 
the present work, the next two subsections (2.3.2 and 2.3.3) aim to review experimental 
evidence from testing theories in experimental asset markets. Theories that have widely 
been addressed so far are market efficiency (by information dissemination, by informa-
                                                 
79  However, recruiting students from a single class (or a few parallel courses) may be advantageous in 
generating a homogeneous subject pool with most similar background knowledge, if this is wished to 
keep constant. 
80  For a more detailed taxonomy of field experiments, see subsection 2.2 in Harrison and List (2004). 
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tion aggregation and dissemination, and by information production) and the impact of 
individual judgment errors on rational market equilibriums. These are particular rele-
vant in the context of the present work. 
 
2.3.2 Experimental tests of market efficiency 
2.3.2.1 Preliminaries 
Testing market efficiency and other market-related characteristics from field 
data appears to be a hard, if not impossible task. First, it would be almost impossible to 
control for the information set of a very large number of traders in naturally-occurring 
asset markets, and to separate, for instance, insiders (and their level of private informa-
tion) from noise traders. Second, a test of market efficiency against a normative bench-
mark suffers from the joint hypothesis problem, i.e., such a test unavoidably combines 
the question of market efficiency with the question of whether the assumed theoretical 
model is correct. Thus, if in a given situation the market deviates from what the model 
predicts, is it the market that is inefficient or is it rather the model that imprecisely pre-
dicts the “true” value of the asset under consideration? And analyzing price adjustments 
instead that occur as a result of news arrival only provides little remedy, since this does 
not say anything about the efficiency of price levels, i.e. the market as a whole. Addi-
tionally, in many cases it is not only single news that affects an asset price at the same 
time, but rather a bundle of news including sector-specific and market-specific news 
that overlap and, in practice, this is hard to disentangle.  
Analytical models are often concerned with deriving theoretically appealing so-
lutions to problems that result in equilibriums of a comparative statics analysis. How-
ever, the existence of equilibrium is no sufficient condition for that it is in fact reached, 
even under the specific assumptions of the given model. Experimental asset markets, in 
contrast, can explicitly address this issue by mapping the complete process of market 
activity from the start to the end. If equilibrium is not reached in experimental asset 
markets, this does not necessarily mean that equilibrium does not exist; possibly the 
trading period simply stopped too early. Contrariwise, if one cannot observe any sub-
stantial changes in market variables at the end of the trading period, there is no reason to 
assume that equilibrium would be reached if trading time was prolonged. However, ana-
lyzing the price path provides the experimenter with valuable insights on how the termi-
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nal value of an asset was reached, regardless of whether this state represents a situation 
of equilibrium or not. 
Following Sunder (1995), it can be distinguished between three different ex-
perimental approaches of testing informational efficiency in asset markets: the first ap-
proach focuses on dissemination of information. It analyzes whether a particular set of 
information is effectively conveyed from one group of homogenously informed traders 
(insiders) to another homogenously group of not-informed traders (noise traders) via the 
market mechanism. If it works, not-informed traders finally are able to effectively trade 
as if they possessed the insider information. Dissemination of information mainly refers 
to the first and to the second proposition of the Hayekian hypothesis (cf. subsection 
2.1.4.1). The second approach includes the aggregation of information that is widely 
dispersed among traders, and the dissemination of this information to all traders. The 
question is how traders, all endowed with a fractional subset of information, can piece 
together everyone’s individual tesserae into market prices which, at the end, reflect the 
overall available information. Finally, the third approach implements the production of 
information as an endogenous variable so that it comes to analyzing simultaneous equi-
libriums in both asset markets and information markets.  
The early 1980s can be considered as a starting point for experimental econo-
mists to conduct asset market experiments. Results gathered from these first studies 
provided initial support for the core statements of the Hayekian hypothesis. The find-
ings highlighted the important role of market prices for dissemination and aggregation 
of information by simply showing that it “works” under some idealized conditions of 
experimental asset markets.  
 
2.3.2.2 Information dissemination 
Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott (1982) investigate the role of learning and experi-
ence in repeated trials of experimental asset markets with surely known asset payoffs, 
i.e. in the absence of information asymmetry among traders. One of their experiments 
included trading in a single asset paying different amounts of dividends to three types of 
traders twice a trading round. The market mechanism was organized as an oral double 
auction. Since the amount of dividends was private knowledge to all traders, two equi-
librium market prices existed for the first sub-period of each trading round, namely a 
naïve equilibrium (i.e., only bearing in mind private information on a trader’s own divi-
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dends in the two sub-periods) and a perfect foresight equilibrium (i.e., additionally con-
sidering potential speculative gains which could be earned in the second sub-period). In 
the second sub-period of each trading round a single unambiguous equilibrium price 
existed (namely the maximum amount of dividend paid to any of the three groups of 
traders). As it turned out from a sequence of eight identical replications under a station-
ary environment, asset prices in the second sub-period, as expected, were close to the 
equilibrium price of that sub-period in all trials. Asset prices in the first sub-period os-
cillated around the naïve equilibrium in the first trading rounds. Remarkably, though, 
prices in the first sub-period started to converge toward the perfect foresight equilibrium 
after a few repetitions of trading trials, since traders obviously learned what some of 
their counterparts were ready to pay for the asset in the second sub-periods. Apparently, 
experience from the second sub-period of a trading round “swung back” to the first sub-
period trading activity in later trading rounds. It can be concluded that the price system 
was able to reveal information (namely, dividend prospects of other traders) which was 
privately held at first. And agents in this environment were obviously able to learn from 
their experience across markets and thus were able to exploit profitable trading strate-
gies.  
Plott and Sunder (1982) tie in with the aforementioned experiments by Forsythe, 
Palfrey, and Plott (1982). They design a series of experimental markets in which assets 
only pay a single dividend once a trading round, but introduce uncertain payoffs in-
stead.81 Besides, they also use an oral double auction mechanism and define three types 
of traders. The uncertainty was reflected by the fact that the amount of dividend de-
pended lately on which out of two possible states of the world occurred. Probabilities of 
occurrence were known in advance. An important design feature was the fact that, at the 
beginning of each trading period, half of the traders (i.e., six out of twelve, two of each 
trader type) was given reliable hints on which future state of the world would occur, 
thus making them to insiders, while the other half of participants was left uninformed. 
Subjects were informed on the procedure in the instructions; however, the identity of 
insiders remained undisclosed. Again, there was one prior (or: naïve) information com-
petitive equilibrium and one rational expectations (or: perfect foresight) competitive 
equilibrium. Under the assumption of risk-neutral individuals, probabilities and divi-
dends were chosen adeptly so that these two equilibriums differed in one of the two 
                                                 
81  Design details described below refer to Market 3 of their study. 
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possible states (prior information equilibrium to be at a higher level), but were the same 
in the other state of the world. The general question addressed by their experiments was, 
whether transaction prices and asset allocations, in the course of a twelve-fold repetition 
of trading rounds (with different states of the world occurring), were consistent, if at all, 
with one of the theoretically derived equilibriums. As a result, they find evidence of 
trade prices converging closely (but neither perfectly nor instantaneously) toward the 
rational expectations equilibrium (instead toward the naïve equilibrium), which strongly 
supports the conjecture that uninformed traders are able, after gaining some experience, 
to infer reliable information on the real state of the world only from observing market 
prices. Moreover, profits of insiders were nearly the same as profits of non-insiders 
suggesting that initially uninformed traders finally acted pretty much as if they pos-
sessed insider information.82  
DeJong et al. (1992) replicate two of Plott and Sunder’s (1982) markets in a 
computerized double auction environment. In contrast to an oral double auction, traders 
can follow only the best bid and ask quote for each asset, the current market price, and 
transaction prices of their own trades. In particular this means that they can neither ob-
serve the prices from other traders’ transactions, nor do they know the identity of traders 
behind the current bid and ask quotes. As a result, the authors find that the markets are 
nonetheless able to convey information from the informed traders to the uninformed and 
that prices tend toward rational expectations equilibriums, albeit somewhat slower. 
Watts (1993) addresses the question of whether the common knowledge about 
the presence of insiders influences convergence toward the equilibrium. She reexamines 
the study by Plott and Sunder (1982), introducing a half-half chance for the existence of 
insiders (in that case, six out of twelve traders became insiders), and no insiders other-
wise. She finds that the uncertainty about whether there are informed agents in the mar-
kets or whether not reduces the accuracy of rational expectations predictions. In the 
                                                 
82  Convergence of asset allocations, however, emerged somewhat slower. Banks (1985) generally con-
firms the conclusions drawn by Plott and Sunder (1982) with respect to the price dynamics of the market. 
However, he was concerned about the fact that always the same traders were provided with insider infor-
mation throughout the twelve trading periods. Therefore, one cannot rule out the possibility that rational 
expectations equilibriums in their study were achieved by mimicking the behavior of traders identified as 
potential insiders, rather than by inferring information solely from current market prices. (Recall that the 
market institution in Plott and Sunder (1982, p. 666) was an oral double auction which enabled agents to 
unhamperedly observe trading behavior of other traders.) Banks’ findings slightly weaken the claim that 
information dissemination occurs exclusively by learning from market prices, but do not question the 
general message. 
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same vein Camerer and Weigelt (1991) test for “information mirages”83 in trading be-
havior when no insiders are around and find that traders are generally able to learn from 
market data whether insiders are present or not (essentially by the pace of trading), but 
some information mirages occurred in early trading rounds of a session, suggesting that 
it took the subjects some time to gain enough experience. A related question is to what 
extent are the transmission of information and the attainment of rational expectations 
equilibriums affected by the number of insiders in a market. Nöth and Weber (1996), for 
instance, conclude that market efficiency increases with the number of insiders. Ex-
perimental evidence is mixed, but at least suggests that the diffusion of information be-
comes more coincidental as the number of informed traders decreases.  
Copeland and Friedman (1987) conducted the first experimental study in which 
information was distributed sequentially to traders. They implemented a computerized 
double auction market and varied both the content and the timing of messages across 
traders. Their hypothesis of more trading volume as information arrives successively to 
the market (as opposed to a simultaneous distribution of information) was not con-
firmed, instead trading volume was lower: in order to avoid unfavorable transactions 
against insiders, uninformed traders waited until they received the information and 
hence, traded less often all in all. This was also reflected in wider bid-ask spreads in 
earlier sections of trading, and immediately after new messages arrived. Besides, they 
found previous results obtained by oral double auctions to be replicable in their comput-
erized double auction setup.  
 
2.3.2.3 Information aggregation and dissemination 
Another type of asset market experiments investigates the second approach of 
testing information efficiency in asset markets, namely the aggregation of widely dis-
persed information and conveyance of this information to all traders. Plott and Sunder 
(1988) conducted a series of experiments that are good representatives of this class of 
experiments. In their studies three possible states of nature (X, Y, and Z) are equally 
likely to occur. All variations of their experimental markets included repeated trading 
rounds in one or more assets with a maturity of one period paying a state-dependent 
                                                 
83  They define “information mirages” to be self-generating trading, “creating price paths that falsely 
reveal information that no one has”. This can arise when subjects trade, “mistakenly, as if they had 
learned inside information from others.” (Camerer and Weigelt (1991, pp. 489-490)). 
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dividend at the end of each trading period. As in earlier studies, the market mechanism 
employed was an oral double auction. Markets consisted of eight or twelve traders.  
To explore potential aggregation of information, every trader was initially pro-
vided with only a fragment of information indicating which state would definitely not 
occur (like “not Y” or “not Z”, each of which was privately sent to one-half of the trad-
ers, if X was the realization). Thus, the true state of the world could have been inferred 
through a process of elimination if one possessed all bits of information. However, each 
single trader could only rule out one of three alternatives, what is different to the insider 
models mentioned above in which a subgroup of traders received perfect information. 
All design features were made common knowledge. Final payoffs and probabilities 
were chosen such that the rational expectations equilibrium differed from the prior in-
formation equilibrium. In one series (series A)84 the market offered a single three-state 
asset that entailed different payoffs in each of the three states. But payoffs did not only 
differ in the three states of nature, but also for the three types of traders (to which par-
ticipants had been assigned at the beginning of the experiment). As a result, it is worth 
mentioning that market prices did not converge toward the rational expectations equilib-
rium. Presumably, the design was too complex to give traders the opportunity of implic-
itly recomposing the dispersed information via the price system. Moreover, the design 
was incomplete, since a single three-state asset is not able to span the whole state space. 
This motivated the authors to modify the design by introducing three state-spanning 
contingent claim assets in another series (series B). In that experiment, the markets si-
multaneously offered three “all-or-nothing” assets, each of which exactly referred to one 
possible state of the world (X, Y, or Z) and paid off a certain dividend if that state oc-
curred and nothing otherwise.85 Dividends were still different for the three types of trad-
ers. In a further series (series C), Plott and Sunder replicated the series A markets with 
the distinction that dividends were the same for all traders in the three possible states. 
As a result, they find that market prices and allocations in the series B and C experi-
ments indeed converge toward the rational expectations equilibrium, with the contingent 
claims markets performing best. One of the discussed explanations is the conjecture that 
“the purchase or sale of a security could be directly interpreted as a belief about the oc-
currence of a particular state. Thus traders in the contingent claims markets had a ‘natu-
                                                 
84  The labeling of the three series (A–C) does not exactly reflect the chronology of the trading sessions. 
85  State-contingent claims are also referred to as “Arrow-Debreu securities”. 
2  Fundamental concepts and literature review 72 
ral’ knowledge about the preferences of other traders that was not present in the single 
security markets.” (Plott and Sunder (1988, p. 1116)).  
With these experiments, the authors were one of the first who showed that, under 
some specific conditions, (experimental) asset markets are in principle able to aggregate 
fragmented pieces of information held by different traders, and that they are at the same 
time able to transfer aggregated information to all agents as a whole. However, it ap-
pears to depend particularly on the concrete market institutions and instruments whether 
this task can be achieved. State-contingent claims seem to be well-suited in doing so. 
Yet, in accordance with O'Brien and Srivastava (1991) it is also noteworthy that mar-
kets, which are efficient in the sense that there are no exploitable arbitrage strategies, 
need not necessarily to be efficient in a rational expectations sense. In their experiments, 
O’Brien and Srivastava find that successively increasing the complexity of the market 
design (like multiple, multi-period assets, correlated dividends across assets and peri-
ods) makes it more and more unlikely that the market mechanism aggregates informa-
tion efficiently, even with a uniform and publicly known dividend structure and a popu-
lation of experienced subjects. 
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) further investigate the extent to which markets 
actually aggregate and disseminate information. They conduct a series of experimental 
asset markets modifying a number of market parameters. They find that trading experi-
ence together with common knowledge about other traders’ payoff structures (i.e., other 
traders’ preferences) are sufficient conditions to achieve rational expectations equilib-
riums.  
The previously discussed experiments suggest that the ability of markets to ag-
gregate and distribute information via the price system works in general, but depends on 
different market factors like market rules and institutions, initial allocation of informa-
tion among agents, experience of traders and the number and nature of offered assets. In 
some environments, information aggregation worked remarkably well, in other settings 
markets failed to do so. 
 
2.3.2.4 Information production 
The studies on aggregation and conveyance of information in experimental asset 
markets described above refer to the first and the second proposition of the Hayekian 
hypothesis. The studies reviewed in the following additionally examine the third propo-
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sition, i.e., competition as a discovery process. Recall the free-rider problem that may 
arise with costly information production: if prices always immediately and completely 
adjusted to new information, no incentives would exist to produce such information at 
positive costs (cf. subsection 2.1.4.2). This problem is usually encountered by introduc-
ing noisy rational expectations models. These models allow for noise that covers up the 
true equilibrium to the extent that gains from trading only reimburse information pro-
ducers for their information procurement costs (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), 
Hellwig (1980), and Verrecchia (1982)). In these models, equilibriums in both the asset 
market and in the information market are analyzed simultaneously.  
In an experimental market design almost identical to that of Plott and Sunder 
(1982), Sunder (1992) attaches a positive value to private information and does no 
longer provide some of the agents with costless insider information.86 Half of the mar-
kets (series A) in his experiment were preceded by a separate market for information in 
which a fixed number of traders (four out of twelve) could decide to purchase insider 
information in an auction,87 thereby gaining knowledge on the true state of nature. The 
identity of insiders remained undisclosed after the auction took place. As a result, mar-
ket prices for information were initially high, but decreased substantially as trading ex-
perience improved in later trading rounds. Obviously, traders realized that it was not 
profitable to pay for information that, after a short period of trading, was incorporated in 
market prices anyway. This intuition rendered costly information acquisition unneces-
sary.88 Gross profits of the informed traders turned out to be greater than those of the 
uninformed; however, when the cost of information procurement was subtracted, net 
profits were almost the same for both types of traders. The price for information thus 
was about equal to the marginal profit from this information, which is consistent with 
noisy rational expectation predictions. According to Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, p. 
248), for instance, a market is efficient in its strong form only if the equilibrium price 
for additional information is zero. Given the rather low prices for information in Sun-
der’s (1992) markets, these appeared to be fairly efficient. In a second set of markets 
                                                 
86  Theoretically, the value of information is equal to the difference between the expected utility making 
an optimal decision under the best possible information, and the expected utility of an optimal decision 
where this information is not available (see Copeland and Friedman (1992, p. 241)). 
87  The auction scheme was a uniform price sealed bid auction (at the fifth highest bid price). 
88  However, if only a few traders initially possess insider information, it could be worthwhile again to 
purchase insider information and to try exploiting this information head start afterwards (see Huber, Kir-
chler, and Sutter (2006, p. 190)).  
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(series B), Sunder (1992) changes the design by charging a fixed price for purchasing 
insider information, allowing all traders to acquire this information. He finds that the 
number of information buyers varied widely and did not stabilize during the course of 
the experiment, because traders could not rely on the fact that enough information was 
bought at the end. When many traders bought insider information, it was pretty soon 
revealed through market prices and made it difficult for those who bought the informa-
tion to yield adequate compensation. When only a few traders purchased the informa-
tion, though, the market sometimes failed to reveal this information.  
Copeland and Friedman (1992) conducted experiments with a sequential provi-
sion of costly information in different settings, one of which is comparable to Sunder 
(1992) and yield similar results. In the more complex settings of their experiments, 
however, markets appeared to be incomplete, allowing substantial net profits to infor-
mation holders. Huber, Kirchler, and Sutter (2006) demonstrate that even costless in-
formation does not necessarily yield a positive marginal utility. In their setting, only 
above-average informed traders can gain from the additional information they receive.  
 
2.3.3 Experimental tests of individual judgment errors and market outcomes 
A central aspect of the present work is the question whether individual judgment 
biases transfer to competitive market outcomes, particularly in the context of partition-
dependence. This subsection is to review existing literature on this issue with respect to 
other judgmental biases than partition-dependence. An early example of addressing 
these topics experimentally is Camerer (1987) who analyzes experimental asset markets 
(employing a double-oral auction mechanism) in which prices provide insights on 
whether traders collectively act as Bayesian updaters in processing sample likelihood 
information, or whether prices rather reflect traders’ susceptibility to the “representa-
tiveness bias”. In addition, he compares individual judgments elicited before trading to 
market outcomes. Results are mixed: in one part, both average judgments as well as 
average market prices are very close to the Bayesian benchmark; in another part, 
though, market prices appear to be even more biased than individual judgments. How-
ever, the size of the bias diminishes as traders’ experience increases.  
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber (1989) compare individual-level judgments 
to laboratory market outcomes with respect to a bias they call the “curse of knowledge”. 
One common assumption in models of asymmetric information like this one is that bet-
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ter-informed people are able to predict the judgments of less-informed agents. However, 
it turns out that better-informed people are not always able to disregard their additional 
private information in estimating less-informed people’s judgments, even in an incentiv-
ized environment. As a result, predictions of other people’s judgments are biased. The 
authors find the “curse of knowledge” bias to be not fully eliminated in market out-
comes, but to be reduced by around 50% compared to individual judgments. They also 
find that bias strength in individual judgments is reduced with market experience. The 
main reason for the error-correcting ability of market forces, according to the authors, is 
the fact that less biased subjects more or less know that they are less biased. Therefore, 
this group of agents trade earlier and more actively, thereby signaling and conveying 
their information to more biased traders (congruent with the “smart few hypothesis”, see 
subsection 2.1.4.4). Contrary to the market forces, they suggest that incentives and ex-
perience did not play an important role in reducing the bias in their markets.  
In a more recent study, Kluger and Wyatt (2004) use the Monty Hall problem89 
to explore whether individual judgment errors survive in equilibrium market prices. In a 
two-stage experimental design they first elicit participants’ subjective probability esti-
mates on this problem to control for the bias in the judgments. In a second stage, they 
draw on the same subjects to constitute a market in which trading is related to the same 
decision problem.90 Afterwards, they compare individual judgments and therefrom de-
rived errors to market prices and allocations. Each of the twelve sessions comprises a 
total of six participants. If a market was composed of traders, all of whom were subject 
to the judgment bias, the authors find that markets are biased in a similar way, even in 
repeated trials and with substantial incentives. Thus, individual judgment errors aggre-
gated into market prices. Contrariwise, if there were at least a few91 subjects in the mar-
                                                 
89  The Monty Hall problem is named after an American game show in which a candidate faces three 
closed doors, two of which hide a goat (blank), and one of which hides a brand new car (grand prize). 
After the candidate has picked a door which she guesses to hide the car, the host opens a door which he 
knows is hiding one of the two goats. Leaving the remaining two doors closed, the candidate then gets the 
chance to decide whether she wishes to switch to the other door or whether she wants to adhere to the 
initially chosen door. While the chance of winning the new car is one third and remains one third, if the 
candidate hangs on to her initial decision, the chance of winning doubles to two thirds, if she opts to 
change the door with her final decision, regardless of which door she had initially selected. While this 
solution can easily be derived in a formal way (e.g., by applying Bayes’ theorem), it is counterintuitive to 
most people who fail to see why they should switch to another door once a goat is revealed; see, e.g., 
Friedman (1998). 
90  Two trading schemes were employed successively: Second-price sealed bid auctions and oral double 
auctions. 
91  Two traders are enough in their setting. 
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ket who did not err in individual judgments, market results turned out to be consistent 
with rational theory. Thus, competition among only a few bias-free traders was enough 
to correct the bias in market prices. Not surprisingly, the authors conclude that trading 
alone does not always ensure individual biases to be expunged from market prices; 
however, they present evidence for the conjecture that only a few unbiased agents is 
sufficient to collectively correct the bias, at least under the conditions of their market 
settings (also congruent with the “smart few hypothesis”).  
Coval and Shumway (2005) also contribute to the question whether behavioral 
biases affect prices. They analyze field data on Chicago Board of Trade (CBoT) pro-
prietary traders and report strong evidence for behavioral biases (in particular: loss-
aversion) among market makers.92 While biased traders seem to exert a substantial in-
fluence on prices in the short run, these prices tend to be reverted more quickly than 
those generated by unbiased traders, indicating that the market is able to distinguish 
between trades initiated by biased traders and information-based trades. The authors 
conclude that price impacts that result from behaviorally biased traders are quickly re-
moved by the healing power of arbitrage in a professional, highly liquid, and short-term 
environment.  
 
                                                 
92  Concretely, they analyze trading positions of CBoT market makers on a daily basis and find that 
traders who suffered losses in the morning increase their afternoon risk to a greater extent than traders 
who accumulated gains by the end of the morning. Thus, losing market makers are willing to assume 
more risk in the afternoon to avoid losses in their daily settlement of accounts. 
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3 Study 1: Laboratory study 
3.1 Basis treatment 
3.1.1 Study design 
The first study is designed to see whether partition-dependence occurs and per-
sists in short-run experimental markets. In addition, effects expressed in probability 
judgments (both before and after trading) are compared with effects revealed by predic-
tion-market trading prices. Furthermore, individual trading behavior is studied in greater 
detail to assess the quality and the validity of main results and to see whether (self-
rated) competence of traders affects the extent of partition-dependence. 
In April 2007, 192 undergraduate finance students (134 male, 58 female) were 
recruited from the University of Muenster (in Germany) to participate in one of twelve 
two-hour experimental trading sessions. To carry out the competence analysis (see sub-
section 3.1.4.1) students were asked to self-assess their general competence (scale 1–7) 
in the field of soccer (e.g. German Bundesliga) during the registration process (and they 
were asked for some more competence self-ratings in other domains to avoid problems 
with self-selection). Based on their self-reported soccer competence participants were 
grouped (without informing them) into high- and low-competence slots.93 Each of the 
twelve sessions comprised 16 traders who were randomly divided into two self-
contained groups (markets) with 8 traders in each. The sessions spanned one week and 
took place in a computerized laboratory environment where participants were separated 
from each other by dividers during the trading periods. The instructions (see Appendix 
I, translated from German) were handed out to all participants and were read out aloud 
by the experimenter to ensure that all information about the experiment was common 
knowledge. 
                                                 
93  As noted, students were asked to self-rate their competence/knowledge on four other topics (scale   
1–7) than soccer; these included: estimating distances, current political power structure, financial ratio 
analysis, and macroeconomic indicators. While soccer is directly related to one part of the experiment, the 
other four topics were just asked to avoid any self-selection bias in the students’ willingness to partici-
pate. Mean (median) self-reported soccer competence was 4.25 (4.5). Students with a competence score 
of 1–4 (N1=95) were assigned to the low-competence groups, students with a score of 5–7 (N2=95) were 
assigned to the high-competence groups (two backup participants did not complete the questionnaire 
during the registration process). 
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The essential part of the experiment consisted of several trading rounds in a set 
of three “winner-take-all” contracts94 on the occurrence of specific future events. Three 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events were defined for each market. 
Events that were used in the instructions, for instance, included intervals of the vote 
share received by the SPD (Social Democratic Party, a major German political party) in 
the next “Bundestag” elections. Concretely, the events considered in this example were 
the vote share v to fall into the following ranges: [0% ≤ v ≤ 29.9%], [30.0% ≤ v ≤ 
34.9%], and [35.0% ≤ v]. Each of the three events was represented by a single “winner-
take-all” asset. If an event occurred (did not occur), the asset that corresponded to that 
event would pay the owner 100 cents (0 cents) after the uncertainty about the outcome 
was resolved, i.e., after the election. Thus, exactly one of the three assets would pay 100 
cents while the other two assets would expire worthless. By construction, since all 
events together cover the full state space but at the same time individual events do not 
overlap, a complete set of assets is certain to pay 100 cents. Such a complete bundle of 
all available assets is called a “unit portfolio” (unit pf) and could be traded with the ex-
perimenter at any time for 100 cents to allow arbitrage when the sum of state space-
spanning prices is above or below 100 cents, and to create liquidity in stocks or assets. 
Recall that under some assumptions the prices of “winner-take-all” contracts can be 
directly interpreted to reflect market-aggregated probabilities that an event occurs, as 
discussed in subsection 2.1.4.3. 
The experimental setting included trading in the following three event do-
mains:95 finance, sports, and weather. The relevant event partitions are displayed in 
Table 3.1. The finance related event domain refers to the closing price of the most im-
portant German stock market index (DAX) on the day two weeks after the experiment. 
In partition 1 (the low partition) the events are that the DAX index value is in the inter-
vals [0, 7248.99], [7249, 7415.99], or 7416 and above (denoted [7416+]). In partition 2 
(the high partition) the events are based on the intervals [0, 7415.99], [7416, 7563.99], 
and [7564+]. 
 
 
 
                                                 
94  See subsection 2.1.1.3 for a definition of “winner-take-all” contracts in prediction markets. 
95  In the following, the terms “event domain” and “stimulus” are used synonymously. 
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Table 3.1:  Sets of asset partitions for the different treatments in Study 1. 
Financial markets   ----   Event:  DAX-closing in 2 weeks 
Asset definition: 
An asset will pay 100 cents, if the outcome of the underlying event exactly fits the 
definition of the asset. The other two assets will expire worthless. 
 
Relevant for the payment of the assets in the financial markets domain is the Xetra-
DAX closing (incl. final auction) in two weeks from today (i.e., on May 8, 2007). 
Xetra-DAX closing as of April 23, 2007 was 7335.62. 
 
 Partition 1 Partition 2 
Asset 1 DAX.[0 - 7248.99] DAX.[0 - 7415.99] 
Asset 2 DAX.[7249 - 7415.99] DAX.[7416 - 7563.99] 
Asset 3 DAX.[7416+] DAX.[7564+] 
 
 
Weather ----   Event:  Maximum Temperature in Münster at the end of May 
Asset definition:  
An asset will pay 100 cents, if the outcome of the underlying event exactly fits the 
definition of the asset. The other two assets will expire worthless. 
 
Relevant for the payment of the assets in the weather domain is the maximum tem-
perature two meters above ground-level (abbreviation: TX) at the weather center 
Muenster/Osnabrueck (station no.: 10315) on May 31st, 2007 in degrees Celsius de-
termined by Germany’s National Meteorological Service (“Deutscher Wetterdienst”). 
 
 Partition 1 Partition 2 
Asset 1 Temp.[up to 15.9] Temp.[up to 19.9] 
Asset 2 Temp.[16.0 - 19.9] Temp.[20.0 - 23.9] 
Asset 3 Temp.[20.0+] Temp.[24.0+] 
 
 
Sports   ----   Event: Total number of goals scored on the 34th game day of  
              German 1. Bundesliga (Season 2006/2007) 
Asset definition:  
An asset will pay 100 cents, if the outcome of the underlying event exactly fits the 
definition of the asset. The other two assets will expire worthless. 
 
Relevant for the payment of the assets in the sports domain is the total number of 
goals scored on the final game day of German 1. Bundesliga in the season 2006/2007 
(soccer/men). 
 
 Partition 1 Partition 2 
Asset 1 Goals.[0 - 20] Goals.[0 - 25] 
Asset 2 Goals.[21 - 25] Goals.[26 - 30] 
Asset 3 Goals.[26+] Goals.[31+] 
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The weather outcome refers to the maximum temperature in Muenster on May 
31, 2007, approximately one month after the experiments. The sports outcome is the 
total number of goals scored by all teams of German “Bundesliga” on the final game 
day of the current soccer season, three to four weeks after the experiments. The weather 
partitions are [-, 15.9], [16.0, 19.9], [20.0+] (low partition) and [-, 19.9], [20.0, 23.9], 
[24.0+] (high partition). The sports partitions are [0, 20], [21, 25], [26+] (low partition) 
and [0, 25], [26, 30], [31+] (high partition). 
As becomes clear from the fact that two partitions of the state space were de-
signed for each event domain, the main treatment variable is the way in which the state 
space is divided (i.e. partitioned) into events. In a between-subject design, participants 
in different markets were randomly assigned to trade one of the two different partitions 
of the state space for each event domain. In order to eliminate the possibility that parti-
tion-dependence is driven by information conveyed by the presented partition, both par-
titions were explicitly described to all participants in the instructions.96 This guaranteed 
that each participant did have the same information about the two different partitions 
and thus ensured that participants did not infer any likelihood information from the 
events they traded. 
As Figure 3.1 that was not shown to the subjects illustrates, to create these parti-
tions, each state space was initially divided into four disjoint and exhaustive intervals (I1 
to I4). In each partition two of the adjacent intervals were combined to form a single 
asset. In partition 1 (the low partition) the upper two intervals were combined (forming 
an asset a1,3 with interval denoted I3∪ I4), and the lower two intervals were traded sepa-
rately (I1 and I2). In partition 2 (the high partition) the lower two intervals were com-
bined (forming an asset a2,1 with interval denoted I1∪ I2), and the upper two intervals 
were traded separately (I3 and I4). Both partitions therefore have three separate events. 
Note that by construction, the first asset in partition 2 (a2,1), which refers to the interval 
I1∪ I2, is a fusion of the first two assets a1,1 (I1) and a1,2 (I2) in partition 1. The third as-
set in partition 1 (a1,3), which refers to the interval I3∪ I4, is a fusion of assets a2,2 (I3) 
and a2,3 (I4) in partition 2.97 Thus, from a rational point of view these combinations are 
                                                 
96  This refers to the “credibility” account discussed in subsection 2.2.3. 
97  To make the point crystal clear, to the extent that any information is conveyed by the partitions de-
scribed in the instructions, it is that the experimenter thinks that the dividing point between intervals I2 
and I3 is special (perhaps it divides the state space into regions of relatively equal expected likelihood). 
However, because there is no informational asymmetry between conditions, partition-dependence cannot 
be rationalized on the basis of information conveyed to participants by the partitions presented. 
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equally likely to occur and hence, should differ neither in terms of judged probabilities 
nor in terms of prediction market prices.98 
 
7249 7416 7564
DAX
Treatment 2
Asset a2,2 (I3)Asset a2,1 (I1∪ I2) Asset a2,3 (I4)
Treatment 1
Asset a1,2 (I2)Asset a1,1 (I1) Asset a1,3 (I3∪ I4)
7416 ≤ DAX ≤ 7563.99
7249 ≤ DAX ≤ 7415.99DAX ≤ 7248.99 7416 ≤ DAX
DAX ≤ 7415.99    7564 ≤ DAX
 
Figure 3.1:  Construction of assets for two DAX partitions. 
For the sports and weather event domains the interval boundaries were chosen 
rather arbitrarily based on historical outcomes, so there is no conclusive way to link 
probabilities expressed by individual judgments or inferred from market prices to objec-
tive probabilities. However, for the finance DAX event domain, the four intervals were 
created from historical data: Given the previous DAX closing price, and the recent 
short-term historical volatility of the DAX, it is possible to calculate the expected prob-
ability density function (PDF) for the DAX close two weeks in the future. The calcula-
tion is based on a random-walk theory for stocks and stock index price movements and 
is consistent with efficient market theory (see, e.g., Hull (2009, pp. 260-272) for a text-
book version): The stochastic process usually used to describe stock (index) price 
movements is called a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). For each infinitesimal small 
period of time the GBM assumes (i) normally distributed returns and (ii) independent 
                                                 
98  This experiment corrected a flaw in an earlier pilot study, in which the boundaries of adjacent closed 
intervals were the same (e.g., [x, y] and [y, z], so that y is included in both intervals). The use of closed 
intervals is a design flaw because if subjects are highly confident that the numerical value is y, then the 
sum of the interval prices for [x, y] and [y, z] could rationally be higher than the combined interval [x, z]. 
For the DAX stock market index (scaled in the hundredth) and for temperatures (rounded to the nearest 
0.1°C) the overlap of the closed intervals at their common meeting point y is probably a minor problem, 
but for the sports outcomes (number of goals) it creates an interpretive problem. The results from the 
earlier pilot study and the one reported here, however, are quite similar. 
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returns for two non-overlapping intervals. Given this stochastic process the logarithmic 
future price of a stock (index) ln ST is normally distributed with mean ln S0 + (µ –
 σ2/2)·T and standard deviation Tσ : 
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Against this background, the interval boundaries were defined such that each of 
the four events represents a certain percentile of the expected PDF. The intervals        
{I1, …, I4} represent the following percentiles: {27.5%; 27.5%; 22.5%; 22.5%}. Consis-
tently, intervals I1∪ I2 and I3∪ I4 represent a percentile of 55.0% and 45.0%, respec-
tively. If prices of the “winner-take-all” contracts were guided by historical frequency, 
they should correspond to these percentiles. Since different experimental sessions were 
spread out over a week, the DAX intervals were adjusted for each experimental session 
(based on the recent DAX index close) to preserve the percentiles.99 This day-by-day 
adjustment of interval boundaries enables (i) comparability and aggregation of the data 
from sessions on different dates and (ii) allows comparing expressed probabilities and 
market prices with the historical guesses. Traders were not told about the procedure for 
constructing and adjusting the intervals, since doing so would instruct subjects about 
expected probabilities and constitute an additional treatment effect. Since there was no 
such adjustment for the weather and sports events, if similar patterns are evident across 
all three event domains then there is no harmful influence from the day-to-day adjust-
ment of the DAX intervals. No additional background knowledge was provided con-
cerning the different event domains.100 
For each of the three event domains two completely identical and independent 
trading rounds were run successively (i.e., repeated trials were run under a “stationary 
replication” condition), resulting in six trading rounds per participant and experimental 
group, as shown in Figure 3.3. Each trading round lasted ten minutes (with short breaks 
between rounds). The order in which the participants traded assets from the three event 
domains varied for each experimental session and was perfectly counterbalanced (i.e., 
                                                 
99  See Appendix II for a Table with session-individual DAX interval boundaries. 
100  However, participants were told the previous DAX close in the instructions to give them a clue of the 
current index level. 
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for each of the six possible event domain orders there were two experimental sessions) 
to avoid any order effects.101 In each of the six trading rounds the participants were ini-
tially endowed with a combination of assets (i.e., unit portfolios spanning the set of as-
sets) and cash, to the value of €20 in total.102 Participants were compensated incentive-
compatible based on their final cash and asset holdings for an afterwards randomly cho-
sen trading round, at the point when the relevant uncertainty about the future outcome 
was resolved and asset payoffs (either 100 or 0 cents) became clear.  
 
 
Figure 3.2:  Screenshot of the trading application (practice market).103 
                                                 
101  The six possible event domain orders are: (1) 2 × finance, 2 × weather, 2 × sports; (2) 2 × finance, 
2 × sports, 2 × weather; (3) 2 × weather, 2 × finance, 2 × sports; (4) 2 × weather, 2 × sports, 2 × finance; 
(5) 2 × sports, 2 × finance, 2 × weather; and (6) 2 × sports, 2 × weather, 2 × finance. 
102  In each market (of eight participants) groups of two traders were randomly endowed with one of the 
four different combinations: 16 unit portfolios + 400 cents, 12/800, 8/1200, 4/1600, all of them represent-
ing a value of €20. For each trader her initial endowment was the same over the six trading rounds. 
103  The trading software was especially developed for the study. It is based on Java Runtime Environ-
ment technology and was set up on a web-based client-server structure. The graphical user interface 
(GUI) was divided into three areas: the account info area, the market area and the order history. Partici-
pants could submit, edit or cancel buy or sell orders via an order form. Orders were processed and exe-
cuted by the system within split seconds; the trading screen updated in real-time. 
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Expected value of payment was €20 per person.104 There was no credit line and 
no short selling, although traders could use unit portfolio transactions to short sell assets 
indirectly.105 No explicit transaction costs were imposed for trading. The trading institu-
tion was a multi-unit continuous double auction (CDA) with a hidden order book. Sub-
jects only saw the best bid and ask quotes for each asset (see Figure 3.2 for a screenshot 
of the trading software). Participants could submit bid and ask quotes for each asset 
simultaneously, so they could act as effective market makers. Trading took place only 
among the eight traders that were assigned to the same market;106 in particular they 
could not trade across markets with different partitions. During instruction and a prac-
tice trading round, participants were provided hints on the handling of the trading soft-
ware and were told how to exploit arbitrage opportunities (within the market) by buying 
or selling unit portfolios with the experimenter for cash. 
Before the first trading round for each event domain, and after the second (and 
final) trading round, the participants were asked to provide their individual probability 
judgments for the occurrence of the three events they traded. These judgments were not 
incentivized. Participants were also asked in advance for their self-rated competence in 
making such probability judgments in the domain of the specific stimulus (scale 1 [in-
competent] to 7 [very competent]). At the end of the session they were further asked to 
provide some personal information like age, self-rated knowledge in the field of statis-
tics and econometrics, or trading experience. Some earlier studies have compared indi-
vidual judgments of probabilities (as often elicited or inferred from psychology experi-
ments) with probabilities expressed by market trades (see subsection 2.3.3). Like those 
studies, one question the present method can address is whether partition-dependence is 
expressed by individual judgments, and whether it is moderated by the bundle of institu-
tional and learning properties of markets. Figure 3.3 illustrates one of the six possible 
courses of an experimental session:107 
                                                 
104  The minimum possible payoff per participant was €0, the maximum possible payoff was €160 (which 
equals the amount that was paid in total to the eight participants of a market). Hence, the total amount of 
€320 was paid to the 16 participants in each experimental session. 
105  Buying the unit portfolio at 100 cents and selling one of the three assets afterwards is equivalent to 
short selling that asset. The only difference is that in the latter case a margin of 100 cents (i.e., the worst 
possible payoff for the shorted asset) is imposed until the final value of the assets is determined. Alterna-
tively, a trader could directly buy the two complement assets (without buying the unit portfolio before) 
which is equivalent to short selling an asset, too, as long as the prices for all assets sum to 100 cents. 
106  The only exception was trading the unit portfolio which was always executed immediately against the 
experimenter. 
107  As mentioned above, the order in which the three event domains were traded was perfectly counter-
balanced for the twelve session slots. 
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Figure 3.3:  Example of the time course of an experimental session. 
To summarize, judgments and experimental trading data was gathered from 
twelve session slots (each of which consisted of two self-contained markets with eight 
traders per market) with six trading rounds each (three different event domains × two 
identical and independent trials per event domain), resulting in 144 trading rounds 
(twelve sessions × six trading rounds per session × two treatments). Half of these mar-
kets (72) offered assets from partition 1, the other half offered assets from partition 2. 
Partitions were randomly assigned to the markets for each event domain, so it was pos-
sible, for instance, that a market of eight participants traded assets of partition 1 in the 
finance and the weather event domain, and traded assets of partition 2 in the sports do-
main (consequently, the other market in that session traded the complement partitions). 
 
3.1.2 Descriptive analysis 
Some general facts on trading activity and market efficiency are presented in the 
following. The total number of trades (except unit portfolio trades) in the 144 trading 
rounds was 6,167. Accordingly, the average number of trades per 10-minutes trading 
round was 42.83, an average of 14.28 for each of the three assets, and total shares traded 
were about 140 in each market. Table 3.2 presents a breakdown of the total number of 
trades across event domains and session slots (but pooled across event partitions). It 
turns out that trades were distributed quite evenly across the three stimuli with some 
more trades occurring in the second trading round of each event domain (6.7% more 
trades on average). It also appears that trading happened to be fairly balanced across the 
twelve session slots, though some slots being more active (like Slot 3 which accounts 
for 10.3% of all trades) than others (like Slot 9 which accounts for only 6.9% of all 
trades). 
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Table 3.2:  Breakdown of the total number of trades. 
Round 1 Round 2 Total Round 1 Round 2 Total Round 1 Round 2 Total
Slot 1 73 84 157 80 97 177 78 86 164 498 8.1%
Slot 2 94 108 202 90 89 179 79 80 159 540 8.8%
Slot 3 115 95 210 91 100 191 117 115 232 633 10.3%
Slot 4 78 105 183 74 81 155 85 71 156 494 8.0%
Slot 5 71 83 154 81 103 184 71 71 142 480 7.8%
Slot 6 77 76 153 76 77 153 74 79 153 459 7.4%
Slot 7 74 81 155 107 94 201 83 76 159 515 8.4%
Slot 8 83 81 164 82 99 181 63 94 157 502 8.1%
Slot 9 69 70 139 75 70 145 70 71 141 425 6.9%
Slot 10 72 64 136 93 79 172 84 86 170 478 7.8%
Slot 11 103 110 213 83 100 183 77 80 157 553 9.0%
Slot 12 89 113 202 81 110 191 91 106 197 590 9.6%
Total 998 1,070 2,068 1,013 1,099 2,112 972 1,015 1,987 6,167 100.0%
Percent
Number of Trades
Finance Sports Weather
Total
 
 
A similarly balanced picture is reflected in the average trading volume per trade, 
with an average volume of 3.39 assets per trade. Table 3.3 provides some summary sta-
tistics on the number of trades per market, the average number of assets per trade, and 
the total volume per market across event domains. 
 
Table 3.3:  Trading volume statistics. 
Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max.
Finance 21 43.08 62 1.93 3.37 5.42 81 144.17 284
Sports 25 44.00 66 2.07 3.31 4.37 78 143.92 210
Weather 26 41.40 64 2.31 3.49 5.90 85 143.48 242
All 21 42.83 66 1.93 3.39 5.90 78 143.85 284
No. of trades
per market
Average No. of 
assets per trade
Total assets traded per 
market
 
 
In addition, trading was relatively continuous across the 10-minute trading pe-
riod: The fraction of trades that occurred in each one-minute interval averaged between 
8.5 and 11.8% (the former in the first, the latter in the second trading minute). As can be 
seen from Table 3.4, trading pace shows very similar patterns across all three event do-
mains and trading rounds: within a small range of fluctuation, the pattern shows increas-
ing trading activity at the beginning of each trading period that reaches a peak in the 
second and third minute. Afterwards, trading activity calms slightly down before an-
other step-up occurs during the last two minutes. This suggests that 10 minutes of trad-
ing is an appropriate period per trial for two reasons: on the one hand, there is enough 
3  Study 1: Laboratory study 87 
time for traders to “calm down” after some minutes of high frequency trading, so they 
can think thoroughly about prices and their positions; on the other hand, the final in-
crease of trading activity implies that participants are still attentive and eager to trade at 
the end of the trading period. 
 
Table 3.4:  Temporal distribution of trades in a 10-minute trading period. 
Round 1 Round 2 Total Round 1 Round 2 Total Round 1 Round 2 Total
Minute 1 8.3% 9.3% 8.8% 12.8% 5.6% 9.1% 5.9% 9.0% 7.4% 8.5%
Minute 2 11.6% 11.7% 11.7% 12.0% 12.1% 12.1% 12.4% 10.9% 11.7% 11.8%
Minute 3 10.4% 11.7% 11.1% 11.2% 11.6% 11.4% 12.8% 11.5% 12.1% 11.5%
Minute 4 10.4% 10.8% 10.6% 8.3% 11.3% 9.8% 8.5% 10.3% 9.5% 10.0%
Minute 5 9.5% 10.1% 9.8% 10.1% 11.2% 10.7% 10.0% 11.3% 10.7% 10.4%
Minute 6 9.0% 9.7% 9.4% 8.6% 9.0% 8.8% 9.1% 10.3% 9.7% 9.3%
Minute 7 9.8% 10.0% 9.9% 9.7% 9.2% 9.4% 9.3% 8.8% 9.0% 9.5%
Minute 8 9.0% 6.4% 7.6% 9.0% 9.6% 9.3% 9.1% 8.8% 8.9% 8.6%
Minute 9 10.2% 9.3% 9.7% 7.9% 9.5% 8.7% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 9.4%
Minute 10 11.6% 11.1% 11.4% 10.5% 10.9% 10.7% 13.2% 9.2% 11.1% 11.1%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Fraction of Trades (in Percent)
Finance Sports Weather
Total
 
 
It is also helpful to look at the volatility of trade prices to get a more comprehen-
sive view of trading activity. The mean standard deviation of trade prices per market 
and asset is 4.99 (based on all trades) and is reduced by nearly half to 2.75 if only the 
last three trades are considered (N=432).108 In general, mean volatility is slightly re-
duced in the second trading round: 5.77 in the first compared to 4.20 in the second trad-
ing round (based on all trades) and 3.09 in the first compared to 2.40 in the second trad-
ing round (based on the last three trades). The mean volatility of asset prices does not 
differ systematically across event domains. Mean standard deviation of trade prices 
seems to be higher for assets of partition 1 (at least for the finance and the weather 
stimulus) and this difference is indeed statistically significant (1% level by a Kruskal-
Wallis test) based on all trade prices, but is not statistically significant for only the last 
three prices (based on the same test). Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 summarize the mean stan-
dard deviation of trade prices. 
 
                                                 
108  N=432 results from 144 trading rounds × 3 assets/trading round. 
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Table 3.5:  Mean standard deviation of trade prices (based on all trades). 
Finance Sports Weather Total Finance Sports Weather Total
Treatment 1
P (I 1 ) 6.57 5.72 5.53 5.94 5.32 3.63 3.16 4.04 4.99
P (I 2 ) 9.17 4.80 5.79 6.59 4.59 4.21 6.42 5.07 5.83
P (I 3 ∪ Ι 4 ) 5.92 5.13 7.22 6.09 6.50 4.91 5.46 5.62 5.86
Total 7.22 5.22 6.18 6.21 5.47 4.25 5.01 4.91 5.56
Treatment 2
P (I 1 ∪ Ι 2 ) 3.91 5.74 4.93 4.86 2.71 4.12 1.84 2.89 3.87
P (I 3 ) 5.29 6.10 3.45 4.95 3.24 3.72 3.83 3.59 4.27
P (I 4 ) 6.96 6.64 4.99 6.20 4.45 4.23 3.28 3.99 5.09
Total 5.39 6.16 4.46 5.34 3.47 4.02 2.98 3.49 4.41
6.30 5.69 5.32 5.77 4.47 4.13 4.00 4.20 4.99Total
Trading Round 1 Trading Round 2
Mean Standard Deviation of Trade Prices (Based on all Trades)
Total
 
Table 3.6:  Mean standard deviation of trade prices (based on last three trades). 
Finance Sports Weather Total Finance Sports Weather Total
Treatment 1
P (I 1 ) 2.07 2.65 1.95 2.23 1.35 1.88 1.04 1.42 1.82
P (I 2 ) 3.51 3.95 2.32 3.26 3.04 4.30 3.44 3.59 3.43
P (I 3 ∪ Ι 4 ) 4.11 3.85 2.92 3.63 4.39 2.09 3.54 3.34 3.48
Total 3.23 3.48 2.40 3.04 2.93 2.76 2.67 2.79 2.91
Treatment 2
P (I 1 ∪ Ι 2 ) 2.25 3.28 3.20 2.91 2.08 1.78 1.63 1.83 2.37
P (I 3 ) 4.20 5.57 0.88 3.55 1.47 1.74 2.72 1.97 2.76
P (I 4 ) 3.07 3.00 2.89 2.99 2.64 1.40 2.66 2.23 2.61
Total 3.17 3.95 2.32 3.15 2.06 1.64 2.34 2.01 2.58
3.20 3.72 2.36 3.09 2.49 2.20 2.51 2.40 2.75
Total
Total
Mean Standard Deviation of Trade Prices (Based on Last Three Trades)
Trading Round 1 Trading Round 2
 
 
One approach to assess market efficiency is to look at the occurrence and exploi-
tation of arbitrage opportunities. As noted above, buying or selling the unit portfolio 
could have been used to exploit arbitrage opportunities within a market rapidly. An ar-
bitrage opportunity exists if the sum of one, two or three bid quotes (buy quota) is above 
100 cents which is called a bid arbitrage opportunity. In that case an arbitrageur could 
buy a unit portfolio at 100 cents from the experimenter and sell the constituent assets 
separately to the market for more than 100 cents. Another arbitrage opportunity exists if 
the three ask quotes (sell quota) sum to less than 100 cents which is called an ask arbi-
trage opportunity. In that case an arbitrageur could buy a full set of assets for less than 
100 cents in the market and sell them jointly as a unit portfolio for 100 cents to the ex-
perimenter. In the present experimental setting, these arbitrage strategies are not per-
fectly riskless since the possibility of block trades is not implemented in the trading 
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software, and hence, sequentially executing the necessary trades will take (at least) a 
few seconds. This bears the risk that arbitrage-permitting quotes are removed from the 
system or arbitrage is exploited by some other arbitrageur in the meantime. In part, this 
can explain why arbitrage opportunities were not exploited in any case. Table 3.7 and 
Table 3.8 present the details of some descriptive statistics on arbitrage opportunities in 
this study.109  
 
Table 3.7:  Summary statistics on bid arbitrage opportunities. 
Panel A: No. of markets (10-min. trading round) with no arbitrage opportunities (N =144 trading rounds)
Finance
Sports
Weather
Total
Panel B: Total arbitrage period [seconds] per market (10-min. trading round),  (N =144 trading rounds)
Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max.
Finance 0.00 47.30 84.01 296.11 0.00 37.36 70.46 305.72 0.00 37.36 77.24 305.72
Sports 0.00 72.87 85.25 210.18 0.00 59.68 75.20 230.82 0.00 62.63 80.22 230.82
Weather 0.00 50.90 82.71 436.26 0.00 46.02 75.24 375.25 0.00 48.93 78.98 436.26
Total 0.00 55.40 83.99 436.26 0.00 46.87 73.64 375.25 0.00 50.71 78.81 436.26
Panel C: Time period [seconds] until exploitation
Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max.
Finance 1.16 15.46 26.88 141.87 1.07 8.43 21.14 208.87 1.07 12.13 23.92 208.87
Sports 1.22 16.18 29.65 133.64 1.05 12.42 19.00 126.36 1.05 12.75 23.48 133.64
Weather 1.23 9.95 28.77 369.73 1.00 12.59 24.74 188.38 1.00 11.45 26.70 369.73
Total 1.16 12.84 28.39 369.73 1.00 11.45 21.38 208.87 1.00 12.24 24.62 369.73
Panel D: Time-weighted amount [cents] per arbitrage occurrence (N =461 occurences)
Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max.
Finance 0.49 5.60 11.85 119.00 0.25 3.03 6.77 50.00 0.25 5.00 9.22 119.00
Sports 0.62 8.38 10.54 44.99 0.01 2.55 5.21 51.00 0.01 4.44 7.45 51.00
Weather 0.05 5.00 6.94 33.00 0.62 3.00 3.77 15.40 0.05 3.91 5.31 33.00
Total 0.05 5.60 9.84 119.00 0.01 3.00 5.29 51.00 0.01 4.10 7.39 119.00
3 2 5
TotalTrading Round 1
3
2
8
Trading Round 2
6
9
20
Bid Arbitrage
3
7
12
 
                                                 
109  Note that a bid quote of 0 cents (any asset could be notionally sold for 0 cents) and an ask quote of 
100 cents (any asset could be purchased as part of the unit portfolio for 100 cents) is assumed for missing 
bid and ask quotes, respectively. By consequence, the bid arbitrage condition may be fulfilled even if a 
bid quote is missing for one or two assets (e.g., the bid quote for one asset is missing but is 50 and 65 
cents for the other two assets, respectively). On the other hand, the ask arbitrage condition cannot be 
fulfilled if at least one ask quote is missing. Note further that arbitrage opportunities lasting for less than 
one second were excluded from the calculations for technical reasons. 
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Table 3.8:  Summary statistics on ask arbitrage opportunities. 
Panel A: No. of markets (10-min. trading round) with no arbitrage opportunities (N =144 trading rounds)
Finance
Sports
Weather
Total
Panel B: Total arbitrage period [seconds] per market (10-min. trading round),  (N =144 trading rounds)
Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max.
Finance 0.00 0.00 22.95 106.84 0.00 6.19 28.15 188.90 0.00 2.89 25.55 188.90
Sports 0.00 0.00 20.75 268.31 0.00 0.00 31.47 395.86 0.00 0.00 26.11 395.86
Weather 0.00 0.00 16.46 225.88 0.00 0.00 37.85 484.85 0.00 0.00 27.16 484.85
Total 0.00 0.00 20.05 268.31 0.00 0.00 32.49 484.85 0.00 0.00 26.27 484.85
Panel C: Time period [seconds] until exploitation
Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max.
Finance 1.85 10.05 20.40 101.43 1.24 9.68 21.80 185.09 1.24 9.86 21.15 185.09
Sports 1.85 10.08 33.20 151.67 1.40 15.61 29.05 334.24 1.40 13.08 30.57 334.24
Weather 1.05 6.69 21.95 180.26 1.08 20.77 47.81 455.34 1.05 9.58 35.23 455.34
Total 1.05 9.52 24.06 180.26 1.08 12.42 30.78 455.34 1.05 10.83 27.82 455.34
Panel D: Time-weighted amount [cents] per arbitrage occurrence (N =136 occurences)
Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max. Min. Median Mean Max.
Finance 0.20 3.50 4.19 17.00 0.38 2.00 3.24 13.77 0.20 3.00 3.68 17.00
Sports 0.50 1.94 2.49 6.36 0.50 2.65 4.42 15.63 0.50 2.00 3.71 15.63
Weather 0.01 1.55 2.57 7.94 0.81 3.56 8.72 37.00 0.01 3.20 5.73 37.00
Total 0.01 2.13 3.28 17.00 0.38 3.00 5.01 37.00 0.01 3.00 4.25 37.00
15 17 32
Ask Arbitrage
Trading Round 1 Trading Round 2 Total
13 10 23
15 17 32
43 44 87
 
 
Panel A of Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 shows a breakdown of the total number of 
markets (i.e., 10-minute trading rounds) with no arbitrage opportunities at all. In total, 
out of 144 markets, 20 (13.9%) do not show bid arbitrage opportunities at all and 87 
(60.4%) have no ask arbitrage opportunities. Panel B contains a breakdown of summary 
statistics (minimum—median—mean—maximum) on the total duration of arbitrage 
opportunities (in seconds) per market. Bid arbitrage occasions sum to a median of 50.71 
seconds per 10-minute trading round (i.e., 8.5% of the total trading time). The respec-
tive median value for ask arbitrage is 0 since the majority of markets does not show any 
ask arbitrage opportunities (as reported above). The mean value is somewhat higher for 
bid arbitrage (78.81 seconds) and is 26.27 seconds for ask arbitrage due to some outlier 
markets. Panel C addresses the question of how long does it take until an arbitrage op-
portunity disappears. This question is important because market efficiency can be as-
sumed to be high if existing arbitrage opportunities are exploited rapidly. The median 
(mean in parentheses) duration of a bid arbitrage event is 12.24 (24.62) seconds after the 
opportunity first appeared, the corresponding values for ask arbitrage are 10.83 (27.82) 
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seconds. These periods are relatively short for both bid and ask arbitrage occasions 
given that block trades were not allowed. Panel D finally sheds light on how meaningful 
arbitrage opportunities were in terms of exploitable profits. The median (mean in paren-
theses) time-weighted amount of arbitrage profits per arbitrage opportunity was only 
4.10 (7.39) cents for bid arbitrage and 3.00 (4.25) cents for ask arbitrage; so even when 
arbitrage opportunities exist they are small. Given the four metrics of Panels A–D, it 
appears that neither there is an obvious pattern of arbitrage opportunities across the 
three event domains nor for the two trading rounds per event domain (figures for bid 
arbitrage look somewhat “better” for the second trading round, figures for ask arbitrage, 
though, look slightly “better” for the first trading round).  
 
Table 3.9:  Time-weighted average of bid and ask sums. 
Bid Ask
Trading Round 1
Finance 84.57 126.84
Sports 87.05 123.15
Weather 87.89 122.70
Average 86.46 124.05
Trading Round 2
Finance 90.52 119.74
Sports 90.32 119.83
Weather 91.03 115.64
Average 90.57 118.40
Total average 88.72 121.16
Time-weighted 
Average Sum of Quotes
 
 
To get an impression of the aggregate bid-ask-spread, Table 3.9 presents the 
time-weighted average of bid and ask sums, i.e. the sum of all bid and ask quotes on 
average, respectively.110 The data is homogeneous across session slots and event do-
mains. However, the average sum of quotes is closer to 100 cents for the second trading 
round of an event domain (bid sum: 90.57 vs. ask sum: 118.40 cents) compared to the 
first trading round (bid sum: 86.46 vs. ask sum: 124.05 cents). Pooling data yields a 
                                                 
110 Periods with missing bid/ask quotes and periods during which the sum of all bid (ask) quotes was 
above (below) 100 cents (i.e., fulfilling the bid/ask arbitrage condition) were excluded from this analysis 
to be as conservative as possible. Including arbitrage periods improves the time-weighted average bid 
(ask) sum to 93.32 (119.47) cents for the pooled data, respectively. 
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time-weighted average bid sum of 88.72 cents and a time-weighted average ask sum of 
121.16 cents. This result suggests that the markup111 is on average higher for the ask 
side than for the bid side of market quotes.  
To summarize, the descriptive analysis of trading data reflects a balanced view 
of high trading activity among participants. Trading is quite evenly distributed across 
session slots and event domains with some more activity taking place in the second of 
the two consecutive trading rounds. Trading within a trading round reflects a regular 
pattern suggesting that ten minutes of trading is an appropriate period per trial. The 
standard deviation of trade prices reflects a “stimulating discussion” among traders 
about “correct” prices, and is slightly reduced in the second trading round. Volatility of 
the last three trade prices, in turn, is reasonably small to assume that they are close to 
equilibrium prices. With respect to the market efficiency of the markets, there was a 
number of bid arbitrage opportunities (i.e., the market was paying too much for a full 
set of assets) and a few ask arbitrage opportunities (i.e., the market was asking too less 
for a full set of assets). However, in most cases arbitrage opportunities were removed 
after a short period of time (either by exploitation or by cancelation of quotes), and were 
modest in terms of possible arbitrage profits. Thus, market efficiency can generally be 
rated high (except for a few outliers): on the one hand, the occurrence of arbitrage op-
portunities shows that the sum of quotes is generally oscillating around 100 cents (as 
confirmed by the time-weighted average sum of bid and ask quotes); on the other hand, 
the fast disappearance of arbitrage opportunities is evidence for market forces being 
strong enough to eliminate obvious irrationalities. 
 
3.1.3 Main results 
3.1.3.1 Judged probabilities 
The main hypotheses and results refer to the focal treatment variable, i.e., the 
different partitions into which the state space was divided. The hypotheses are led by 
the conjecture that subjective probability judgments as well as equilibrium market 
prices are partition-dependent and biased toward the ignorance prior of 1/N, thus differ-
                                                 
111  The “markup” is defined as the difference between the sum of all bid or ask quotes and the price for 
the unit portfolio (e.g., 100 cents) and is sometimes also referred to as “overround”. It is usually used as a 
measure of efficiency and competitiveness in (winner-take-all) betting markets. 
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ing systematically across partitions. Consistent with support theory, judged probabilities 
as well as market prices are expected to be subadditive, i.e. to be higher for an event if it 
is unpacked into two separately evaluated intervals than if it is evaluated as a whole.112 
It is further conjectured that market forces may be in part able to diminish partition-
dependence; the bias is thus expected to be more pronounced in individually judged 
probabilities than in probabilities derived from market prices. 
At first, the pre-trading and post-trading judged probabilities pJ,i will be consid-
ered for the different event domains i (judgments are required, by instruction, to sum to 
1.0 across the exhaustive set of events).113 The notation pJ,i(I1) and pJ,i(I2) refer to the 
judged probability of unpacked intervals I1 and I2, respectively (as in partition 1 in 
Figure 3.1); and pJ,i(I1∪ I2) refers to the judged probability of the single packed interval 
which is the union of intervals I1 and I2 (as in partition 2). Accordingly, pJ,i(I3) and 
pJ,i(I4) refer to the judged probability of unpacked intervals I3 and I4, respectively (as in 
partition 2 in Figure 3.1); and the notation pJ,i(I3∪ I4) is used to denote the judged prob-
ability of the packed interval which is the union of intervals I3 and I4 (as in partition 1). 
In the present between-subjects design, the main treatment effect for individual judg-
ments is analyzed by comparing the sum of probability judgments for intervals I1 and I2 
(partition 1) to the judgment for the interval I1∪ I2 (partition 2), and analogously by 
comparing the sum of probability judgments for intervals I3 and I4 (partition 2) to the 
judgment for interval I3∪ I4 (partition 1). Hypothesis 3.1 states the partition-dependence 
prediction for intervals I1 and I2 (H0(a)) and intervals I3 and I4 (H0(b))114. The null hy-
pothesis of no partition-dependence is that pJ,i(I1) + pJ,i(I2) = pJ,i(I1∪ I2) and pJ,i(I3) + 
pJ,i(I4) = pJ,i(I3∪ I4). 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: 
H0(a):  pJ,i(I1) + pJ,i(I2) > pJ,i(I1∪ I2)   and 
H0(b):  pJ,i(I3) + pJ,i(I4) > pJ,i(I3∪ I4) 
 
                                                 
112  See subsection 2.2.4. for a presentation of support theory. 
113  Pre-trading (or: before-trading) refers to probability judgments elicited before the first trading round 
of each event domain (ex ante). Post-trading (or: after-trading) probability judgments were collected from 
each participant after the second trading round of each event domain (ex post). 
114  Hypothesis H0(b) is reported solely to correspond to later market prices presentation. Note that H0(b) 
is, in fact, redundant for judged probabilities, since the results (i.e., effect size) have to be the same for 
both hypotheses by construction. 
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with pJ,i(Ik) = judged probability for interval Ik of event domain i, 
i = {(f)inance, (s)ports, (w)eather}, 
kpartition_1 = {1, 2, 3 ∪ 4}; kpartition_2 = {1 ∪ 2, 3, 4} 
 
Table 3.10 shows the average and the median pre-trading individual probability 
judgments surveyed before the first trading round of the finance, sports and weather 
event domains (N=96 participants in each of the two partitions):115 
 
Table 3.10:  Pre-trading individual probability judgments. 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1 p(I 1 ) 0.219 0.200 0.279 0.250 0.144 0.120
1 p(I 2 ) 0.497 0.500 0.398 0.400 0.333 0.320
p(I 1 )+p(I 2 ) 0.717 0.700 0.678 0.700 0.477 0.500
2 p(I 1 ∪ Ι 2 ) 0.405 0.400 0.417 0.400 0.199 0.200
PD difference 0.312 0.300*** 0.261 0.300*** 0.278 0.300***
2 p(I 3 ) 0.397 0.400 0.378 0.360 0.349 0.350
2 p(I 4 ) 0.198 0.200 0.205 0.200 0.451 0.400
p(I 3 )+p(I 4 ) 0.595 0.600 0.583 0.600 0.801 0.800
1 p(I 3 ∪ Ι 4 ) 0.283 0.300 0.322 0.300 0.523 0.500
PD difference 0.312 0.300*** 0.261 0.300*** 0.278 0.300***
Event Domain
Finance
(N 1 =N 2 =96)
Sports
(N 1 =N 2 =96)
Weather
(N 1 =N 2 =95)
Treatment
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
 
 
The mean (median in parentheses) difference between summed probabilities of 
unpacked intervals and the packed interval (e.g., pJ,i(I1) + pJ,i(I2) – pJ,i(I1∪ I2)) is .312 
(.300), .261 (.300) and .278 (.300) for the finance, sports and weather events, respec-
tively. All reported differences are statistically highly significant, based on a Kruskal-
Wallis test (p<.0001).116 In line with hypothesis 3.1 the results reveal that participants 
                                                 
115  In the Table, N1 refers to participants in partition 1 and N2 refers to participants in partition 2. For the 
weather events, one set of judgments in each partition is missing due to technical errors, thus N1=N2=95. 
116  The Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-parametric method testing the hypothesis that C samples with Ni 
observations in the ith sample come from the same population. The test is suited to detect differences 
among the population means. It is closely related to a one-way analysis of variance, but does not assume a 
normal distribution. The Kruskal-Wallis test for two samples (like in the present context) is essentially the 
same as a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (for unmatched data) or the Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic; see 
Kruskal and Wallis (1952). 
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on average attribute more probability to an event if it is represented by two out of three 
intervals than if it is represented by only one out of three intervals. The results provide 
strong evidence for partition-dependence in ex ante judged probabilities across all event 
domains.  
Hypothesis 3.1 can also be tested for post-trading judged probabilities. Table 
3.11 shows the average and the median post-trading individual probability judgments 
collected after the second trading round of the finance, sports and weather event do-
mains (again, N=96 participants in each of the two partitions):117 
 
Table 3.11:  Post-trading individual probability judgments. 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1 p(I 1 ) 0.205 0.200 0.252 0.250 0.116 0.100
1 p(I 2 ) 0.494 0.500 0.432 0.400 0.307 0.300
p(I 1 )+p(I 2 ) 0.699 0.700 0.684 0.700 0.422 0.400
2 p(I 1 ∪ Ι 2 ) 0.442 0.400 0.428 0.400 0.196 0.200
PD difference 0.257 0.300*** 0.256 0.300*** 0.226 0.200***
2 p(I 3 ) 0.382 0.400 0.403 0.400 0.352 0.350
2 p(I 4 ) 0.176 0.160 0.169 0.150 0.452 0.400
p(I 3 )+p(I 4 ) 0.558 0.600 0.572 0.600 0.804 0.800
1 p(I 3 ∪ Ι 4 ) 0.301 0.300 0.316 0.300 0.578 0.600
PD difference 0.257 0.300*** 0.256 0.300*** 0.226 0.200***
Treatment
Post-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Event Domain
Finance
(N 1 =N 2 =96)
Sports
(N 1 =N 2 =96)
Weather
(N 1 =96; N 2 =95)
 
 
The mean (median in parentheses) difference between summed probabilities of 
unpacked intervals and the packed interval (e.g., pJ,i(I1) + pJ,i(I2) – pJ,i(I1∪ I2)) is .257 
(.300), .256 (.300), and .226 (.200) for the finance, sports and weather events, respec-
tively. Like the pre-trading judged probabilities, all reported differences are statistically 
highly significant, based on a Kruskal-Wallis test (p<.0001).  
 
                                                 
117  In the Table, N1 refers to partition 1 and N2 refers to partition 2. For the weather events, one set of 
judgments is missing in partition 2 due to a technical error, thus N2=95. 
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3.1.3.2 Equilibrium market prices 
Of course, probability judgments elicited from individuals might reflect thought-
less errors (particularly since those judgments are not incentivized) which are strongly 
or weakly diminished in two 10-minute trading periods. As discussed above, markets 
are, after all, a kind of dollar-activity-weighted opinion polls that also provide substan-
tial time for reflection and opportunities for learning from others. Thus, probabilities 
inferred from market prices are analyzed in the following. 
Figure 3.4 to Figure 3.6 show the aggregated development of asset prices over 
time for the finance, sports and weather event domains. This means, at each point of 
time, the relevant market prices (and sums of prices for unpacked interval-assets) are 
averaged over all twelve (identical) session slots. Figuratively speaking, price charts 
from the twelve session slots were superimposed and current market prices were aver-
aged at each point of time. Note that price charts for the first and the second trading 
round are strung together (separated by a vertical line after 600 seconds). These figures 
shed light on the question of how market prices and partition-dependence, on average, 
develop during the trading rounds and over the two identical trials, i.e., how much 
variation can be observed over the 20 minutes of trading in each event domain. The up-
per chart of each figure refers to the intervals I1 and I2, and the lower chart refers to the 
intervals I3 and I4. In both charts of each figure, the lower path shows the average price 
for the packed asset and the upper path shows the sum of prices for the corresponding 
unpacked assets.118 The gap between the two curves shows the size and persistence of 
the partition-dependence.  
 
                                                 
118  Accordingly, the red curves result from partition 1 markets and the blue curves result from partition 2 
markets. 
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Figure 3.4:  Development of price differences over time for the finance assets. 
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Figure 3.5:  Development of price differences over time for the sports assets. 
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Figure 3.6:  Development of price differences over time for the weather assets. 
For a formal analysis, linear regressions are estimated for the price paths, and 
their slopes are compared which gives a rough measure of price convergence over time. 
Calculate the differences of slopes as a simple measure of convergence over time: 
 
)(,)()(, 2121 IIPiIPIPi ∪+
− ββ  and )(,)()(, 4343 IIPiIPIPi ∪+ − ββ  (3.2)
 
with )(, kIPiβ  denoting the slope coefficient from a linear regression of the average 
asset prices P(Ik) over trading time for event domain i. 
 
Results from the convergence measure analysis can be obtained from Table 3.12. 
A negative (positive) slope coefficient indicates decreasing (increasing) prices over 
time. If the slope difference is negative (positive), this indicates convergence (diver-
gence) of market prices. The more negative the slope difference, the more do prices 
from differently partitioned markets converge. 
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Table 3.12:  Measures of price convergence over time. 
Finance Sports Weather
Avg. [P(I 1 )+P(I 2 ) ] -0.0096 -0.0053 -0.0243
Avg. P(I 1 ∪  I 2 ) 0.0023 0.0042 -0.0109
Slope difference -0.0119 -0.0095 -0.0134
Avg. [P(I 3 )+P(I 4 ) ] -0.0140 -0.0171 -0.0007
Avg. P(I 3 ∪  I 4 ) -0.0061 -0.0012 0.0156
Slope difference -0.0079 -0.0159 -0.0163
Convergence measure
(mean slope difference) -0.0099 -0.0127 -0.0149
Slope Coefficient β  from Linear Regression
 
 
As Table 3.12 reveals, a slight tendency of convergence can be observed in both 
of the intervals for all three event domains, with the weather domain showing the most 
and the finance domain showing the least convergence. The finding that there is some 
slow convergence motivates the later experiments with much longer time periods (Study 
2). Despite the fact that there is some convergence of market prices in this lab study, the 
price difference between the sum of unpacked-interval assets and the packed-interval 
asset remains large in magnitude and partition-dependence is well pronounced during 
the whole trading period. 
In the following, a more formal analysis of price differences between the two 
treatments is presented. This analysis concentrates on equilibrium market prices. For 
each market, define the “equilibrium market price” Pi*(Ik) to be the quantity-weighted 
average of the last three trade prices (prices at which trades were executed, not bids and 
asks) in the second trading round for the interval Ik asset (the focus is on the data from 
the second trading round here, as prices from this round were less noisy and hence more 
reliable; however, it turned out that data from the two trading rounds did not differ sys-
tematically). For each event domain the experiment generates twelve equilibrium prices 
per asset for each partition.119 The hypotheses of partition-dependence in equilibrium 
market prices are parallel to those above for judgments: 
 
 
 
                                                 
119  Recall that the whole population of 192 participants was assigned to markets of eight traders each, 
resulting in 24 trading groups which further divided into twelve markets of each partition. 
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Hypothesis 3.2: 
H0(a):  Pi*(I1) + Pi*(I2) > Pi*(I1∪ I2)  and 
H0(b):  Pi*(I3) + Pi*(I4) > Pi*(I3∪ I4) 
 
with Pi*(Ik) = equilibrium market price for an asset that refers to interval Ik of 
              event domain i, 
i = {(f)inance, (s)ports, (w)eather}, 
kpartition_1 = {1, 2, 3 ∪ 4}; kpartition_2 = {1 ∪ 2, 3, 4} 
 
Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 show the distribution of equilibrium market prices (or 
summed equilibrium market prices) for the low intervals (I1 and I2 in Figure 3.7) and the 
high intervals (I3 and I4 in Figure 3.8) for the two partition groups (N=12 equilibrium 
prices per event domain and treatment).120 Look at Figure 3.7 for the low intervals first: 
for the finance event domain, equilibrium market prices for the packed-event assets 
Pi*(I1∪ I2) range between 15.00 and 60.13 cents (partition 2), while the sums of equilib-
rium prices for the unpacked-event assets Pi*(I1) + Pi*(I2) range from 48.01 to 96.96 
cents (partition 1). The corresponding range of values for the sports (weather in paren-
theses) event domain is 17.20 to 69.00 cents (1.37 to 31.20 cents) for prices Pi*(I1∪ I2) 
and 58.47 to 90.99 cents (18.03 to 52.17 cents) for the sum of prices Pi*(I1) + Pi*(I2). 
Red squares in the figures indicate median values. Figure 3.8 illustrates respective val-
ues for the high intervals I3 and I4: for the finance event domain, equilibrium market 
prices for the packed-event assets Pi*(I3∪ I4) range from 13.75 to 54.50 cents (partition 
1), while the sums of equilibrium prices for the unpacked-event assets Pi*(I3) + Pi*(I4) 
range from 28.59 to 84.53 cents (partition 2). The range of values for the sports 
(weather in parentheses) event domain is 16.00 to 66.67 cents (51.89 to 88.00 cents) for 
prices Pi*(I3∪ I4) and 33.13 to 81.74 cents (56.18 to 99.83 cents) for prices Pi*(I3) + 
Pi*(I4). As hypothesized, it becomes clear by visual inspection that equilibrium market 
prices for intervals I1 and I2 (I3 and I4) are systematically higher in partition 1 (partition 
2), where these intervals were traded separately.  
 
                                                 
120  Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 refer to the second trading round of each event domain. 
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Figure 3.7:  (Summed) equilibrium market prices for the two partition markets (intervals I1 and I2). 
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Figure 3.8:  (Summed) equilibrium market prices for the two partition markets (intervals I3 and I4). 
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For the low intervals of the sports events, for example, equilibrium market prices 
from the two treatments hardly overlap, although both, as in all other cases, refer to the 
same possible outcomes of the underlying variable (in this case, both prices refer to the 
event that [0, 25] goals would be scored on the final game day). 
Aggregating the data, Table 3.13 shows the mean prices (divided by 100 cents to 
make them comparable to judged probabilities) for the three assets of each partition. For 
comparison the average judgments collected before and after trading are also reported 
(see Table 3.10 and Table 3.11). 
 
Table 3.13:  Mean equilibrium market prices (2nd trading round) and individual judgments (pre-trading 
and post-trading). 
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
1 I 1 0.219 0.152 0.205 0.279 0.230 0.252 0.144 0.048 0.116
1 I 2 0.497 0.561 0.494 0.398 0.490 0.432 0.333 0.256 0.307
I 1 +I 2 0.717 0.713 0.699 0.678 0.720 0.684 0.477 0.303 0.422
2 I 1 ∪ Ι 2 0.405 0.424 0.442 0.417 0.439 0.428 0.199 0.149 0.196
PD difference 0.312 0.289 0.257 0.261 0.281 0.256 0.278 0.154 0.226
2 I 3 0.397 0.404 0.382 0.378 0.416 0.403 0.349 0.354 0.352
2 I 4 0.198 0.177 0.176 0.205 0.152 0.169 0.451 0.496 0.452
I 3 +I 4 0.595 0.581 0.558 0.583 0.568 0.572 0.801 0.850 0.804
1 I 3 ∪ Ι 4 0.283 0.336 0.301 0.322 0.391 0.316 0.523 0.707 0.578
PD difference 0.312 0.245 0.257 0.261 0.177 0.256 0.278 0.143 0.226
Average PD difference 0.267 0.229 0.149
Finance WeatherSports
Mean Judged Probability/Equilibrium Prices
Treatment
 
 
From Table 3.13 it turns out that the difference between summed equilibrium 
prices (divided by 100) of unpacked assets, Pi*(I1) + Pi*(I2), and the packed asset, 
Pi*(I1∪ I2), is .289, .281 and .154 for the finance, sports and weather markets, respec-
tively, all of them showing in the expected direction (i.e., indicating subadditivity). The 
corresponding values for the high intervals, Pi*(I3) + Pi*(I4) – Pi*(I3∪ I4), are .245, .177 
and .143, respectively. Averaging the magnitude of partition-dependence in equilibrium 
market prices for the low and the high intervals yields an average effect size of .267, 
.229 and .149 for the finance, sports and weather domains, respectively, reflecting 
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strong partition-dependence.121 A similar Table showing differences in medians can be 
obtained from Appendix III. Results are very similar to those derived from means. Al-
though not marked in the Table, all reported differences are statistically highly signifi-
cantly different from zero, based on a Kruskal-Wallis test (p<.01). Besides, the results 
are very robust with respect to alternative definitions of the equilibrium market prices: 
using only the last trade price, for instance, or calculating an unweighted average of the 
last three trade prices hardly changes the results; Kruskal-Wallis tests are equipollent 
under all variations and thus there is no reason to suspect that the effect (and its size) 
just depends on the concrete measure of equilibrium market prices. 
To summarize the main results so far, it can be said that partition-dependence is 
strongly pronounced in subjective probability judgments elicited before and after trad-
ing (effect size between .226 and .312). Although there is some slight convergence of 
market prices over the 20 minutes of trading, equilibrium market prices (at the end of 
the second trading round) exhibit well pronounced partition-dependence (effect size 
between .149 and .267). As it seems, the market forces in the present short-run lab study 
are not able to drive out the bias from market prices. The next subsection aims to further 
explore the extent to which individually judged probabilities affect market prices and 
vice versa.  
 
3.1.3.3 Comparison of market prices to individual probability judgments 
A relevant question is whether partition-dependence expressed in market equi-
librium prices is as much pronounced as in individual probability judgments. One may 
argue that market forces, if not able to eliminate the bias, are at least able to mitigate 
partition-dependence by (i) the exchange of information through the price mechanism 
and/or (ii) by the activity of some (marginal) traders who drive market prices in a direc-
tion that is consistent with rational theory. For a theoretical discussion of this question 
and a review of existing empirical results, see subsections 2.1.4.4 and 2.3.3. 
To address this issue with data from the present lab study, the two self-contained 
markets from each session slot (offering assets from the different partitions) were no-
tionally matched. In the present between-subjects design this allows calculating parti-
                                                 
121  Note that the partition difference is not necessarily the same for the low and high intervals in market 
prices, in contrast to the judgments where this difference has to be the same for the low and high intervals 
due to the fact that, by instructions, they always summed to 1.0. 
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tion-dependence per session slot as the difference between the sum of the two unpacked 
events (from one partition) and the corresponding packed event (from the other parti-
tion). Note that this hypothetical matching procedure is somewhat arbitrary, since par-
ticipants in one treatment traded completely independently from participants in the other 
treatment. However, this procedure is the only way to test for differences in partition-
dependence between before-trading individual judgments and market outcomes. And 
matching the two markets from the same session slot (compared to any other matching 
rule) ensures that the same overall conditions prevail for both groups (like most recent 
DAX index level, weather conditions outside the lab or lab room temperature, and re-
cent news on the soccer teams). Equilibrium market prices again are calculated as the 
volume-weighted average of the last three trade prices that occurred in the second trad-
ing round; and probability judgments are averaged across the eight traders who build a 
market. This allows calculating the partition bias for both before-trading judgments and 
market prices in each of the twelve session slots resulting in twelve paired data points 
per event domain. Then, the null hypothesis of no differences in bias strength between 
before-trading judgments and equilibrium market prices can be tested. Hypotheses H0(a) 
and H0(b) are specified below: 
 
Hypothesis 3.3: 
H0(a):  Pi*(I1) + Pi*(I2) – Pi*(I1∪ I2) = pJ,i(I1) + pJ,i(I2) – pJ,i(I1∪ I2)      and 
H0(b):  Pi*(I3) + Pi*(I4) – Pi*(I3∪ I4) = pJ,i(I3) + pJ,i(I4) – pJ,i(I3∪ I4) 
 
with Pi*(Ik) = equilibrium market price for an asset that refers to interval Ik of 
              event domain i, 
pJ,i(Ik) = judged probability for interval Ik of event domain i, 
i = {(f)inance, (w)eather, (s)ports}. 
kpartition_1 = {1, 2, 3 ∪ 4}; kpartition_2 = {1 ∪ 2, 3, 4} 
 
For the finance event domain, session-based partition-dependence in equilibrium 
market prices is lower than partition-dependence inferred from before-trading individual 
judgments in 4 out of 12 cases for the low intervals (and in 8 out of 12 cases for the 
high intervals), but hypotheses H0(a) and H0(b) cannot be rejected by a Wilcoxon 
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matched-pairs signed-ranks test (p=.5829 for H0(a) and p=.3465 for H0(b)).122 These 
results suggest that the partition bias in equilibrium market prices is not systematically 
different (in neither direction) from the partition bias in before-trading individual prob-
ability judgments. In general, this holds true for the sports event domain (bias reduction 
of market prices in 5 out of 12 cases for the low intervals (p=.5303) and in 8 out of 12 
cases for the high intervals (p=.0995). For the weather event domain, in contrast, hy-
potheses H0(a) and H0(b) can be rejected (bias reduction of market prices in 9 out of 12 
cases for the low intervals (p=.0186) and in 10 out of 12 cases for the high intervals 
(p=.0186), indicating that the partition bias is somewhat lower in market prices com-
pared to pre-trading individual probability judgments. Adding the results from Table 
3.13 (in section 3.1.3.2), it can be concluded that market-price partition-dependence is 
slightly reduced compared to before-trading probability judgments for finance and 
sports event domains, and cut in half for weather events. However, conservative tests 
using session-level data only show a statistically significant reduction for the weather 
event domain. 
While partition-dependence was analyzed independently in subsection 3.1.3.1 
for pre-trading and post-trading individual probability judgments, an obvious question is 
whether individual judgments elicited after the second trading round of each event do-
main are influenced by market activity. Thus, post-trading judgments are compared to 
the judgments collected before the first trading round. As can be seen from Table 3.13 
partition-dependence in after-market judged probabilities is .257, .256 and .226 for the 
finance, sports and weather event domains, respectively, so the bias of partition-
dependence is still well pronounced. Compared to the before-market judged probabili-
ties, this is a decrease of –.055 (–17.6%), –.005 (–1.9%) and –.052 (–18.7%) in the fi-
nance, sports and weather event domains, respectively. As a result, the bias is slightly 
reduced for the finance and the weather domain, but is hardly changed for the sports 
stimulus. Using before-trading and after-trading individual probability judgments of the 
events in all three event domains allows to perform a powerful within-subjects test that 
analyzes whether participants, in general, adjusted their ex post judgments systemati-
                                                 
122  The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (Wilcoxon (1945)) is a non-parametric alternative to the paired Stu-
dent’s t-test of two related samples or repeated measurements on a single sample. Like the t-test, the Wil-
coxon test involves comparisons of differences between measurements, so it requires that the data are 
measured at an interval level of measurement. However, the test does not require assumptions about the 
concrete shape of the distribution of measurements. It should thus be used whenever the distributional 
assumptions that underlie the t-test cannot be satisfied. 
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cally and, if they were doing so, in which direction. For each subject the difference be-
tween the after- and the before-trading probability judgments is analyzed for the packed 
intervals.123 Since the general direction of the bias suggests the judgments for the 
packed intervals are too low, define a subject’s judgments to reflect a bias reduction due 
to trading experience if this difference is positive, i.e. if post-trading judgments for the 
packed intervals are higher than pre-trading judgments.124 
 
Hypothesis 3.4: 
H0: ( ) 0)()(3
1 3
1
1,,1,, =∪−∪⋅∑
=
++
i
xx
before
isJxx
after
isJ IIpIIp  
 
with pJ,s,i(Ix∪ Ix+1) =  subject s’s judged probability (after/before trading) for the 
packed interval Ix∪ Ix+1 of event domain i, 
i = {(f)inance, (s)ports, (w)eather} 
Ix∪ Ix+1 = I1∪ I2 or I3∪ I4, depending on subject s’s assignment to one of the two 
                 treatments in event domain i. 
 
Averaging the differences for the three event domains per subject, as described 
in hypothesis 3.4 above, values are positive in 52.1% of the cases (100 out of 192 sub-
jects), and negative in 34.4% of the cases (66 out of 192). Trading does not influence 
the remaining 26 subjects, on average, in any direction.125 A conservative sign test 
shows that the effect is significant (p<.01, one-sided test). Overall, the two 10-minute 
trading periods apparently have a modest de-biasing effect on individual judgments, 
though a substantial degree of partition-dependence remains after 20 minutes. 
Testing hypothesis 3.4 separately for each event domain (as specified in hy-
pothesis 3.4.(a)) and thus not averaging a subject’s judgment differences from the three 
event domains, loses some statistical power but can address the question whether bias 
reduction is a general phenomenon in the present data or whether it is possibly driven 
by a single event domain. 
                                                 
123  Recall that all participants randomly faced one of the two packed intervals, (I1∪ I2) or (I3∪ I4) in each 
event domain, depending on whether they were assigned to partition 2 or to partition 1. 
124  Calculating the after-before difference of the sums of unpacked intervals would be an equivalent 
method of testing for a bias reduction. Since the judgments for the unpacked intervals are expected to be 
relatively too high, a bias reduction would exist if this difference was negative. 
125  15 subjects did not change their packed-interval judgments at all, i.e., for all event domains they 
stated the same judgments before and after trading. 
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Hypothesis 3.4.(a): 
H0: 0)()( 1,,1,, =∪−∪ ++ xx
before
isJxx
after
isJ IIpIIp  for each event domain i. 
 
It turns out that the null hypothesis of no bias reduction can neither be rejected 
for the finance domain (p=.1577, one-sided test) nor for the sports stimulus (p=.4648, 
one-sided test). In particular, it becomes obvious that a considerable proportion of sub-
jects (37.5% in finance and 33.3% in sports) did not change their judgments (at least) 
for the packed event. On the level of event domains, it can also be checked for differ-
ences in adjusting judgments for the packed event across low and high intervals (as 
I1∪ I2 in partition 2 is the union of the low intervals and I3∪ I4 in partition 1 is the union 
of the high intervals). A Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of populations, though, shows 
no significant effects for the finance and the sports event domains. This gives reason to 
believe that no systematic effect is caused from the fact that the interval I1∪ I2 is repre-
sented by the “first” asset (i.e., lowest interval) in partition 2, while the interval I3∪ I4 is 
traded as the “third” asset (i.e., highest interval) in partition 1. 
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Figure 3.9:  Frequency distributions for the difference (after-before) in judgments for packed events. 
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For the weather event domain, however, bias reduction as measured in terms of 
hypothesis 3.4.(a) is statistically significant at the 5% level (p=.0274, one-sided test) 
with 36.5% of subjects confirming their before-trading judgments for the packed event. 
In this case, the effect is mainly driven by an increase of judgments for the I3∪ I4 inter-
val in treatment 1 (+.055 or +10.6%, statistically significant based on a Kruskal-Wallis 
test), whereas judgments for the interval I1∪ I2 hardly differ. Hence, bias reduction for 
the pooled population seems at least to some extent to arise from a bias reduction in the 
weather domain, rather than to be a general phenomenon. Figure 3.9 shows the fre-
quency distributions for the difference (after-before) in judgments for the packed inter-
val across event domains and partitions. From this figure it is hard to believe, in fact, 
that there is a general tendency of raising judgments for the relatively undervalued 
packed asset after trading. 
To summarize, partition-dependence inferred from market prices is slightly re-
duced compared to the bias expressed in pre-trading judgments for the finance and 
sports event domains, and cut in half for weather events, though statistical significance 
is modest. Comparing after-trading judged probabilities to before-market judgments, 
there is a decline in effect strength of –.055 (–17.6%), –.005 (–1.9%) and –.052             
(–18.7%) in the finance, sports and weather event domains, respectively. Hence, the 
bias is slightly reduced for the finance and the weather domain, but is hardly changed 
for the sports stimulus. A within-subjects test that analyzes whether participants gener-
ally increase their judgments for the undervalued packed event shows that the two 10-
minute trading periods apparently have a modest de-biasing effect on individual judg-
ments, though a substantial degree of partition-dependence remains after 20 minutes. In 
addition, the message of the de-biasing effect is somehow limited due to the fact that it 
is mainly driven by one of the three event domains (weather). After all, for the finance 
event domain it seems as if partition-dependence is slightly reduced in market prices 
and this reduction translates to after-trading judgments. For the weather stimulus, there 
is a comparable reduction in post-trading judgments, but this reduction does not fully 
reflect the very strong decline of effect size that is observed in market prices. For the 
sports domain, market prices reveal a small increase of partition-dependence in market 
prices for the low intervals and a considerable reduction for the high intervals, while 
partition-dependence in after-trading judgments is almost at the same level as before-
trading.  
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3.1.3.4 1/N ignorance prior and consistency of prices with a theoretical benchmark 
In subsection 2.2.3, anchoring and insufficient adjustment of the 1/N ignorance 
prior was presented as a convincing explanation for partition-dependence, particularly 
in the context of probability judgments for dimensional state spaces. This account fo-
cuses on the “ignorance prior” heuristic that is based on distributing probability evenly 
across all available “categories” in a first step. Without precise knowledge of objective 
probabilities and without having (at least) two differently partitioned state spaces, 
though, it is difficult to decide whether and to what extent judgments or market prices 
are biased by 1/N allocation. (Note, for example, that an allocation of 1/N could either 
reflect full ignorance, but could also be consistent with objective probabilities by 
chance.) The main design feature of creating two different partitions of the state space 
allows testing for partition-dependence without the knowledge of objective probabilities 
of events. That means, regardless of what the true probability of an event is, partition-
dependence can be measured by simply comparing judgments and prices from the two 
treatments. If, in the present study, people were applying an ignorance prior of 1/N of 
the judged probability to each of the three events they faced, the difference between the 
sum of the two unpacked-interval judgments (2 × 1/N = .667) and the single packed-
interval judgments (1 × 1/N = .333) should be one third. So differences in pre-trading 
judgments (effect size of .312, .261 and .278 for the finance, sports and weather do-
mains, respectively) are close to (2 – 1)/N = .333 and thus suggest a very strong impact 
of the ignorance prior, as demonstrated in earlier psychology experiments. Differences 
in post-trading judgments (effect size of .257, .256 and .226 for the finance, sports and 
weather domains, respectively) are still close to .333 but moderately reduced in com-
parison to pre-trading judgments.  
Two alternative explanations for the results might spring to mind: Partitions 
convey information (the “credibility” account; see subsection 2.2.3); and prices do not 
reflect mean or median beliefs (see subsection 2.1.4.3 for a discussion). The first alter-
native explanation is that subjects infer reasonable beliefs from the partition that is pre-
sented to them. This explanation is disabled by the fact that all subjects were explicitly 
told about both their own event partition and the different partition for the same event 
given to the other subjects. Thus, there might well be an informational effect but it 
should be the same in both groups (up to sampling error) and therefore cannot explain 
the between-group differences that are observed.  
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The second alternative explanation is that prices do not reflect average or me-
dian beliefs, which could create an apparent bias in prices. For example, suppose prices 
reflect the most optimistic beliefs. Then separate prices for events I1 and I2 could add to 
more than the price for I1∪ I2. This explanation is closely related to the theoretical de-
bate about what prediction market prices reveal about average beliefs. Recall that 
Manski (2006) noted that whether the market price is close to the mean or median of a 
distribution of beliefs in a population of traders depends on the traders’ risk attitudes 
and wealth constraints, and their correlation with belief.126 Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
(2007) replied by showing some sufficient conditions under which the market price is 
the mean of the belief distribution, and by showing that under other reasonable condi-
tions prices are likely to be close to the mean belief. The fact that subjects in the present 
experiment gave individual probability judgments for events, and collectively created 
market prices for the same events, provides a rare opportunity to shed some empirical 
light on this debate: One can compute the quantile of the individual belief distribution 
that market prices correspond to, i.e., take the second of the two consecutive trading 
rounds and compare the quantiles of post-market event beliefs elicited from subjects 
with the quantity/volume-weighted average of the last three trade prices. Remember that 
in each market there are eight belief judgments and a single (averaged) price for all 
three events that were traded. The estimated quantile is the percentage of those eight 
beliefs that are below the market price. Separate quantile estimates can be computed for 
twelve separate experimental sessions for each of the three event domains. The mean 
belief quantiles for prices of the finance, sports and weather events are .507, .512, and 
.483 (all close to the median belief, the .5 quantile).127 Furthermore, in 54% of the 36 
session-stimulus comparisons, the estimated belief quantile is .375, .5, or .625 (i.e., the 
price is between the highest and lowest three out of eight beliefs about half the time). 
Thus, the hypothesis that market prices approximately reflect the median belief is rea-
sonably well supported in these data, when individual beliefs and collective prices can 
be directly compared.  
                                                 
126  For example, in principle one very wealthy risk-neutral trader who is extremely optimistic could 
effectively set a market price which reflects his extreme optimism if others trade less because of wealth 
constraints or risk-aversion. 
127  The mean belief quantiles on a (not averaged) per asset basis are generally close to the .5 quantile, 
too. They range between .344 and .594 (finance assets), .396 and .677 (sports assets), and .229 and .729 
(weather assets). 
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With regard to a comparison of prediction market prices to a theoretically de-
rived benchmark, recall that for the sports and weather event domains the interval 
boundaries were chosen rather arbitrarily, so that there is no conclusive way to link ex-
pressed probabilities to objective probabilities. Contrariwise, as is described in subsec-
tion 3.1.1, for the finance event domain, the four intervals were created based on a nor-
mative theory of stock index price movements, such that the four intervals correspond 
to certain percentiles of the expected probability density function for the DAX close two 
weeks in the future. This allows carrying out an additional analysis by comparing mar-
ket prices from the finance markets to theoretically derived probabilities for the DAX 
events and sheds light on the question to which extent prices are consistent with theo-
retically derived probabilities.  
Table 3.14 opposes equilibrium market prices of trading rounds 1 and 2, aver-
aged across the twelve session slots, to (i) the 1/N ignorance prior of one third for each 
of the three assets and (ii) (for the finance event markets) to the theoretical benchmark. 
Note that (rescaled) mean equilibrium prices do not necessarily sum to 1.0 (the range is 
from .984 (minimum) to 1.127 (maximum)). Since prices are directly compared to the 
ignorance prior probabilities and to the theoretical benchmark, the obvious procedure is 
to standardize equilibrium market prices such that they sum to 1.0 in each treatment. 
Hence, the columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.14 show standardized equilibrium prices. Com-
paring the (standardized) mean equilibrium trade prices to the corresponding values of 
the ignorance prior distribution, it appears that prices apparently deviate from one third 
(at least for two of three assets in each treatment), suggesting substantial adjustments to 
the ignorance prior. In addition, there seems to be no obvious pattern in how prices dif-
fer from the ignorance priors. For instance, it is not always the second asset (I2 in treat-
ment 1 and I3 in treatment 2) for which prices are the highest, as might be hypothesized. 
Nor is it the packed asset (I3∪ I4 in treatment 1 and I1∪ I2 in treatment 2) that trades 
consistently at the highest price. Regardless of whether participants notionally “start” by 
a naïve allocation of probabilities to events or not, these results suggest that traders 
eventually do incorporate their beliefs and private information into market prices. Ap-
parently, though, these adjustments happen to be insufficient, as is reflected in the 
strong effects of partition-dependence reported above. 
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Table 3.14:  Mean equilibrium trade prices (actual/standardized), 1/N ignorance prior, and theoretical 
benchmark. 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2
Finance
Treatment 1
P(I 1 ) 0.187 0.152 0.166 0.145 0.333 0.275
P(I 2 ) 0.577 0.561 0.512 0.535 0.333 0.275
P(I 3 ∪ Ι 4 ) 0.363 0.336 0.322 0.320 0.333 0.450
Total 1.127 1.049 1.000 1.000
Treatment 2
P(I 1 ∪ Ι 2 ) 0.421 0.424 0.405 0.422 0.333 0.550
P(I 3 ) 0.414 0.404 0.398 0.402 0.333 0.225
P(I 4 ) 0.205 0.177 0.197 0.176 0.333 0.225
Total 1.040 1.005 1.000 1.000
Sports
Treatment 1
P(I 1 ) 0.228 0.230 0.212 0.207 0.333 -
P(I 2 ) 0.476 0.490 0.443 0.441 0.333 -
P(I 3 ∪ Ι 4 ) 0.372 0.391 0.346 0.352 0.333 -
Total 1.076 1.111 1.000 1.000
Treatment 2
P(I 1 ∪ Ι 2 ) 0.401 0.439 0.408 0.436 0.333 -
P(I 3 ) 0.391 0.416 0.397 0.413 0.333 -
P(I 4 ) 0.192 0.152 0.195 0.151 0.333 -
Total 0.984 1.007 1.000 1.000
Weather
Treatment 1
P(I 1 ) 0.090 0.048 0.084 0.047 0.333 -
P(I 2 ) 0.335 0.256 0.313 0.253 0.333 -
P(I 3 ∪ Ι 4 ) 0.646 0.707 0.603 0.700 0.333 -
Total 1.071 1.010 1.000 1.000
Treatment 2
P(I 1 ∪ Ι 2 ) 0.160 0.149 0.153 0.149 0.333 -
P(I 3 ) 0.388 0.354 0.371 0.354 0.333 -
P(I 4 ) 0.499 0.496 0.477 0.496 0.333 -
Total 1.047 0.999 1.000 1.000
Mean Equilibrium Trade 
Price
Mean Equil. Trade Price 
(Standardized to 1.0)
1/N 
Ignorance 
Prior
Theoretical 
Benchmark
 
 
Comparing (standardized) mean equilibrium market prices to theoretically de-
rived probabilities for the finance event domain, it appears as if prices differ substan-
tially but unsystematically from this benchmark in both treatments. In particular, events 
that represent the same distributional probabilities (p(I1) = p(I2) = .275 in treatment 1 
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and p(I3) = p(I4) = .225 in treatment 2) show differences of .390 (treatment 1) and .226 
(treatment 2) in terms of equilibrium market prices. It seems as if market generated 
probabilities are in no way consistent with the theoretical benchmark. Session-level 
prices do not show any systematic patterns either. 
 
3.1.4 Second order results 
3.1.4.1 Competence effects 
A relevant question is whether the degree of partition-dependence depends on 
the subjects’ (self-perceived) level of competence and knowledge in a certain event do-
main. It can be hypothesized that people who feel more competent in a given event do-
main are able to provide probability judgments which are better calibrated than those 
provided by people who feel less knowledgeable. The rationale behind this conjecture is 
that experts, due to their knowledge and experience, are less sensitive to a concrete par-
tition of the state space and, if the ignorance-prior model applies, are able to adjust the 
ignorance prior more accurately than others. This should result in reduced partition-
dependence since judgments of competent people are likely to be more consistent with 
whatsoever objective likelihoods no matter which state space partition the experts face. 
Reduced partition-dependence should also be reflected in prediction-market prices if 
these markets contain some competent traders. Consistent with the “smart few hypothe-
sis” (or marginal trader hypothesis) this is because expert traders are supposed to be in a 
position in which they can recognize and exploit potential mispricing of winner-take-all 
contracts and thereby influence market prices in a direction that is more consistent with 
objective probabilities. If judgments and market prices were consistent with objective 
probabilities in both treatments, there would be no partition bias. This section is to ana-
lyze whether self-rated competence influences partition-dependence in the present lab 
environment. 
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Figure 3.10:  Frequency distribution of subjects’ self-rated competence. 
When participants were asked to provide their subjective probability judgments 
just before trading began in each event domain they were also asked to self-rate their 
competence on a [1 (very incompetent) – 7 (very competent)] scale on making such 
judgments. Figure 3.10 illustrates the frequency distribution of self-assessed compe-
tence scores for the three event domains. The mean competence levels for the finance, 
sports and weather domains are 3.45, 3.80 and 3.67, respectively; the median value is 4 
for all event domains. A bimodal distribution of competence levels would be most suit-
able for second order analyses of competence as such a distribution would generate 
strong discriminatory power between people who feel very competent and those who 
feel very incompetent about a given event domain. It appears from Figure 3.10 that 
there is considerable variation in competence among the subjects and across event do-
mains (with the highest standard deviation in the sports domain), but competence is not 
at all bimodal distributed. Rather, there is a substantial fraction of people who feel more 
or less competent (at least for the finance and weather domains) which results in a peak 
at levels [3] and [4]. Given these distributions, competence effects in individual prob-
ability judgments could be distorted by a substantial degree of noise from moderately 
competent people. To form sub-groups as heterogeneous as possible, moderately com-
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petent people are excluded from the following analysis what makes it possible to oppose 
highly competent people to very incompetent participants. Concretely, in the finance 
domain levels [1–2] are classified as the low-competence group (N=52), levels [5–6]128 
as the high-competence group (N=44), while levels [3–4] are excluded (N=96). In the 
sports domain levels [1–2] are used as the low-competence group (N=57), levels [6–7] 
as the high-competence group (N=42), while levels [3–5] are excluded (N=93). Finally, 
in the weather domain levels [1–2] are used as the low-competence group (N=34), lev-
els [5–7] as the high-competence group (N=50), while levels [3–4] are excluded 
(N=105).129 To provide enough statistical power, the groups were created such that a 
minimum of thirty subjects remains in each of the low- and high-competence clusters. 
Second order competence effects can be analyzed by a 2 × 2 factorial analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). ANOVA is the standard method to analyze the influence of two (or 
more) independent variables on a single (interval-scaled) variable.130 In addition, 
ANOVA is suited to detect interaction effects between those variables. The basic idea 
of ANOVA is to test whether there are significant differences between means by de-
composing variances. Since the existence and significance of the main treatment effect 
(i.e., partition-dependence) is analyzed in sections 3.1.3.1 (for judged probabilities) and 
3.1.3.2 (for equilibrium market prices) the focus here is on interaction effects. Interac-
tions exist if the effect of a focal independent variable (here: partition type) on a de-
pendent variable (here: judgments for intervals I1∪ I2 or I3∪ I4) depends on the value of 
a third variable which is called the moderator variable (here: different competence 
groups). Interaction effects can be thought of as the difference between mean differ-
ences. That is to say, the difference between two means in a 2 × 2 factorial design re-
flects the impact of an independent variable on a dependent variable at a given level of 
the moderator variable, and the fundamental question is whether these differences vary 
as a function of the levels of the moderator variable.131 The following hypotheses can be 
derived:132 
 
                                                 
128  Level [7] is unallocated in this event domain. 
129  Unfortunately, three competence ratings in the weather domain were lost due to technical errors. 
130  For a textbook version of the two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the role of interaction 
effects see, e.g., Backhaus et al. (2006, pp. 119-153). 
131  See Jaccard (1998, pp. 2-6). 
132  Again, the second hypothesis is redundant for judged probabilities because probabilities, by instruc-
tion, sum to 1.0. Thus, the effect size is necessarily the same for both intervals. 
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Hypothesis 3.5: 
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Table 3.15:  Interaction effects between partition type and competence level in pre- and post-trading 
probability judgments. 
Competence Level Low High Low High
Mean probability judgments
Finance
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) 76.28 65.08 71.55 60.62 29 / 18
p(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 41.22 41.15 42.30 46.58 23 / 26
Difference 35.06 23.93 29.25 14.04
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed)
Sports
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) 74.66 55.63 72.46 58.25 25 / 24
p(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 39.51 38.06 43.13 37.50 32 / 18
Difference 35.15 17.57 29.33 20.75
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed)
Weather
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) 51.85 43.91 44.78 37.82 15 / 22
p(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 26.21 16.18 22.79 15.48 19 / 27
Difference 25.64 27.73 21.99 22.34
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed) (.386)
-0.35
(.479)
17.58**
(.023)
8.58
(.178)
Pre-Trading Judgments Post-Trading Judgments N low  / N high
-2.09
11.13*
(.056)
15.21**
(.031)
 
 
Table 3.15 shows mean probability judgments (before- and after-trading) for the 
low intervals (I1∪ I2) for the three event domains, broken down into the two compe-
tence groups. Calculating the difference of mean judgments between the sum of un-
packed events (I1 and I2) and the packed event (I1∪ I2) yields the effect size of partition-
dependence for a given competence level. Calculating the difference of these differ-
ences, in turn, gives information about the interaction effect (p-value, one-tailed, in pa-
rentheses). If this difference of differences (the interaction term) is positive, this indi-
cates a lower degree of partition-dependence in the high-competence group, as hypothe-
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sized. It turns out that there is a substantial interaction between the effect size of parti-
tion-dependence and competence level in the finance and sports event domains (statisti-
cally significant in three of four cases, as indicated by the asterisks: ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively). This means, partition-dependence 
is on average less pronounced in judgments from the high-competence groups than in 
judgments from the low-competence groups, and this difference is remarkable in size, as 
Table 3.15 shows. In pre-trading judgments for the finance domain, this is mainly at-
tributable to a lower sum of judgments for the unpacked events by competent people 
(65.08 against 76.28). The same is true in pre-trading judgments for the sports events 
(55.63 against 74.66). Contrariwise, there is no statistically significant interaction effect 
in the weather stimulus. Interestingly, highly competent subjects attribute consistently 
less probability to the interval I1∪ I2 compared to low competent people (except for 
post-trading judgments for the packed event in the finance domain).  
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Figure 3.11:  Plots of cell means for judgments in the finance event domain (before- and after-trading). 
Figure 3.11 presents plots of cell means for the finance event domain, illustrat-
ing the interaction effects between the focal treatment variable (i.e. partition type) and 
competence levels in before- and after-trading probability judgments. The Figure shows 
3  Study 1: Laboratory study 118 
the focal independent variable (partition type) on the horizontal axis, the mean values of 
judged probability for the low intervals on the vertical axes (i.e., the sum of judgments 
for the unpacked events in partition 1 (left-hand axis) and the judgment for the packed 
event in partition 2 (right-hand axis)), separately for each category of the moderator 
variable (i.e., the different levels of the competence proxy: 0 = low competence, 1 = 
high competence). If the lines connecting cell means are nonparallel, as is the case for 
the finance event domain, this indicates interaction effects. The slope of the line con-
necting cell means of highly competent people is much smaller than the slope for the 
low-competence group. This means that there is less partition-dependence for highly 
competent subjects than for low competent participants. In after-trading judgments there 
is even a crossover interaction as the two lines intersect.  
To summarize the results on competence effects in judged probability, the data 
reveals statistically significant competence interactions comparing judgments by highly 
competent subjects to those provided by very low competent subjects in the finance and 
the sports event domains. Partition-dependence is thus generally less pronounced for the 
high competence group. While competence matters in before- and after-trading judg-
ments for the finance and the sports stimulus, there is virtually no competence interac-
tion in the weather judgments. Perhaps this is because the genuine (but unobservable) 
distribution of weather competence is much more compressed than indicated by the 
seven-fold scale so that the “competence gap” is much smaller than in the finance and 
sports domains. In other words, while almost everyone is likely to have at least a rough 
idea about normal temperatures for the relevant time of the year, the finance and sports 
events are supposed to be much more information-driven as they do not necessarily co-
me to mind in everyday life. But even if the results suggest that highly competent peo-
ple are less susceptible to the partition bias in some domains, partition-dependence is 
yet well pronounced for this subsample (effect size between 14.04 and 27.73).  
Consequentially, the next question is whether second-order competence effects 
are also reflected in prediction-market prices. Recall that participants were allocated to 
six high- and six low-competence session slots based on their self-reported soccer 
(“Bundesliga”) competence during the registration process to carry out this analysis. 
Based on this allocation procedure the mean (median in parentheses) competence level 
of the six high-competence groups varied between 5.81 and 6.27 (6 for all groups) and 
ranged from 2.25 to 2.75 (2 to 3) for the six low-competence groups. As a result, the 
experimental groups happened to be quite homogenous within each competence class, 
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but at the same time were rather heterogeneous for different competence levels (high vs. 
low). Based on the self-rated soccer competence that was collected just before trading, 
these competence proxies ranged from 4.88 to 5.50 (5 for all groups) for the high-
competence session slots and from 1.88 to 3.00 (1 to 2.5) for the low-competence slots. 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between soccer competence elicited during the 
registration process and soccer competence collected during the experiment (based on 
N=190 individual statements)133 is .779. As could have been expected, self-stated com-
petence was consistently lower when concretely asking the subjects for their ability of 
making probability judgments on the number of goals (right before trading) than asking 
for their general knowledge in the field of soccer (during registration), but was still very 
selective during the experiment.134  
This said, one can compare market prices and partition-dependence from the 
high- and low-competence markets for the sports-events markets and see whether the 
partition bias is indeed less pronounced in the high-competence markets. The hypothe-
ses are parallel to those derived for probability judgments: 
 
Hypothesis 3.6: 
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133  N=2 backup participants did not register via the registration process. 
134  A related question is about correlations between soccer competence and competence in the other two 
event domains (finance and weather). Calculating pairwise correlation coefficients between the compe-
tence proxies shows that correlation is only small and statistically insignificant between the weather and 
sports competence proxies (ρweather, sports=.0471) and between the weather and finance competence proxies 
(ρweather, finance=.0803). The correlation between the sports and finance competence proxies, however, is 
statistically significant (at the 1% level), but is also modest in magnitude (ρsports, finance=.2789). Possible 
effects from this correlation are considered to be negligible since mean (median in parentheses) self-
assessed competence in the finance stimulus is 3.60 (4) in the high sports-competence groups and not 
much different compared to 3.29 (3) in the low sports-competence session slots (a Kruskal-Wallis equal-
ity-of-populations rank test is statistically significant only at the 10% level (p=.0852)). Given these corre-
lations, one may conclude that grouping participants based on their soccer competence allows for second 
order analyses in the sports stimulus, but does not imply any unintended competence treatments in the 
finance and the weather event domains. 
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Table 3.16:  Interaction effects between partition type and competence level in equilibrium market 
prices for the sports event domain. 
Competence Level Low High Low High
Panel A: Mean equilibrium market prices
P(I 1 ) + P(I 2 ) 68.77 72.00 73.72 70.21 6 / 6
P(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 39.20 41.01 44.37 43.51 6 / 6
Difference 29.57 30.98 29.35 26.69
Difference of differences
P(I 3 ) + P(I 4 ) 54.31 62.22 52.80 60.74 6 / 6
P(I 3 ∪ I 4 ) 36.46 37.91 39.56 38.66 6 / 6
Difference 17.85 24.30 13.24 22.09
Difference of differences
Panel B: Mean equilibrium market prices (normalized by 100)
P(I 1 ) + P(I 2 ) 65.35 65.50 65.08 64.49 6 / 6
P(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 41.92 39.73 45.66 41.74 6 / 6
Difference 23.43 25.77 19.41 22.75
Difference of differences
P(I 3 ) + P(I 4 ) 58.08 60.27 54.34 58.26 6 / 6
P(I 3 ∪ I 4 ) 34.65 34.50 34.92 35.51 6 / 6
Difference 23.43 25.77 19.41 22.75
Difference of differences -2.34 -3.34
-1.41 2.65
-2.34 -3.34
-6.45 -8.85
Trading Round 1 Trading Round 2 N low  / N high
 
 
Table 3.16 shows mean equilibrium market prices (first and second trading 
round) for the two partitions in the sports event domain, grouped by the competence 
level of markets. Panel A contains the mean equilibrium prices based on the last three 
trade prices (volume-weighted) of each market. In Panel B mean equilibrium market 
prices were normalized such that they sum to 100 for each partition type and compe-
tence level. This was done to make differences comparable to probability judgments 
presented above and to control for different “overrounds” (i.e., deviations of the sum of 
market prices and one hundred) in the markets. The calculation of interaction effects is 
parallel to that in Table 3.15 above. The main treatment effect corresponds to the results 
presented in subsection 3.1.3.2. However, it turns out that there is only little interaction 
between partition type and the level of competence in market prices, i.e., the difference 
of differences is rather small (ranges between –8.85 and 2.65) compared to differences 
in probability judgments. Actually, three out of four differences (Panel A) are less than 
zero and thus reflect greater partition-dependence in the high-competence subsample. 
Normalizing market prices (Panel B) does not alter the results. Even without performing 
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an ANOVA (which is problematic due to the small sample size here) it can be con-
cluded that there is no evidence for competence interactions in the sports event domain 
markets. In particular it seems as if the competence discrepancy diminishes in the mar-
ket in the sense that the partition bias shrinks for the low-competence group, and in-
creases for the high-competence group, compared to pre-trading judgments. Statistical 
power of analyzing the market prices is limited, though, as only six markets exist for 
each combination of partition type and competence level. 
To summarize, the data collected in the lab provide evidence for interaction ef-
fects between the subjects’ self-rated competence and the size of partition-dependence 
in individually judged probabilities. Highly competent people seem to be less suscepti-
ble to the partition bias than low competent people, at least for the finance and sports 
event domains. By contrast, this effect does not show in judged probabilities of the 
weather events. In all cases, though, the main treatment effect remains substantial (even 
for the highly competent subgroup). In addition, the degree of partition-dependence in 
the markets’ equilibrium prices does not depend on the competence level of traders that 
comprise these markets (as measured for the sports event domain), even though partici-
pants were homogeneously allocated to the markets by their level of self-rated compe-
tence. 
 
3.1.4.2 Trader-based analysis 
To characterize the quality of results inferred from market prices and trading ac-
tivity in the lab study and to further explore the role of competence in these markets, it 
is helpful to have a more detailed look at how (equilibrium) market prices emerged. A 
relevant question is, for instance, whether trading was dominated by only a small num-
ber of traders who actively traded among themselves, or whether market prices were the 
result of multilateral trading activity by the majority of participants. Another question 
is, for example, whether traders tend to have a great exposure at the end of the trading 
round or whether they rather try to close open positions by accumulating unit portfolios 
and cash. This subsection is to address these questions. 
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Figure 3.12:  Frequency distribution of the number of trades per trader (buy & sell). 
Figure 3.12 shows frequency distributions of the total number of trades per 
trader for each of the six trading rounds, regardless of whether a trader acted as a buyer 
or a seller (N=192 for each of the six trading rounds).135 Each bin of the chart represents 
a single number of trades. The mean number of trades (double count) is 10.71 (standard 
deviation: 5.49; median: 10) which means that the average trader was involved in a 
trade once in each minute of trading. Remarkably, there is only one trader who did not 
trade throughout the whole trading round (this occurred in the second trading round of 
the weather event domain). Generally speaking, trading involvement was extremely 
high, suggesting that participants were indeed interested in trading. In particular, there 
were virtually no trade “deniers”, i.e. people who traded rarely and confined themselves 
to just cash in their initial endowment. In most cases, frequency distributions are right-
skewed and some subjects bought and/or sold assets up to thirty times (maximum is 32) 
within a trading round which is equivalent to approximately three trades per minute. To 
address the question whether market outcomes are largely influenced by a small fraction 
of very active traders, the following trade concentration metric is developed: For each 
                                                 
135  Trades of the unit portfolio were excluded from the data. 
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of the eight traders in a market, calculate the proportion of trades in which she appeared 
as either a buyer or seller. For example, suppose that 73 trades occurred in a given trad-
ing round, and a single trader was involved in 14 trades (either purchases or sales), then 
this metric would result in a 19.2% share of trades in which this trader participated. 
Since there are always two traders involved in a given trade, this metric sums up to 
200% for all traders of a market. Consequently, if trades were uniformly distributed 
among the eight traders, each of them would have a trade concentration share of 25%. 
Hypothetically, if a trader was involved in all trades that occurred in a given market, her 
metric would yield a 100% share.  
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Figure 3.13:  Frequency distribution of the proportion of trades per trader (trade concentration metric). 
Figure 3.13 shows the frequency distributions of the trade concentration ratio for 
each of the six trading rounds (N=192 for each of the six trading rounds). Each bin of 
the chart represents an interval of 5%. The vertical red line at .25 indicates the “bench-
mark share” of a uniform distribution as described above, which is, by construction, 
equal to the mean of the distribution. The median concentration ratio is 23.4% and the 
standard deviation is 11.4%. The highest share was reached by a trader in the second 
trading round of the finance stimulus in which this trader accounted for 64.3% of the 
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trades. However, the 90%-percentile is much lower (at a 40.0% share) which means that 
90% of the traders each accounted for less than 40% of the trades. The 10%-percentile, 
in turn, is 11.7% which means that only 10% of the traders each accounted for less than 
11.7% of trades. To summarize, market prices are the result of trading activity generated 
by many different traders, with some traders being particularly active. In addition, there 
are no systematic patterns that uniquely apply to one of the three event domains or to 
one of the two trading rounds. The overall view of trading activity gives reason to as-
sume that market outcomes in the present experiment are to a great extent the result of 
collective information processing, with some traders being even more confident to “put 
their money where their mouths are” than others. 
Another issue with respect to the role of markets in aggregating traders’ beliefs 
and how this may affect partition-dependence deals with the relationship between indi-
vidual probability judgments and individual trade prices. As discussed earlier, in “win-
ner-take-all” prediction markets asset prices can be thought of reflecting market-implied 
probabilities for the occurrence of an event. Assuming risk-neutral traders, their reserva-
tion prices for assets are expected values.136 Thus, a risk-neutral market participant can 
be expected to purchase a contract if the current market price (or to be more precise: if 
the current ask quote) is lower than her individual probability judgment for the corre-
sponding event, and she can be expected to sell a contract if the current price (bid quote) 
is higher than her individual probability judgment. This guarantees a positive expected 
profit based on a trader’s subjective probability judgments. Since individual probability 
judgments were collected before and after the trading rounds, the judgments can be 
compared to trade prices at which a given trader did buy and sell the corresponding as-
sets. In doing so one can study whether participants consistently traded according to 
their likelihood beliefs or whether they adjusted their beliefs as a reaction to the devel-
opment of market prices. To aggregate trade prices the average buy and sell prices 
(quantity-weighted) were calculated for each trader and asset based on actual trades of 
that trader. 
Two specific metrics are developed that calculate a trader’s expected profit from 
trading (i) by comparing before-trading judgments to individual trade prices of the first 
trading round and (ii) by comparing after-trading judgments to individual trade prices of 
                                                 
136  See Camerer (1987, p. 984); if traders are not risk-neutral, their reservation prices equal certainty 
equivalents. 
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the second trading round in each event domain.137 The basic idea behind this calculation 
is as follows: If risk-neutral traders always agreed to buy and sell winner-take-all assets 
at prices that exactly correspond to their individual (i.e., subjective) probability esti-
mates, the expected profit from trading would be zero. Thus, traders have an incentive 
to create a positive expected return by buying assets at a price lower than their subjec-
tive probability judgment, and selling assets for a price higher than their individual 
probability estimate. Hence, for each trader and asset the quantity-weighted difference 
between judged probabilities and individual trade prices is calculated, separately for buy 
and sell transactions. Afterwards, expected profits from purchases and from sales are 
added up separately and standardized by the overall number of assets traded by a trader. 
For example, assume that a trader’s before-trading judgments for the finance event do-
main were p(I1)=20%, p(I2)=55%, and p(I3∪ I4)=25%. Further assume that, in the first 
trading round, this trader purchased a quantity of 10 assets at price P(I1)=13.0, 4 assets 
at price P(I2)=30.5, and 10 assets at price P(I3∪ I4)=32.0. At the same time, she sold a 
quantity of 4 assets at price P(I1)=30.0, 1 asset at price P(I2)=60.0, and 3 assets at price 
P(I3∪ I4)=34.0. Then, her expected profit from the purchases would be: ([20–13] · 10 + 
[55–30.5] · 4 + [25–32] · 10) = 98, and the expected profit from the sales would be: 
([30–20] · 4 + [60–55] · 1 + [34–25] · 3) = 72. To make these profits comparable across 
subjects, they are standardized by the overall number of traded assets which yields 
98/24 = 4.08 [cent] for purchases and 72/8 = 9.00 [cent] for sales. From an economic 
perspective, these values can be interpreted as the mean expected profit per unit of (pur-
chased or sold, respectively) asset based on subjective probability estimates. Averaging 
the two profits gives an aggregate metric of the mean expected profit per unit (6.54 
[cent] in this example). This metric is calculated for each of the 192 participants in each 
event domain. Similarly, one can compare after-trading judgments and second trading 
round transactions which results in the second metric. 
The derived metrics are expected to be on average positive, thus indicating that 
participants do systematically trade according to their beliefs. This means that they buy 
(sell) an asset when they think the price is relatively too cheap (expensive), as measured 
by their subjective probability judgments. Positive expected profits would also suggest 
                                                 
137  It would be also possible to compare before-trading judgments to second round trade prices and/or 
first round trade prices to after-trading judgments. However, it may be conjectured that (i) ex ante judg-
ments are closely related to transactions in the first trading round, and (ii) transactions in the second trad-
ing round are closely related to ex post judgments. 
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that market prices arise from the interaction of thoughtful acting participants, rather than 
from noisy transactions by uninterested subjects. A disadvantage of this method is that 
it cannot control for interim changes in subjective probability judgments as individual 
transaction prices are only compared to before- or after-trading judgments. This implic-
itly assumes constant judgments during trading rounds and disregards the possibility of 
learning effects while trading occurs. However, the method seems to be a second-best 
alternative based on existing data. 
Panel A of Table 3.17 shows the mean expected profit per unit of asset compar-
ing before-trading judgments to individual trade prices of the first trading round, aver-
aged across all traders. Besides, the Table shows the 25%, 50% (median), and 75% per-
centile of the distribution. For each event domain, one can obtain the expected profits 
resulting from purchases (buy transactions), sales (sell transactions), and the average 
expected profit (an aggregate metric based on all trades). All means (except for pur-
chases in the finance and the weather domain) are statistically significantly greater than 
zero based on a one-sample t-test (p<.001), as indicated by triple asterisks (***)). In 
particular, all aggregated metrics are positive and range from 3.83 [cent] for weather-
related assets to 5.92 [cent] in the sports domain. For the finance domain, for example, 
this means that there is an average expected profit of 4.16 [cent] per unit of traded asset. 
Panel B of Table 3.17, in turn, shows the mean expected profit per unit of asset compar-
ing after-trading judgments to individual trade prices of the second trading round, aver-
aged across all participants. All means are statistically significantly greater than zero 
(p<.001), as indicated by triple asterisks (***). Aggregated metrics are comparable in 
magnitude to those in Panel A and range from 3.63 [cent] for weather-related assets to 
6.45 [cent] in the sports markets. The percentiles indicate that the distributions are posi-
tively skewed, i.e., the majority of participants seems to avoid negative expected profits 
from trades and a substantial number of traders yield significantly higher expected re-
turns from trades. With respect to the main treatment variable one can control for differ-
ences in expected profits for the two partitions. However, no systematic differences be-
tween the two types of partition can be found. For the sake of clear arrangement, these 
results are not included in Table 3.17. 
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Table 3.17:  Mean expected profits per unit of traded asset. 
25 50 75
Panel A: Before-Trading Judgments vs.
Trading Round 1 Trade Prices
Finance
Purchases 192 -0.04 -5.86 0.00 5.72
Sales 192 8.36*** 0.00 5.74 15.00
All Trades 192 4.16*** -1.01 2.50 8.05
Sports
Purchases 192 3.40*** -2.46 1.79 8.92
Sales 192 8.44*** 0.00 8.10 14.57
All Trades 192 5.92*** -0.35 4.74 11.16
Weather
Purchases 192 0.93 -4.41 0.39 6.79
Sales 192 6.74*** 0.00 4.37 14.15
All Trades 192 3.83*** -1.34 3.21 8.21
Panel B: After-Trading Judgments vs.
Trading Round 2 Trade Prices
Finance
Purchases 192 3.11*** -2.27 1.08 8.45
Sales 192 7.19*** 0.00 3.68 13.51
All Trades 192 5.15*** -0.19 2.31 9.07
Sports
Purchases 192 4.78*** -1.11 3.10 11.04
Sales 192 8.13*** 0.00 6.34 13.92
All Trades 192 6.45*** 0.02 4.35 11.22
Weather
Purchases 192 2.77*** -1.97 0.54 7.77
Sales 192 4.50*** -0.41 2.52 9.12
All Trades 192 3.63*** -0.61 2.20 7.33
N PercentilesMean
 
 
Interestingly, the results are consistent with an endowment effect what becomes 
clear from the fact that expected profits were notably higher for sales than for pur-
chases. The endowment effect implies that the willingness to accept (WTA) is greater 
than the willingness to pay (WTP) for a given good. The effect is caused by an under-
weighting of opportunity costs (see Thaler (1980, pp. 43–47); see also Knetsch (1989), 
and Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991)). Accordingly, people tend to attribute a 
greater value to a certain good if they own it (literally speaking, if the good is part of 
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their endowment) than if they do not possess it (i.e., the good is not part of their en-
dowment). Note that attributing different values to the same good (depending on 
whether it is part of one’s endowment or not) is inconsistent with standard economic 
theory. Transferred to the present study this means that expected profits generally have 
to be higher for sellers before they agree to sell than profits have to be for buyers before 
they are ready to buy, compared to normative standards.  
Against the background of the trader-based analysis so far, a related question is 
whether (i) the trading frequency or (ii) the trading volume is influenced by individual 
competence. While subsection 3.1.4.1 focused on analyzing second order effects in ag-
gregated market outcomes and mean judgments, competence effects are analyzed on a 
per trader basis in the following. It can be hypothesized that traders who are more com-
petent than others are willing to trade more frequently and at higher volumes than less 
competent people. Due to their high competence and knowledge, they are expected to 
have a strong opinion of which assets to sell and to buy, and at what prices. As moti-
vated in subsection 3.1.4.1, the analysis is based on a comparison between the most and 
the least competent people to achieve highest possible discriminatory power. A two-
sample t-test is performed for each event domain and trading round to test whether (i) 
the average number of trades (buy or sell) and (ii) the average trading volume (buy or 
sell) are the same for both the high- and the low-competence group. 
 
Table 3.18:  Differences in the average number of trades (Panel A) and the average trade volume 
(Panel B) per trader by competence level. 
Round 1 Round 2 N Round 1 Round 2 N Round 1 Round 2 N
Panel A: Average Number of Trades (Buy and Sell) per Trader
HIGH_COMP 12.7 12.1 44 12.6 13.0 42 9.6 11.0 50
LOW_COMP 9.3 11.2 52 10.2 10.6 57 8.8 9.3 34
Difference 3.3*** 0.9 2.5** 2.4** 0.8 1.7*
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.0024) (0.2488) (0.0124) (0.0335) (0.2195) (0.0758)
Panel B: Average Trading Volume (Buy and Sell) per Trader
HIGH_COMP 41.4 43.9 44 45.6 46.3 42 32.4 38.5 50
LOW_COMP 26.2 33.7 52 30.1 31.3 57 33.0 36.8 34
Difference 15.2*** 10.2** 15.5*** 15.0*** -0.7 1.7
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.0002) (0.0182) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.5644) (0.3663)
Finance Sports WeatherEvent Domain/
Trading Round
 
 
As can be read from Panel A of Table 3.18 there is some modest support for the 
hypothesis that highly competent people trade more often than their less competent 
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counterparts. The highest difference in the average number of trades (either purchases 
or sales) occurs for the first trading round of the finance domain (Δ = 3.3 trades), but is 
considerably reduced in the second trading round (Δ = 0.9). For the sports stimulus the 
difference is well pronounced and persists over the two rounds of trading (Δ = 2.5 and 
Δ = 2.4, respectively). The weakest effect occurs for the weather domain in which the 
differences amount to Δ = 0.8 and Δ = 1.7, respectively. Even if the differences do not 
seem to be large in terms of absolute trades, the results indicate that highly competent 
subjects traded more often by 8 to 36%, which is statistically significant in four out of 
six cases as indicated by the asterisks in Table 3.18 (***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively). Furthermore, as can be seen in Panel B of Table 
3.18, there is strong support for the hypothesis that highly competent people trade on 
average a higher volume than their less competent counterparts which proves true for 
the finance and the sports event domain, but does not hold for the weather stimulus.138 
The difference in the average trading volume (either purchases or sales) is around 15 
[assets] and statistically highly significant in three out of six markets, somewhat lower 
in the second trading round of the finance markets, but close to zero in the weather mar-
kets. It appears as if the average number of trades and the average trading volume for 
less competent people are on a rather constant level across event domains and trading 
rounds. Corresponding values for highly competent participants are generally higher for 
the finance and the sports domain, but similar to those of the low-competence group for 
the weather event domain. A possible explanation for the weak effect in the weather 
domain (as opposed to the relatively strong effects for finance and sports) could be that 
a high score of self-rated competence does not result in a “strong opinion” on any of the 
offered assets. As discussed earlier, trading activity in the finance and the sports event 
domain is likely to be more information-driven than trading in the weather domain. 
Another relevant question deals with a trader’s portfolio composition at the end 
of each trading round. Traders could try to redeploy their portfolio structure by the end 
of a trading round so that they only hold cash and/or unit portfolios which results in a 
sure payoff. Another strategy would be to “put all the eggs in one basket”, i.e., to accu-
mulate as many of a particular asset as possible which yields a relatively high payoff if 
the underlying event occurs and loses everything otherwise. On the one hand, this is a 
                                                 
138  Since subjects were allocated to session slots by their self-rated sports competence, they basically 
faced traders of the same competence level in the sports markets, but not in the finance and the weather 
markets. 
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question of individual risk aversion (i.e., how much of an expected risky payoff is given 
up in exchange for a sure profit). In the present setting, though, one cannot control for 
risk aversion since no such parameters were elicited. On the other hand, the question of 
a trader’s exposure may have something to do with competence and knowledge. Sup-
pose a trader who is quite uninformed in one of the three event domains. If this trader, 
for instance, is very uncertain about her probability judgments, she could have an inter-
est in eliminating risk from her portfolio and generating a sure payoff. By contrast, if a 
trader feels very familiar with a particular event domain, and if this trader is very confi-
dent about her probability judgments, she could have a keen interest in creating an im-
balanced portfolio with the prospect of a high payoff. 
In the following, the impact of self-rated competence on portfolio exposure is 
analyzed. Again, the analysis is based on a comparison between the most and the least 
competent participants from the population (see subsection 3.1.4.1). For each trader the 
sure (or minimum) payoff is calculated based on the number of unit portfolios and cash 
holdings at the end of a trading round.139 Besides, the maximum possible payoff is cal-
culated that obtains if the most represented asset in a trader’s portfolio pays 100 cent. 
To relate these two values, the sure payoff is divided by the maximum possible payoff. 
Even if it is not known whether participants have this payoff ratio in mind, the metric 
provides crude information on the risk of a portfolio. For instance, the payoff ratio 
would be zero if a trader “puts all her eggs in one basket”, and it would be equal to 1 for 
a trader whose portfolio solely consists of unit portfolios and cash. A major drawback of 
this metric is the fact that no probabilities are taken into account. However, objective 
probabilities are difficult to derive for the sports and the weather events, and substan-
tially depend on the normative model that is applied to the finance events. 
Panel A of Table 3.19 reports the mean sure payoffs [in cent] for highly and low 
competent traders. Mean sure payoffs (minimum payoffs) range between 999 and 1,481 
cent and are generally lower for highly competent subjects which is statistically signifi-
cant in the sports markets and in the first trading round of the finance domain (based on 
a two-sample t-test (one-tailed); ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
level, respectively). Similar to previous results, statistical significance is marginal for 
the two weather trading rounds. In general, highly competent traders earn a minimum 
                                                 
139  The number of unit portfolios equals the quantity of the asset with the smallest holding in the trader’s 
portfolio. For example, if a trader holds a portfolio consisting of 5 × asset 1, 8 × asset 2, and 10 × asset 3, 
the number of unit portfolios is five, equivalent to a value of 500 cent. 
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payoff that is considerably lower than sure payoffs earned by less competent people. 
Panel B, in turn, compares the mean of maximum possible payoffs for traders from the 
different competence levels. The mean of maximum payoffs ranges between 2,477 and 
3,344 cent and is statistically significantly higher for highly competent traders in all 
finance and sports trading rounds (indicated by the asterisks). The difference for these 
two event domains ranges between 285 and 749 cent, indicating that the maximum pay-
off is substantially higher for highly competent traders. Again, no statistically signifi-
cant effects can be found for the weather domain. The general tendency of these results 
is confirmed by the results of Panel C that show the payoff ratio metric (i.e., the indi-
vidual ratio of the minimum to the maximum possible payoff). The sure payoffs as a 
fraction of the maximum payoffs are lower for highly competent people compared to 
less competent people. Like in Panel A, these findings are statistically significant for the 
first trading round in finance, and both sports trading rounds, but are not statistically 
significant for the weather markets. The mean payoff ratio metric is around .5 for the 
high-competence group (and even lower for the sports domain), indicating that on aver-
age the sure payoff would be doubled if the “correct” event occurs. 
 
Table 3.19:  Differences in sure (minimum) payoffs, maximum possible payoffs, and payoff ratio by 
competence level of traders. 
Round 1 Round 2 N Round 1 Round 2 N Round 1 Round 2 N
Panel A:
Mean Sure Payoff [cent]
HIGH_COMP 1,222 1,226 44 1,048 999 42 1,310 1,255 50
LOW_COMP 1,481 1,287 52 1,399 1,418 57 1,370 1,375 34
Difference -258** -61 -351*** -419*** -60 -119
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.0117) (0.3238) (0.0033) (0.0005) (0.3057) (0.1867)
Panel B:
Mean Maximum Possible Payoff [cent]
HIGH_COMP 2,856 2,999 44 3,122 3,344 42 2,724 2,843 50
LOW_COMP 2,477 2,714 52 2,631 2,595 57 2,756 2,913 34
Difference 380*** 285* 491*** 749*** -31 -70
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.0016) (0.0744) (0.0009) (0.0026) (0.5814) (0.6194)
Panel C:
Mean Payoff Ratio = Sure Payoff / Maximum Possible Payoff
HIGH_COMP 0.48 0.47 44 0.39 0.38 42 0.51 0.49 50
LOW_COMP 0.63 0.53 52 0.57 0.60 57 0.54 0.53 34
Difference -0.15*** -0.06 -0.18*** -0.22*** -0.02 -0.04
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.004) (0.1544) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.3293) (0.2683)
Event Domain/
Trading Round
Finance Sports Weather
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To summarize, highly competent subjects were ready to forego some of a sure 
minimum payoff in exchange for the prospect of very high payoffs if the “predicted” 
event would occur. Apparently, highly competent traders took a higher exposure as their 
portfolio structure was more imbalanced at the end of the trading round. This conclu-
sion holds true for the finance and sports markets, but does not hold for the weather 
events. Controlling for differences in actual payoffs between the two competence 
groups yields statistically significant differences only for the first sports trading round 
(p=.0863, two-tailed) in which highly competent participants earn on average an addi-
tional payoff of about 296 cent (2,239 vs. 1943). The results indicate that for most trad-
ing rounds a lower minimum payoff or a higher maximum payoff (i.e., a lower payoff 
ratio), on average does not yield any differences in actual payoffs. Portfolio structure 
choice in the present setting seems to be rather a question of risk propensity and safety 
needs between groups with different knowledge and competence. Furthermore, one can 
control for differences in subjectively expected payoff values based on the traders’ indi-
vidual before- and after-trading judgments and the actual portfolio structure at the end 
of a trading round.  
 
Table 3.20:  Subjectively expected payoff based on individual judgments by competence level of traders. 
Round 1 Round 2 N Round 1 Round 2 N Round 1 Round 2 N
Mean Expected Payoffs
based on Individual Judgments
HIGH_COMP 2,154 2,389 44 2,371 2,395 42 2,175 2,179 50
LOW_COMP 2,109 2,135 52 2,142 2,147 57 2,104 2,150 34
Difference 45 254** 229** 248* 71 28
(p -value, two-tailed) (0.5459) (0.0197) (0.0314) (0.071) (0.364) (0.7438)
Event Domain/
Trading Round
Finance Sports Weather
 
 
For each first (second) trading round the expected payoff from a trader’s portfo-
lio is calculated based on individual probability judgments elicited before (after) trad-
ing. Table 3.20 reports mean expected payoffs based on individual judgments for the 
different competence groups. As a result, expected values for subjects of the low-
competence group are relatively constant across event domains and trading rounds and 
range between 2,104 and 2,150 cent. Thus, they expect to generate an extra 104–150 
cent by trading (besides the initial endowment of 2,000 cent) based on individually 
judged probabilities. Subjects in the high-competence group expect to earn a payoff that 
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turns out to be notably higher (229–254 cent) in the sports markets and the second trad-
ing round of the finance markets. In the two weather trading rounds and in the first fi-
nance round, they expect to earn a payoff which is similar to low competent partici-
pants. This means, for the sports markets and in part for the finance markets, highly 
competent people are confident to earn a payoff that is substantially higher than that 
expected by low competent people. For the weather domain and in part for the finance 
stimuli, however, the effect diminishes and subjectively expected payoffs by highly 
competent people are similar to those by low competent subjects.  
 
3.2 Information treatment 
3.2.1 Motivation and study design 
The results of the basis treatment of Study 1 (subsection 3.1) reveal strong parti-
tion-dependence in individual probability judgments and prediction market prices. Al-
though some mitigation of effect size could be observed in the experimental markets in 
the course of a trading round, the partition bias remains well pronounced in equilibrium 
market prices and in after-trading individual judgments. Although market institutions in 
the experimental asset markets were designed such that they facilitated best possible 
trading conditions,140 market forces seem not to be able to eliminate the systematic dis-
tortions expressed in individual judgments. One may argue that this result is in part due 
to the fact that no further information was provided about the probability of events dur-
ing the short periods of trading (10 minutes per trading round, 20 minutes per event 
domain). One may further argue that traders even forgot about the fact that there is an-
other partition of the state space for the other half of participants (as they were told in 
the instructions) in the heat of the moment. To investigate the role of information con-
veyance and to address the questions of whether and how the effect size of partition-
dependence in prediction market prices depends on the level of individual information, 
a follow-up study was designed. Content and type of the information had to be specified 
such that it could influence traders’ beliefs and trading decisions. The follow-up study 
                                                 
140  Recall that the trading institution included a computerized market environment based on a continuous 
double auction and provided the possibility of trading multiple assets, submitting bid and asks simultane-
ously, accessing the order book, and did not impose any transaction costs. Traders could even short sell 
assets indirectly using the unit portfolio. 
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was conducted in May 2007 and the experimental setup was very much the same as in 
the basis treatment (see subsection 3.1.1) except for two major differences:141  
 
1.  In the instructions, the Table that contains the description of the different asset par-
titions was arranged in a way to clarify the relationship between the assets of differ-
ent partitions. Table 3.21 shows exactly how the description was presented to the 
participants (translated from German): 
 
Table 3.21:  Sets of asset partitions for the different treatments in Study 1 (information treatment). 
Financial markets   ----   Event:  DAX-closing in 2 weeks 
 
Relevant for the payment of the assets in the financial markets domain is the 
Xetra-DAX closing (incl. final auction) in two weeks from today (i.e., on May 
21, 2007). Xetra-DAX closing as of May 4, 2007 was 7516.76. 
 
Market A Partition 1 Partition 2 Market B 
Asset A.1 DAX.[0 - 7437.99] 
Asset A.2 DAX.[7438 - 7608.99] DAX.[0 - 7608.99] Asset B.1 
DAX.[7609 - 7759.99] Asset B.2 Asset A.3 DAX.[7609+] DAX.[7760+] Asset B.3 
 
 In addition, subjects were given the following hint (translated from German): 
 
 “Please note that the intervals of the assets were randomly chosen. Note further 
that two assets from one market can be described as equal to one asset from the 
other market; the Table above clarifies this for us. It is further evident that the sum 
of market prices of two assets from one market (e.g., assets A.1 and A.2) can be 
compared to the corresponding market price of one asset from the other market (in 
this case: asset B.1) since they incorporate exactly the same payoff claim. As for the 
current market prices and bid/ask quotes for the assets from the other market you 
will be informed of them later at two different points of time during each trading 
round.” 
 
2. During each 10-minute trading round there were two points in time at which sub-
jects were informed on the current market price, the best buy and the best sell offers 
                                                 
141  A minor difference was the fact that subjects were not allocated to session slots based on their self-
stated soccer competence during the registration process. Thus, all participants allocated themselves to 
one of the twelve session slots. All other parameters of the experiment exactly correspond to the basis 
treatment design. See Appendix II for a Table with session-individual DAX interval boundaries in the 
information treatment. 
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of each of the assets from the corresponding market (that traded assets from the 
other partition at the same time). The first “market snapshot” appeared after four 
minutes of trading, the second “market snapshot” appeared three minutes later, after 
seven minutes of trading. Participants were not informed in advance of the exact 
time at which news would arrive.142 The information was presented to the subjects 
through a message window which popped up on their trading screen automatically 
(see Figure 3.14 which refers to the practice market).143 
 
 
Figure 3.14:  Message window in Study 1 (information treatment). 
 
Against the background of the very strong effect of partition-dependence in the 
basis treatment of Study 1, the design modifications of the information treatment are 
suited to test for partition-dependence under “tightened” conditions. First, the fact that 
the state space was notionally divided into four (more or less) randomly chosen inter-
vals was presented to the participants in a more salient way and it became clear from the 
instructions that two assets from one partition were packed to form a single asset in the 
other partition (and that another asset was unpacked into two assets in the other parti-
tion). Besides, it was explicitly pointed out to the subjects that the summed market 
prices of two assets from one partition could be directly compared to the market price of 
the corresponding packed asset from the other partition, since these positions were 
equivalent in terms of their final payoff structure. Second, participants were reminded of 
this design feature twice a trading round by receiving (real-time) market quotes and 
prices from the other market. Providing the subjects with price information from the 
                                                 
142  Under some circumstances, it can be unfavorable to trade immediately before traders expect to get 
new information (see Sunder (1995, p. 455)). So informing traders about the exact times at which news 
arrived could result in discontinuous trading which was not intended. 
143  An alternative way of providing subjects with this information would be to allow them looking at 
market data from the other market whenever they want. However, the message window was chosen to 
provide the information in order to control for available sets of information at a given point in time. 
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other market should also reinforce them to reflect on their beliefs and to reconsider 
market prices in their own markets. By the type of message participants receive infor-
mation that reflect a kind of dollar-weighted aggregated opinion about probabilities of 
events, generated by eight other traders trading a set of assets that is directly related to a 
trader’s own assets. In contrast to the basis treatment of Study 1, in which the two mar-
kets of a session slot acted completely independently, the message transfer in the infor-
mation treatment creates an effective link between the two markets of a session slot 
from the fourth minute in each trading round.144 
With reference to the hypotheses derived in subsection 3.1.3, reduced partition-
dependence is expected in individual probability judgments due to the more salient 
presentation of the intervals and the relationship between the two sets of assets in the 
instructions. Note that this form of presentation could induce a different framing of the 
events, away from an ignorance prior of one third for each asset and toward an alloca-
tion of [.25, .25, .50] for assets of partition 1 and [.50, .25, .25] for assets of partition 2. 
Furthermore, reduced partition-dependence is expected for equilibrium market prices 
due to some convergence of market prices for assets (or combination of assets) that refer 
to the same event. Convergence of market prices could be caused by both rising prices 
for the packed event and falling prices for the unpacked events. To a certain extent, 
though, partition-dependence in market prices is expected to remain since traders in the 
information treatment were still not able to trade across markets to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities arising from partition-dependence. In addition, subjects do not have any 
information on how competent their counterparts are; neither do they have details on the 
other market’s liquidity which they could find important to assess the reliability of the 
received information. As Brüggelambert (1999, p. 109) states, it is the sureness about 
the reliability of a source of information that turns “news” into “information”. Thus, 
people who receive a market snapshot from another market do not have reason per se to 
assume that they themselves are “wrong” with their market prices. Furthermore, the 
prior-information model posits that peoples’ expectations are not at all influenced by 
observed prices. According to this model, market participants only use their prior in-
formation instead, which is exogenous to the price formation process (see, e.g., Forsythe 
and Lundholm (1990)). By consequence, prices would emerge straightly forward from 
the dynamics of demand and supply as in a Walrasian system (Plott and Sunder (1982)). 
                                                 
144  Recall that after four minutes of trading the first message was transmitted. 
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However, many experimental studies show that prices do not concur with the prior-
information equilibriums (in particular, see subsection 2.3.2.3) which gives reason to 
assume that traders do in fact take into account information that is conveyed by prices 
when updating their beliefs. Hence, one may suppose that traders do not per se ignore 
the information messages in the present study.  
In response to the message transmission some traders might adjust their quotes 
which, in turn, could cause prices to move in a direction of reduced partition-
dependence. Possibly, though, this could induce herd behavior by other traders.145 
Herding in the context of financial markets refers to the phenomenon that traders some-
times react pro-cyclical and by this means trigger self-energizing price movements; 
traders then ignore private information and mimic a particular market pattern. This, in 
turn, could lead to reverse partition-dependence in the context of the present treatment. 
Furthermore, overconfidence of subjects could see to it that traders do not care much 
about market prices of some other markets and, by consequence, that the degree of par-
tition-dependence is not affected by information exchange. Overconfident people over-
value their private information and tend to ignore new signals (Biais et al. (2005)).  
To summarize the hypotheses with regard to the information treatment of Study 
1, reduced partition-dependence is expected to be expressed in pre-trading individual 
probability judgments due to a more obvious presentation (and additional textual expla-
nations) of intervals, assets and their relationship in the instructions. In addition, the 
crosswise message transmission is expected two have two effects: first, participants 
should be stimulated to reconsider and adjust their beliefs by comparing them to market 
prices of the corresponding market. Second, people (in particular less competent sub-
jects) might think that there are more competent traders in the other market and that it is 
worth trading assets at prices consistent with prices from the other market. This, in turn, 
would cause convergence of market prices and would result in reduced partition-
dependence. However, partition-dependence is not expected to be fully eliminated from 
market prices due to some uncertainty that remains about the reliability of received mes-
sages. In addition, other information related biases like, e.g., herd behavior and overcon-
                                                 
145  For recent surveys of herding in financial markets, see Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), and Chamley 
(2004). Cipriani and Guarino (2005) analyze herd behavior in a laboratory financial market and find that 
herd behavior seldom occurred in their experimental setting. However, in some cases subjects preferred to 
ignore their private information and abstain from trading which is not captured by theory. 
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fidence could affect market prices and could thus overlay the bias-reducing effects on 
the partition bias. 
 
3.2.2 Main results and impact of information transmission 
Table 3.22, which has the same structure as Table 3.13 for the basis treatment of 
Study 1, summarizes the main results of the information treatment. The Table contains 
the mean pre-trading individual probability judgments, equilibrium market prices after 
the second trading round (quantity-weighted average of last three trade prices) and the 
mean post-trading individual probability judgments. The effect size of partition-
dependence in pre-trading judgments (i.e., pJ,i(I1) + pJ,i(I2) – pJ,i(I1∪ I2)) is .263, .211 
and .201 for the finance, sports and weather event domains, respectively. The partition 
bias in post-trading judgments is .240, .216 and .212 for the finance, sports and weather 
events, respectively. A similar Table showing differences in medians can be obtained 
from Appendix III. Results are very similar to those derived from means. All reported 
differences are statistically highly significantly different from zero (p<.0001). Compar-
ing post-trading judgments to pre-trading judgments in the information treatment, it 
appears that the effect size is pretty much on the same level for each event domain (i.e., 
there is not much variability in before- and after-trading judgments). With respect to the 
effect size expressed in equilibrium market prices, it turns out that the partition bias 
between summed prices (divided by 100) of unpacked assets, Pi*(I1) + Pi*(I2), and the 
packed asset, Pi*(I1∪ I2), is .153, .189 and .205 for the finance, sports and weather do-
main, respectively. Corresponding values for the high intervals, Pi*(I3) + Pi*(I4) – 
Pi*(I3∪ I4), are .156, .189 and .191. Averaging the effect size for the low and the high 
intervals yields an average bias of .154, .189 and .198 for the finance, sports and 
weather domains, respectively. Like for the judgments, all reported differences are sta-
tistically highly significantly different from zero (p<.01). Comparing equilibrium mar-
ket prices to the very similar pre- and post-trading judgments in the information treat-
ment, it is striking that there is a strong reduction of bias size in the finance markets, a 
small reduction in the sports events, and virtually no effect of bias reduction in the 
weather markets.  
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Table 3.22:  Mean equilibrium market prices (2nd trading round) and individual judgments (pre-trading 
and post-trading) in the information treatment of Study 1. 
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
1 I 1 0.209 0.161 0.184 0.241 0.176 0.203 0.165 0.116 0.142
1 I 2 0.474 0.451 0.497 0.403 0.405 0.420 0.324 0.316 0.323
I 1 +I 2 0.683 0.613 0.681 0.644 0.580 0.623 0.489 0.432 0.465
2 I 1 ∪ Ι 2 0.420 0.459 0.441 0.433 0.391 0.408 0.288 0.227 0.253
PD difference 0.263 0.153 0.240 0.211 0.189 0.216 0.201 0.205 0.212
2 I 3 0.392 0.380 0.396 0.358 0.376 0.378 0.368 0.358 0.385
2 I 4 0.188 0.153 0.164 0.209 0.228 0.214 0.344 0.399 0.362
I 3 +I 4 0.580 0.533 0.559 0.567 0.605 0.593 0.712 0.756 0.747
1 I 3 ∪ Ι 4 0.317 0.378 0.319 0.356 0.416 0.377 0.511 0.565 0.535
PD difference 0.263 0.156 0.240 0.211 0.189 0.216 0.201 0.191 0.212
Average PD difference 0.154 0.189 0.198
Finance WeatherSports
Mean Judged Probability/Equilibrium Prices
Treatment
 
 
Table 3.23 compares individual probability judgments, elicited before trading 
and thereafter, from the basis treatment with the judgments from the information treat-
ment (N=96 in each cell).146 This allows testing for interaction effects between partition 
type and information treatment. The analysis is performed by calculating the difference 
of differences, i.e., the difference in partition bias for the two different “info treat-
ments”; one-sided p-values are reported based on a 2 × 2 factorial analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Looking at pre-trading judgments first, it turns out that partition-dependence 
in the information treatment is reduced by .048 (a 15.7% decrease), .05 (–19.2%) and 
.077 (–27.7%) in the finance, sports and weather domain, respectively. The decline is 
statistically significant at the 10%-level for the finance domain, and at the 5%-level for 
the weather domain (as indicated by the asterisks), but is not statistically significantly 
different from zero for the sports stimulus. For the finance and sports event domains, 
the bias reduction can be mainly attributed to both lower judgments for the sum of un-
packed events and higher judgments for the packed event; for the weather stimulus, bias 
reduction is due to higher judgments for the packed event.  
 
                                                 
146  Due to technical errors, two judgments are missing for the weather events (basis treatment). 
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Table 3.23:  Interaction effects between partition type and treatment (basis vs. information treatment) in 
pre- and post-trading probability judgments. 
Treatment Basis Info Basis Info
Mean probability judgments
Finance
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) 0.717 0.683 0.699 0.681 96 / 96
p(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 0.405 0.420 0.442 0.441 96 / 96
Difference 0.312 0.263 0.257 0.240
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed)
Sports
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) 0.678 0.644 0.684 0.623 96 / 96
p(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 0.417 0.433 0.428 0.408 96 / 96
Difference 0.261 0.211 0.256 0.216
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed)
Weather
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) 0.477 0.489 0.422 0.465 95 / 96
p(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 0.199 0.288 0.196 0.253 95 / 96
Difference 0.278 0.201 0.226 0.212
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed) (.0119)
-0.014
(.3283)
-0.050
(.126)
-0.040
(.167)
N basis  / N infoPre-Trading Judgments Post-Trading Judgments
-0.077**
-0.048*
(.0839)
-0.017
(.3255)
 
 
While partition-dependence remains well pronounced in terms of absolute bias 
strength across event domains, the effect size seems to be reduced as a result of the 
modified presentation of intervals and assets in the instructions.147 For post-trading 
judgments it turns out that the difference in partition-dependence between the basis 
treatment and the information treatment almost shrinks to zero for the finance and 
weather domains, i.e., there are virtually no differences in bias strength between the two 
“info treatments”. For the sports stimulus, partition-dependence in the info treatment is 
slightly lower than in the basis treatment by .04 (–15.6%). However, none of the inter-
action terms for post-trading judgments is statistically significant.  
The next question is to what extent market prices and therefrom derived parti-
tion-dependence is influenced by the real-time price information disseminated to the 
                                                 
147  Recall that judgments were collected right before trading in each event domain began. Thus, one has 
to take into account that participants already gathered some trading experience before providing their 
judgments for the second and the third event domain (the order in which the three event domains ap-
peared was perfectly counterbalanced). Traders in the information treatment additionally gathered experi-
ence in receiving information via the message window which might have influenced their before-trading 
judgments in the subsequent event domains. Therefore, one must be careful in attributing reduced parti-
tion-dependence in pre-trading judgments solely to the different presentations in the instructions. 
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participants while trading. As it was hypothesized that market prices converge in re-
sponse to the exchange of market data between experimental groups, an obvious starting 
point is to compare both treatments with respect to the convergence measure introduced 
in subsection 3.1.3.2. Recall that some degree of price convergence due to learning and 
experience was already found in the basis treatment of the study in which no cross-
market information was provided. Price convergence due to message exchange, though, 
should be more pronounced. 
 
Table 3.24:  Measures of price convergence over time (info treatment). 
Finance Sports Weather
Avg. [P(I 1 )+P(I 2 ) ] -0.0121 -0.0111 -0.0138
Avg. P(I 1 ∪  I 2 ) -0.0004 -0.0027 -0.0050
Slope difference -0.0117 -0.0084 -0.0088
Avg. [P(I 3 )+P(I 4 ) ] -0.0096 -0.0104 0.0036
Avg. P(I 3 ∪  I 4 ) -0.0028 0.0033 0.0060
Slope difference -0.0068 -0.0137 -0.0024
Convergence measure
(mean slope difference) -0.0092 -0.0111 -0.0056
Slope Coefficient β  from Linear Regression
 
 
Table 3.24 presents the results of the convergence measure analysis for the in-
formation treatment that can be directly compared to the results obtained for the basis 
treatment presented in Table 3.12 (see subsection 3.1.3.2).148 Comparing the (mean) 
slope differences from both treatments, though, suggests that convergence of market 
prices is even more pronounced in the basis treatment.149 However, linear regression 
coefficients based on the whole trading period of two trading rounds only provide a 
rough measure of price convergence.  
To further assess whether market price convergence is likely to be message-
driven or rather the result of general learning and trading experience (as in the basis 
treatment), a 2 × 2 factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) is suited to shed light on 
                                                 
148  For graphs that show the aggregated development of asset prices over time for the three event do-
mains in the information treatment, see Appendix IV. These graphs directly correspond to the graphs in 
Figure 3.4 to Figure 3.6 in subsection 3.1.3.2. 
149  Recall that a negative (positive) slope difference indicates convergence (divergence) of market prices. 
The more negative the slope difference, the more prices from differently partitioned markets do converge. 
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possible interaction effects between partition type and information treatment in terms of 
equilibrium market prices. Table 3.25 compares mean equilibrium market prices of the 
basis treatment with equilibrium prices of the information treatment (N=12 in each cell) 
and reports p-values for ANOVA interaction terms (one-tailed; ***, **, * indicate sta-
tistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively). It turns out that results are 
mixed. There is a considerable bias reduction in equilibrium prices of the info treatment 
for the first and second trading rounds of the finance and the sports markets (except for 
the high intervals of the sports markets). This result can be largely attributed to a de-
cline in the sum of market prices for the unpacked assets (note that there is some “over-
round” in the basis treatment markets, i.e., equilibrium market prices in partition 1 sum 
to more than 1.0). For the weather event domain, by contrast, results are ambiguous: 
they indicate a bias reduction in the info treatment based on trading round 1 market 
prices, but indicate a stronger effect of the partition bias in the info treatment based on 
trading round 2 market prices. Particularly noticeable for the weather domain, though, is 
the strong bias reduction between the first and the second trading round in the basis 
treatment (while the bias between trading rounds is only slightly reduced in the informa-
tion treatment). In most cases, though, statistical significance of the differences in effect 
size between the basis treatment and the information treatment is marginal. Obviously, 
there is a need for a more detailed analysis of price reactions to the arrival of real-time 
market data from the differently partitioned market.  
Since the exchange of current market information constitutes an explicit interre-
lationship between the two markets of a session slot, it is worth looking at the develop-
ment of price differences over time on a session-based level. Figure 3.15 to Figure 3.20 
present overall time-series for the sum of market prices of unpacked assets (P(I1) + P(I2) 
and P(I3) + P(I4), respectively) against the corresponding packed asset (P(I1∪ I2) and 
P(I3∪ I4), respectively). Each Figure refers to either the low or the high-interval assets 
of one of the three event domains and contains a price chart for each of the twelve ses-
sion slots. The red curves belong to partition 1 and the blue curves belong to partition 2. 
The black vertical line (at 600 sec.) separates the first from the second trading round and 
the dashed gray vertical lines (after 240/420 and 840/1,020 sec., respectively) indicate 
the points of time at which messages were transmitted.150 Note again that markets are 
                                                 
150  Due to the limited performance of the application server, messages were usually delivered with a 
short delay (mean delivery time was 16 seconds). 
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effectively unrelated during the first four minutes of each trading round, i.e. before the 
first set of information was transferred. 
 
Table 3.25:  Interaction effects between partition type and treatment (basis vs. information treatment) in 
mean equilibrium market prices. 
Treatment Basis Info Basis Info
Mean equilibrium market prices
Finance
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) 0.764 0.628 0.713 0.613 12 / 12
p(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 0.421 0.455 0.424 0.459 12 / 12
Difference 0.343 0.172 0.289 0.153
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed)
p(I 3 ) + p(I 4 ) 0.619 0.540 0.581 0.533 12 / 12
p(I 3 ∪ I 4 ) 0.363 0.352 0.336 0.378 12 / 12
Difference 0.257 0.188 0.246 0.156
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed)
Sports
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) 0.704 0.581 0.720 0.580 12 / 12
p(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 0.401 0.410 0.439 0.391 12 / 12
Difference 0.303 0.171 0.280 0.189
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed)
p(I 3 ) + p(I 4 ) 0.583 0.644 0.568 0.605 12 / 12
p(I 3 ∪ I 4 ) 0.372 0.434 0.391 0.416 12 / 12
Difference 0.211 0.210 0.177 0.189
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed)
Weather
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) 0.425 0.475 0.303 0.432 12 / 12
p(I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 0.160 0.245 0.149 0.227 12 / 12
Difference 0.265 0.230 0.154 0.205
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed)
p(I 3 ) + p(I 4 ) 0.887 0.737 0.850 0.756 12 / 12
p(I 3 ∪ I 4 ) 0.646 0.526 0.707 0.565 12 / 12
Difference 0.241 0.211 0.143 0.191
Difference of differences
(p -value, one-tailed)
-0.030 0.049
(0.3266) (0.2224)
(0.1790) (0.1155)
-0.001 0.012
N basis  / N infoTrading Round 1 Trading Round 2
-0.035
-0.170**
(0.0221)
-0.136**
(0.0334)
-0.069 -0.090
(0.2659)
0.051
(0.1974)
-0.132**
(0.0409)
-0.091
(0.1293)
(0.4950) (0.4398)
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Figure 3.15:  Overall time-series price chart (info treatment) by slot (domain: finance, low intervals). 
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Figure 3.16:  Overall time-series price chart (info treatment) by slot (domain: finance, high intervals). 
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Figure 3.17:  Overall time-series price chart (info treatment) by slot (domain: sports, low intervals). 
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Figure 3.18:  Overall time-series price chart (info treatment) by slot (domain: sports, high intervals). 
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Figure 3.19:  Overall time-series price chart (info treatment) by slot (domain: weather, low intervals). 
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Figure 3.20:  Overall time-series price chart (info treatment) by slot (domain: weather, high intervals). 
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The price charts of Figure 3.15 to Figure 3.20 reveal a great diversity of different 
patterns of price reactions. In principle, two basis scenarios can be distinguished which 
are characterized by whether some degree of partition-dependence is implicitly ex-
pressed by the first message or not: 
 
(i) If no partition-dependence is reflected by market prices at the time when the first 
information appears (the first dashed line of each trading round), prices for the 
considered intervals seem to continue oscillating around their base level (like, 
e.g., in slots 5 and 10 of the finance domain, or slot 3 of the sports stimulus).  
 
(ii) In most cases, though, partition-dependence is well pronounced in market prices 
after the first four minutes of trading what became obvious to the participants 
when they received the first information about market data from the other mar-
ket.  
¾ In some of these cases, partition-dependence is temporarily reduced, but 
reincreases over the course of the trading period (like, e.g., in slot 1 of 
the finance domain (first trading round)).  
¾ In other slots, partition-dependence seems to be reduced permanently 
(like, e.g., the high intervals in slot 4 and 9 of sports). 
 In some of these markets the reduction of partition-dependence 
appears to be caused by a reduction of prices for the unpacked-
event assets (like for the low intervals in slot 2 of finance or the 
low intervals in slot 2 of weather). 
 In other markets this seems to be due to an increase of the price 
for the packed-interval asset (e.g., slot 6 of finance (particularly 
in the second trading round)). 
 In some slots, prices apparently converge both-way (e.g., slot 7 of 
finance). 
 
In a few instances, there is some weak evidence for reverse partition-dependence 
(e.g., slots 3 and 5 of finance). In some of the slots, though, information seems to have 
virtually no impact on prices (e.g., slot 8 of finance, slots 1 and 11 of sports, or slot 9 of 
weather). On the whole, in many of the experimental markets price developments seem 
to be a mixture of some of the described patterns. Moreover, price reactions are often 
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different for the low and the high intervals. Accordingly, it is hard to derive a general 
conclusion from observed price patterns. In addition, if at all adjustments occur, they are 
quite different in pace and magnitude. Finally, it is not even clear whether price adjust-
ments are a response to new information or rather a result of general learning and ex-
perience.  
 
To deal with this question in a more formal way, define  
 
PDs,t (I1∪ I2) := Ps,t (I1) + Ps,t (I2) – Ps,t (I1∪ I2)  and  (3.3)
PDs,t (I3∪ I4) := Ps,t (I3) + Ps,t (I4) – Ps,t (I3∪ I4) (3.4)
 
to represent the degree of partition-dependence in slot s = 1, …, 12 at point t = 1, 
2 (the two points of time at which the first and the second message was transferred to 
the other market, respectively). Let PD*s,3 (I1∪ I2) and PD*s,3 (I3∪ I4) represent the size 
of partition-dependence expressed in mean equilibrium market prices (based on the 
quantity-weighted average of the last three trade prices of a trading round). Further de-
fine )( 212, IIPDs ∪  and )( 432, IIPDs ∪  as the time-weighted average size of partition-
dependence in the time between the two messages arrived (i.e., between the fourth and 
the seventh minute), and )( 213, IIPDs ∪  and )( 433, IIPDs ∪  as the time-weighted aver-
age amount of partition-dependence in the time between the second message and the 
end of the trading period (i.e., from the seventh minute until the end). Figure 3.21 illus-
trates the five measures of partition-dependence in the information treatment. 
 
Start of 
trading
round
End of 
trading
round
Message 1 
(4 minutes)
Message 2 
(7 minutes)
PDs,1 PDs,2 PD*s,3
2,sPD 3,sPD
Trading
time
(time-weighted
average)
(time-weighted
average)
 
Figure 3.21:  Measures of partition-dependence in the information treatment. 
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It is now possible to carry out a more systematic analysis of how partition-
dependence varies throughout the trading period and how it is related to the information 
received from the differently partitioned market. The following four metrics of parti-
tion-dependence can be derived in each market:  
 
(i) The average amount of partition-dependence between the two messages ( 2,sPD ) 
compared to the degree of partition-dependence expressed in the first message 
(PDs,1); 
(ii) the average size of partition-dependence between the second message and the 
end of the trading round ( 3,sPD ) compared to the degree of partition-
dependence expressed in the second message (PDs,2); 
(iii) partition-dependence expressed in mean equilibrium market prices at the end of 
a trading round (PD*s,3) compared to partition-dependence expressed in the first 
message (PDs,1), and finally  
(iv) the average degree of partition-dependence in the last sub-period ( 3,sPD ) com-
pared to the average degree of partition-dependence between the two messages 
( 2,sPD ).  
 
If information transmission has a de-biasing effect on market prices, partition-
dependence is expected to be reduced in later stages of a trading period. Accordingly, 
the following four hypotheses can be derived:151 
 
Hypothesis 3.7.(i): 
H0(a):   )( 212 IIPD ∪  – PD1 (I1∪ I2) < 0  and 
H0(b):  )( 432 IIPD ∪  – PD1 (I3∪ I4) < 0 
 
 
 
                                                 
151  Note that hypotheses 3.7.(i)-(iv) may induce some interpretational difficulties in cases of reverse 
partition-dependence. While reduced partition-dependence generally leads to negative values for H0(a) 
and H0(b), a negative value may also reflect increased reverse partition-dependence. However, instances 
of reverse partition-dependence are rare in the present data and should not have a major impact on median 
differences. An alternative approach would be to run a simple linear regression (without constant term) 
for each of the derived metrics (i)–(iv), and to interpret the resulting slope coefficient as a measure of bias 
reduction. 
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Hypothesis 3.7.(ii): 
H0(a):   )( 213 IIPD ∪  – PD2 (I1∪ I2) < 0  and 
H0(b):  )( 433 IIPD ∪  – PD2 (I3∪ I4) < 0 
 
Hypothesis 3.7.(iii): 
H0(a):   PD*3 (I1∪ I2) – PD1 (I1∪ I2) < 0   and 
H0(b):  PD*3 (I3∪ I4) – PD1 (I3∪ I4) < 0 
 
Hypothesis 3.7.(iv): 
H0(a):   )( 213 IIPD ∪  – )( 212 IIPD ∪  < 0  and 
H0(b):  )( 433 IIPD ∪  – )( 432 IIPD ∪  < 0 
 
For each of the four hypotheses above, there are twelve paired data points per 
event domain and trading round. Table 3.26 reports the results of the hypotheses tests 
(based on a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test), broken down into event do-
mains and trading rounds. Note that all values were rescaled (× 100) for the sake of clar-
ity. For each sub-hypothesis H0(a) (for the low intervals) and H0(b) (for the high inter-
vals) the Table contains median values for the respective measures of partition-
dependence to gain some feeling for the effect size. The third row shows the median of 
differences and the fourth row reports p-values (one-sided; ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively).  
In general, the results are supportive of the conjecture that there is some reduc-
tion in effect size after new market data have arrived (a negative sign of the median of 
differences indicates reduced partition-dependence, which is the case for the majority of 
event domain-trading round combinations). The median difference of effect size across 
all hypotheses ranges between 2.18 (an increase of partition-dependence) and –8.09 (a 
reduction of partition-dependence) in terms of absolute differences. For the first trading 
round of the sports markets all metrics indicate a statistically significant reduction of 
partition-dependence, which is considerable in magnitude. For the second trading round 
of the sports markets, though, the data reflects a slight tendency for increased partition-
dependence. Some meaningful reductions of effect size can also be observed for the 
finance and the weather markets.  
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Table 3.26:  Results of hypotheses tests (3.7.(i)–3.7.(iv)). 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2
Hypothesis 3.7.(i):
H0(a):
PD 2 (I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 19.58 17.09 18.44 20.20 26.29 18.25
PD 1 (I 1 ∪  I 2 ) 20.75 17.50 18.50 19.00 28.75 17.50
Median of differences -0.24 -1.35 -3.38** 1.43* -3.04* 0.27
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.4688) (0.1047) (0.0250) (0.0790) (0.0790) (0.3475)
H0(b):
PD 2 (I 3 ∪ I 4 ) 20.41 14.88 19.44 18.24 27.57 17.98
PD 1 (I 3 ∪  I 4 ) 19.51 14.25 25.50 17.25 25.00 19.75
Median of differences -2.25 -0.66 -3.37** 2.18* -0.81 -1.35
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.1361) (0.2669) (0.0356) (0.0584) (0.3769) (0.1941)
Hypothesis 3.7.(ii):
H0(a):
PD 3 (I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 16.90 14.25 18.28 22.45 23.98 18.08
PD 2 (I 1 ∪  I 2 ) 24.00 15.50 19.75 19.75 26.00 17.70
Median of differences -2.84** -1.68* -2.75** 0.60 -1.73 -2.54**
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.0422) (0.0681) (0.0498) (0.4070) (0.2164) (0.0356)
H0(b):
PD 3 (I 3 ∪ I 4 ) 18.39 14.52 22.28 15.79 19.49 17.92
PD 2 (I 3 ∪  I 4 ) 19.00 11.25 24.75 16.45 24.25 21.00
Median of differences -0.40 0.27 -3.10* -0.06 -2.57** -0.90
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.4688) (0.3190) (0.0790) (0.4688) (0.0356) (0.1047)
Hypothesis 3.7.(iii):
H0(a):
PD * 3 (I 1 ∪  I 2 ) 12.95 11.90 14.48 23.38 22.79 19.78
PD 1 (I 1 ∪  I 2 ) 20.75 17.50 18.50 19.00 28.75 17.50
Median of differences -2.33** -5.80* -8.09** -0.32 -3.58 -0.71
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.0498) (0.0790) (0.0299) (0.4688) (0.1197) (0.3769)
H0(b):
PD * 3 (I 3 ∪  I 4 ) 17.16 12.98 18.49 16.76 18.25 14.45
PD 1 (I 3 ∪  I 4 ) 19.51 14.25 25.50 17.25 25.00 19.75
Median of differences -4.68* 0.69 -3.24** 0.29 -5.03 -3.30**
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.0584) (0.4377) (0.0498) (0.2652) (0.2164) (0.0356)
Hypothesis 3.7.(iv):
H0(a):
PD 3 (I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 16.90 14.25 18.28 22.45 23.98 18.08
PD 2 (I 1 ∪ I 2 ) 19.58 17.09 18.44 20.20 26.29 18.25
Median of differences -2.25 -1.93* -2.99** 0.61 -1.00 -2.42*
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.1361) (0.0912) (0.0422) (0.4070) (0.4377) (0.0681)
H0(b):
PD 3 (I 3 ∪ I 4 ) 18.39 14.52 22.28 15.79 19.49 17.92
PD 2 (I 3 ∪ I 4 ) 20.41 14.88 19.44 18.24 27.57 17.98
Median of differences -1.90 0.34 -5.46** -0.61 -1.44 -0.09
(p -value, one-tailed) (0.3475) (0.4295) (0.0299) (0.3190) (0.2164) (0.5000)
Median
Finance Sports Weather
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In particular it seems as if the reduction is well pronounced when comparing 
partition-dependence in equilibrium market prices with partition-dependence expressed 
at the time of the first message (hypothesis 3.7.(iii)), and when comparing the average 
effect size of partition-dependence in the last sub-period with partition-dependence ex-
pressed at the time of the second message (hypothesis 3.7.(ii)). Admittedly, though, the 
results are by no means consistent. Although most of the medians of differences show a 
negative sign, statistical significance is marginal in about half the times. 
Taken together the results from the information treatment, one may conclude 
that there is a slight tendency for the partition bias to be reduced over the course of a 
trading round, particularly after new market data from the differently partitioned market 
have arrived (most signs of the calculated metrics are negative). The results suggest that 
traders effectively pay some attention to information received from the other market 
which, in turn, leads to some convergence of market prices. To a great extent, though, 
traders seem to adhere to their initially set anchor. Furthermore, it has to be taken into 
account that the messages did not allow a direct comparison of market prices; partici-
pants rather had to “pack” or “unpack” reported prices themselves to make them compa-
rable to prices from their own market. The complexity of messages notwithstanding, the 
results can be taken as further evidence for the fact that partition-dependence proves 
quite robust in the short-run experimental markets of the present lab study. Partition-
dependence is to some extent diminished, but not eliminated by the “market forces”, 
even under the “tightened” conditions in which participants were (i) reminded of the 
existence of a different partition and (ii) were informed about obvious price inconsisten-
cies between the two markets. 
 
3.3 Interim conclusions 
The lab Study 1 was designed to see whether partition-dependence occurs and 
persists in short-run experimental asset markets, and to compare effects expressed in 
probability judgments with effects revealed by market trading prices. Both judgments 
and prices do show strong effects of partition-dependence across the three event do-
mains that were used. Market prices show a much smaller effect in one of three event 
domains, and there is a small influence of market experience on post-trading individual 
judgments. It seems as if there is some convergence of market prices, but market forces 
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are not able to eliminate the bias. The results derived from market prices prove rather 
reliable since there was vigorous trading among participants and intra-market efficiency 
can be rated high as temporary arbitrage opportunities within markets were quickly re-
moved. The hypothesis that prices are structurally-biased compared to beliefs is refuted 
because prices are close to the median quantile of measured beliefs.  
The basis treatment of Study 1 also aimed to analyze the extent to which differ-
ent competence characteristics of the trading population influences the degree of parti-
tion-dependence. Competence of highly knowledgeable people apparently reduces parti-
tion-dependence in judged probability for two out of three event domains. A plausible 
explanation would be that some of the event domains (here: finance and sports) are 
more information-driven than others (here: weather). However, partition-dependence 
remains well pronounced even for highly competent subjects and competence effects 
are hardly reflected in market outcomes of the sports markets to which traders were al-
located by their level of self-rated competence. One may argue that differences in com-
petence and knowledge diminish in the market environment, but a trader-based analysis 
shows that there are significant differences in the trading behavior of differently compe-
tent people with respect to the exposure and risk of their portfolios and with respect to 
their subjectively expected payoffs. Thus, there are significant differences between 
highly and low competent participants, but these differences hardly transfer to market 
prices in the present lab setting. 
In addition, the information treatment of Study 1 was designed to examine 
whether partition-dependence persists under “tightened” conditions in which asset parti-
tions were pointed out more obviously to the participants and in which the subjects re-
ceived real-time information about current prices from the differently partitioned mar-
ket. The results of the information treatment suggest that a more salient presentation of 
the design features may to some extent reduce the bias strength in pre-trading judg-
ments, and the exchange of real-time market data between differently partitioned mar-
kets may induce some more convergence of market prices, in particular after new mes-
sages have arrived, but statistical significance of the results is modest and partition-
dependence proves quite robust, even under the “tightened” conditions of the informa-
tion treatment. Thus, partition-dependence is to some extent diminished, but is far away 
from being fully removed by “market forces”. 
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4 Study 2: An NBA/FIFA field experiment 
4.1 Experimental design 
The very modest effects of trading experience on partition-dependence seen in 
Study 1, after 20 minutes of trading, suggest the possibility that with much longer trad-
ing spans, and perhaps with more knowledgeable traders, partition-dependence could be 
reduced more strongly or wiped out. Study 2, a field experiment lasting several weeks, 
was designed to test this hypothesis. 
From April to July 2006, an internet-based experimental trading study was con-
ducted. Participants were invited to trade online via the internet in prediction markets 
for outcomes in the NBA Basketball Playoffs 2005/06 and the FIFA Soccer World Cup 
2006.152 As this study was linked to real sports events, trading markets were open con-
tinuously (i.e., 24 hours a day, 7 days a week without interruptions) for approximately 
nine weeks for the NBA markets (April 20 through June 21, 2006) and approximately 
6½ weeks for the FIFA markets (May 24 through July 9, 2006), except for markets that 
closed when teams were eliminated from the tournament. A number of N=317 under-
graduate finance students from the University of Muenster (Germany), and N=139 stu-
dents from the CASSEL list at UCLA, Los Angeles (United States) was recruited.153 
Two different channels of recruitment were used in order to analyze second order ef-
fects (U.S. students were expected to feel more competent about NBA events whereas 
German students should feel more competent in the FIFA Soccer World Cup events.  
The study was divided into two independent parts: The first part included trading 
in all-or-nothing contingent claims in experimental prediction markets in which the 
claims’ payoffs depended on the total number of victories for a particular NBA team 
during the Playoffs. For example, a market offered four claims on the San Antonio 
Spurs, spanning the total number of games the Spurs could win during the Playoffs. One 
claim would pay a fixed sum of money, 100 cents (€1) if, after the Playoffs, the Spurs 
                                                 
152  The NBA Basketball Playoffs 2005/06 took place from April 22 through June 21, 2006. The FIFA 
Soccer World Cup 2006 took place from June 9 through July 9, 2006. 
153  The CASSEL (California Social Science Experimental Laboratory) list contains a pool of students 
who registered to participate in research studies and experiments. It draws from a large, diverse group of 
UCLA undergraduates as subjects; http://www.cassel.ucla.edu. 
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have won 0–3 games (i.e., either zero, one, two, or three games). Another claim would 
pay 100 cents if their win total is 4–7; a third would pay out if the total is 8–11; and a 
fourth would pay 100 cents if the total is 12–16. The three claims that do not pay 100 
cents expire worthless (note that by construction, there are exactly three claims that ex-
pire worthless, whereas a single claim pays 100 cents at the end). The second part of the 
study included trading in all-or-nothing contingent claims whose payoffs depended on 
the total number of goals scored by a particular national team during the entire World 
Cup tournament (excluding penalty shoot-out goals). For example, a market offered 
four claims on Brazil’s national team, spanning the total number of goals Brazil could 
score in the World Cup. One claim would pay a fixed amount of money, 100 cents (€1) 
if, at the end of the World Cup, Brazil has scored 0–2 goals (i.e., either zero, one, or two 
goals). Another claim would pay out if, at the end, their goal total is 3–8; a third would 
pay if the total is 9–11; and a fourth would pay 100 cents if the total is 12 or more.  
As in Study 1, the basic idea of these prediction markets is that, after the Play-
offs and the World Cup are over, exactly one claim (asset) in each market would pay 
100 cents, whereas the other three claims expire worthless. Again, this is due to the fact 
that the event intervals represent all possible outcomes of the state space, but do not 
overlap, i.e. they represent exclusive and collectively exhaustive events. 
The main treatment variable is the way in which the state space (number of vic-
tories or goals, respectively) is divided into sub-events: For each event domain, there 
are two partitions (treatments) that combine sub-events differently, as shown in Figure 
4.1 (Playoffs) and Figure 4.2 (World Cup). For example, in the NBA markets the first 
partition packs the victory intervals [4, 7] and [8, 11] into a single interval [4, 11], and 
unpacks the interval [12, 16] into two components of [12, 15] and [16]. More formally, 
the state space was divided into five disjoint and exhaustive intervals I0, …, I4. The first 
(lowest) interval (I0) was the same for both partitions ([0, 3] for the Playoffs and [0, 2] 
for the World Cup). Then, in each of the two partitions two adjoining intervals were 
packed to form a single asset: In partition 1, intervals I1 and I2 were packed to form the 
interval I1∪ I2, whereas the upper two intervals were traded separately (I3 and I4). In 
partition 2, intervals I3 and I4 were combined to form I3∪ I4, whereas the intervals I1 and 
I2 were traded separately. In the instructions, the participants were explicitly informed 
what the two different partition sets were (and that they were randomly assigned to only 
one partition), to control for the concern that offering one partition would convey in-
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formation to subjects about likelihoods.154 Every participant was allowed to trade assets 
based on four different teams—called “team markets”—using the same numerical parti-
tions for each of the four teams. This means, a trader faced the same asset intervals for 
all of the four teams in each part (NBA, FIFA) of the study. More illustratively, the two 
partitions used in this study looked as follows: 
 
Treatment 2
Asset a1,2 (I3)
Asset a2,2 (I2)
Asset a1,3 (I4)
Treatment 1
Asset a1,0 (I0)
Asset a2,3 (I3∪I4)
[0 – 3] [4 – 7] [8 – 11] [12 – 16]
[4 – 11] [12 – 15] [16][0 – 3]
Asset a2,1 (I1)
Asset a1,1 (I1∪I2)
Asset a2,0 (I0)
 
Figure 4.1:  Construction of asset partitions (NBA Playoffs victory totals). 
Treatment 2
Treatment 1
[0 – 2] [3 – 5] [6 – 8] [9+]
[3 – 8] [9 – 11] [12+][0 – 2]
Asset a1,2 (I3) Asset a1,3 (I4)Asset a1,0 (I0) Asset a1,1 (I1∪I2)
Asset a2,2 (I2) Asset a2,3 (I3∪I4)Asset a2,1 (I1)Asset a2,0 (I0)
 
Figure 4.2:  Construction of asset partitions (FIFA World Cup goal totals). 
                                                 
154  Note that the participants did not see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 which show the clear links between 
packed and unpacked events, but they were informed of the two sets of partition intervals (Appendix V 
contains the complete instructions of Study 2. Information about the partitions can be found in subsection 
3.1.of the instructions.). 
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Since the NBA Playoffs follow a best-of-seven knock-out bracket mode, the in-
tervals correspond to the number of victories needed by a team to advance across the 
four playoff rounds, so bets on the various win-total events are equivalent to betting that 
teams will lose in the first round, the second round, and so forth. Since each fixture is a 
best-of-seven match, the first team to win four games wins the round and advances. 
Therefore, betting on the interval [0, 3] is equivalent to betting that the team will leave 
the Playoffs in the first round, because a team that only wins a total of 0–3 games will 
be eliminated by an opponent that wins four. The interval [12, 15] is equivalent to win-
ning three rounds (the conference final) but losing in the fourth (and final) round (the 
Playoffs final). The “interval” [16] is only reached by the NBA champion, who wins 
four games in all four rounds.155 The intervals for the number of goals in the FIFA Soc-
cer World Cup were not structured to correspond to advancement across rounds, but 
were chosen such that they all appeared likely based on the results from the three previ-
ous World Cups.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one four-team market for NBA Playoffs 
games, then to another four-team market for FIFA World Cup goals.156 Groups were 
reshuffled for the World Cup markets so that students only faced the same traders again 
by coincidence. Participants from the two different recruitment channels were never 
assigned to the same market, though. In addition, the students did not know anything 
about the identity of their counterparts in a market. Each experimental group initially 
had twenty traders, but some dropped out over time. Each market (each experimental 
group) consisted of four separate “team markets”, so each participant traded in assets 
based on four different teams in each part of the study. A single “team market” covers 
the complete state space for a single team. NBA four-team markets included two teams 
from each of the two Conferences (Eastern and Western).157 World Cup four-team mar-
                                                 
155  Hence, it is known in advance for how many teams a particular claim will pay 100 cents at the end: 
For eight out of the 16 teams the win total falls into the range of [0, 3] (I0), four teams end up in the inter-
val I1, two teams in I2 (therefore, six teams in I1∪ I2), one team ends up in I3 and one team in I4 (therefore, 
two teams in I3∪ I4). 
156  There were a number of dropouts during the first part of the study, so that the second part continued 
with less World Cup prediction markets than Playoffs markets. 
157  Since there are 16 teams constituting the Playoffs bracket at the beginning, this resulted in four dif-
ferent market compositions (market 1: W1, E8, E3, W6; market 2: W2, E7, E4, W5; market 3: W3, E6, 
E1, W8; market 4: W4, E5, E2, W7 with W=Western Conference and E=Eastern Conference and the 
digits representing the seed of the team within the Conference). 
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kets used four official tournament “groups”, out of the eight groups created by FIFA 
organizers, which were supposed to generate the most interest and trade.158  
The experimental protocol was similar to Study 1, but was adapted for the Web 
(see Appendix V). Participants were instructed about the composition of assets and 
markets (including the partitions of assets they could trade, and the alternative parti-
tion), how to use the trading system, payment and incentives, and some details about the 
NBA Playoffs and the FIFA World Cup, by e-mail. They also had internet access to a 
homepage (see Figure 4.3) with study details, FAQs,159 and a practice market in order to 
allow participants to get acquainted with the trading interface (see Figure 4.4). Partici-
pants were kept up to date on the tournaments by e-mail newsletter. The markets were 
open continuously, so that participants could access the trading platform whenever and 
wherever they liked.  
 
 
Figure 4.3:  Study homepage. 
                                                 
158  This means that teams of a four-team market played each other in the group phase. This guaranteed 
that exactly two teams per experimental group were active (at least) until the beginning of the knockout 
phase, since the two top teams from each group advanced to the knockout phase. The groups we used 
were A (Germany, Costa Rica, Poland, Ecuador), C (Argentina, Côte d’Ivoire, Serbia/Montenegro, Neth-
erlands), E (Italy, Ghana, USA, Czech Republic), and F (Brazil, Croatia, Australia, Japan). 
159  The FAQs can be found in Appendix VI. 
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As in Study 1, the trading mechanism was a multi-unit continuous double auc-
tion (CDA) with a hidden order book, so that subjects could see only the best bid and 
ask quotes and the most recent trade price for each asset. Traders could submit bid and 
ask quotes for each asset simultaneously, acting as market makers. Trading took place 
only among the twenty participants eligible to trade in each market.160 There was no 
credit line or short selling opportunity.161 No explicit transaction costs were imposed for 
trading.  
 
 
Figure 4.4:  Screenshot of the trading application used in Study 2 (practice market). 
Participants were initially endowed with different combinations of cash and unit 
portfolios totaling 1,000 cents (€10) in each “team market” of the NBA Playoffs and 
were endowed again in the World Cup markets.162 At the end of the experiment one out 
                                                 
160  An exception was trading of the unit portfolio which was always executed immediately against the 
experimenter. 
161  However, the use of the unit portfolio enabled the participants to sell assets short indirectly. 
162  In each market (of twenty participants) always four traders were randomly endowed with one of the 
five different combinations: 9 unit portfolios + 100 cents, 7/300, 5/500, 3/700, and 1/900, all of them 
representing an initial value of €10. For each trader the composition of her initial endowment was the 
same for the four “team markets” in the NBA Playoffs part of the study, but was randomized again for the 
FIFA World Cup markets. 
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of the four teams for each experimental group was randomly drawn to compensate the 
participants incentive-compatibly based on the sum of the actual asset values in their 
final portfolio (assets being worth either 100 cents or nothing) and their cash balance, 
for an expected payment of €20 (€10 for Playoffs and €10 for World Cup markets) per 
person. Questionnaire data was collected from all participants before trading, including 
individual probability judgments that outcomes would fall into the intervals that corre-
sponded to the assets they traded (only before trading).163 
 
 
Figure 4.5:  Illustration of the experimental setup of Study 2. 
It is important to stress that the participants only had direct access to their own 
four-team NBA and World Cup markets. They could not directly observe market data 
(like prices or quotes) from other experimental groups trading different partitions.164 A 
detailed timetable with all relevant events in the context of this study can be obtained 
                                                 
163  The questionnaires can be found in Appendix VII. 
164  Of course, it cannot be ruled out the possibility that students were informed about these prices by 
friends that happen to trade exactly the same teams but the other partition of the state space. However, 
even in this case, arbitrage opportunities across markets could not jointly be exploited as it was not guar-
anteed that the same team was chosen for the incentive-compatible payment in both groups. 
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from the study instructions (see Appendix V, section 2). Figure 4.5 summarizes the ex-
perimental setup; in particular it illustrates the composition of the markets. In all cases 
twenty traders build an experimental group that contains four teams (“team markets”) 
and offers four assets of partition 1 (intervals I0, I1∪ I2, I3, I4) or partition 2 (intervals I0, 
I1, I2, I3∪ I4) for each team.  
For each part (event domain) of the study—NBA Playoffs and soccer World 
Cup—assets on 16 teams were traded all in all. Thus trading prices from two different 
partitions for each of 16 teams in each of the two event domains can be compared. Due 
to the large number of participants that were recruited, two identical experimental set-
tings (“clones”) could be filled with German students and one identical setting could be 
filled with U.S. students. 
 
4.2 Main results 
4.2.1 Judged probabilities 
The analysis of results is similar to the analysis from lab Study 1. First, it will be 
tested for partition-dependence in the individual probability judgments elicited before 
the beginning of trade. Next, it will be looked for partition-dependence in the bids, asks, 
and trading prices in the markets. It will also be tested whether the probabilities for the 
lowest-outcome event ([0, 3] for victories, [0, 2] for goals), which is the same interval in 
both partitions, happen to differ in the differently-partitioned markets. There is no rea-
son to expect that these probabilities will differ (because the ignorance prior probability 
is 1/4 for this event in both partitions), but any difference provides a measure of sam-
pling error. This is just a test for whether there are systematically different beliefs in the 
two markets, and also gives a measure of statistical variability which is useful to assess 
the size of any partition-dependence effect. Aside from the lowest-outcome event, it is 
conjectured that subjective probability judgments as well as quotes and trade prices will 
exhibit partition-dependence even in this large-scale field experiment that is based on 
real sports events spanning several weeks. As in the lab experiments (Study 1), judged 
probabilities and market prices are expected to be higher for an event if it is subdivided 
into two events than if it is traded in aggregation. The notation follows the notation used 
in Study 1. The main hypotheses are as follows:  
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Hypothesis 4.1: 
H0(a):  pJ,i(I0, partition_1) = pJ,i(I0, partition_2), 
H0(b):  pJ,i(I1) + pJ,i(I2) > pJ,i(I1∪ I2)  and 
H0(c):  pJ,i(I3) + pJ,i(I4) > pJ,i(I3∪ I4) 
 
with pJ,i(Ik) = judged probability for interval Ik of team i, 
i = {CHI, …, WAS} for NBA Playoffs teams, and 
i = {ARG, …, USA} for FIFA World Cup teams, and 
kpartition_1 = {0, 1∪ 2, 3, 4}, kpartition_2 = {0, 1, 2, 3∪ 4} 
 
Table 4.1:  Partition-dependence in before-trading judgments for NBA Playoffs events. 
N 1 /N 2
CHI 15.0 19.0 ** 22.5 *** 37/36
CLE 2.0 20.0 *** 15.0 *** 37/36
DAL 0.0 24.5 *** 20.0 *** 40/37
DEN -2.0 17.5 *** 18.0 *** 41/34
DET 2.5 25.0 *** 36.5 *** 41/34
IND -10.0 25.0 *** 12.0 *** 41/34
LAC 5.0 5.0 10.0 *** 40/37
LAL -5.0 22.5 *** 10.0 ** 40/37
MEM 15.0 25.0 *** 23.0 *** 37/36
MIA -10.0 20.0 *** 15.0 *** 40/37
MIL -5.0 20.0 *** 10.0 ** 40/37
NJN -10.0 * 30.0 *** 20.0 *** 40/37
PHX 0.0 30.0 *** 27.5 *** 37/36
SAC -12.5 25.0 *** 2.0 * 41/34
SAS 0.0 30.0 *** 40.0 *** 40/37
WAS -10.0 10.0 *** 10.0 40/37
Team
Δ Median, Whole Population (N =302x4), 
German and U.S. Subjects (Pooled)
p(I 1 )  + p(I 2 )
– p(I 1 ∪ I 2 )
p(I 3 )  + p(I 4 )
– p(I 3 ∪ I 4 )
Event I 0 
Equality
 
Notes. The Table presents differences in medians (ΔMedian) for interval I0 and differences in me-
dians for the sum of unpacked events and the packed event per NBA team. N1 (N2) indicates the number 
of participants in partition 1 (partition 2) that provided probability judgments for the team. Each partici-
pant (N=302) provided judgments for four different teams (from the four team markets) resulting in a 
total of 1,208 judgments. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
(two-tailed) based on a Kruskal-Wallis test for each team. 
 
Because some participants did not submit probability judgments before the first 
playoff game was played (and their judgments were excluded), there are N=302 (199 
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German and 103 U.S.) sets of judgments for the NBA teams.165 For the World Cup, 
there are N=263 judgment sets submitted by German participants before the opening 
game was played.166 Each participant provided ex ante probability judgments for the 
teams and intervals she would be trading afterwards, providing four probability judg-
ments (four intervals) for four teams (four “team markets” in each experimental group). 
Judged probabilities summed to 1.0 for each team. 
 
Table 4.2:  Partition-dependence in before-trading judgments for FIFA World Cup events. 
Event I 0 
Equality
N 1 /N 2
ARG -1.5 37.5 *** 40.0 *** 30/34
AUS -5.0 0.0 5.0 33/34
BRA 0.0 22.0 *** 20.0 *** 33/34
CIV 6.5 10.0 * 8.5 *** 30/34
CRC 0.0 15.0 * 9.0 *** 35/32
CRO 10.0 ** 10.0 ** 20.0 *** 33/34
CZE 8.0 * 35.0 *** 37.5 *** 35/30
ECU 10.0 10.0 9.0 *** 35/32
GER 0.0 35.0 *** 37.5 *** 35/32
GHA -2.5 12.5 ** 5.0 * 35/30
ITA 4.0 25.0 *** 27.5 *** 35/30
JPN 5.0 ** 0.0 6.0 *** 33/34
NED 0.0 32.5 *** 30.0 *** 30/34
POL 5.0 30.0 *** 30.0 *** 35/32
SCG 10.0 0.5 14.0 *** 30/34
USA 0.0 15.0 *** 7.0 *** 35/30
p(I 3 )  + p(I 4 )
– p(I 3 ∪ I 4 )
p(I 1 )  + p(I 2 )
– p(I 1 ∪ I 2 )
Team
Δ Median, Whole Population (N =263x4), 
German Subjects
 
Notes. See Table 4.1 notes. Each participant (N=263) provided judgments for four different 
teams (from the four team markets) resulting in a total of 1,052 judgments. 
 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show the median differences in judgments (×100) for 
the two different partitions (team by team) and significance by a non-parametric 
                                                 
165  There were only two days between the NBA bracket was fixed and the first playoff match (CLE-
WAS, 2006/04/22, 9.00 P.M.). So N=302 subjects submitted their judgments within the period between 
2006/04/21, 12.00 A.M. and 2006/04/22, 9.00 P.M. Judgments submitted afterwards were excluded, since 
they might be affected by the results of the first games. 
166  In total, N=267 German participants completed the questionnaire. N=4 observations which were sub-
mitted after the first game (GER-CRC, 2006/06/09, 6.00 P.M.) were dropped, since they might be affected 
by the results of the first game, resulting in N=263 remaining datasets. These were completed between 
2006/05/24, 12.00 A.M. and 2006/06/09, 6.00 P.M., a period of 17 days. No World Cup results will be 
reported for U.S. participants since there was an extensive dropout of U.S. students for this part of the 
study. 
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Kruskal-Wallis test. Not surprisingly, the differences in the commonly partitioned event 
between partitions (in the first column) are close to zero and not statistically significant 
in most of the cases. The differences between the summed probabilities of the unpacked 
events and the probability for the corresponding packed event (in the second and third 
column) are positive, almost always highly significant, and are comparable in magni-
tude to the effects reported earlier (approximately a .20 increase in probability when the 
interval is unpacked). 
 
4.2.2 Market prices 
The next question is whether there is evidence for partition-dependence in ob-
served market prices resulting from trading activity among traders. Remember that sev-
eral “clone” groups were installed that traded the same events independently. For this 
purpose, the most active team-markets (as measured by the overall number of trades) in 
each partition for each team were chosen from the market “clones” and matched for 
further analyses. In the NBA Playoffs, the most liquid markets were the Dallas Maver-
icks (DAL) and Miami Heat (MIA) (partly because they became the two finalists, so 
their claims were traded for the longest span of time). For DAL, there were 119 and 129 
trades in partitions 1 and 2, respectively. For MIA, there were 102 trades and 101 trades 
in partitions 1 and 2, respectively.167 
Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show trade price charts, i.e. the most recent market 
price (in cents) plotted against the number of days since trading began, for assets corre-
sponding to different partitions. Because there were only about two trades per day 
across all assets, there are many horizontal flat spots in the time series, which indicate 
the level of the last trade price when there is no current trading.168 Gray vertical lines 
indicate the beginning of a game. The numbers on top of each panel (next to the vertical 
lines) indicate the cumulated number of victories after each game (if the number is in-
creased by one, the team won the game, if it is unchanged, the game was lost). For ex-
ample, Figure 4.6 shows that the Dallas Mavericks (DAL) won the first four games, lost 
the next game, won the sixth game and so on. 
                                                 
167  Tables showing the overall number of trades (ex unit portfolio trades) for each Playoffs and World 
Cup team market can be obtained from Appendix VIII. 
168  Note, though, that horizontal flat spots may also hide actual trades at unchanged trade prices. 
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Figure 4.6:  Price chart (Dallas Mavericks, DAL). 
The upper panel compares prices for the asset intervals I0 [0, 3] for partition 1 
(blue line) and partition 2 (red line). These prices are low, usually zero, since DAL and 
MIA were expected to win many games, and prices do not differ between the two parti-
tions for each team.169 In the second panel a blue line indicates the current market price 
of the packed asset [4, 11] of partition 1 and a red line shows the sum of the market 
prices for unpacked assets [4, 7] and [8, 11] of partition 2. The fact that the red line lies 
above the blue line reflects partition-dependence (i.e., the sum of market prices for as-
sets [4, 7] and [8, 11] was usually higher than the market price for asset [4, 11]). The 
third panel shows a red line for the current market price of packed asset [12, 16] of par-
tition 2 and the blue line represents the sum of the market prices for the unpacked assets 
[12, 15] and [16] of partition 1. The fact that the blue line is above the red line, for most 
of the time, indicates partition-dependence, too. 
Figure 4.7 shows similar patterns for the two most liquid Miami Heat (MIA) 
markets. The price charts provide evidence for pronounced partition-dependence in the 
market prices, as the red curve is above the blue curve for most of the time in the middle 
                                                 
169  Corresponding price charts for all teams can be obtained from Appendix IX. 
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panel. The effect is also pronounced for the first thirty days in the third panel but dimin-
ishes afterwards (for the high-win-total intervals, in fact, there is mild reverse partition-
dependence in the last half of the trading span). During the first days of trading prices 
sometimes summed to more than 100 cents. However, this does not necessarily indicate 
that there was a lot of potential arbitrage opportunities, since trades for the unpacked 
assets rarely occurred at the same time. 
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Figure 4.7:  Price chart (Miami Heat, MIA). 
For the World Cup markets, Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 show price charts for 
Germany (57 and 59 trades in partitions 1 and 2, respectively) and Italy, the eventual 
World Cup champion (65 trades in both partitions). Note that the numbers on top of 
each panel (next to the vertical lines) indicate the cumulated number of goals after each 
game (if the number is increased, the team marked one or more goals in that game, if it 
is unchanged, no goal was scored). Both markets show persistent partition-dependence 
of recent prices (although note that trades are rare), i.e., the red line is above blue in the 
middle panel and vice versa in the lower panel.  
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Figure 4.8:  Price chart (Germany, GER). 
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Figure 4.9:  Price chart (Italy, ITA). 
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4.2.3 Hypothetical “pseudo-arbitrage” strategies 
4.2.3.1 Preliminaries 
Because prices are constantly changing in response to new information over the 
several weeks of these tournaments, the “equilibrium market prices” for a static event 
toward the end of trading cannot easily be used to determine the degree of partition-
dependence revealed by prices (as in the lab Study 1). Therefore partition-dependence is 
measured in two more nuanced ways in the next two subsections. Both methods meas-
ure the hypothetical “pseudo-arbitrage” available by comparing the summed prices for 
the two unpacked-interval assets (traded in one market) with the price for the equivalent 
packed-interval asset (traded in a differently partitioned market). These calculations are 
not true arbitrage opportunities because traders cannot actually trade in markets with 
different partitions; they simply provide an economically relevant measure of the parti-
tion-dependent gap in prices between the two markets.  
The first method only looks at available bids and asks and computes whether 
there is a hypothetical pseudo-arbitrage opportunity across markets for each moment in 
time (“bid-ask pseudo-arbitrage”). The second method interpolates actual trade prices, 
assuming one could trade continuously at a price between the last trade price and the 
next trade price (“interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage”). Roughly speaking, these 
two methods provide a lower and upper bound on the possible arbitrage profits from 
exploiting partition-dependence that would be available to a hypothetical trader with 
access to multiple markets with different partitions. 
 
4.2.3.2 Bid-ask pseudo-arbitrage 
The first test looks at hypothetical cross-market pseudo-arbitrage opportunities 
using current bid and ask quotes.170 The method calculates the time-weighted pseudo-
arbitrage profit that would result from selling the unpacked-interval assets and buying 
the equivalent packed-interval asset, at available bid and ask prices. The question is 
whether there would be arbitrage opportunities if traders could actually trade in both 
markets, given the available bid and asks which can be used for trade. Remember that 
participants could only trade in one experimental group at a time and were not informed 
                                                 
170  For this purpose, the most active markets in each partition and team again were chosen from the ex-
perimental “clones” to notionally build a single “slot” (i.e., to match markets with different partitions). 
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about prices from other markets, so they could not actually execute these arbitrage 
trades (which is the reason why this method is referred to as “pseudo-arbitrage”). Ask-
ing how large the arbitrage opportunities are is simply a way to characterize the eco-
nomic size of partition-dependence in these markets, using all the information on bids 
and asks. However, because trading is often quite thin, there are long stretches of time 
when bids and asks are not available on all assets and the measured partition-
dependence is zero. 
Consider intervals I1 and I2 that trade separately (unpacked) in partition 2 and 
fused (packed) in partition 1. If there is partition-dependence, then the bids for assets 
underlying events I1 and I2 will be high (compared to bids for the packed asset I1∪ I2). 
So one kind of pseudo-arbitrage is to take the sum of the current bids for assets I1 and I2 
(i.e., the prices at which one could sell those assets) and to subtract the current ask for 
the equivalent asset I1∪ I2 (i.e., the price at which one could buy that asset). If this dif-
ference is positive, then a trader with access to both markets could sell the two un-
packed assets of intervals I1 and I2 for more than she could buy the packed interval asset 
I1∪ I2. If there is reverse partition-dependence, then the opposite strategy would be 
profitable (i.e., buying the components I1 and I2 (at their ask prices) and selling the 
packed asset I1∪ I2 (at its bid quote)). The size of these arbitrage strategies is repre-
sented by the following notation: 
 
X(12) := Bi,t(I1) + Bi,t(I2) – Ai,t(I1∪ I2)  vs.  
Y(12) := Bi,t(I1∪ I2) – [Ai,t(I1) + Ai,t(I2)]  
 
with Bi,t(Ik) = Best (highest) bid quote for interval Ik of team i at time t 
Ai,t(Ik) = Best (lowest) ask quote for interval Ik of team i at time t 
 
The value of position X(12) represents a strategy of selling unpacked assets I1 and 
I2 at their bid quotes in one partition and buying the packed asset I1∪ I2 at its ask quote 
in the other partition at each point of time. Position Y(12), in turn, refers to a reverse par-
tition-dependence strategy and is based on selling the packed asset I1∪ I2 in one parti-
tion and simultaneously buying unpacked assets I1 and I2 in the other partition. Arbi-
trage opportunities exist only if these positions are positive. Analogously, positions X(34) 
and Y(34) can be calculated for assets I3 and I4 against asset I3∪ I4:  
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X(34)  := Bi,t(I3) + Bi,t(I4) – Ai,t(I3∪ I4)  vs.  
Y(34) := Bi,t(I3∪ I4) – [Ai,t(I3) + Ai,t(I4)]  
 
with Bi,t(Ik) = Best (highest) bid quote for interval Ik of team i at time t 
Ai,t(Ik) = Best (lowest) ask quote for interval Ik of team i at time t 
 
Figure 4.10 shows these statistics over the life of the experiment for NBA team 
Dallas Mavericks (DAL). The top panel shows Bi,t(I1) + Bi,t(I2) – Ai,t(I1∪ I2) (in blue) 
and Bi,t(I1∪ I2) – [Ai,t(I1) + Ai,t(I2)] (in red). The second panel shows the maxima of each 
of these spreads and zero (i.e., it only shows their values when they are positive, when 
pseudo-arbitrage is profitable). The blue spikes in the second panel indicate that there 
are pseudo-arbitrage opportunities, which are sometimes quite large in magnitude but 
are sporadic and usually short-lived. The red line at zero (second panel) indicates that 
there is never a set of available bids and asks consistent with profitable arbitrage against 
reverse partition-dependence. The horizontal lines at the bottom of the second panel 
indicate the spans of time during which any bid or ask exists in the market for each of 
the assets in the arbitrage strategy. When those lines are interrupted there is no liquidity 
and hence no opportunity for arbitrage.171 Further note that a gray vertical line in the 
chart shows the point of time at which the displayed event became impossible (zero 
probability). For instance, when the Dallas Mavericks had won their eighth game, inter-
val I1 ([4, 7]) became impossible. Hence, the charts are truncated at that point, since 
assets for intervals I1∪ I2 and I2 exactly represent the same claim as from then, and 
therefore position X(12) [= Bi,t(I1) + Bi,t(I2) – Ai,t(I1∪ I2) → Bi,t(I2) – Ai,t(I2)] and position 
Y(12) [= Bi,t(I1∪ I2) – [Ai,t(I1) + Ai,t(I2)] → Bi,t(I2) – Ai,t(I2)] both turn into the negative bid-
ask spread for interval I2 (which is negative by definition). The third and fourth panels 
show the same time series for the pseudo-arbitrage of intervals I3 and I4 against the in-
terval I3∪ I4. There are frequent interruptions in the bid-ask existence series (at the bot-
tom of the fourth panel), so pseudo-arbitrage opportunities are rare.  
                                                 
171  For technical reasons, missing ask quotes were set +∞ and missing bid quotes were set 0. For eco-
nomical reasons, bid and ask quotes (or the sum of two bid or ask quotes) were capped at 100 cents. 
Hence, positions X(12) and Y(12) are actually calculated as X(12) := min{Bi,t(I1) + Bi,t(I2), 100} – 
min{Ai,t(I1∪ I2), 100} and Y(12) := min{Bi,t(I1∪ I2), 100} – min{Ai,t(I1) + Ai,t(I2), 100}. Note that arbitrage 
opportunities from position Y(12) can only occur if all three quotes are available. By contrast, there may be 
arbitrage opportunities from position X(12) even if one of the quotes Bi,t(I1) or Bi,t(I2) misses, since it might 
be possible, for instance, to sell Bi,t(I1) for more than the cost of Ai,t(I1∪ I2). The same considerations also 
apply to positions X(34) and Y(34), respectively. 
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Figure 4.10:  Hypothetical cross-market pseudo-arbitrage (Dallas Mavericks, DAL). 
Figure 4.11 shows the same time series for the World Cup winning team Italy 
(ITA). There are few pseudo-arbitrage opportunities for the low-goal intervals I1 and I2, 
but quite a bit of pseudo-arbitrage for intervals I3 and I4. From days 9 through 25, there 
is a persistent gap in the bids of unpacked events I3 and I4 and the ask for event I3∪ I4. 
These examples illustrate the advantage of using the continuous bid and ask informa-
tion. Trades are rather rare for Italy events (only about one trade per day across all as-
sets) but bids and asks are common enough to show persistent gaps in (potential) prices. 
Again, there is no evidence for profitable arbitrage strategies against reverse partition-
dependence, which adds support to the conjecture that partition-dependence in these 
markets is rather systematic than just a random error.  
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Figure 4.11:  Hypothetical cross-market pseudo-arbitrage (Italy, ITA). 
Table 4.3 reports the value of the time-weighted pseudo-arbitrage statistics for 
all teams. These are the area under the blue and red curves in the second and fourth pan-
els of Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11, divided by the total trading time.172 The profitability 
of strategies exploiting partition-dependence (in columns 2 and 4) is often very low, but 
is above 1.0 for 9 of 32 teams. Furthermore, pseudo-arbitrage against reverse partition-
dependence is much less profitable. For 38 of the 46 team-partition comparisons, arbi-
traging against partition-dependence is more profitable than arbitraging against reverse 
partition-dependence (excluding 18 team–partition cases in which both figures are 
zero), a fraction significantly lopsided by a conservative sign test (z=5.88, p<.001). 
                                                 
172  Dividing by the total trading time is to make these statistics comparable across teams. Note that the 
relevant trading time ends either when the last auction for assets I1, I2 or I1∪ I2 (or I3, I4 or I3∪ I4, respec-
tively) occurred or when the corresponding interval asset I1 (or I3) expired worthless. 
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Table 4.3:  Per-day profitability of hypothetical bid/ask pseudo-arbitrage strategies. 
Arbitrage PD 
(Sell I 1 , I 2 ,
Buy I 1 ∪ I 2 )
Arbitrage 
Reverse PD 
(Buy I 1 , I 2 ,
Sell I 1 ∪ I 2 )
Arbitrage PD 
(Sell I 3 , I 4 ,
Buy I 3 ∪ I 4 )
Arbitrage 
Reverse
(Buy I 3 , I 4 ,
Sell I 3 ∪ I 4 )
NBA Playoffs teams
CHI 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.00
CLE 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00
DAL 1.95 0.00 0.03 0.00
DEN 0.00 1.08 0.00 0.00
DET 1.36 0.26 0.00 5.06
IND 0.12 0.00 0.20 0.00
LAC 0.16 0.00 0.71 0.00
LAL 0.00 0.00 5.14 0.00
MEM 0.00 0.00 2.61 0.00
MIA 0.96 0.00 0.75 0.00
MIL 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
NJN 0.65 0.00 7.90 0.00
PHX 0.25 0.00 1.46 0.00
SAC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SAS 0.44 0.00 0.24 0.00
WAS 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00
FIFA World Cup teams
ARG 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.00
AUS 0.55 0.01 0.48 0.00
BRA 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.00
CIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CRC 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00
CRO 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
CZE 0.64 0.00 9.93 0.00
ECU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GER 0.22 0.00 0.79 0.00
GHA 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
ITA 0.35 0.00 8.36 0.00
JPN 3.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
NED 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
POL 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.00
SCG 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Low Intervals High Intervals
Team
 
 
4.2.3.3 Interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage 
The bid-ask measures described in subsection 4.2.3.2 above are very conserva-
tive because there are substantial periods of time when there are no bids and asks for 
some of the assets. Since bids and asks are limit orders—any other trader can immedi-
ately sell to a posted bid, or buy at a posted ask—traders may be conservative in posting 
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these bids and asks. An active trader posting new bids or asks might be able to initiate 
trades from subjects who are willing to trade but have not currently posted bids or asks. 
One simple way to measure the potential of a more pro-active strategy is to as-
sume that some traders are willing to trade even if they have not posted current bids or 
asks. Computing the gains from this strategy requires some assumption about the prices 
at which trades could take place, when there are no bids and asks. A conservative sim-
plifying assumption is that the path of implicit trade prices is smoothly monotonic: That 
is, if a trade occurs at price P at one point in time t and the next trade occurs at price P–
d, at a later time t+n, then it is assumed that trades could take place in the price interval 
[P–d, P] continuously between times t and t+n if an agent tried to initiate trade. Imple-
menting this assumption conservatively, one way to bound the possible trades is to as-
sume that somebody could buy an asset, at any point in time t, at the maximum of the 
last observed trade price and the next observed trade price. Similarly, it is assumed that 
a trader could sell an asset at the minimum of the last observed price and the next ob-
served price.173 These assumptions imply that there is unobserved willingness to trade 
that is not manifested in posted bids and asks, but that the unobserved trade prices are 
always bounded by the worst prices at which the last and next (unforeseen) trades take 
place. For example, suppose the trade prices of a thinly-traded asset are 42 at day 20 and 
48 at day 25, and there are no trades between those dates. If you are buying the asset, it 
is assumed that you could buy it at the higher price of 48 during days 20 to 25 even 
though there is no trading during those days (and even if there are no posted bids or 
asks). If you are selling the asset, it is assumed that you could sell it for the lower price 
of 42 during days 20 to 25.  
The described measure can be termed “interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage” 
because the past and future prices are used to interpolate a trade price continuously. The 
arbitrage is hypothetical because it just summarizes price differences in separate mar-
kets and assumes that trades can take place when there are no standing bids or asks. 
Because they cannot trade across markets, participants cannot directly act on these 
pseudo-arbitrage opportunities. This on-paper trading strategy is conservative in the 
following sense: Suppose there is no trade between time t and the time t+1 when a team 
loses, but at time t+l there is a trade in which the team’s asset price plunges because of 
                                                 
173  Note that the “previous” trade price is assumed to be the first trade price before the first auction oc-
curred, and the “next” trade price to be the latest trade price after the last auction in the market took place. 
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their loss. Then the assumption is that the trading price available in the time interval [t, 
t+1] is the post-plunge price. In effect, the strategy assumes that if there is new informa-
tion which reduces the next executed trade price, the information is capitalized in all 
prices between the last and next prices. Note that basketball games and soccer matches 
are occurring during the continuous flow of trading, so using the worst of the last and 
next prices often means that traders are (hypothetically) betting against unfavorable 
public information, which adds to the conservatism of this measure. This measure is 
also related to simply taking the area between the red and blue lines (second and third 
panels) in Figure 4.6 to Figure 4.9. Suppose those curves were altered so that whenever 
there is a price decrease in an unpacked event, from the last price P at time t to a new 
price P–d and time t+n, the price line between t and t+n is lowered to P–d. Similarly, 
when there is a price increase for the packed-interval asset, the price line is retroactively 
shifted upward to the new, higher price. Redrawing in this way in the second panel, for 
example, would reduce the red line (because the unpacked assets are always being sold 
at weakly worse prices), and increase the blue line. The gap between those redrawn 
lines (truncated at zero) is the same as the interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage 
measure.  
In formal notation, the interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage profit X(12) (and 
X(34)) for the intervals I1 and I2 (I3 and I4, respectively) at time t is:  
 
X(12) := min{Pi,t-r(I1), Pi,t+n(I1)} + min{Pi,t-r(I2), Pi,t+n(I2)}  
 – max{Pi,t-r(I1∪ I2), Pi,t+n(I1∪ I2)}  
 
X(34) := min{Pi,t-r(I3), Pi,t+n(I3)} + min{Pi,t-r(I4), Pi,t+n(I4)} 
 – max{Pi,t-r(I3∪ I4), Pi,t+n(I3∪ I4)} 
 
where Pi,s(Ik) is the trade price at time s for interval k in event domain i, and t–r 
and t+n are the times of the most recent and next trades. 
Similarly, it can be tested for hypothetical profits Y(12) (and Y(34)) from the corre-
sponding reverse arbitrage strategy that is calculated as follows:174 
                                                 
174  However, for economical reasons the following is assumed: for strategy X(12), min{Pi,t-r(I1), Pi,t+n(I1)} 
+ min{Pi,t-r(I2), Pi,t+n(I2)} and max{Pi,t-r(I1∪ I2), Pi,t+n(I1∪ I2)} each are capped at 100 cents, and for strat-
egy Y(12), min{Pi,t-r(I1∪ I2), Pi,t+n(I1∪ I2)} and max{Pi,t-r(I1), Pi,t+n(I1)} + max{Pi,t-r(I2), Pi,t+n(I2)} each are 
also capped at 100 cents. The same considerations also apply to positions X(34) and Y(34), respectively. 
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Y(12) := min{Pi,t-r(I1∪ I2), Pi,t+n(I1∪ I2)} 
 – max{Pi,t-r(I1), Pi,t+n(I1)} – max{Pi,t-r(I2), Pi,t+n(I2)} 
 
Y(34) := min{Pi,t-r(I3∪ I4), Pi,t+n(I3∪ I4)} 
 – max{Pi,t-r(I3), Pi,t+n(I3)} – max{Pi,t-r(I4), Pi,t+n(I4)} 
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Figure 4.12:  Interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage (Dallas Mavericks, DAL). 
Figure 4.12 shows the interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage profit over time 
for the Dallas Mavericks (DAL) in the NBA event domain. The blue line in the first 
panel shows the hypothetical arbitrage profits from selling at the minimum interpolated 
prices for unpacked intervals I1 and I2, and buying at the maximum interpolated price 
for packed interval I1∪ I2 (X(12)). The red line, by contrast, shows the hypothetical prof-
its from the reverse arbitrage strategy, i.e., selling at the minimum interpolated price for 
the packed interval I1∪ I2, and buying at the maximum interpolated prices for unpacked 
intervals I1 and I2 (Y(12)). Because this “profit” can be positive or negative, the second 
panel shows the value of this hypothetical profit when it is above zero (i.e., the profit 
conditional on it being positive). Panels three and four show the same calculations for 
the assets based on unpacked intervals I3 and I4 and the packed interval I3∪ I4 (X(34) and 
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Y(34)). The panel two and four hypothetical profits from selling the unpacked-interval 
assets and buying the packed-interval asset (blue lines) are often positive and large in 
magnitude. 
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Figure 4.13:  Interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage (Italy, ITA). 
Figure 4.13 shows the corresponding data from trades on Italy (ITA) in the 
World Cup event domain. The results are similar. Note that if there were reverse parti-
tion-dependence (the packed-interval asset price is higher) the red lines in Figure 4.12 
and Figure 4.13 would be above zero, but this is never the case. The fact that there is 
virtually no reverse effect proves partition-dependence in the expected direction (as 
indicated by the blue curves) to be systematically positive and not merely the result of 
random error. 
A way to measure the daily average interpolated-price hypothetical pseudo-
arbitrage profit for each team, is to calculate the area under the blue and red curves in 
the second and fourth panels of Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13, and divide it by the total 
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trading time (in days).175 These statistics are provided for each team and interval in 
Table 4.4. Note the figures are always positive because if the return to pseudo-arbitrage 
is negative, it is assumed the trade would not be made (i.e., only positive profits are av-
eraged). The average per-day hypothetical profit from exploiting partition-dependence 
(selling the unpacked-interval assets and buying the packed-interval asset) is higher than 
for the reverse strategy (buying unpacked and selling packed) for 21 out of 32 teams for 
intervals I1 and I2, and for 26 out of 32 for intervals I3 and I4 (significant by sign test at 
p<0.1 and p<.001, respectively). The median per-day pseudo-arbitrage profit exploiting 
partition-dependence, across the 32 teams from both sports, is 5.66 for intervals I1 and I2 
and 5.89 for intervals I3 and I4; the average of this median across intervals is 5.77. 
The interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage profits shown by the time series in 
this subsection (Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13, Table 4.4) are larger and more persistent 
than the sporadic short-lived pseudo-arbitrage profits based on submitted bids and asks 
shown in subsection 4.2.3.2 (Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11, Table 4.3). The hypothetical 
profits from these two measures could be treated as a lower and upper bound on the 
financial magnitude of partition-dependence. Profitability as measured using simultane-
ously-available bids and asks (subsection 4.2.3.2) provides a lower bound because there 
are so many stretches of time with incomplete bids and asks. Profitability as measured 
by the interpolated-price method (subsection 4.2.3.3) artificially liquefies the market by 
essentially assuming there is always a latent trade waiting to occur at the right price, so 
this method provides an upper bound (though it is still conservative because it assumes 
trades would be executed at the worst of the most recent and next future prices).  
                                                 
175  Note that the relevant trading time ends either when the last auction for an asset of the relevant inter-
val occurred or when the corresponding interval asset I1 (or I3) expired worthless.  
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Table 4.4:  Per-day profitability of hypothetical interpolated-price pseudo-arbitrage strategies. 
Arbitrage PD 
(Sell I 1 , I 2 ,
Buy I 1 ∪ I 2 )
Arbitrage 
Reverse PD 
(Buy I 1 , I 2 ,
Sell I 1 ∪ I 2 )
Arbitrage PD 
(Sell I 3 , I 4 ,
Buy I 3 ∪ I 4 )
Arbitrage 
Reverse
(Buy I 3 , I 4 ,
Sell I 3 ∪ I 4 )
NBA Playoffs teams
CHI 1.24 0.85 2.04 0.00
CLE 3.71 0.72 13.48 0.00
DAL 22.39 0.00 7.38 0.02
DEN 3.49 5.48 2.43 1.54
DET 16.10 2.70 0.48 7.50
IND 7.98 0.19 0.00 0.00
LAC 9.41 0.00 7.76 0.00
LAL 8.56 0.00 8.29 0.00
MEM 0.16 2.14 11.51 0.00
MIA 27.51 0.00 13.52 2.03
MIL 0.00 2.97 2.75 0.00
NJN 5.87 1.69 24.03 0.00
PHX 14.53 0.23 8.17 0.00
SAC 0.38 0.90 0.15 0.58
SAS 28.59 0.00 16.07 0.33
WAS 8.27 0.00 5.23 0.00
FIFA World Cup teams
ARG 0.53 2.55 13.05 0.00
AUS 2.33 1.07 7.24 0.36
BRA 0.00 5.63 0.57 3.50
CIV 0.04 4.53 0.08 0.72
CRC 1.01 6.30 0.01 0.24
CRO 0.66 2.24 1.22 0.00
CZE 21.85 0.00 29.21 0.00
ECU 12.24 0.05 9.74 0.01
GER 11.87 0.04 9.35 0.20
GHA 0.00 23.55 1.98 0.00
ITA 22.84 0.06 27.66 0.00
JPN 8.11 0.51 1.68 0.00
NED 10.73 0.00 6.54 2.14
POL 0.71 0.19 0.81 0.46
SCG 0.60 0.20 0.25 0.00
USA 5.45 8.08 1.35 0.00
Team
Low Intervals High Intervals
 
 
4.3 Second order results 
As was mentioned in the description of the experimental protocol (subsection 
4.1), two different channels of recruitment were used in order to analyze second order 
effects: U.S. students (recruited from the CASSEL list at UCLA, Los Angeles (United 
4  Study 2: An NBA/FIFA field experiment 180 
States)) were expected to be more competent about NBA events, whereas German stu-
dents (recruited from an undergraduate finance class at the University of Muenster 
(Germany)) were expected to be more competent about the FIFA Soccer World Cup 
events. However, because U.S. participation in the NBA Playoffs markets and the 
World Cup markets was low, there is little statistical power to detect such effects so 
they will not be discussed further.176 The following analyses thus focus on second order 
effects in subjective probability judgments that were provided by the participants before 
each part of the study began.  
In the run-up to each part of the study, participants were asked to complete a 
short questionnaire on the Internet.177 Basically, the questionnaires included some self-
rating questions that can be used as additional competence proxies (competence, inter-
est, intention to follow the events on TV, etc.), a brief trivia quiz, and the elicitation of 
subjective probability judgments (4 events per teams × 4 teams) for the intervals they 
traded. Additionally, in the first questionnaire (before NBA Playoffs) participants were 
asked four general questions about attributes that may have an impact on how the sub-
jects behave and derive their decisions during this trading study. These questions may 
help to decide whether fundamental differences between differently recruited subjects 
(U.S. vs. German students) exist. The general questions were supposed to be uncorre-
lated with competence and include the year of birth, self-ratings on general trading ex-
perience (e.g., in the stock or bond market) and knowledge in the field of statistics, as 
well as the question whether a participant has ever been active in sports betting. The 
differently recruited subsamples (NGerman=317; NU.S.=139) turn out to be fairly balanced 
with respect to these questions. The average year of birth is 1982 for German students 
(σ=2.0) and 1984 for U.S. students (σ=3.4). General trading experience (scale 1–7) was 
moderate in both subsamples (μ=2.5, σ=1.5 for Germans and μ=2.8, σ=1.5 for U.S. 
students). Knowledge and skills in the field of statistics (scale 1–7) were somewhat 
                                                 
176  At the outset of the study it was intended to compare market data from “U.S. markets” (i.e., markets 
that comprised U.S. students) to market data from “German markets” (i.e., markets that consisted of 
German students) with respect to the effect size of partition-dependence expressed in market prices. Un-
fortunately, the U.S. markets turned out to be fairly illiquid in the NBA Playoffs part of the study so that 
it is hard to draw any meaningful conclusion in terms of competence effects from these data. In order to 
be in a position to carry out these analyses for the FIFA World Cup part of the study, German students 
were allocated to some “high-competence” markets and just as many “low-competence” markets based on 
their self-reported World Cup competence (scale 1–7) during the registration process. Unfortunately, even 
in the World Cup part of the study some markets turned out to suffer from thin trading, which makes it 
difficult again to analyze second order effects from trading data. Therefore, no second order competence 
results from trading data are reported here. 
177  See Appendix VII for the questionnaires. 
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higher (μ=3.9, σ=1.2 for Germans and μ=4.0, σ=1.5 for U.S. students). Finally, 39.7% 
of German and 32.4% of U.S. students had been active in sports betting before. Thus, 
potential differences in the degree of partition-dependence are unlikely to be caused by 
differences in these general attributes. 
The remaining questions (including the trivia quiz) were collected separately for 
both parts of the study. They were mainly chosen to produce some more competence 
proxies and to check whether U.S. students were indeed more knowledgeable about 
NBA events (and less knowledgeable about World Cup events). Self-assessment ques-
tions included a 1–7 scale and the trivia quiz comprised seven multiple-choice questions 
(like “Which team has won the most championships in NBA history?”),178 thus yielding 
a 0–7 score of correct answers. As it turns out, competence proxies are consistently 
higher for U.S. students than for German students in the NBA Playoffs event domain 
(subjects who completed the questionnaire after the first game took place were excluded 
from the following statistics; remaining sample size: NGerman=199; NU.S.=103). Mean 
self-rated competence in making judgments regarding the NBA Playoffs was 4.8 (me-
dian=5, σ=1.7) for U.S. students, but only 2.7 (median=2, σ=1.6) for German partici-
pants. In general, U.S. students are also much more interested in the NBA Playoffs 
(μ=5.1, median=5, σ=1.8 for U.S. students; μ=3.0, median=3, σ=1.8 for German sub-
jects) and were going to track the Playoffs more intensely on TV, via Internet, etc. 
(μ=4.9, median=5, σ=1.8 for U.S. students; μ=2.7, median=2, σ=1.6 for German sub-
jects). Similar results obtain for the trivia quiz scores (μ=4.1, median=4, σ=1.8 for U.S. 
students; μ=2.4, median=2, σ=1.6 for German subjects), on the whole confirming the 
hypothesis of U.S. students being considerably more competent and knowledgeable 
about NBA events than their German counterparts (all reported differences are statisti-
cally highly significant by a Kruskal-Wallis test (p<.0001)).  
 
                                                 
178  Actually, two versions of the trivia quiz existed for each event domain to control for possible differ-
ences in the degree of difficulty. However, no such differences were found. 
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Table 4.5:  Interaction effects between partition type and recruitment channel in before-trading prob-
ability judgments for each NBA team. 
Events (Intervals) N German  / N U.S.
Recruitment channel German U.S. German U.S. left --- right col.
Mean probability judgments (x100) per team
CHI
Sum of unpacked events 42.77 27.57 33.25 23.00 22 / 14 --- 24 / 13
Packed event 24.88 21.08 11.77 5.50 24 / 13 --- 22 / 14
Difference 17.89 6.49 21.48 17.50
Difference of differences
CLE
Sum of unpacked events 64.64 63.36 32.00 24.15 22 / 14 --- 24 / 13
Packed event 47.58 48.85 10.23 12.00 24 / 13 --- 22 / 14
Difference 17.06 14.51 21.77 12.15
Difference of differences
DAL
Sum of unpacked events 65.40 59.35 44.04 37.69 20 / 17 --- 27 / 13
Packed event 46.00 42.69 24.75 27.29 27 / 13 --- 20 / 17
Difference 19.40 16.66 19.29 10.40
Difference of differences
DEN
Sum of unpacked events 55.17 60.40 33.15 29.29 24 / 10 --- 27 / 14
Packed event 39.81 33.57 17.21 12.90 27 / 14 --- 24 / 10
Difference 15.36 26.83 15.94 16.39
Difference of differences
DET
Sum of unpacked events 49.29 49.20 55.04 83.71 24 / 10 --- 27 / 14
Packed event 30.00 12.64 40.42 38.00 27 / 14 --- 24 / 10
Difference 19.29 36.56 14.62 45.71
Difference of differences
IND
Sum of unpacked events 56.00 56.40 30.26 23.29 24 / 10 --- 27 / 14
Packed event 37.89 27.07 11.04 12.60 27 / 14 --- 24 / 10
Difference 18.11 29.33 19.22 10.69
Difference of differences
LAC
Sum of unpacked events 50.24 43.75 24.77 28.79 29 / 8 --- 26 / 14
Packed event 46.88 44.57 13.59 6.25 26 / 14 --- 29 / 8
Difference 3.36 -0.82 11.18 22.54
Difference of differences
LAL
Sum of unpacked events 55.45 50.65 37.85 19.77 20 / 17 --- 27 / 13
Packed event 41.19 37.54 21.55 13.94 27 / 13 --- 20 / 17
Difference 14.26 13.11 16.30 5.83
Difference of differences
-17.27 -31.09**
1.15 10.47
-11.22 8.53
4.18 -11.36
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) / p(I 1 ∪  I 2 ) p(I 3 ) + p(I 4 ) / p(I 3 ∪  I 4 )
-11.47 -0.45
2.74
11.40 3.98
8.89
2.55 9.62
 
to be continued on the next page 
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Table 4.5 continued 
Events (Intervals) N German  / N U.S.
Recruitment channel German U.S. German U.S. left --- right col.
Mean probability judgments (x100) per team
MEM
Sum of unpacked events 45.59 37.43 34.00 16.85 22 / 14 --- 24 / 13
Packed event 27.92 25.85 10.41 7.93 24 / 13 --- 22 / 14
Difference 17.67 11.58 23.59 8.92
Difference of differences
MIA
Sum of unpacked events 64.85 61.53 38.07 35.38 20 / 17 --- 27 / 13
Packed event 42.81 44.23 17.75 25.41 27 / 13 --- 20 / 17
Difference 22.04 17.30 20.32 9.97
Difference of differences
MIL
Sum of unpacked events 48.62 33.75 25.00 21.79 29 / 8 --- 26 / 14
Packed event 30.38 29.86 12.07 3.75 26 / 14 --- 29 / 8
Difference 18.24 3.89 12.93 18.04
Difference of differences
NJN
Sum of unpacked events 64.93 73.13 34.46 27.79 29 / 8 --- 26 / 14
Packed event 39.27 45.57 17.86 8.13 26 / 14 --- 29 / 8
Difference 25.66 27.56 16.60 19.66
Difference of differences
PHX
Sum of unpacked events 60.91 54.29 44.08 51.08 22 / 14 --- 24 / 13
Packed event 32.92 32.00 21.00 23.57 24 / 13 --- 22 / 14
Difference 27.99 22.29 23.08 27.51
Difference of differences
SAC
Sum of unpacked events 42.88 45.90 24.22 19.36 24 / 10 --- 27 / 14
Packed event 29.52 18.86 11.79 12.60 27 / 14 --- 24 / 10
Difference 13.36 27.04 12.43 6.76
Difference of differences
SAS
Sum of unpacked events 56.66 45.63 55.73 60.00 29 / 8 --- 26 / 14
Packed event 30.77 20.29 29.62 40.63 26 / 14 --- 29 / 8
Difference 25.89 25.34 26.11 19.37
Difference of differences
WAS
Sum of unpacked events 57.40 52.88 21.33 20.38 20 / 17 --- 27 / 13
Packed event 42.89 36.15 10.60 13.29 27 / 13 --- 20 / 17
Difference 14.51 16.73 10.73 7.09
Difference of differences
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) / p(I 1 ∪  I 2 ) p(I 3 ) + p(I 4 ) / p(I 3 ∪  I 4 )
6.09 14.67
4.74 10.35
14.35 -5.11
-1.90 -3.06
5.70 -4.43
-2.22 3.64
-13.68 5.67
0.55 6.74
 
 
Table 4.5 shows interaction effects between partition type (treatment) and re-
cruitment channel in mean before-trading probability judgments for each NBA team. 
For each team the first row shows the sum of means for unpacked events (low intervals 
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in the two left-hand columns and high intervals in the two right-hand columns). The 
second row shows mean values for the packed event. The left-hand sub-columns of each 
main column show the means for subjects recruited in Germany, the right-hand sub-
columns show respective values for participants recruited in the U.S. The rightmost col-
umn indicates sample size (i.e., number of participants who provided judgments for a 
team) broken down for each of the eight sample cells. Contrary to the Lab Study (sec-
tion 3), low and high intervals are not complementary since some probability was as-
signed to the I0 interval in both partitions (which is not displayed in the Table). The row 
“difference” shows mean effect size of partition-dependence in each sub-group, and the 
row “difference of differences” calculates the difference in bias strength between the 
two sub-groups. This value is above zero, if partition-dependence is lower for U.S. stu-
dents, and it is negative, if partition-dependence is lower for German students.  
As Table 4.5 reveals, bias strength varies widely within the different sub-groups 
and intervals. For the low intervals (p(I1) + p(I2) – p(I1 ∪ I2)) it ranges between 3.36 
(LAC) and 27.99 (PHX) for German subjects, and varies from –.82 (LAC, indicating 
slight reverse partition-dependence) to 36.56 (DET) for U.S. students; effect size for the 
high intervals (p(I3) + p(I4) – p(I3 ∪ I4)) ranges between 10.73 (WAS) and 26.11 (SAS) 
for German participants, and spans from 5.83 (LAL) to 45.71 (DET) for U.S. subjects. 
Note that complete ignorance would imply a difference of 25.0 in terms of absolute 
probability since each partition is divided into four intervals (1/N=.25, so when a packed 
event is unpacked, ignorance prior judgments rise by 25.0). With respect to the pre-
sumed competence effect, the difference in partition bias between groups ranges be-
tween –17.27 (DET) and 14.35 (MIL) for low intervals, and varies from –31.09 (DET, 
an obvious outlier) to 14.67 (MEM) for high intervals. As it turns out, no systematic 
competence effects are recognizable, which is also reflected in a 2 × 2 factorial 
ANOVA that shows no statistically significant interaction effects between the degree of 
partition-dependence and channel of recruitment among the 32 team-interval compari-
sons, except the above mentioned outlier (p-value .0189 indicated by two asterisks).179 
                                                 
179  In part, statistical inference of ANOVA results may be limited in the present case due to possible 
violations of assumptions (independence of observations within and between samples, normality of sam-
pling distribution, homogeneity of variances) and/or due to small sample sizes. Including those judgments 
that were submitted after the Playoffs had begun increases the overall sample size by 118 German and 36 
U.S. data sets. As a result, a few more interaction terms turn out to be statistically significant, but the 
general tendency of the findings does not change, and results may be affected by scores from the first 
games. For the sake of clarity, these results are not reported here. 
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In particular, it is noticeable that neither U.S. students nor German participants seem to 
be consistently less biased than their counterparts, and bias strength is generally high in 
both sub-samples. The channel of recruitment was chosen as a proxy for competence 
about the events, so maybe this proxy is not selective enough to detect interaction ef-
fects. However, carrying out the same analysis using different competence proxies (self-
rated competence, interest in the Playoffs, intention to track the Playoffs on TV, etc., 
and score of the trivia quiz) does not alter the results with regard to the interaction ef-
fects.180  
To reduce variance within sub-groups and to enhance statistical power by in-
creasing the number of observations, one may pool participants’ judgments (per event) 
for the four different teams of a four-team market (e.g., DAL, WAS, MIA, LAL).181 To 
further reduce variance, one may even pool the judgments over all sixteen teams, which 
gives a single 2 × 2 comparison of the low and the high intervals, respectively. Results 
are displayed in Table 4.6. Note that NGerman and NU.S. refer to the number of judgments 
(four per person) rather than to the number of subjects. However, the null hypothesis of 
no interaction effects still cannot be rejected for most of the interaction terms. Partition 
bias is sometimes lower, but sometimes even higher for U.S. students, and the differ-
ence of differences is generally not high, suggesting that competence interactions be-
tween German and U.S. students in the present data are very weak, if at all existent.  
 
                                                 
180  For each of these competence proxies, participants were grouped into two categorical “competence” 
groups according to whether their self-rating/quiz score was less than or equal to the median self-
rating/quiz score (“low-competence” group) or whether it was above the median (“high-competence” 
group). 
181  This implicitly assumes a subject’s judgments for different teams to be uncorrelated. Remember that 
each participant faced the same partition of events for the four teams of her four-team market. 
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Table 4.6:  Interaction effects between partition type and recruitment channel in before-trading prob-
ability judgments, pooled over four-team markets (market clones). 
Events (Intervals) N German  / N U.S.
Recruitment channel German U.S. German U.S. left --- right col.
Mean probability judgments (x100)
per four-team market (pooled)
SAS, MIL, NJN, LAC
Sum of unpacked events 55.11 49.06 34.99 34.59 116 / 32 --- 104 / 56
Packed event 36.83 35.07 18.28 14.69 104 / 56 --- 116 / 32
Difference 18.28 13.99 16.71 19.90
Difference of differences
PHX, CHI, CLE, MEM
Sum of unpacked events 53.48 45.66 35.83 28.77 88 / 56 --- 96 / 52
Packed event 33.32 31.94 13.35 12.25 96 / 52 --- 88 /56
Difference 20.16 13.72 22.48 16.52
Difference of differences
DEN, IND, DET, SAC
Sum of unpacked events 50.83 52.97 35.67 38.91 96 / 40 --- 108 / 56
Packed event 34.31 23.04 20.11 19.02 108 / 56 --- 96 / 40
Difference 16.52 29.93 15.56 19.89
Difference of differences
DAL, WAS, MIA, LAL
Sum of unpacked events 60.78 56.10 35.32 28.31 80 / 68 --- 108 / 52
Packed event 43.22 40.15 18.66 19.99 108 / 52 --- 80 / 68
Difference 17.56 15.95 16.66 8.32
Difference of differences
ALL 16 TEAMS
Sum of unpacked events 54.84 51.33 35.45 32.80 380 / 196 - 416 / 216
Packed event 37.02 32.42 17.68 16.71 416 / 216 - 380 / 196
Difference 17.82 18.91 17.77 16.09
Difference of differences
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) / p(I 1 ∪  I 2 ) p(I 3 ) + p(I 4 ) / p(I 3 ∪  I 4 )
4.29 -3.19
6.44 5.96
-13.41** -4.33
1.61 8.34*
-1.09 1.68
 
 
What follows is a parallel analysis of probability judgments in the World Cup 
part of the study. As was pointed out in fn. 176, only data from German students were 
used from the second part of the study. Thus, the following analyses of second order 
effects will focus on the self-rated World Cup competence proxy of German students 
(“In general, how competent do you feel in making judgments regarding the FIFA Soc-
cer World Cup 2006?”, scale 1–7) instead of the recruitment channel. Without notifying 
them, participants were grouped into a “low-competence” group (if their competence 
proxy was less than or equal to the median of self-assessments) or into a “high-
competence” group (if their proxy was above the median). Median self-rated compe-
tence was fairly high among German students (median=5, σ=1.6, N=263), just like the 
other two competence proxies (interest in the World Cup: median=7, σ=1.6; intention to 
track the World Cup on TV, etc.: median=6, σ=1.5) which were collected in a Web-
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based World Cup questionnaire. Trivia quiz scores were somewhat lower (median=4, 
σ=1.4).182  
Analogous to Table 4.5, Table 4.7 shows interaction effects between partition 
type (treatment) and self-rated competence (either “low-competence” group or “high-
competence” group) in mean before-trading probability judgments for each World Cup 
team. Notes to Table 4.5 similarly apply to Table 4.7. Like for the NBA events, Table 
4.7 reveals that the extent of partition-dependence bias varies greatly within the differ-
ent sub-groups and intervals. For the low intervals (p(I1) + p(I2) – p(I1 ∪ I2)) bias size 
ranges between –9.56 (JPN, reflecting reverse partition-dependence) and 29.52 (NED) 
for the low-competence group, and varies from 1.27 (SCG, indicating almost partition-
independence) to 41.97 (CZE) for the high-competence group; effect size for the high 
intervals (p(I3) + p(I4) – p(I3 ∪ I4)) ranges between –6.31 (AUS, reverse partition-
dependence) and 27.78 (ARG) for the low-competence group, and spans from 3.70 
(GHA) to 45.50 (CZE) for the high-competence group. With respect to the presumed 
competence effect, the difference in partition bias between groups ranges between         
–21.62 (ITA, indicating the low-competence group being less biased) and 13.10 (ARG) 
for low intervals, and varies from –23.20 (CZE) to 9.49 (ARG) for high intervals.183 It is 
striking that for 19 out of the 32 team-interval differences the low-competence group 
appears to be less biased than those subjects who were allocated to the high-competence 
group. Some of these “reverse” competence effects are statistically significant (by a 
2 × 2 factorial ANOVA) on a 10%-level, whereas none of the positive interaction terms 
shows statistical significance.184 However, none of the two competence groups seems to 
be consistently better calibrated than the other. The power of results also seems to be 
restricted by the fact that for some teams (e.g., CIV, CRC, SCG) competence interac-
tions point in a different direction for the low and high intervals. 
                                                 
182  Again, no differences in the degree of difficulty were found for the two versions of the trivia quiz. 
183  Note that the difference of differences is difficult to interpret for team AUS and for the low intervals 
of team JPN, as the low-competence groups reveal reverse partition-dependence, whereas the high-
competence groups indicate partition-dependence in the expected direction. 
184  Again, ANOVA results may be limited due to possible violations of assumptions and/or due to even 
smaller sample size compared to the NBA Playoffs part of the study. Only N=4 participants provided 
their judgments after the World Cup had begun, so including their judgments does not at all alter the 
results. 
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Table 4.7:  Interaction effects between partition type and self-rated competence in before-trading prob-
ability judgments for each FIFA World Cup team. 
Events (Intervals) N low_comp. /N high_comp..
Competence Level Low High Low High left --- right col.
Mean probability judgments (x100) per team
ARG
Sum of unpacked events 55.84 51.87 67.52 63.22 19 / 15 --- 21 / 9
Packed event 26.43 35.56 39.74 44.93 21 / 9 --- 19 / 15
Difference 29.41 16.31 27.78 18.29
Difference of differences
AUS
Sum of unpacked events 58.00 65.21 12.69 9.15 15 / 19 --- 13 / 20
Packed event 63.77 53.05 19.00 4.95 13 / 20 --- 15 / 19
Difference -5.77 12.16 -6.31 4.20
Difference of differences
BRA
Sum of unpacked events 19.33 38.63 93.77 88.05 15 / 19 --- 13 / 20
Packed event 5.31 10.30 77.27 59.16 13 / 20 --- 15 / 19
Difference 14.02 28.33 16.50 28.89
Difference of differences
CIV
Sum of unpacked events 60.63 57.40 14.24 18.11 19 / 15 --- 21 / 9
Packed event 45.71 53.33 5.53 6.27 21 / 9 --- 19 / 15
Difference 14.92 4.07 8.71 11.84
Difference of differences
CRC
Sum of unpacked events 46.87 51.53 19.95 12.50 15 / 17 --- 19 / 16
Packed event 37.74 40.94 4.73 3.18 19 / 16 --- 15 /17
Difference 9.13 10.59 15.22 9.32
Difference of differences
CRO
Sum of unpacked events 48.67 75.79 46.31 28.85 15 / 19 --- 13 / 20
Packed event 44.85 57.95 25.33 7.95 13 / 20 --- 15 / 19
Difference 3.82 17.84 20.98 20.90
Difference of differences
CZE
Sum of unpacked events 61.35 71.30 46.60 65.00 20 / 10 --- 20 / 15
Packed event 39.80 29.33 24.30 19.50 20 / 15 --- 20 / 10
Difference 21.55 41.97 22.30 45.50
Difference of differences
ECU
Sum of unpacked events 42.27 54.18 18.79 15.13 15 / 17 --- 19 / 16
Packed event 38.63 47.06 9.07 3.18 19 / 16 --- 15 /17
Difference 3.64 7.12 9.72 11.95
Difference of differences
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) / p(I 1 ∪  I 2 ) p(I 3 ) + p(I 4 ) / p(I 3 ∪  I 4 )
10.85 -3.13
-14.31
13.10 9.49
-12.39
-17.93* -10.51*
-1.46 5.90
-3.48 -2.23
-14.02 0.08
-20.42* -23.2*
 
to be continued on the next page 
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Table 4.7 continued 
Events (Intervals) N low_comp. /N high_comp..
Competence Level Low High Low High left --- right col.
Mean probability judgments (x100) per team
GER
Sum of unpacked events 45.67 59.76 64.32 59.81 15 / 17 --- 19 / 16
Packed event 27.32 30.31 41.00 34.71 19 / 16 --- 15 /17
Difference 18.35 29.45 23.32 25.10
Difference of differences
GHA
Sum of unpacked events 52.30 56.90 14.60 9.80 20 / 10 --- 20 / 15
Packed event 40.60 47.87 9.30 6.10 20 / 15 --- 20 / 10
Difference 11.70 9.03 5.30 3.70
Difference of differences
ITA
Sum of unpacked events 52.95 68.40 53.85 62.67 20 / 10 --- 20 / 15
Packed event 40.10 33.93 39.30 28.50 20 / 15 --- 20 / 10
Difference 12.85 34.47 14.55 34.17
Difference of differences
JPN
Sum of unpacked events 49.67 63.89 20.00 18.25 15 / 19 --- 13 / 20
Packed event 59.23 56.05 10.67 4.42 13 / 20 --- 15 / 19
Difference -9.56 7.84 9.33 13.83
Difference of differences
NED
Sum of unpacked events 62.00 58.27 59.10 54.11 19 / 15 --- 21 / 9
Packed event 32.48 37.22 33.05 36.87 21 / 9 --- 19 / 15
Difference 29.52 21.05 26.05 17.24
Difference of differences
POL
Sum of unpacked events 56.20 71.88 39.21 29.69 15 / 17 --- 19 / 16
Packed event 39.21 53.31 16.47 8.65 19 / 16 --- 15 /17
Difference 16.99 18.57 22.74 21.04
Difference of differences
SCG
Sum of unpacked events 59.00 66.27 20.48 21.44 19 / 15 --- 21 / 9
Packed event 49.52 65.00 8.95 6.80 21 / 9 --- 19 / 15
Difference 9.48 1.27 11.53 14.64
Difference of differences
USA
Sum of unpacked events 66.25 75.00 24.20 16.33 20 / 10 --- 20 / 15
Packed event 50.25 60.33 8.25 3.60 20 / 15 --- 20 / 10
Difference 16.00 14.67 15.95 12.73
Difference of differences 1.33 3.22
-1.58 1.70
8.21 -3.11
-17.4* -4.50
8.47 8.81
2.67 1.60
-21.62* -19.62
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) / p(I 1 ∪  I 2 ) p(I 3 ) + p(I 4 ) / p(I 3 ∪  I 4 )
-11.10 -1.78
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Carrying out the same analysis using the remaining competence proxies (interest 
in the World Cup,185 intention to track the World Cup on TV, etc., and score of trivia 
quiz) does not alter the general results with respect to the direction and statistical infer-
ence of analyzed interaction effects.186 
 
Table 4.8:  Interaction effects between partition type and self-rated competence in before-trading prob-
ability judgments, pooled over four-team markets (market clones). 
Events (Intervals) N low_comp. /N high_comp..
Competence Level Low High Low High left --- right col.
Mean probability judgments (x100)
per four-team market (pooled)
GER, POL, ECU, CRC
Sum of unpacked events 47.75 59.34 35.57 29.28 60 / 68 --- 76 / 64
Packed event 35.72 42.91 17.82 12.43 76 / 64 --- 60 / 68
Difference 12.03 16.43 17.75 16.85
Difference of differences
NED, ARG, CIV, SCG
Sum of unpacked events 59.37 58.45 40.33 39.22 76 / 60 --- 84 / 36
Packed event 38.54 47.78 21.82 23.72 84 / 36 --- 76 / 60
Difference 20.83 10.67 18.51 15.50
Difference of differences
ITA, USA, CZE, GHA
Sum of unpacked events 58.21 67.90 34.81 38.45 80 / 40 --- 80 / 60
Packed event 42.69 42.87 20.29 14.43 80 / 60 --- 80 / 40
Difference 15.52 25.03 14.52 24.02
Difference of differences
BRA, JPN, CRO, AUS
Sum of unpacked events 43.92 60.88 43.19 36.08 60 / 76 --- 52 / 80
Packed event 43.29 44.34 33.07 19.12 52 / 80 --- 60 / 76
Difference 0.63 16.54 10.12 16.96
Difference of differences
ALL 16 TEAMS
Sum of unpacked events 53.15 61.00 38.09 35.33 276 / 244 - 292 / 240
Packed event 39.79 44.10 22.95 17.61 292 / 240 - 276 / 244
Difference 13.36 16.90 15.14 17.72
Difference of differences
-15.91** -6.84
-3.54 -2.58
10.16* 3.01
-9.51* -9.50
p(I 1 ) + p(I 2 ) / p(I 1 ∪  I 2 ) p(I 3 ) + p(I 4 ) / p(I 3 ∪  I 4 )
-4.40 0.90
 
 
                                                 
185  Since median interest in the World Cup was 7, the low-interest group was built by subjects whose 
self-rating was below the median, and the high-interest group contained the subjects whose self-rating 
was equal to the median (cf. fn. 180). 
186  Interestingly, though, using the „interest in the World Cup“ proxy yields an interaction effect (namely 
in the expected direction) that is statistically significant at the 5%-level for the high intervals of team 
GER. This is interestingly, because it may be assumed that German subjects were particularly interested 
in the German national team and thus competence effects might be exceptionally pronounced for this 
team. 
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Pooling participants’ judgments (per event) for the four different teams of a 
four-team market (e.g., GER, POL, ECU, CRC), and pooling judgments for all sixteen 
teams (ALL 16 TEAMS) yield the results displayed in Table 4.8. (Note that Nlow_comp 
and Nhigh_comp refer to the number of judgments (four per person) rather than the number 
of participants.) Even if effects turn out to be somehow more consistent across low and 
high intervals, and despite the fact that three of the interaction effects for the low inter-
vals turn out to be statistically significant (*, ** indicate statistical significance at the 
10% and 5% level, respectively), results remain mixed. Results from pooling judgments 
for all sixteen teams show a small “reverse” competence effect, but partition-
dependence is quite balanced across sub-groups, and bias size generally remains high. 
Thus, the null hypothesis of no interaction effects cannot be rejected for most of the 
interaction terms, suggesting that competence effects in the present data are rather ran-
dom errors than a general phenomenon. So either competence effects, if they exist, are 
not accentuated enough in the analyzed population, or competence proxies are not selec-
tive enough to detect such effects, or statistical significance is limited due to small sam-
ple sizes. Another explanation would be that subjects possibly did not think carefully 
enough about their judgments, as these were not incentivized.  
 
4.4 Interim conclusions 
Study 2 documents the persistence of partition-dependent pricing effects in a 
field experiment in which self-selected participants trade assets whose value depend on 
the outcomes of events in which they take great interest—the NBA Playoffs and the 
World Cup tournament—and for which trading lasts for several weeks. These experi-
ments address concerns about the generalizability of lab experiments due to the limited 
involvement of traders and short span of trade. Probability judgments before trading 
begins exhibit partition-dependence that is similar in magnitude to previous psychologi-
cal studies—for instance, the sum of unpacked intervals (e.g., [4, 7] playoff wins plus 
[8, 11] wins) is judged to about 20 percent larger in absolute probability than the packed 
interval [4, 11]. In addition, the bias appears to be quite insensitive to variations in the 
level of participants’ self-perceived competence in both parts of the study. 
The partition-dependence revealed by actual prices of event assets can be 
roughly bounded by two different methods. Using the possibility of hypothetical cross-
4  Study 2: An NBA/FIFA field experiment 192 
market arbitrage at available bids and asks yields an average daily profit of about 1% 
(largely because there are long stretches of time where there is not a simultaneous set of 
bids for the unpacked assets and an ask for the packed asset). Using an interpolated-
price procedure, which assumes that trades could take place continuously, but only at 
the worst price from the last trade and next future trade, gives hypothetical arbitrage 
profits around 6%. The two measures represent likely lower and upper bounds on the 
practical profitability from exploiting partition-dependence, and therefore bound its 
likely economic magnitude in markets like these. For both measures and a large major-
ity of team markets, these potential profits are much larger than profits from executing 
the opposite strategy (buying unpacked intervals and selling the equivalent packed in-
terval asset), indicating that partition-dependence is a systematic bias rather than an 
artifact of random error.  
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5 Study 3: Naturally-occurring prediction markets 
for economic derivatives 
5.1 Institutional structure of economic derivatives 
The lab and field experiments document the existence of partition-dependence 
when different partitions are traded (in separate markets) for the same event domain. An 
open question is whether these effects can be inferred from naturally-occurring predic-
tion markets that rely on a single partition. Study 3 addresses this question.  
In October 2002, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs launched large-scale pre-
diction markets for bets on the outcomes of macroeconomic indicators such as the 
change in U.S. non-farm payrolls (NFP), levels of the Institute for Supply Manage-
ment’s (ISM) purchasing manager index (a measure of business confidence), U.S. initial 
jobless claims (IJC) (adjusted to reflect seasonal hiring patterns), retail sales (RSX) (ex 
automobiles, adjusted for normal seasonal variations), and others.187 These “economic 
derivatives” (ED) markets are designed to give professionals such as institutional trad-
ers (hedge funds, proprietary traders, pension funds, large banks, etc.) the opportunity to 
take direct positions in unexpected fluctuations of macroeconomic risks, and potentially 
to provide better widespread distributional forecasts of the underlying variables.188 With 
economic derivatives, traders can take direct positions in macroeconomic risks,189 as 
                                                 
187  Other macroeconomic indicators that serve as underlying for economic derivatives markets are: Eu-
rozone harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) (a measure of inflation in Europe), U.S. interna-
tional trade balance (ITB), and U.S. gross domestic product (GDP); see CME (2005). 
188  Initially, economic derivatives were traded over-the-counter based on an agreement with ICap to 
distribute the securities to the inter-dealer-market. As from September 2005, economic derivatives were 
organized by the International Securities Exchange (ISE) and clearing was operated and guaranteed by 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). In June 2007, though, ISE and CME have decided to discon-
tinue economic derivatives auctions due to low trading volume. Before closing the markets, some 120 
participants were active in these auctions. At any auction there were about 40 participants (some 80% of 
them were large and small hedge funds); see Parker (2007, p. 11). The highest trading volume was gener-
ated in NFP derivatives, with an average nominal value of approximately $9 million per auction 
(Gadanecz, Moessner, and Upper (2007)). 
189  Macroeconomic or business cycle risks are a fundamental source of risk in corporate activity, as these 
factors have a major impact on sales, orders received, wage demands, interest rates, earnings, and the like; 
but they do also affect households, as macroeconomic factors may influence job security, consumption, or 
price stability. Early attempts have been made in the 1970ies to trade macroeconomic risks using deriva-
tives, for instance by Lovell and Vogel (1973), who proposed the introduction of specific futures con-
tracts to provide everyone with the opportunity to hedge against fluctuations in the general consumer 
price index (CPI). In the 1980ies, financial engineering was used to introduce investment innovations 
(e.g., “macro swaps” and “macro options”) based on macroeconomic risks (see, e.g., Marshall et al. 
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they can avoid to assume the “basis risk” that is usually associated with positions in 
proxy securities (such as bonds, equities, foreign exchange, and other derivatives which 
are supposed to react in a certain direction as a result of a data release (surprise)). The 
basis risk is the risk that a chosen proxy security does not exactly react to the data out-
turn as was expected by the trader (see CME (2005), and Gadanecz, Moessner, and Up-
per (2007)). The markets may potentially provide better forecasts, as prices of eco-
nomic derivatives reflect information on the entire probability distribution of underlying 
expectations, and not just point estimates as this is usually the case with survey-based 
measures (Gadanecz, Moessner, and Upper (2007)). Economic derivatives markets may 
attract both speculators (giving them the opportunity to express their view directly on 
economic statistics) and hedgers (who wish to reduce the discrete event risk associated 
with an economic release). 
For each underlying numerical variable (i.e., the release of a specific numerical 
macroeconomic indicator) a diverse set of contracts is available for trading, including 
capped options (capped calls and floored puts), forwards (range forwards), and digital 
(binary) options (digital calls, digital puts, and digital range options) (see CME 
(2005)).190 Capped options are “plain-vanilla” style options paying money equal to the 
amount by which the released indicator exceeds (call) or falls below (put) the exercise 
price, but are capped at the highest (call) and lowest (put) strike prices available in the 
auction. Range forwards pay the difference between the actual outcome of an indicator 
and the trade price, capped at the highest and lowest strike prices. If this difference is 
negative, the value falls due for payment. Digital calls and puts are options that pay out 
a fixed amount ($1) if they end up in-the-money and nothing otherwise. The fixed 
amount does not depend on how deep an option is in-the-money. Finally, digital range 
options comprise two strike prices (a lower and an upper bound) which define a certain 
interval. These options pay out if the released statistic falls within this range and noth-
ing otherwise. Therefore, digital range options in economic derivatives exactly coincide 
with the “all-or-nothing” contracts used in Studies 1 and 2. With digital range options a 
trader is able to take a position in any interval bounded by two adjacent strike prices 
(and combinations of that). Usually, there are about 10 to 20 equidistant strike prices for 
                                                                                                                                               
(1992), Bansal, Marshall, and Yuyuenyongwatana (1994), and Bansal, Marshall, and Yuyuenyongwatana 
(1995)), and influential work on macro markets was also done by Shiller (1993), and Shiller (2003). 
190  Trading in digital options represents about three quarters of trades, but less than half in terms of 
transaction volume. Hedgers usually prefer plain-vanilla options which account for much larger volumes; 
see Beber and Brandt (2009, p. 12). 
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each upcoming data release, dividing the state space in 11 to 21 mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive ranges. It is important to stress that the ranges are deliberately 
set by the organizers of these markets to reflect the likely range of the outcomes. In 
more detail, strike prices are set to cover at least two to three standard deviations based 
on historical volatility of the indicator and the scale midpoint is chosen to reflect mean 
survey expectations.191 For example, the strike prices for an U.S. non-farm payrolls auc-
tion may range from –250,000 (i.e., a decrease in payrolls from the previous level) to 
+100,000 in increments of 25,000 jobs. This generates a total of sixteen intervals and a 
scale midpoint of –75,000 jobs (]–∞; –250,000], [–249,999; –225,000], …, [75,001; 
100,000], [100,001; +∞[).  
In most financial derivatives markets, trading occurs as a continuous auction, 
with market makers providing liquidity to the audience by continuously posting bid and 
ask quotes at which they are ready to buy and sell assets. Usually, market makers hedge 
their positions by countertrades in the respective underlying or using other derivatives. 
However, hedging economic derivatives is difficult since there is no such “underlying” 
for macroeconomic statistics and proxy securities bear the basis risk as described above. 
Without market makers, though, liquidity is low and trading may suffer from thin trad-
ing. For this reason, the economic derivatives markets use a parimutuel system which is 
also common in horse race betting.192 In this mechanism the prices of the instruments 
are based solely on relative demand for their implied outcomes and enables market 
clearing without discrete matching of buy and sell orders (see Baron and Lange (2003), 
and Lange and Economides (2005)). In parimutuel markets investors who bet on event 
A and win (i.e., event A occurs and associated options are in-the-money) share the win-
nings from those who bet on all other (“losing”) events (i.e., those options which end 
out-of-the-money). As parimutuel clearing applies to all kinds of derivatives in the eco-
nomic derivatives markets (capped options, forwards, and digital (binary) options), 
these instruments are decomposed into a combination of several “state contingent 
claims” (SCC) for valuation. The state contingent claims are in fact digital range op-
tions based on available exercise prices, a fact that highlights the relevance of the dif-
ferent strike-price intervals of the state space for the pricing of these derivatives. As in 
horse betting, the trading system periodically discloses interim prices showing what the 
                                                 
191  See Filippov (2005, p. 47), and CME (2005, p. 5). 
192  See subsection 2.1.1.4 for an introductory note on continuous double auctions (as used in Studies 1 
and 2) and parimutuel markets. 
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payouts would be if no further orders were submitted.193 These auctions typically take 
place in the morning of the day on which the economic statistic is released and are 
sometimes preceded by other auctions on the same statistic release one or two days be-
fore (e.g., non-farm payrolls auctions are held on the morning the data are released and 
on the two days before). Thus, these markets usually have a very short-term forecast 
horizon and thereby offer hedging opportunities against so-called event risks.194 Each 
auction lasts for 1 to 2 hours. 
Most important in the context of the present work, the economic derivatives 
market prices can be used to derive a risk neutral probability density function of the 
market’s aggregated beliefs about the outcome of every single data release.195 Through-
out the auction period the trading application continuously discloses indicative prices of 
available derivatives and lists filled orders, as well as an implied probability distribution 
derived from current market prices (strictly speaking, these are prices of the digital 
range options on all intervals).196 Figure 5.1, for instance, shows the implied probabili-
ties from one set of digital options, for a retail trade statistic announced in April 2005. 
Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2006), who report data covering the first 2½ years of these 
markets, conclude that market-generated forecasts based on prices from the economic 
derivatives markets are slightly more accurate than the “survey forecasts” released by 
Money Market Services (MMS) on the Friday before a data release, much as the Iowa 
political market prices are typically more accurate than comparable political polls (Berg 
and Rietz (2006)). To derive the market-based forecast they use the distribution of out-
comes implied by market prices and calculate the distribution’s mean by assuming that 
the probability distribution is uniform within each bin (boundaries of bins are defined 
by adjacent strike prices). For the MMS forecast, the “consensus” forecast typically 
averages across around 30 professional analysts. Their finding of market-based fore-
casts being slightly more accurate than the survey estimates is measured in terms of the 
                                                 
193  Since investors in the economic derivatives market are allowed to place limit orders, the parimutuel 
trading mechanism may result in multiple equilibriums. This problem is encountered by using a special 
auction-clearing tool that chooses the equilibrium prices such that the number of total trades will be 
maximized. (This clearing-algorithm was developed by Longitude Inc. and is called “Parimutuel Deriva-
tive Call Auction technology”; see Baron (2004).) As in many traditional auctions, all trades (at a given 
strike) that occur are executed at the same price, regardless of the limit price. 
194  By contrast, the „macro securities“ proposed by Shiller (1993) were designed to protect economic 
agents against long-term macroeconomic risks which may affect their livelihood. 
195  See subsection 2.1.4.3. for a discussion of whether and under what circumstances prediction market 
prices can be interpreted as market-derived probabilities. 
196  See Appendix X for a screenshot of the trading interface. 
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mean absolute error (MAE) and the root mean squared error (RMSE) from both mecha-
nisms.  
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Digital option prices on ranges of retail trade statistics (taken from Gürkaynak and Wolfers 
(2006)). 
Essentially, there are two reasons to believe in the superiority of market-derived 
forecasts (see Gadanecz, Moessner, and Upper (2007)): first, economic derivatives auc-
tions take place shortly before the actual data are released, whereas surveys are gener-
ally published with a lead of one week or more, so one may argue that in the meantime 
more information is potentially available and is incorporated in the market-derived es-
timates. Second, economic derivatives prediction markets offer particularly strong in-
centives to trade upon one’s true beliefs, as millions of dollars are involved. Analysts, in 
turn, may be tempted to misrepresent their views in surveys in order to position them-
selves relative to consensus estimates. 
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5.2 Ignorance-prior analysis: The “mixture” model 
First note that each economic derivatives market presents a single partition of 
possible event outcomes to participants (the digital option outcome ranges). As a result, 
one cannot compare prices in two differently-partitioned events on the same interval to 
estimate the degree of partition-dependence, as was done through experimental manipu-
lation in Studies 1 and 2. However, one can think of a simple econometric “mixture” 
model to estimate the degree of partition-dependence. For each event category x, as-
sume 
 
fobs (x) = (1 – λ) · ftrue (x) + λ · f1/N (x), (5.1)
 
where fobs (x) is the observed probability distribution implied by economic de-
rivatives prices, ftrue (x) is the unobserved unbiased probability distribution, f1/N is an 
ignorance-prior distribution assigning equal probability mass to each interval, and λ is 
the weight on the 1/N ignorance prior.197 
If each event was traded repeatedly, the empirical distribution of realized out-
comes could be compared to the distribution of implied probabilities and the 1/N distri-
bution to produce a sharp estimate of the apparent weight on the 1/N component. How-
ever, there is only one observation of implied probabilities for each point of time and 
each economic statistic. Therefore, the data for the different points of time and across 
the different statistics are pooled.198 A mean forecast Mobs = µ( fobs) is computed for 
each auction by weighting the interval midpoints by the observed probabilities fobs, and 
a respective ignorance prior mean M1/N is determined by assigning equal weight to each 
                                                 
197  Note the structural similarity of the “mixture” model presented here and partition-dependence mod-
eled within the framework of support theory (cf. equation (2.15) in subsection 2.2.4.1). Note also the 
structural similarity of the presented model and the “information model” introduced by Sobel and Raines 
(2003) in their analysis of the favorite-longshot bias in racetrack betting. Their model is based on a 
Bayesian updating process that starts with an ignorance prior probability of 1/N for all of the N entrants. 
Posterior beliefs then result from a weighted combination of 1/N probability and probability implied by 
the information signals received by the bettor. 
198 In the following, the same data on the economic derivatives are used as in Gürkaynak and Wolfers 
(2006). To make the four statistics they use (non-farm payrolls, ISM business confidence, retail sales (ex 
auto), and initial unemployment claims) comparable one may follow Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2006) and 
normalize the data by the historical size of the forecast error. 
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interval midpoint.199 For symmetric partitions, M1/N thus coincides with the scale mid-
point of available strike prices. 
From (5.1) it follows that Mobs is a linear function (1 – λ) · Mtrue + λ · M1/N. Call 
the actual realization of the economic statistic X and apply a little algebra to see that the 
observed forecast error can be written as:200 
 
Mobs – X = [Mtrue – X] – λ / (1 – λ) · [Mobs – M1/N] (5.2)
 
That is, the observed forecast error, Mobs – X, has two components. The first 
component is the error term from a de-biased forecast based on ftrue (x) (which is ex-
pected to have expectation zero). The second component is a negatively-weighted term 
which reflects the degree of partition-dependence (through the weight λ). Intuitively, 
suppose the forecast from market data Mobs is above the equal-weight forecast M1/N. If 
there is partition-dependence contaminating fobs (x), then fobs (x) is biased downward 
(toward M1/N) relative to the de-biased ideal forecast ftrue (x) (which is an unbiased pre-
dictor of X). This downward bias means the forecast error, Mobs – X, is likely to be nega-
tive. Thus, when [Mobs – M1/N] is positive Mobs – X is likely to be negative (and vice 
versa). The strength of the negative correlation can be used to estimate –λ / (1 – λ) and 
the implied λ. For cases in which Mobs > M1/N, Figure 5.2 illustrates how the forecast 
error Mobs – X becomes negative by Mtrue being biased downward (toward M1/N) as a 
result of partition-dependence. Roughly speaking, the model predicts that the unbiased 
forecast Mtrue is actually further away from M1/N than indicated by the observed forecast 
Mobs. 
 
                                                 
199  With regard to the midpoints of the tail intervals, one may follow Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2006, 
p. 6, fn. 9): “For the tails we impute an upper- and lower-bound so that the midpoint would be equal to 
the mean of that bin if the PDF were normal.” 
200  The derivation of the regression model can be obtained from Appendix XI. 
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x
Mtrue
≈ X
MobsM1/N
Mobs= (1 – λ) ⋅ Mtrue + λ ⋅ M1/N
Mobs– X < 0Mobs > M1/N
Mtrue biased downward (toward M1/N)
 
Figure 5.2:  Illustration of a negative forecast error (Mobs – X) < 0 if Mobs > M1/N. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the results of estimating regression (5.2) for markets for 
four different statistics.  
 
Table 5.1:  Results of regressions of forecast errors on the difference between observed forecast and 
1/N forecast. 
Coefficient
–λ / (1 – λ) t -Statistic
p -value 
(one-tailed)
λ Implied by 
Regression
Error-
minimization
Initial jobless claims 
(IJC) 64 0.13 0.16 0.44 -0.15 0.06
Business confidence 
(ISM) 30 -0.64 -1.88 0.04 0.39 0.08
Non-farm payrolls (NFP) 33 -1.29 -1.53 0.07 0.56 0.56
Retail sales (excl. autos) 
(RSX) 26 -1.01 -1.32 0.10 0.50 0.50
All statistics pooled 153 -0.77 -2.60 0.01 0.44 0.39
Regression (5.2) Results Implied Weight λ on 1/N
No. of 
Events
 
Note. P-value for test of regression coefficient different than zero is one-tailed. 
 
There is modest support for a negative correlation between forecast errors and 
the “forecast – 1/N gap”, which is consistent with bias toward a 1/N prior. One of the 
event domains (initial jobless claims) shows no bias; the other three event domains 
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show substantial bias. However, small sample sizes for individual event domains make 
the effects statistically marginal. The coefficient estimated from pooling all the event 
domains (–.77) is more significant and implies a value of the weight on 1/N of λ =.44 
(because –.77 is an estimate of –λ / (1 – λ)). Three of the four event domains imply val-
ues of λ from .39 to .56. 
A second analysis uses the “mixture” model introduced in (5.1) to infer the un-
observed unbiased probability distribution ftrue (x) from the observed distribution fobs (x) 
for various weights λ. As mentioned above, under partition-dependence the observed 
forecast Mobs is biased toward the 1/N-forecast. Thus, the model can be used to inflate 
the difference from 1/N to undo this compression. Furthermore, one can ask whether 
bias-corrected forecasts Mtrue(λ) are more accurate than observed forecasts Mobs. From 
(5.2) it follows: 
 
Mtrue – X = [1 / (1 – λ)] · (Mobs – λ · M1/N) – X (5.3)
 
That is, the true forecast error Mtrue – X can be computed as a function of λ, the 
unknown weight on the 1/N ignorance prior. Using the Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2006) 
data, one may compute the mean absolute error (MAE) between the actual realization of 
the economic statistic, and the λ-weighted combination of the forecast from the ob-
served probability, Mobs, and the forecast M1/N, for various weights λ. The results are 
displayed in Figure 5.3: For each of the four available economic statistics the graph 
shows the mean absolute error (MAE) over different values of λ. Mean absolute errors 
are normalized by historical standard errors of survey-based forecasts to make them 
comparable across event domains. For example, λ = 0 implies that no weight is attached 
to the ignorance-prior; in that case Mtrue coincides with Mobs. For λ → 1 it is assumed 
that Mtrue consists almost solely of the 1/N prior. Assuming Mtrue – X to have expectation 
zero, one can ask for which implied weight of λ the true forecast error reaches a mini-
mum. The values of λ that minimize the error from an λ-weighted combination are pro-
vided in the rightmost column of Table 5.1 and are indicated by a circle for each eco-
nomic indicator in Figure 5.3. For two of the statistics (initial jobless claims (IJC) and 
business confidence (ISM)) the weights are low, but positive. For the other two statistics 
(non-farm payrolls (NFP) and retail sales (RSX)) the weights are close to .50. For all 
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statistics pooled (indicated by the vertical gray line in Figure 5.3), the error-minimizing 
λ weight is about .39. 
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Figure 5.3:  Error Minimization (MAE vs. Lambda). 
It may be possible that the low weights for the ISM and IJC statistics on the one 
hand, and the much higher weights for RSX and NFP on the other hand reflect some 
knowledge or information effect. One may argue that the latter two indicators are more 
difficult to predict than the former as their forecast errors (MAE) turn out to be gener-
ally higher. In addition, retail sales figures (RSX) are usually capable of big surprises 
and are still quite imprecise when first released (they are the first report of the month on 
consumer spending, do not include the services sector, are measured only in nominal 
dollars, etc.), and for non-farm payrolls (NFP) only a few reliable data are available for 
that month at the time when the indicator is released; initial jobless claims (IJC), by 
contrast, are released on a weekly basis and are only subject to minor revisions (see 
Baumohl (2007), p. 74 for RSX, pp. 25-26 for NFP, and p. 40 for IJC). If an economic 
indicator is more difficult to predict, though, then one may expect people to implicitly 
put more weight on the ignorance prior (i.e., insufficient adjustment) than when the sta-
tistic is reasonably well predictable (i.e., stronger adjustment due to more reliable in-
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formation). This is consistent with the results of the presented error-minimization analy-
sis. 
Admittedly, though, as can be seen from Figure 5.3 the MAE reacts rather insen-
sitive to variations of λ, at least for weights below .70 (except for the ISM indicator of 
business confidence which is quite sensitive for λ > .40). That means, even for sizeable 
weights on the ignorance prior distribution, the forecast error does not change much. 
Accordingly, great uncertainty remains in determining how much weight is attached to 
the ignorance prior empirically, that is, to what extent values of Mobs are actually biased 
toward M1/N. However, for other event domains than those considered here, identified 
values of λ may have a much greater impact on forecast accuracy. Another issue that 
arises with the regression (5.2) model is that it does not control for other variables that 
may explain why the expectation of an economic number derived from economic de-
rivatives auctions is biased toward the average of the midpoints of the strike ranges. 
One thing that comes to mind is that observed forecasts Mobs may rather be biased to-
ward the prior outcome Xt–1 of the indicator in question (assuming that the market de-
signer will be guided by the last realization of the indicator when deciding how to de-
sign the strike prices for the next auction). However, as was mentioned above, for each 
series of auctions strike prices are adjusted to reflect current survey expectations (and to 
span at least two standard deviations based on historical volatility), and in fact there is 
considerable variation in the absolute level of strike intervals over time. Running a sim-
ple regression of the observed market-based forecast Mobs on (i) the current scale mid-
point M1/N, and (ii) on the most recent outcome Xt–1 suggests that much more of the total 
variance is explained by the scale midpoint of current intervals (R2IJC =.96; R2ISM =.98; 
R2NFP =.96; R2RSX =.87) than is explained by the most recent outcome of the economic 
statistic (R2IJC =.52; R2ISM =.90; R2NFP =.53; R2RSX <.01).201 Thus, anchoring on the latest 
realization of the economic number can be largely ruled out as explanation of why ob-
served market forecasts are biased toward M1/N. Alternatively, as strike intervals are 
chosen symmetrically around a midpoint to reflect mean survey expectations, market-
derived forecasts could be simply biased toward the mean survey forecast. In fact, cor-
relation between the scale midpoint and survey consensus forecasts is very high,202 but 
                                                 
201  Since the release of macroeconomic indicators is often subject to later revisions, the latest (revised) 
estimate of last month's actual number (reported by Yahoo) was used in the regression as the most recent 
outcome of the economic statistic. 
202  The values of ρ range between .96 and .99 for the four indicators. 
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the values do not perfectly coincide. Given that Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2006, Section 
3) find market-derived forecasts to be slightly more accurate than survey expectations 
(and taking into account that market-derived forecasts could even be more precise when 
correcting for the implied weight λ on M1/N as demonstrated by the error-minimization 
analysis), there is no reason to assume that anchoring on mean survey expectations is 
better suited to account for the observed bias than pure partition-dependence, though 
this possibility cannot be entirely neglected. Finally, despite the fact that the way in 
which strike price intervals are chosen is common knowledge among the market partici-
pants, the credibility account (assuming that some meaningful information on likely 
outcomes is conveyed by the way in which the state space was partitioned by the organ-
izers) cannot be completely ruled out in the context of economic derivatives, since 
unlike in Studies 1 and 2 only a single partition exists at each point in time. 
Taken together, these calculations suggest considerable degree of partition-
dependence in two of the four macroeconomic statistics, and in the pooled economic 
derivatives market prices (a total sample of 153 separate markets). The results are in-
structive, as they demonstrate the existence of partition-dependence even in large-scale 
prediction markets with high stakes at play and professional market participants. In part, 
the results can be interpreted to be consistent with a knowledge or information effect in 
which the relative weight on the ignorance prior is reduced as more reliable information 
are available to foresee the outcome of the indicator. 
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6 Conclusion 
Partition-dependence is the finding that judged probabilities—as expressed by 
individuals directly or implied by asset market prices for event-contingent claims in 
prediction markets—vary systematically with the set of exclusive and exhaustive events 
into which a state space happens to be “partitioned”. This phenomenon was first discov-
ered in a cumulative series of psychology experiments beginning in the late 1970s. The 
basic finding in those studies is that “unpacking” a single category or interval into two 
or more component intervals which are logically equivalent increases the original inter-
val’s total expressed probability. This finding is inconsistent with the description invari-
ance principle postulated by rational theory of decision making. The present thesis tack-
les the question of to what extent market forces are able to eliminate (or at least dimin-
ish) partition-dependence observed in individual judgments. The experiments show that 
the bias transfers to competitive markets and that the phenomenon never disappears 
even under variations in (i) the event domains that are being traded, (ii) the salience of 
the relation between the differently partitioned assets and the obviousness of price dis-
crepancies, (iii) the self-selection of participants, (iv) the length of the markets, and (v) 
whether the markets are experimentally-created or are created by large market firms.  
Study 1 demonstrated pronounced partition-dependence under standard lab con-
ditions for short-run (20 minutes) markets. Furthermore, although market experience 
diminishes partition-dependence it does not eliminate the bias. Unpacking one event 
interval (of three) into two component intervals (out of three) increases its judged prob-
ability by about .25. The degree of partition-dependence varies with the competence 
level of participants in subjectively judged probabilities for two of three event domains, 
but competence effects do not show when comparing equilibrium prices from markets 
that comprised differently competent traders. It is possible that some event domains 
used in this study are more information-driven (and thus competence-driven) than oth-
ers. It is also likely that the range of the ordinal scaled competence proxies reflects dif-
ferently pronounced differences in terms of absolute competence across event domains. 
In addition, competence differences among traders are also reflected in the risk of their 
portfolios and in general trading activity. Creating an effective link between differently 
partitioned markets by disclosing price discrepancies during the trading sessions further 
reduced the effect size of partition-dependence, though the reduction was moderate and 
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unsystematically across event domains. Study 2 documents similar partition-dependence 
in longer-run markets (several weeks) on events in which the participants took great 
interest (NBA Playoffs and FIFA soccer World Cup). Unpacking event intervals led to 
hypothetical arbitrage profits of 1–6%, which is considerably smaller than in the lab 
markets. Controlling for the competence of participants in individual probability judg-
ments suggests that the bias appears to be quite insensitive to variations in the level of 
participants’ self-rated competence for both parts of the study. Study 3 examined field 
data from prediction markets for macroeconomic statistics with a single partition in each 
market. Econometric techniques suggest that probabilities implied by prediction market 
prices are a convex combination of partition-independent probabilities and an “igno-
rance prior” (1/N for each of N intervals) with a weight λ for the prior distribution of 
around .50 in two of four markets and .05–.10 in the other two markets. In addition, 
there are slight indications that the degree of uncertainty in predicting a certain indicator 
is positively correlated with the weight λ attributed to the ignorance prior. 
First note that if markets were opened with two different partitions, and traders 
were allowed to trade in both markets, there is little doubt that arbitrage would erase 
obvious differences. That is, if the price of events I1 and I2 were both higher than the 
identical packed event I1∪ I2, arbitrage would bring the sum of event I1 and I2 prices 
into line with the price of I1∪ I2. This (conjectured finding) simply means that if differ-
ent partitions were actually traded on the same events no partition-dependence would be 
observed in comparing certain sets of event prices. However, in practice there is usually 
no reason why two different partitions would be created and traded simultaneously. 
Therefore, the relevant question is whether revealed prices could conceivably be a com-
bination of highly accurate prices for each interval and a 1/N error term for each interval 
when a single partition is traded. The analysis of the 153 separate economic derivatives 
markets reported in Study 3 suggests the answer is “Yes”, that such partition-
dependence could influence prices. 
A central principle in including all three studies in this thesis is to search for a 
single explanation that can apply to all the results. If one does prefer a single explana-
tion for the many findings, the combination of experimental and empirical methods used 
in the three studies suggests that a basic behavioral propensity to bias judgments over N 
intervals toward 1/N is a component of what is observed. No other plausible explanation 
can explain the results of all three studies: 
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The apparent bias cannot be due to information conveyed by the choice of parti-
tion because the subjects in Studies 1 and 2 were told about both partitions. Any infor-
mation conveyed by the choice of partition should affect both markets equally and 
therefore any partition-dependence observed in cross-market comparison cannot be 
traced to shared information. The apparent bias is also not likely to be entirely due to 
the nature of trading institutions since Studies 1 and 2 used double auctions and the 
Study 3 data come from a pari-mutuel auction mechanism. The apparent bias cannot be 
entirely due to naïveté of subjects, since traders in Study 1 participated actively in trad-
ing markets (and they deliberately opted for doing so, rather than just cashing in on their 
initial endowment for sure without trading) and since there is self-selection of active 
traders in Study 2 (NBA Playoffs and World Cup) and Study 3 (economic derivatives) 
markets. The apparent bias cannot be entirely due to overweighting of low probabilities 
(say, below .10) because many of the sub-event probabilities are much higher than that 
threshold. 
More generally, these studies suggest two important themes in thinking about 
the implication of psychology for economics. One theme is that attention is grabbed by 
salient presentations of intervals, and people probably do not always compensate for the 
effect of attention-grabbing. For example, Morwitz, Johnson, and Schmittlein (1993) 
report that simply asking people whether they will buy a car in the next year increases 
their tendency to buy a car—by 50%. Similarly, unpacking an interval into the two 
components increases attention to those components and seems to increase implied 
probability. Because there is typically no canonical normative way to partition a con-
tinuous variable, how the variable’s possible outcomes are divided into intervals can 
inevitably influence perceptions of the likely value of that variable.  
The second theme is that the extent to which individual psychological processes 
influence market prices will depend on the processes and on the markets. As Camerer 
and Fehr (2006) note, in some market institutions the biases of a small number of trad-
ers will be amplified by strategic complementarity, and in other institutions biases are 
reduced because unbiased traders can profit by extinguishing biases created by other 
traders. The partition-dependence discussed here seems to exist to various extents in 
different experimental and field markets, but its robustness and persistence over time 
should be explored in further studies. It is remarkable that partition-dependence sur-
vives in the competitive asset markets of the presented studies even though highly com-
petent traders were present in these markets. This evidence is a challenge to the “smart 
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few hypothesis” according to which only a few unbiased traders are enough to result in 
rational market outcomes (as long as these traders have sufficient capital under their 
disposal to exploit mispricing). Thus, a good starting point for further research would be 
to explore in greater detail which market forces (like “cancellation”, “learning”, “evolu-
tionary”, “marginal traders”, etc.) effectively contribute to eliminating individual biases 
from asset markets and under what circumstances. Moreover, while the microstructural 
design features of the presented experimental markets were chosen such that they offer 
best conditions (based on previous evidence from experimental asset markets) for the 
partition bias to be expunged, future research should further examine the robustness of 
partition-dependence with respect to systematic changes in market microstructure (like, 
e.g., different auction mechanisms or short selling constraints) and with respect to the 
obviousness of existing price divergence. 
Of course, for financial economists the next step is to explore whether an under-
standing of this bias is manifested by institutional practices. As noted above there is 
evidence that capital budgeting decisions across corporate divisions tend to be biased 
toward 1/N (when N is the number of divisions). Similarly, in corporate finance one can 
imagine, say, 10 tranches of debt (i.e., groups of similarly-risky debt obligations) which 
vary from high-risk to low-risk (like this is common for asset-backed securities and 
other securitization transactions). If the first 9 tranches are small in size, holders of debt 
in the 10th tranche might feel safer than they should, thinking there are 9 tranches ahead 
of them which need to default before those defaults imply a macroeconomic single that 
their 10th-tranche debt is in danger (rather than adding up the amount of debt in those 
tranches). Firms that bundle debt into tranches might exploit this perceived bias to cre-
ate many small high-risk tranches to artificially reassure those holding the larger 
amount of low-risk debt. Whether this type of phenomenon occurs is an empirical ques-
tion. But the here presented results at least suggest an interesting hypothesis of this sort 
that could be explored in this setting and in others.  
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Appendix I: Instructions for Study 1: Laboratory 
study 
 
 
WESTFÄLISCHE 
WILHELMS-UNIVERSITÄT 
MÜNSTER 
 
Instructions for the experiment 
„Stock market in the laboratory“ 
 
Prof. Craig R. Fox (UCLA), Prof. Colin Camerer (Caltech), 
Prof. Thomas Langer, Ulrich Sonnemann  
(Universität Münster) 
 
0. Introduction 
 
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for taking the time to support our 
research. 
 
Your task for approximately the next two hours will be to trade assets on a computer 
based trading system. 
 
Before starting the experiment, we would like to familiarize you with the experiment 
and how the trading software that you will use works. 
 
Therefore we would like to fully explain the three following questions: 
 
¾ What will be traded? 
¾ How does the trading system work? 
¾ How will you be paid? 
 
In studies like this one it is standard to provide the participants with written instructions 
and to go through them together, in order to guarantee that every group has exactly the 
same information about how the experiment works. Please keep general questions until 
the end of the introduction, as they may be answered during the following explanations. 
Although if there is something which you do not understand at all, please ask the people 
in charge, so that they can explain the point in further detail. 
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1. What will be traded? 
 
In this experiment you will trade very simple assets which you can probably better 
imagine as bets on the occurrence of a certain future event (e.g. „Germany will be 
European Soccer Champion 2008“). Depending on whether the event occurs or not the 
asset will pay the owner either 100 or 0 monetary units (MU). Due to the fact that the 
outcome of the event is uncertain during the trading period, the price usually varies be-
tween the two extremes.  
 
In a market you can always trade three assets simultaneously which all depend on the 
same basic event. At the end of the event, only one of the three assets will pay 100 MU. 
To clarify this, we will give you an example which will also be used later in a practice 
trading round: 
 
Example. The uncertain future event is what share of votes the SPD party will receive 
in the next election of the German “Bundestag“. The three assets relating to this event 
can be described in the following way: 
 
Asset 1: 
SPD.[0-29.9] 
This asset will pay exactly 100 MU if the SPD share of votes is 
smaller than 30.0 % or will expire worthless otherwise. The final 
outcome for this, and the following assets, is based on all valid 
secondary votes (indirect votes for the party), which is determined by 
the “Bundeswahlleiter.” 
 
Asset 2: 
SPD.[30.0-34.9] 
This asset will pay exactly 100 MU if the SPD share of votes is 
between 30.0 % and 34.9 % or will expire worthless otherwise. 
 
Asset 3: 
SPD.[35.0+] 
This asset will pay exactly 100 MU if the SPD share of votes is 
equal to or more than 35.0 % or will expire worthless otherwise. 
 
Please note that after the election of the German “Bundestag” only one out of the three 
assets will pay 100 MU, while the other two assets will expire worthless (since the in-
tervals cover every possible outcome of the event, but at the same time do not overlap). 
 
Before you start trading you should think about how much you are willing to pay for 
these assets and for how much you are willing to sell them for in the market. Trading 
will only occur between the participants of each experimental session. There are no ex-
ternal and/or computer-controlled participants in the market (one small exemption is the 
unit-portfolio, which will be explained later). Transaction costs do not exist for these 
assets. 
 
During the experiment you will not trade assets on political events, but on events con-
cerning financial markets, weather and sports. The order in which you will deal with 
these three topics will be determined randomly and varies for each group.  
 
Furthermore, for each topic the groups will not trade the exact same three assets, since 
there are two different partitions (i.e. subset of assets), which will be assigned to your 
experiment session randomly. In order to guarantee that each participant has the same 
information, the following table shows all groups of three assets used in this study (even 
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those that you will not be dealing with) including an accurate description of the pay-
ment conditions. 
 
Financial markets   ----   Event:  DAX-closing in 2 weeks 
Asset definition: 
An asset will pay 100 cents, if the outcome of the underlying event exactly fits the 
definition of the asset. The other two assets will expire worthless. 
 
Relevant for the payment of the assets in the financial markets domain is the Xetra-
DAX closing (incl. final auction) in two weeks from today (i.e., on May 8, 2007). 
Xetra-DAX closing as of April 23, 2007 was 7335.62. 
 
 Partition 1 Partition 2 
Asset 1 DAX.[0 - 7248.99] DAX.[0 - 7415.99] 
Asset 2 DAX.[7249 - 7415.99] DAX.[7416 - 7563.99] 
Asset 3 DAX.[7416+] DAX.[7564+] 
 
 
Weather ----   Event:  Maximum Temperature in Münster at the end of May 
Asset definition:  
An asset will pay 100 cents, if the outcome of the underlying event exactly fits the 
definition of the asset. The other two assets will expire worthless. 
 
Relevant for the payment of the assets in the weather domain is the maximum tem-
perature two meters above ground-level (abbreviation: TX) at the weather center 
Muenster/Osnabrueck (station no.: 10315) on May 31st, 2007 in degrees Celsius de-
termined by Germany’s National Meteorological Service (“Deutscher Wetterdienst”). 
 
 Partition 1 Partition 2 
Asset 1 Temp.[up to 15.9] Temp.[up to 19.9] 
Asset 2 Temp.[16.0 - 19.9] Temp.[20.0 - 23.9] 
Asset 3 Temp.[20.0+] Temp.[24.0+] 
 
 
Sports   ----   Event: Total number of goals scored on the 34th game day of  
              German 1. Bundesliga (Season 2006/2007) 
Asset definition:  
An asset will pay 100 cents, if the outcome of the underlying event exactly fits the 
definition of the asset. The other two assets will expire worthless. 
 
Relevant for the payment of the assets in the sports domain is the total number of 
goals scored on the final game day of German 1. Bundesliga in the season 2006/2007 
(soccer/men). 
 
 Partition 1 Partition 2 
Asset 1 Goals.[0 - 20] Goals.[0 - 25] 
Asset 2 Goals.[21 - 25] Goals.[26 - 30] 
Asset 3 Goals.[26+] Goals.[31+] 
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At the beginning of each trading round, you will receive an initial endowment of 2000 
MU, which partly consists of assets and partly consists of cash. If you spend all your 
liquid funds or sell all your assets, you are not able to buy or sell any more; i.e. debts or 
short selling are not permitted. However, in order to obtain liquidity in cash or assets 
you can use a so called “unit-portfolio”, which will be explained in the next paragraph. 
 
 
Unit-portfolio („Unit-PF“) 
 
The unit-portfolio is based on the idea that a full set—consisting of all 3 assets of one 
event—will always lead to a certain payment of 100 MU. This is independent of the 
outcome of the uncertain event, since one of the assets will always pay an amount of 
100 MU, while the other two assets will expire worthless. 
 
Therefore the person in charge of the experiment changes 100 MU for a complete set of 
assets at any time during the experiment. This trade takes place via the so called unit-
portfolio, which can be bought or sold like the other assets via the trading system. How-
ever, the trading partner for this kind of deal is always the person in charge of the ex-
periment and the price is fixed at 100 MU, i.e. it does not depend on bids and asks. In 
particular it should be clear that this deal does not depend upon the value of a single 
asset, but the fact that all 3 assets combined represent a certain payment of 100 MU. To 
clarify this, we return to our example. If you buy one “unit-PF”, one asset of each of the 
available assets is added to your portfolio. Thus, exactly one asset of type SPD.[0-29.9], 
one asset of SPD.[30.0-34.9] as well as one asset of type SPD.[35.0+] will be added, 
while your cash balance will be lowered by 100 MU. After the purchase of the „unit-
PF“, you are able to trade and sell these assets in the market independently.  
 
By selling a “unit-PF”, 100 MU will be added to your account, while simultaneously 
your portfolio will be reduced by one of each type of asset (of course, this sale is only 
permitted if you own at least one asset of each type). Hence, by using the “unit-PF” you 
can either acquire liquidity in assets, if you have enough cash or liquidity in cash, as 
long as you own a positive quantity of all types of assets. 
 
In addition, by using the “unit-PF” you can exploit arbitrage opportunities in the market 
more directly. Arbitrage means completing a transaction, which results in a sure profit. 
 
Arbitrage opportunity 1. If the market prices for individual assets enable you to pur-
chase a complete set of assets for less than 100 MU, you can obtain a certain profit by 
buying these 3 assets for less than 100 MU and selling them via the “unit-PF” for 100 
MU to the person in charge of the experiment. 
 
Arbitrage opportunity 2. Alternatively, you can obtain a certain profit, if it is possible 
to sell the 3 assets individually in the market for more than 100 MU. Then you can pur-
chase a complete set of assets via the “unit-PF” for 100 MU and sell them in the market 
as individual assets for a higher price afterwards. 
 
Such arbitrage opportunities are not excluded by the trading system automatically. 
Therefore, you should be aware that arbitrage may be possible! 
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2. How does the trading system work? 
 
The trading system is a so called continuous double auction, i.e. at any time during the 
trading round you can act as buyer or seller. After a test trading phase you will trade a 
total of 6 rounds, each of 10 min. Each scenario appears twice, so you will deal with 3 
different scenarios in total. 
 
We will now explain the trading software in detail. 
 
Trading screen 
 
 
 
The trading screen is divided into three areas: 
 
1. “Information Area“: 
 
In this area you can find “account info”, “session info” and “time info”. The “ac-
count info” shows information on your cash balance and blocked cash which will be 
explained in more detail later on. 
 
2. “Market Area“: 
 
This area gives an overview about the tradable assets, your own portfolio, blocked 
assets, the recent market price (“current price”) and the best (highest) buy and the 
Information 
Market 
Order 
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best (lowest) sell quote. The best buy order (sell order) indicates the volume and the 
price limit of the highest buy order (lowest sell order) at present, separated by an 
“@” symbol. For example, the display “20 @ 10” means, that one or more traders 
are ready to buy a quantity of 20 assets SPD.[0 - 29.9] at a price of 10 MU each. 
 
3. “Order History”: 
 
This area shows all of your orders which are pending or executed (currently there is a 
quantity of 1 order in the system). By pushing the “delete” button an outstanding or-
der will be deleted. Using the “edit” button means all data regarding this order will 
be transferred into the “edit form” which subsequently appears. 
 
 
Order placement 
 
You can place an order by pushing one of the “buy”/”sell” buttons in the market area. 
Thereupon the “order form” appears: 
 
 
 
You can complete your order by adding/modifying how many assets you would like to 
trade and for which price limit. By pushing the “clear” button you will delete all values 
previously entered, by pushing the “order” button you will confirm your order and it 
will be processed by the system (“order accepted”).  
 
The “order form” remains active until you press the “close” button. While the “order 
form” is still active you can configure and submit further buy or sell orders. 
 
After confirming your order, it will be processed by the system. When trading, this can 
last for 1-2 seconds. Your trading screen will be blocked during this time. 
 
Regarding order placement, you should pay particular attention to the following two 
error messages: 
 
Error “not enough cash” and error “short selling restriction”: 
 
These error messages will appear, if you: 
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1. do not possess enough cash and/or if you have already placed too many active 
buy orders (“not enough cash”), or, if you  
 
2. do not possess enough assets and/or if you have placed too many active sell 
orders (“short selling restriction”). 
 
This is because any order placed will block your cash or assets until the orders are exe-
cuted or cancelled. Blocked cash will be shown in the “account info”, blocked assets 
will be displayed in the associated column of the market area. This prevents you from 
placing orders which cannot be executed. Current orders can be cancelled or edited any-
time, in order to access the blocked cash/assets again. 
 
In addition, the error message “do not trade with yourself” may occur. This happens if 
you try to place a buy and a sell order for the same asset simultaneously and if the limit 
price of the buy order is the same or higher than the limit price of your own sell order.  
 
 
Order editing and cancelling 
 
Orders not yet executed can be cancelled and edited anytime, in order to do this; pick a 
current order, which is marked as “pending” in the section “orders”, and push one of the 
related buttons “edit” or “delete” which correspond to this order. “Delete” immediately 
deletes the order from the system, “edit” removes the order from the system as well, but 
at the same time inserts the data into the “edit form” that appears: 
 
 
 
In this “edit form” you can modify the quantity and the limit price of your order. By 
pressing “OK” the modified order will be placed to the trading system, by pressing 
“cancel” the original order will be placed to the system again. 
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Order execution 
 
As previously mentioned, the trading system is based on a continuous double auction. 
Two orders will be executed against each other simultaneously, only if the buy order 
has the same or a higher price limit as the corresponding sell order. Please look at the 
following order book, i.e. the data sheet of current buy and sell orders, which are en-
tered into the system but not yet executed: 
 
buy order sell order 
 1 @ 60 MU 
 1 @ 56 MU 
 1 @ 50 MU 
 -none entered-  
 
Assume you would like to buy assets and enter a buy order “6 @ 80” MU into the trad-
ing system, i.e. you are willing to buy a quantity of 6 assets with a price limit of 80 MU 
each. You definitely know that you are going to buy 1 asset as you can see on your 
“trading screen” that a quantity of 1 asset is offered at a price of 50 MU in the market 
(best sell order). 
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The remaining part of the order book is not visible on the trading screen. Due to the fact 
that you are willing to pay up to 80 MU per asset, you will buy a quantity of 3 assets in 
total (see order book). 
 
 
 
Important: Your original order quantity of 6 has been split up, so that 3 orders, each 
consisting of 1 asset, have been completed, while one order of 3 assets remains in the 
trading system. The price which is shown in the “price” column is your limit price (for 
the pending order) or the trading price (for the executed orders). 
 
The part of your order which was not yet executed (3 @ 80) now appears as the best 
buy offer in the order book. Therefore, an amount of 240 MU was blocked and is dis-
played as “blocked cash” in your “account info”. 
 
If two orders can be executed against each other, the transaction will always take place 
at the price limit of the previously requested buy or sell order (time priority). 
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3. How will you be paid? 
 
To encourage you to carefully think about your decisions, your compensation/payment 
will be incentive-compatible. This means, your trading performance (as well as a little 
bit of luck) will determine your payment. 
 
For each experimental group we will randomly select one out of the six trading rounds 
and use this as the basis for your payment. For this round we will determine the value of 
your portfolio and add it to your cash balance (to decide which asset will pay 100 MU 
and which assets will be worthless, we have to wait until the relevant uncertainty (fi-
nancial markets, weather, or sports) is resolved). 
 
The total value of your portfolio will be divided by 100 
and equals your payment in Euro! 
 
 
We will inform you by e-mail about how much you earned. At a later date, you will be 
able to pick up your money from room 263 during office hours (daily 10 till 12) and you 
will need to bring identification (student ID, identity card, etc.). 
 
Good luck! 
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Appendix II:  Session-individual DAX interval 
boundaries in Study 1 
 
Table A.II.1:  Session-individual DAX interval boundaries in Study 1: Basis treatment. 
I 1 I 2 I 3 ∪  I 4 I 1 ∪  I 2 I 3 I 4
1 5/2/2007 [0 - 7327.99] [7328 - 7496.99] [7497+] [0 - 7496.99] [7497 - 7646.99] [7647+]
2 4/24/2007 [0 - 7248.99] [7249 - 7415.99] [7416+] [0 - 7415.99] [7416 - 7563.99] [7564+]
3 4/25/2007 [0 - 7181.99] [7182 - 7347.99] [7348+] [0 - 7347.99] [7348 - 7494.99] [7495+]
4 4/26/2007 [0 - 7256.99] [7257 - 7423.99] [7424+] [0 - 7423.99] [7424 - 7572.99] [7573+]
5 4/26/2007 [0 - 7256.99] [7257 - 7423.99] [7424+] [0 - 7423.99] [7424 - 7572.99] [7573+]
6 4/27/2007 [0 - 7300.99] [7301 - 7468.99] [7469+] [0 - 7468.99] [7469 - 7618.99] [7619+]
7 5/2/2007 [0 - 7327.99] [7328 - 7496.99] [7497+] [0 - 7496.99] [7497 - 7646.99] [7647+]
8 4/25/2007 [0 - 7181.99] [7182 - 7347.99] [7348+] [0 - 7347.99] [7348 - 7494.99] [7495+]
9 4/25/2007 [0 - 7181.99] [7182 - 7347.99] [7348+] [0 - 7347.99] [7348 - 7494.99] [7495+]
10 4/26/2007 [0 - 7256.99] [7257 - 7423.99] [7424+] [0 - 7423.99] [7424 - 7572.99] [7573+]
11 4/27/2007 [0 - 7300.99] [7301 - 7468.99] [7469+] [0 - 7468.99] [7469 - 7618.99] [7619+]
12 4/27/2007 [0 - 7300.99] [7301 - 7468.99] [7469+] [0 - 7468.99] [7469 - 7618.99] [7619+]
Partition 1 Partition 2Session
Slot Date
 
 
Table A.II.2:  Session-individual DAX interval boundaries in Study 1: Info treatment. 
I 1 I 2 I 3 ∪  I 4 I 1 ∪  I 2 I 3 I 4
1 5/7/2007 [0 - 7437.99] [7438 - 7608.99] [7609+] [0 - 7608.99] [7609 - 7759.99] [7760+]
2 5/7/2007 [0 - 7437.99] [7438 - 7608.99] [7609+] [0 - 7608.99] [7609 - 7759.99] [7760+]
3 5/7/2007 [0 - 7437.99] [7438 - 7608.99] [7609+] [0 - 7608.99] [7609 - 7759.99] [7760+]
4 5/8/2007 [0 - 7443.99] [7444 - 7613.99] [7614+] [0 - 7613.99] [7614 - 7764.99] [7765+]
5 5/8/2007 [0 - 7443.99] [7444 - 7613.99] [7614+] [0 - 7613.99] [7614 - 7764.99] [7765+]
6 5/8/2007 [0 - 7443.99] [7444 - 7613.99] [7614+] [0 - 7613.99] [7614 - 7764.99] [7765+]
7 5/9/2007 [0 - 7357.99] [7358 - 7525.99] [7526+] [0 - 7525.99] [7526 - 7675.99] [7676+]
8 5/9/2007 [0 - 7357.99] [7358 - 7525.99] [7526+] [0 - 7525.99] [7526 - 7675.99] [7676+]
9 5/9/2007 [0 - 7357.99] [7358 - 7525.99] [7526+] [0 - 7525.99] [7526 - 7675.99] [7676+]
10 5/11/2007 [0 - 7329.99] [7330 - 7497.99] [7498+] [0 - 7497.99] [7498 - 7647.99] [7648+]
11 5/11/2007 [0 - 7329.99] [7330 - 7497.99] [7498+] [0 - 7497.99] [7498 - 7647.99] [7648+]
12 5/11/2007 [0 - 7329.99] [7330 - 7497.99] [7498+] [0 - 7497.99] [7498 - 7647.99] [7648+]
Partition 1 Partition 2Session
Slot Date
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Appendix III: Median equilibrium market prices 
and judgments 
 
Table A.III.1:  Median equilibrium prices (2nd trading round) and individual judgments (pre-trading 
and post-trading): Basis treatment. 
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
1 I 1 0.200 0.129 0.200 0.250 0.244 0.250 0.120 0.051 0.100
1 I 2 0.500 0.563 0.500 0.400 0.469 0.400 0.320 0.244 0.300
I 1 +I 2 0.700 0.714 0.700 0.700 0.716 0.700 0.500 0.271 0.400
2 I 1 ∪ Ι 2 0.400 0.453 0.400 0.400 0.422 0.400 0.200 0.130 0.200
PD difference 0.300 0.261 0.300 0.300 0.294 0.300 0.300 0.141 0.200
2 I 3 0.400 0.417 0.400 0.360 0.385 0.400 0.350 0.361 0.350
2 I 4 0.200 0.177 0.160 0.200 0.149 0.150 0.400 0.474 0.400
I 3 +I 4 0.600 0.570 0.600 0.600 0.553 0.600 0.800 0.842 0.800
1 I 3 ∪ Ι 4 0.300 0.358 0.300 0.300 0.414 0.300 0.500 0.690 0.600
PD difference 0.300 0.212 0.300 0.300 0.139 0.300 0.300 0.152 0.200
Average PD difference 0.237 0.217 0.147
Weather
Treatment
Median Judged Probability/Equilibrium Prices
Finance Sports
 
 
Table A.III.2:  Median equilibrium prices (2nd trading round) and individual judgments (pre-trading 
and post-trading): Info treatment. 
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Pre-Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
Equilibrium 
Market 
Prices 
(Round 2)
Post-
Trading 
Individual 
Judgment
1 I 1 0.200 0.121 0.150 0.215 0.161 0.200 0.150 0.091 0.100
1 I 2 0.500 0.425 0.500 0.400 0.409 0.400 0.300 0.343 0.300
I 1 +I 2 0.700 0.594 0.700 0.700 0.570 0.670 0.500 0.444 0.500
2 I 1 ∪ Ι 2 0.450 0.453 0.450 0.400 0.422 0.400 0.250 0.219 0.250
PD difference 0.250 0.141 0.250 0.300 0.148 0.270 0.250 0.225 0.250
2 I 3 0.350 0.388 0.400 0.350 0.395 0.400 0.350 0.350 0.400
2 I 4 0.175 0.140 0.100 0.200 0.255 0.200 0.300 0.387 0.395
I 3 +I 4 0.550 0.532 0.550 0.600 0.615 0.600 0.750 0.730 0.750
1 I 3 ∪ Ι 4 0.300 0.412 0.300 0.300 0.447 0.330 0.500 0.584 0.500
PD difference 0.250 0.119 0.250 0.300 0.169 0.270 0.250 0.146 0.250
Average PD difference 0.130 0.158 0.185
Treatment
Median Judged Probability/Equilibrium Prices
Finance Sports Weather
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Appendix IV: Aggregated development of price dif-
ferences over time (info treatment) 
 
(see next page) 
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Figure A.IV.1:  Development of price differences over time for the finance assets (info treatment). 
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Figure A.IV.2:  Development of price differences over time for the sports assets (info treatment). 
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Figure A.IV.3:  Development of price differences over time for the weather assets (info treatment). 
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Appendix V:  Instructions for Study 2: An 
NBA/FIFA field experiment 
 
 
 NBA Playoffs/FIFA World Cup Study –   
Study Instructions 
 
Prof. Craig R. Fox (UCLA), Prof. Colin Camerer (Caltech), 
Prof. Thomas Langer, Ulrich Sonnemann  
(University of Muenster, Germany) 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Timetable 
3. Assets and Markets 
 3.1 Contingent Claims 
 3.2 Unit Portfolio 
4. Payment/Incentives 
5. Trading System 
 5.1 Installation and Login 
 5.2 Trading Screen 
 5.3 Order Submission 
 5.4 Order Execution 
6. NBA Basketball Playoffs Mode 
7. FIFA Soccer World Cup Mode 
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1. Introduction 
 
Thank you very much for registering for our NBA Playoffs/FIFA World Cup Study! 
 
In the next weeks you will have the opportunity to trade online contracts whose payoffs 
depend on the outcomes of this year’s NBA Basketball Playoffs as well as the FIFA 
Soccer World Cup ’06 in Germany. In the course of this experiment you will be as-
signed to both one NBA market AND one FIFA market. Thus, in the first market you 
will trade on the NBA Playoffs and in the second market you will trade on the FIFA 
World Cup. But don’t worry, you need not be both a basketball and soccer expert in 
order to successfully participate in this experiment! 
 
Because the study is based on real sports events, the trading period for the NBA Play-
offs will be from April 20 through June 22, 2006 (at the latest) and for the FIFA World 
Cup from the middle of May through July 9, 2006. Thus, the overall trading period 
lasts from April 20 through July 9, 2006 and we kindly request that all participants 
actively trade throughout this period. 
 
You can expect to earn cash payments of €20 (about $24) per person on average, de-
pending on your decisions, the outcomes of the games, and your individual trading per-
formance. It is therefore possible to earn more or less than €20/$24 (including earning 
nothing), but there is NO way for you to lose any money! 
 
In order to make sure that all participants have the same information about the proce-
dure of this study and on the trading software, we strongly recommend that you go 
through this instruction file very carefully. However, if you feel familiar with some 
of the information provided in this document, e.g. the NBA Playoffs mode or the trad-
ing system, you can skip those sections. 
 
We set up an NBA/FIFA Study homepage where you can access the trading software, 
and get news and additional study-related information. There will also be a FAQs sec-
tion, where you can get more detailed information on the trading system etc. You can 
reach this webpage at: 
 
http://www.internetexperiment.de/NBA-FIFA-Study/ 
 
There will also be a support helpdesk which can be contacted via: 
 
tradingstudy@hss.caltech.edu or 
trading.study@anderson.ucla.edu 
 
We hope that you will enjoy participating in this study--thank you very much for sup-
porting our research! 
 
Prof. Thomas Langer (University of Muenster, Germany) 
Prof. Craig R. Fox (UCLA, USA) 
Prof. Colin Camerer (Caltech, USA) 
Ulrich Sonnemann (University of Muenster, Germany) 
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2. Timetable 
 
In the following Table you can find a summary of all key data related to this study: 
 
Date/Period Study NBA Basketball Play-
offs 
FIFA Soccer 
World Cup 
Wed, April 19  regular season ends,  
 set of qualified 
teams will be set 
(Playoff Matchups) 
Thu, April 20  link to NBA ques-
tionnaire sent to 
participants via 
email,  
 practice market 
opened 
 all NBA markets 
opened, start of 
NBA trading period 
Sat, April 22  Playoffs begin 
Sat, May 20  link to FIFA ques-
tionnaire sent to 
participants via 
email 
Mon, May 22  all FIFA markets 
opened, start of 
FIFA trading period 
Thu, June 8  NBA Finals start 
date (winner East-
ern vs. winner 
Western Confer-
ence) 
Fry, June 9  opening game,  
 start of group 
phase 
Fry, June 9 through  
Fry, June 23 
 group phase 
Thu, June 22  last NBA markets 
closed 
 latest possible end 
date of NBA Finals 
Sat, June 24 through  
Tue, June 27 
 round of last 16 
(1/8-finals) 
Fry, June 30 through  
Sat, July 1 
 1/4-finals 
Tue, July 4 through  
Wed, July 5 
 1/2-finals 
Sat, July 8  game for 3rd place 
Sun, July 9  last FIFA markets 
closed 
 World Cup Final 
Mon, July 10  link for final ques-
tionnaire sent to 
participants via 
email,  
 start paying partici-
pants  
Tab. 1: Timetable. 
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3. Assets and Markets 
 
  Note: This section explains the most important and crucial aspects of the ex-
perimental design and should be read carefully by ALL participants!  
 
3.1 Contingent Claims 
 
The basic activity in this experiment is to trade claims which pay money depending on 
the outcomes of this year’s NBA Playoffs and FIFA Soccer World Cup 2006. Since the 
first market you will be trading in is based on the NBA Playoffs, we will concentrate on 
these markets right now and tell you the details for the FIFA World Cup markets later 
on. 
 
A typical market will consist of four intervals/ranges for the total number of wins for a 
particular team. For example, one market might trade four claims on the San Antonio 
Spurs, spanning the total number of games the Spurs will win in the 2006 Playoffs. One 
claim will pay a fixed sum of money, 100 Eurocents (= €1 which is about $1.20) if, af-
ter the Playoffs are over, the Spurs have won 0-3 games. If you think the Spurs are 
likely to win very few games, you should buy this claim. If you think they are likely to 
win more than 3 games, you should sell this claim. Another claim will pay 100 Euro-
cents if their win total is 4-7; a third will pay 100 Eurocents if the total is 8-11; and a 
fourth will pay 100 Eurocents if the total is 12-16.  
 
  General Question: 
  “How many games does a particular team win in the 2006 NBA  
  Playoffs?” 
 
For the second part of this experiment we will now concentrate on the details of the 
FIFA World Cup markets (please refer to the first part of the instructions file for the 
assets and markets description of the NBA markets). 
 
A typical market will consist of four intervals/ranges for the total number of goals 
scored by a particular national team during the entire tournament (ex penalty shoot 
outs). For example, one market might trade four claims on Brazil’s national team, 
spanning the total number of goals Brazil will score in the World Cup. One claim will 
pay a fixed sum of money, 100 Eurocent (= €1 which is about $1.20) if, after the World 
Cup is over, Brazil has scored 0-2 goals. If you think Brazil is likely to score very few 
goals, you should buy this claim. If you think they are likely to score more than 2 goals, 
you should sell this claim. Another claim will pay 100 Eurocent if, at the end, their goal 
total is 3-8; a third will pay 100 Eurocent if the total is 9-11; and a fourth will pay 100 
Eurocent if the total is 12 or more. 
 
  General Question: 
“How many goals (ex penalty shoot outs) does a particular national team 
score during the entire FIFA Soccer World Cup 2006 tournament?” 
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The basic idea of these markets is that after the Playoffs (and the World Cup) are over, 
exactly one asset/claim in each market will pay 100 Eurocents per claim, while the three 
remaining claims will become worthless. This is due to the fact that the claim intervals 
represent all possible outcomes, but do not overlap. However, since the outcome of the 
event is uncertain during most of the trading period, the price for a claim usually varies 
between 0 and 100 Eurocents. Before you start trading you should carefully think about 
how much you are willing to pay for these claims and how much you are willing to sell 
them for in the market! 
 
You will be randomly placed into one market for NBA Playoff games and (later on) 
another for FIFA World Cup results. Important: Each market consists of four separate 
“team markets”, so you can trade in four different teams in each market. In each “team 
market” you will be endowed with a set of cash and assets representing an initial wealth 
of 1,000 Eurocents (= €10 or appr. $12). You do not have to trade if you do not wish to.  
 
Please note that there will be different partitions, i.e. asset intervals in the markets. The 
partitions in the NBA markets are as follows: 
 
Partition 1: [0-3], [4-11], [12-15], [16] games won. 
Partition 2: [0-3], [4-7], [8-11], [12-16] games won. 
 
Please note that there will be different partitions, i.e. asset intervals in the markets. The 
partitions in the FIFA markets are as follows: 
 
Partition 1: [0-2], [3-8], [9-11], [12+] goals. 
Partition 2: [0-2], [3-5], [6-8], [9+] goals. 
 
You will be randomly assigned to a market of twenty participants with one of the parti-
tions above. The market composition was reshuffled for the FIFA markets, thus it is 
likely that you will face other traders in your FIFA market than in the NBA markets. 
There are no external and/or computer-controlled participants in the market. There are 
no explicit transaction costs for your trading. 
 
3.2 Unit Portfolio 
 
For each team there is an “extra asset” in the market which is called the unit portfolio 
(Unit PF). The Unit PF is based on the idea that a full set of all four assets will always 
guarantee a certain payment of 100 Eurocents. This payoff is independent of how many 
games a particular team has won, since exactly one (and only one) of the claims will 
pay 100 Eurocents, while the other three assets will expire worthless. This payoff is in-
dependent of how many goals a particular team scores, since exactly one (and only one) 
of the claims will pay 100 Eurocent, while the other three assets will expire worthless. 
 
Therefore you will be able to exchange 100 Eurocents for a complete set of assets at any 
time in the experiment. Practically, this trade with the experimenter takes place via the 
unit portfolio, which can be purchased or sold like the other assets via the trading sys-
tem. However, the trade partner for this deal will always be the experimenter and the 
price for the unit portfolio is fixed at 100 Eurocents, i.e. it does not depend on bids and 
asks in the market. In particular it should be clear that this trade does not allow any as-
7  Appendices 230 
sessment of the value of a single asset, but the fact that all four assets combined repre-
sent a certain payment of 100 Eurocents. To clarify this, we return to our example of the 
San Antonio Spurs. If you buy one unit portfolio, there will be one asset of each claim 
in the market added to your portfolio. Thus, exactly one asset of type 0-3, one asset of 
4-7, one asset of 8-11 as well as one asset of 12-16 will be added, while your cash will 
be reduced by 100 Eurocents. To clarify this, we return to our example of Brazil’s na-
tional team. If you buy one unit portfolio, there will be one asset of each claim in the 
market added to your portfolio. Thus, exactly one asset of type 0-2, one asset of 3-8, one 
asset of 9-11 as well as one asset of 12+ will be added, while your cash will be reduced 
by 100 Eurocent. 
 
The Unit PF allows you to buy or sell a complete set of all four assets 
for a particular team at a fixed price of 100 Eurocents. You might 
want to do this in order to increase your cash on hand or stock in as-
sets, without taking any risks. 
 
After buying a unit portfolio, you can trade and sell the purchased assets in the market 
independently! By selling a unit portfolio, 100 Eurocents will be added to your cash 
account, while simultaneously your portfolio stock will be reduced by one of each asset 
(please note that this sale is only permitted if you own at least one unit of each asset). 
Hence, by using the unit portfolio you can either enhance liquidity in assets (as long as 
you have enough cash), or enhance liquidity in cash (as long as you have at least one of 
all the four assets in the market). 
 
By using the unit portfolio you can exploit arbitrage opportunities in the market more 
directly. Arbitrage means performing a transaction which results in a sure profit. 
 
Arbitrage opportunity 1. If the market prices enable you to purchase a full set of as-
sets for less than 100 Eurocents, you can realize a sure profit by buying these four as-
sets for less than 100 Eurocents and selling them via the unit portfolio for 100 Euro-
cents to the experimenter. 
 
Arbitrage opportunity 2. If it is possible to sell the four assets separately in the mar-
ket for more than 100 Eurocents, you can buy a full set of assets via the unit portfolio 
for 100 Eurocents and sell them in the market for a higher price afterwards. 
 
Such arbitrage opportunities are not excluded by the trading system automatically. 
Therefore, you should carefully watch for arbitrage possibilities! 
 
4. Payment/Incentives 
 
In order to motivate you to thoroughly think about your trading activities in this ex-
periment, you will be paid based on your decisions, the outcomes of the games and thus, 
your individual trading performance. Keep in mind that there is NO WAY FOR YOU 
TO LOSE MONEY.  
 
At the end of this experiment we will randomly draw one out of the four teams from 
your NBA market and one out of the four teams from your FIFA market. These “team 
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markets” then serve as the basis for your payment. Please note, that you will not know 
which of the teams in your markets will be relevant for your payment until the end of 
this study, so you should think carefully about your decisions in all “team markets”!  
 
We will then add your cash account to your final portfolio value (with the assets worth 
either 100 Eurocents or nothing) for both of the drawn NBA and FIFA “team markets”, 
and will pay you the resulting overall value in Eurocents (or US$ at the current ex-
change rate; today’s exchange rate is about 1.20 $/€).  
 
Example: If at the end of the experiment you have 500 Eurocents and three assets worth 
100 Eurocents each in the selected NBA “team market” plus 1,000 Eurocents and five 
assets worth 100 Eurocents each in the selected FIFA country’s “team market”, you will 
receive a payment of (500 + 3* 100) + (1,000 + 5* 100) = 2,300 Eurocents (€23 ~ 
$27.60). 
 
As you will initially be endowed with cash and unit portfolios totaling 1,000 Eurocents 
(€10 ~ $12) in each market you would earn 2* €10 = €20 ~ $24 if you do not trade at 
all. 
 
Further details on the means of payment (check, PayPal etc.) will be provided later via 
email. 
 
5. Trading System 
 
5.1 Installation and Login 
 
The trading system is based on Java technology, so you should have a recent Java ver-
sion installed to run the trading software on your computer (Java 1.5, recently named 
Java5). If your Java version is outdated, you can get the latest version at:  
 
http://www.java.com/en/ 
 
You can access your NBA resp. FIFA market via the study homepage at: 
 
http://www.internetexperiment.de/NBA-FIFA-Study/ 
 
by following the link of your particular NBA or FIFA market number (we informed you 
of your personal market affiliation by email). Please note that on the first login the trad-
ing software (5.5 MB) has to be downloaded to your computer. This will take a while 
but is not necessary on later logins. You should accept the security certificate issued by 
the “Chair of Finance, University of Muenster”. You will then see the “ECMS | Login” 
screen and will be asked for your “User:” ID (which we told you by email) and your 
personal “Password:” (which you chose after completing the first questionnaire). After 
clicking the “Login” button, the trading screen (“ECMS | internetexperiment.de (Uni 
Münster)”) will appear. 
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  Note: The following sections can be skipped if you have well-founded trading 
experience and feel comfortable with the continuous double auction trad-
ing mechanism! 
 
5.2 Trading Screen 
 
The trading screen is divided into five areas (see figure 1): 
 
Information. In this area you can find information on your current cash balance, 
portfolio value, and credit line. At the top of this box are tabs which allow you to switch 
between the four different “team markets”. (The screenshots presented in this document 
refer to the practice market which can be accessed via the study homepage!) 
 
Market. This area gives you an overview of the assets (and intervals) that are traded in 
this “team market”, your own portfolio, the current market price as well as the best (i.e. 
highest) buy and the best (i.e. lowest) sell offers (which is called the order book). The 
best buy offer (sell offer) indicates the volume and the price limit of the highest buy 
offer (lowest sell offer) at the current time, separated by an “@” symbol. To give you an 
example: “2 @ 30.00” means that one or more trader(s) are ready to buy a quantity of 
two assets “RUS.[0-5]”at a price of 30.00 Eurocents each. 
 
Order Form. In this area you can enter your own orders. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Trading Screen. 
 
Information 
Market 
My Orders 
Edit Form 
Order Form 
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My Orders. This area shows all of your orders which are pending or which were 
executed (currently there is one pending order in the system) in chronological order. In 
this area pending orders can be transmitted to the “Edit Form” on the right hand side or 
they can be deleted and thus, removed from the trading system.  
 
Edit Form. Here, you can modify your pending orders by altering the price limit or the 
quantity.  
 
5.3 Order Submission 
 
In principle, there are two different ways to submit an order: 
 
1. You can enter all the values (market, asset, buy/sell, quantity and price) in the 
“Order Form” on your own and click the “Order” button afterwards to submit the 
order. 
 
2. You can push one of the buttons “Buy”/“Sell” in the “Market” section. The 
respective asset will be transmitted to the “Order Form” automatically; if available, 
the best sell offer (if you clicked on the “Buy” button) or the best buy offer (if you 
clicked on the “Sell” button) will be set as default price. To complete your order, 
just indicate the quantity you want and click the “Order” button. Of course, all 
default values can be modified manually. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Order Submission. 
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After submitting your order, it will be processed by the system. If your order is going to 
result in a trade, this can last for 1-2 seconds. Your trading screen will be blocked dur-
ing this time. 
 
In this context you should pay attention to the following two error messages: 
 
Error “not enough cash” and error “short selling restriction” 
 
These error messages will occur, if  
 
1. either you do not have enough cash and/or if you already have too many pending 
buy orders (“not enough cash”), or if  
 
2. you do not have enough assets and/or if you already have too many pending sell 
orders (“short selling restriction”). 
 
Please note that any pending order will tie-up your cash (buy order) or assets (sell order) 
until these orders are executed or deleted. This prevents you from placing orders which 
might not be possible due to a lack of cash/assets. Pending orders can be deleted or ed-
ited at any time in order to make the tied-up cash/assets available again. 
 
From figure 2 above you can see that an amount of 2* 30.00 = 60.00 Eurocents is tied-
up for the pending buy order at the moment. The disposable cash amount reduced to 
500 - 60 = 440 Eurocents. 
 
5.4 Order Execution 
 
The trading system is based on a so-called “continuous double auction”. This means 
that a buy and a sell offer will be executed if the respective buy order has at least the 
same price limit as the corresponding sell order. Please look at the following order 
book, which contains a list of all active buy and sell offers in the market: 
 
Buy Offers Sell Offers 
 1 @ 60.00 
 1 @ 56.00 
 1 @ 50.00 
- none -  
Fig. 3: Order book. 
 
Assume you would like to buy assets and enter a buy order for “6 @ 80.00“ into the 
trading system, i.e. you are willing to buy a quantity of six assets at a price limit of 
80.00 Eurocents each. In general, only the best offers will appear in the order book of 
your “Market” section. 
 
In this case, you know for sure that you will buy one asset at a price of 50.00 Eurocents 
in the market (best sell offer), as you can see from the trading screen. 
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Fig. 4: Order book example. 
 
The remaining part of the order book is hidden to you. However, since you are willing 
to pay up to 80.00 Eurocents per asset, you will buy a quantity of three assets in total 
(see Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 5: Splitted Order. 
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As you can see from the “My Orders” section in Fig. 5, your original order of six assets 
was split, so that three orders, each consisting of one asset, were executed (highlighted 
in green colour), while an order of three assets remains in the trading system. The price 
which is shown in the column “Price” equals the trading price (for the executed orders) 
and equals your limit price (for the pending order).  
 
The “Current Price” in the “Market” area indicates that the last trade was executed at a 
price of 60 Eurocents. The remaining part of your order (“3 @ 80.00”) appears in the 
order book as the best buy offer. 
 
Please note: Whenever two orders can be matched, they will always be executed for the 
price limit of the buy or sell order which was submitted the earliest (time priority). 
 
 
  Note: For more detailed information on the trading system see the FAQs section 
on our study homepage!  
 
 
6. NBA Basketball Playoffs Mode 
 
  Note: This section can be skipped if you are an NBA Playoffs expert and already 
know all the details!  
 
Overall, in the National Basketball Association (NBA) there are 30 teams which are 
divided into Eastern and Western conference (15 teams each). Each conference consists 
of three divisions with five teams in every division. Within a so-called regular season, 
each team plays in total of 82 games (which are divided evenly between home and road 
games). During the regular season, each team faces opponents in its own division four 
times a season (4x4 = 16 games), teams from the other two divisions within the same 
conference three or four times a year (in total 36 games) and all 15 teams of the other 
conference twice (15x2 = 30 games). 
 
Afterwards, the NBA uses a particular seeding system in order to set the Playoffs 
match-ups: The top three seeds (1-3) for each conference are determined by taking the 
winners of the conferences’ three divisions and ranking them by their regular season 
record (i.e., their relation between wins and losses). The remaining five seeds (4-8) for 
each conference are determined by taking the five best teams from the remaining pool 
of 12 teams.  
 
The Playoffs themselves follow a tournament format: Each team plays a rival in a best-
of-seven series, with the first team to win four games advancing to the next round. This 
means that two teams play against each other, until one of the teams wins four times. 
While the losing team is eliminated from the Playoffs and does not play any more 
games, the winning team advances to the next round and has the next match-up accord-
ing to the following preset bracket:  
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San Antonio 
Spurs
Sacramento
Kings
Dallas
Mavericks
Memphis
Grizzlies
Denver
Nuggets
L.A.
Clippers
Phoenix
Suns
L.A.
Lakers
W1
W8
W4
W5
W3
W6
W2
W7
Western Conference
Detroit
Pistons
Milwaukee
Bucks
Cleveland
Cavaliers
Washington
Wizards
New Jersey
Nets
Indiana
Pacers
Miami
Heat
Chicago
Bulls
E1
E8
E4
E5
E3
E6
E2
E7
Eastern Conference
vs.
 
Fig. 6: Traditional NBA Playoffs Bracket with this year’s teams. 
 
In the final round (the NBA Finals), the winner of the Western conference faces the 
winner of the Eastern conference.  
 
Home-court advantage in the NBA Playoffs follows a particular pattern and is based 
strictly on a team’s regular-season record, without regard to whether a team won its 
division or not. In each round except the NBA Finals, the best-of-seven series follows a 
2-2-1-1-1 pattern, meaning that the team with the better won-lost record has home court 
in games 1, 2, 5, and (the decisive game) 7, while the opponent plays at home in games 
3, 4, and 6. In the NBA Finals, home-court advantage follows a 2-3-2 pattern, meaning 
that one team has home court in games 1, 2, 6, and 7, while the other team plays at 
home in games 3, 4, and 5.  
 
Please note that the winning team in the NBA Finals always wins exactly 16 games in 
total; the team that makes it to the NBA Finals but loses, always wins 12 to 15 games 
etc., while the first-round losers win from 0 to 3 games. 
 
7. FIFA Soccer World Cup Mode 
 
  Note: This section can be skipped if you are a FIFA World Cup expert and al-
ready know all the details!  
 
After a two-year period of qualification, 32 national teams have qualified for the final 
tournament (FIFA Soccer World Cup 2006).  
 
In December 2005, the qualified teams were drawn and assigned to eight groups of four 
nations each. Eight teams (Germany, England, Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Brazil, France 
and Spain) were seeded as group heads, based on their so-called FIFA ranking and their 
success in previous FIFA World Cups. The remaining teams were drawn randomly from 
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the different continental zones (and by geographical criteria). They will now compete 
for the World Cup in two phases, a group phase and a knockout phase. 
 
Group phase. From June 9 on, in all of the eight groups, each team plays every other 
team in the group once (pure round-robin schedule), guaranteeing that every team will 
play (at least) three matches. Every match consists of two periods of 45 minutes each 
and can end in a decision (three points for the winner) or a draw (one point for both 
teams). At the end of this phase, the two top teams from each group advance to the 
knockout phase. 
 
Knockout phase. In this phase, teams play each other in single-elimination matches. If 
there is a draw at the end of the regular playing time (i.e. after the second period of 45 
minutes has finished), there are two overtime periods, 15 minutes each. If there is still a 
draw after the 30 minutes of overtime, a penalty shootout is used to decide the winner. 
Please note that goals scored in a penalty shootout do not count for the (official FIFA) 
result of the game (unlike penalty-kicks during the game, which do count for the final 
score of the game). 
 
In the round of 16 (1/8-finals), the winner of each group plays against the runner-up 
from another group. This is followed by the quarterfinals, the semifinals and the World 
Cup final, as can be seen from the following figure: 
 
Group A
Germany
Costa Rica
Poland
Ecuador
Group B
England
Paraguay
Trini./Tobago
Sweden
Group C
Argentina
Côte d'Ivoire
Serbia/Monte.
Netherlands
Group D
Mexico
Iran
Angola
Portugal
Group E
Italy
Ghana
USA
Czech Rep.
Group F
Brazil
Croatia
Australia
Japan
Group G
France
Switzerland
Korea Rep.
Togo
Group H
Spain
Ukraine
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
A1
B2
C1
D2
E1
F2
G1
H2
B1
A2
D1
C2
F1
E2
H1
G2
[1]
[8]
[2]
[5]
[6]
[3]
[4]
[7]
[A]
[B]
[C]
[D]
[I]
[II]
Winner
Losers of [A] vs. [B] 
and [C] vs. [D] play
for 3rd place
 
Fig. 7: FIFA Soccer World Cup Bracket. 
 
The losers from the semifinals play each other in a third place match. 
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Appendix VI:  NBA/FIFA study FAQs (Study home-
page) 
 
General FAQs 
 
Why did you ask for my Social Security Number (SSN) in the registration form? 
Since this is a paid experiment, we can't pay you without reporting tax info. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to help social scientists better understand decision-
making by observing your decisions. 
 
How will I be paid? 
At the end of this experiment we will randomly draw one out of the four teams 
from your NBA market and one out of the four teams from your FIFA market. These 
“team markets” then serve as the basis for your payment. Please note that you will not 
know which of the teams in your markets will be relevant for your payment until the 
end of this study, so you should carefully think about your decisions in all “team mar-
kets”!  
We will then add your cash account to your final portfolio value (with the assets 
being worth either 100 Eurocents or nothing) for both of the drawn NBA and FIFA 
“team markets”, and will pay you the resulting overall value in Eurocents (or in US$ at 
the current exchange rate; today’s exchange rate is about 1.20 $/€).  
 
When will I be paid? 
You will be paid in the middle of July after all NBA and FIFA markets are 
closed. Further payment details will be sent to you via email. 
 
Can I lose real money in this experiment? 
No! There is no way for you to lose money. The worst possible outcome is for 
you to walk away with nothing. 
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Is this experiment about fantasy teams? 
No! You are trading in contracts whose payoffs depend on the outcomes of the 
“real” 2006 NBA Playoffs and the “real” FIFA World Cup being held this year in Ger-
many. 
 
Assets and Markets FAQs 
 
What kind of contracts do I trade in the NBA market? 
You trade in contingent claims whose payoffs depend on how many games a 
particular team wins in the 2006 NBA Playoffs. 
 
What is the basic idea of these markets? 
The basic idea of these markets is that after the Playoffs (and the World Cup) are 
over, exactly one asset/claim in each “team market” will pay 100 Eurocents per claim, 
while the three remaining claims will become worthless. This is due to the fact that the 
asset intervals encompass all possible outcomes, but do not overlap. However, since the 
outcome of the event is uncertain during most of the trading period, the price for an as-
set usually varies between 0 and 100 Eurocents. 
 
What is a unit portfolio (Unit PF)? 
The Unit PF allows you to buy or sell a complete set of all existing assets for a 
particular team at a fixed price of 100 Eurocents in order to increase either liquidity in 
cash or stock in assets without taking any risks. This is an easy way to transform cash 
into assets (buy the unit portfolio) or to transform assets into cash (sell the unit portfo-
lio). 
 
What is meant by arbitrage opportunities? 
Arbitrage means doing a transaction, which results in a sure profit. If, at any 
time, the best sell offers of all assets in a “team market” sum to less than 100 Eurocents, 
you can buy these assets in the market and sell them as a unit portfolio to the experi-
menter at a fixed rate of 100 Eurocents afterwards. As you bought the assets for less 
than 100 Eurocents, you realize a riskless profit.  
If, at any time, the best buy offers of all assets in a “team market” sum to more 
than 100 Eurocents, you can buy a unit portfolio from the experimenter at a fixed rate of 
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100 Eurocents and sell the assets separately in the market afterwards. As you will re-
ceive more than 100 Eurocents, you realize an (almost) riskless profit. 
You should hurry to exploit any arbitrage opportunities, since other market par-
ticipants may try to act in the same direction! 
 
What is an order book? 
An order book is a list of all pending buy and sell orders that are active in the 
market. In this experiment, however, only the best (highest) buy offer and the best (low-
est) sell offer will be disclosed to you in the “Market” section of your trading screen. If 
a buy or a sell offer from the order book is completely executed the next best buy or sell 
offer will appear on the trading screen, if they exist.  
 
What is a price limit? 
The prices you enter in the “Price” field of the “Order Form” or the “Edit Form” 
are always limit prices, meaning that you won’t buy any assets at a price HIGHER than 
your fixed price (limit) and you won’t sell any assets at a price LOWER than your fixed 
price (limit). However, orders may be executed even at a “better” price than your price 
limit, please see FAQ At what trading price will orders be executed? for further details. 
 
What will happen to my pending orders while a game takes place? 
Nothing, i.e. they remain pending in the order book at their original limit prices. 
Thus, you should think very carefully about which orders you wish to remain pending 
and which orders should be deleted before a game, because some claims may become 
worthless immediately following the game.  
Please note that trading will not be suspended during the games, thus your pend-
ing orders might be executed at their original limit prices even if they will be worthless 
within minutes! 
 
What is the trading period? 
In general, the trading period for the NBA markets lasts from April 20 through 
June 22, 2006 (at the latest) and the trading period for the FIFA markets lasts from the 
middle of May through July 9, 2006. However, some markets can expire earlier, as you 
will be trading in four NBA teams and four FIFA countries’ teams respectively. Thus, 
as teams drop out of the tournament, everyone will know which assets are worthless and 
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which will pay out the 100 Eurocents for sure, so those respective “team markets” will 
be closed.  
Unless a market expires as described above, they will be open for trading 24/7, 
i.e. 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 
 
Can I use my cash from “team market” A to buy assets in “team market” B, C or D? 
No! You can’t transfer money from one “team market” to another in order to 
buy more assets in that market, since your four “team markets” are treated separately 
and independently.  
 
What is this “practice market” useful for? 
The practice market is a market where you can get familiar with the trading sys-
tem before entering the markets for real money. We strongly recommend you to enter 
the practice market AT LEAST ONCE before accessing your real NBA market. You 
can access the practice market with your User ID and your password (after you fill out 
the questionnaire). In a similar style to the real markets in this experiment, the practice 
market allows you to trade contracts based on how many gold medals four different 
nations will win in the next Olympic Summer Games. 
Please try to submit, edit and delete at least three buy and sell orders. Also try to 
buy and sell the unit portfolio at least once. Watch for the changes in your cash account 
and your portfolio! The actions taken in this practice market will not at all influence 
your payments at the end of the experiment. Just feel free to try the functions and fea-
tures of the trading software and learn how the market system works! 
 
What happens if a game is cancelled or has to be stopped before the official time or ….? 
In case of superior forces or unforeseeable events (team disqualification, doping 
etc.) we will always refer to the official NBA or FIFA results when fixing the payoffs 
for the assets.  
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Trading System FAQs 
 
Why doesn’t my trading software start when I click the market link? 
Probably, you do not have a recent Java version installed. Java 1.5, recently 
named Java5 is necessary to run the trading software on your computer.  If your Java 
version is outdated, you can get the latest version at: http://www.java.com/en/ 
 
If I make a mistake trading, can I take my order back? 
As long as your order is still pending, you can edit or delete it to alter the price 
and/or quantity or totally remove it from the trading system. However, if your order was 
executed immediately after your submission (because it matched another pending or-
der), there is no way of cancelling your order. So, please check your entries carefully 
before submitting an order to the system! 
 
How can I edit or delete pending orders in the trading system? 
Orders which have not been executed yet can be edited or deleted from the order 
book at any time. You just need to select an active order, which is marked “pending” in 
the “Status” column within the “My Orders” area and press one of the related buttons 
“Edit” or “Delete” in the respective row.  
By editing a pending order your initial order will (temporarily) be removed from 
the order book (and from the list “My Orders”) and the order details will be transmitted 
to the “Edit Form”. In this form, you can modify your order by altering the quantity 
and/or the price limit. Afterwards, you can resubmit your order by clicking “OK” (it 
will then be treated as a new order with respect to its time priority). By clicking the 
“Cancel” button you will be asked whether you want to delete or to restore the edited 
order. 
By pushing the “Delete” button in the “My Orders” section the respective order 
will be deleted immediately! 
 
What is meant by the Error: “not enough cash” in the trading system, when I try to 
submit a buy order? 
The error message “not enough cash” will occur if you do not have enough cash 
to execute the intended buy order and/or if you already have too many pending buy 
orders in the system.  
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Please note that any pending buy order will tie-up that amount of cash (limit 
price x quantity) until the order is executed or deleted. This prevents you from submit-
ting orders for which you might not have the cash on hand to cover. Pending orders can 
be deleted or edited at any time in order to free-up some cash. (As pending AND exe-
cuted orders are recorded chronologically in the same list (“My Orders”), please keep in 
mind that there might be pending buy orders that are down the list.)  
 
What is meant by the Error: “short selling restriction” in the trading system when I try 
to submit a sell order? 
The error message “short selling restriction” will occur, if you do not have 
enough assets to sell and/or if you already have too many pending sell orders of that 
asset in the system. 
Please note that any pending sell order will tie-up that number of assets (quan-
tity) until the order is executed or deleted. This prevents you from submitting orders for 
which you might not the assets on hand to cover. Pending orders can be deleted or ed-
ited at any time in order to free-up some assets. (As pending AND executed orders are 
recorded chronologically in the same list (“My Orders”), please keep in mind that there 
might be pending sell orders that are down the list.) 
 
What is meant by the Error: “do not trade with yourself” in the trading system? 
The error message “do not trade with yourself” will occur, if you try to place a 
buy and a sell order for the same asset at the same time, where the limit price of your 
buy order is EQUAL or HIGHER than the limit price of your sell order. This means that 
you are willing to PAY the same price or more for the asset than you are willing to RE-
CEIVE for the same asset, which is inconsistent.  
However, you can have buy orders and sell orders for the same asset at the same 
time in order to act as a “market maker,” if the limit price of your buy offer is LOWER 
than the limit price of your sell offer! 
 
How is the “Portfolio Value” in the trading system calculated? 
The portfolio value is calculated by taking the number of assets multiplied by 
their current market prices, and then summed across all the assets of a particular “team 
market”. Please note that at the end of the experiment there will be one asset worth 100 
Eurocents and three assets worth 0 Eurocents, in each “team market”. 
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What is meant by “Credit Line” in the trading system? 
Don’t worry about the credit line, as it is zero for all participants in this experi-
ment and simply means that you are not allowed to purchase assets on credit. 
 
What is the “Current Price” in the trading system? 
The current price gives you the last trading price for that asset. 
 
At what trading price will orders be executed? 
In general, the trading mechanism follows a so-called “continuous double auc-
tion” mechanism. This means that a buy and a sell offer will only be executed if the 
respective buy order has AT LEAST THE SAME price limit as the corresponding sell 
order.  
Please note that whenever two orders can be matched, they will always be exe-
cuted at the price limit of the order that was submitted the earliest (time priority). 
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Appendix VII:  NBA/FIFA study questionnaires 
 
Questionnaire data elicited before the NBA Playoffs part of the study:  
 
ECMS | internetexperiment.de 
 
 Questionnaire 
 
Dear Ulrich Sonnemann, 
 
As announced in our first email a few days ago, we would like to ask you to com-
plete a short questionnaire before you can start trading. Note that all collected 
personal information will only be used in anonymous form for research 
purposes and will not be transmitted to third parties. At the end of this ques-
tionnaire you can choose your password for your NBA market, which will, in con-
nection with your User ID, allow you to access the trading system. We would like 
to reiterate that you need not to be a basketball or a soccer expert in order to suc-
cessfully participate in this experiment! 
 
So, let us first ask you some general questions: 
 
1. What is your birth-year? 
 (yyyy)  
   
2. Please self-rate your general trading experience (e.g. stock market, bond mar-
ket etc.)! 
 (low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (high)  
   
3. Please self-rate your knowledge and skills in the field of statistics! 
 (low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (high)  
   
4. Have you ever been active in sports betting? 
 Yes No  
   
 
In the first part of this experiment you will have the opportunity to trade in various 
contracts whose payoffs depend on the total number of wins for a particular 
team in the 2006 NBA Playoffs. A more detailed description will be provided later 
on (in the study instructions). In order to give you an idea of which factors may 
affect the number of wins for a particular team, we will briefly explain the mode of 
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the NBA Playoffs: 
 
Open window for NBA Playoffs description... 
(Note: You do not have to read the NBA Playoffs description if you are an expert 
and already know all the details!) 
 
Against this background, let us now ask you some questions concerning NBA Bas-
ketball: 
 
5. In general, how competent do you feel in making judgments regarding the NBA 
Playoffs? 
 (little) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (highly)  
   
6. In general, how much are you interested in the NBA Playoffs? 
 (little) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (highly)  
   
7. How closely/intensely are you going to follow the 2006 NBA Playoffs (on TV, via 
Internet etc.)? 
 (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very intensely)  
   
8. If any, which is your favorite NBA team? 
  
   
9. Which of the following four NBA teams do you like the best? 
 
Dallas 
L.A. Lakers 
Miami 
Washington 
none  
   
10. In the following, you will be asked seven multiple choice trivia questions con-
cerning NBA Basketball. For each question, there are five choices, but only one an-
swer is correct! Note: We ask you these questions for research purposes only. Your 
answers will neither affect your payment nor any other aspect of the experiment! 
We ask you to answer honestly, on your own, and without cheating! Please, do not 
get discouraged if you have any problems answering these questions! 
 
a. Which team lost the NBA Finals last season (2004/05)? 
 
Detroit Pistons 
Washington Wizards
Philadelphia 76ers 
Los Angeles Clippers
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Denver Nuggets 
I don't know  
   
b. Which team has won the most championships in NBA history? 
 
New York Knicks 
Boston Celtics 
Utah Jazz 
Phoenix Suns 
Portland Trail Blazers
I don't know  
   
c. How many seconds does a team have to take a shot? 
 
10 
16 
24 
35 
60 
I don't know  
   
d. Which team did Michael Jordan play for until his second retirement? 
 
Boston Celtics 
Chicago Bulls 
New York Knicks 
Los Angeles Lakers
Detroit Pistons 
I don't know  
   
e. What was the longest streak of consecutive NBA championships by one team in 
NBA history? 
 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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I don't know  
   
f. Over the last three seasons, how many games did the Detroit Pistons win on 
average (2002/03-2004/05)? 
 
33 
43 
53 
63 
73 
I don't know  
   
g. Over the last three seasons, how many of the 45 playoff match-ups ended in a 
decisive game 7? 
 
3 
12 
21 
30 
39 
I don't know  
   
 
10. In the following, you will be asked seven multiple choice trivia questions con-
cerning NBA Basketball. For each question, there are five choices, but only one an-
swer is correct! Note: We ask you these questions for research purposes only. Your 
answers will neither affect your payment nor any other aspect of the experiment! 
We ask you to answer honestly, on your own, and without cheating! Please, do not 
get discouraged if you have any problems answering these questions! 
 
a. Which team won the NBA title last season (2004/05)? 
 
Utah Jazz 
Los Angeles Lakers
San Antonio Spurs 
Chicago Bulls 
Orlando Magic 
I don't know  
   
b. Which of the following teams has not won the NBA Finals in the last 10 years? 
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Indiana Pacers 
San Antonio Spurs 
Detroit Pistons 
Los Angeles Lakers
Chicago Bulls 
I don't know  
   
c. After how many fouls is a player ejected? 
 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
I don't know  
   
d. For which team has Dirk Nowitzki played since the 1998/99 season? 
 
Boston Celtics 
Los Angeles Lakers
Seattle Supersonics
Dallas Mavericks 
Cleveland Cavaliers
I don't know  
   
e. What was the jersey number worn by Michael Jordan in all (except one) his NBA 
games before his first retirement? 
 
3 
13 
18 
23 
34 
I don't know  
   
f. Over the last five seasons, what is the average number of games won by the 
team with the best regular-season record? 
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50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
I don't know  
   
g. Over the last three seasons, how many of the 24 first-round playoff match-ups 
have been sweeps (4-0)? 
 
2 
5 
8 
11 
14 
I don't know  
   
11. Lastly, we will ask you for your individual probability judgment of the total 
number of wins for the following four teams in this year’s NBA Playoffs. The given 
range in brackets corresponds to the range of wins of the particular team. In other 
words: What do you think is the probability that team XYZ will have 0 to 3 wins in 
this year’s Playoffs and so on. Note: Your probability judgments must sum to 
100% for each team! 
 
Open window for NBA Playoffs description... 
 
1. Dallas [0-3]: % [4-7]: % [8-11]: % [12-16]: %
2. L.A. Lakers [0-3]: % [4-7]: % [8-11]: % [12-16]: %
3. Miami [0-3]: % [4-7]: % [8-11]: % [12-16]: %
4. Washington [0-3]: % [4-7]: % [8-11]: % [12-16]: %
 
Next...
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Questionnaire data elicited before the FIFA World Cup part of the study:  
 
ECMS | internetexperiment.de 
 
 Questionnaire 
 
Dear Ulrich Sonnemann, 
 
Before trading in the FIFA World Cup markets begins, we would like to ask you to 
fill out another short questionnaire. Note that all collected personal informa-
tion will only be used in anonymous form for research purposes and will 
not be transmitted to third parties. We would like to reiterate that you need 
not be a basketball or a soccer expert in order to successfully participate in this 
experiment! 
 
In the second part of this experiment you will have the opportunity to trade in 
various contracts whose payoffs depend on the total number of goals scored by 
a particular national team in the FIFA Soccer World Cup 2006. A more de-
tailed description will be provided later on (in the second part of the study instruc-
tions). In order to give you an idea of which factors may affect the number of goals 
for a particular team, we will briefly explain the mode of the FIFA World Cup: 
 
Open window for FIFA World Cup mode... 
(Note: You don't have to read the FIFA World Cup mode description if you are an 
expert and already know all the details!) 
 
Against this background, let us now ask you some questions concerning the FIFA 
World Cup: 
 
1. In general, how competent do you feel in making judgments regarding the FIFA 
Soccer World Cup 2006? 
 (little) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (highly)  
   
2. In general, how much are you interested in the FIFA World Cup 2006? 
 (little) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (highly)  
   
3. How closely/intensely are you going to follow the FIFA World Cup 2006 (on TV, 
via Internet etc.)? 
 (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very intensely)  
   
4. If any, which is your favourite national team? 
  
   
5. Which of the following four soccer World Cup teams do you like the best? 
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Czech Rep. 
Ghana 
Italy 
USA 
none  
   
6. In the following, you will be asked seven multiple choice trivia questions con-
cerning the Soccer World Cup. For each question, there are five choices, but only 
one answer is correct! Note: We ask you these questions for research purposes 
only. Your answers will neither affect your compensation nor any other aspect of 
the experiment! We ask you to answer honestly, on your own, and without cheat-
ing! Please, don't get discouraged if you have any problems answering these ques-
tions! 
 
a. Which country/countries was/were the host of the last FIFA World Cup in 2002?
 
South Korea/Japan 
Austria/Switzerland 
Belgium/Netherlands
South Africa 
France 
I don't know  
   
b. Which country has won the most World Cup championships? 
 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Germany 
Italy 
England 
I don't know  
   
c. How many times has the host country of the World Cup tournament won the 
championship in its own country (17 World Cups so far)? 
 
0 
3 
6 
9 
12 
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I don't know  
   
d. How many substitutions does FIFA allow a team per game? 
 
1 
3 
5 
7 
unlimited 
I don't know  
   
e. Who was the top scorer in the FIFA World Cup in 2002? 
 
David Beckham 
Ronaldo 
Raúl González 
Henrik Larsson 
Robbie Keane 
I don't know  
   
f. Over the last 3 FIFA World Cups (1994, 1998, and 2002), what is the average
number of goals (ex penalty shootouts) scored by all the teams combined, dur-
ing the whole tournament? 
 
88 
98 
118 
158 
238 
I don't know  
   
g. In how many of the 64 games of the FIFA World Cup in 2002 did the winning 
team score four goals or more ([4+])? 
 
1 
4 
8 
13 
19 
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I don't know.  
   
 
6. In the following, you will be asked seven multiple choice trivia questions con-
cerning the Soccer World Cup. For each question, there are five choices, but only 
one answer is correct! Note: We ask you these questions for research purposes 
only. Your answers will neither affect your compensation nor any other aspect of 
the experiment! We ask you to answer honestly, on your own, and without cheat-
ing! Please, don't get discouraged if you have any problems answering these ques-
tions! 
 
a. Which team won the FIFA World Cup in 2002? 
 
Brazil 
Netherlands 
Italy 
France 
England 
I don't know  
   
b. Which of the following countries has not won the FIFA World Cup within the 
past 20 years? 
 
Brazil 
Spain 
Germany 
France 
Argentina 
I don't know  
   
c. Which national team has never won the World Cup in its own country? 
 
Germany 
England 
Uruguay 
Brazil 
France 
I don't know  
   
d. Within a single game, how many yellow cards does it take before a player is 
kicked out of the game by a red card? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
I don't know  
   
e. Which country does Zinedine Zidane play for? 
 
Italy 
Croatia 
Spain 
Portugal 
France 
I don't know  
   
f. Over the last 3 FIFA World Cups (1994, 1998, and 2002), what is the average
number of goals (ex penalty shootouts) scored by the world champion in the 
entire tournament? 
 
7 
11 
15 
19 
23 
I don't know  
   
g. In how many of the 64 games of the last FIFA World Cup in 2002 did at least 
one of the two opponents not score a single goal? 
 
6 
14 
22 
34 
46 
I don't know  
   
7. Lastly, we will ask you for your individual probability judgment of the total 
number of goals (ex penalty shootouts) for the following four teams in the 
7  Appendices 257 
whole FIFA World Cup tournament. The given range in brackets corresponds to the 
range of goals scored by the particular team. In other words: What do you think is 
the probability that team A will score 0 to 2 goals in this year's World Cup and so 
on. Note: Your probability judgments must sum to 100% for each team! 
 
1. Czech Rep. [0-2]: % [3-5]: % [6-8]: % [9+]: % 
2. Ghana [0-2]: % [3-5]: % [6-8]: % [9+]: % 
3. Italy [0-2]: % [3-5]: % [6-8]: % [9+]: % 
4. USA [0-2]: % [3-5]: % [6-8]: % [9+]: % 
 
Next...
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Appendix VIII:  Overall number of trades for each 
Playoffs and World Cup team market 
 
Table A.VIII.1:  Overall number of trades (ex unit portfolio) for each NBA Playoffs team market. 
I 0 I 1 ∪ I 2 I 3 I 4 I 1 I 2 I 3 ∪ I 4
Number of trades
CHI 3 German 1 10 15 13 8 46
CHI 4 German 2 16 32 18 22 88
CHI 11 German 1 14 9 6 5 34
CHI 12 German 2 12 11 13 17 53
CHI 19 U.S. 1 6 1 7
CHI 20 U.S. 2 3 4 2 2 11
CLE 3 German 1 12 7 13 1 33
CLE 4 German 2 36 35 28 16 115
CLE 11 German 1 14 13 11 2 40
CLE 12 German 2 21 22 20 14 77
CLE 19 U.S. 1 1 2 2 5
CLE 20 U.S. 2 7 4 1 12
DAL 7 German 1 4 33 24 16 77
DAL 8 German 2 6 39 42 42 129
DAL 15 German 1 5 46 39 29 119
DAL 16 German 2 14 23 16 15 68
DAL 23 U.S. 1 1 1
DAL 24 U.S. 2 2 1 3
DEN 5 German 1 22 21 12 6 61
DEN 6 German 2 10 11 9 6 36
DEN 13 German 1 10 12 7 4 33
DEN 14 German 2 6 10 5 2 23
DEN 21 U.S. 1 1 6 7
DEN 22 U.S. 2 4 4
DET 5 German 1 10 19 24 27 80
DET 6 German 2 3 8 29 16 56
DET 13 German 1 3 23 16 7 49
DET 14 German 2 4 13 14 19 50
DET 21 U.S. 1 3 4 9 3 19
DET 22 U.S. 2 1 1 3 5
IND 5 German 1 26 17 9 6 58
IND 6 German 2 8 7 10 25
IND 13 German 1 9 15 6 3 33
IND 14 German 2 8 3 7 6 24
IND 21 U.S. 1 1 2 9 1 13
IND 22 U.S. 2 0
LAC 1 German 1 6 8 10 3 27
LAC 2 German 2 15 20 29 16 80
LAC 9 German 1 21 14 20 11 66
LAC 10 German 2 29 38 32 29 128
LAC 17 U.S. 1 1 1
LAC 18 U.S. 2 3 1 4
LAL 7 German 1 22 19 20 15 76
LAL 8 German 2 17 23 23 6 69
LAL 15 German 1 21 24 11 11 67
LAL 16 German 2 17 12 11 15 55
LAL 23 U.S. 1 0
LAL 24 U.S. 2 4 2 4 10
Market Nr. Subjects Treatment(Partition) Total
Intervals
Team
 
to be continued on the next page 
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Table A.VIII.1 continued 
I 0 I 1 ∪ I 2 I 3 I 4 I 1 I 2 I 3 ∪ I 4
Number of trades
MEM 3 German 1 12 8 17 2 39
MEM 4 German 2 15 19 19 24 77
MEM 11 German 1 12 13 5 3 33
MEM 12 German 2 10 13 7 10 40
MEM 19 U.S. 1 2 2
MEM 20 U.S. 2 0
MIA 7 German 1 11 12 13 11 47
MIA 8 German 2 9 23 30 39 101
MIA 15 German 1 12 38 34 18 102
MIA 16 German 2 10 18 18 14 60
MIA 23 U.S. 1 0
MIA 24 U.S. 2 1 5 1 7
MIL 1 German 1 16 5 3 1 25
MIL 2 German 2 21 14 13 5 53
MIL 9 German 1 17 19 14 16 66
MIL 10 German 2 24 15 18 18 75
MIL 17 U.S. 1 4 4
MIL 18 U.S. 2 1 1
NJN 1 German 1 14 7 13 3 37
NJN 2 German 2 14 35 16 6 71
NJN 9 German 1 11 11 15 10 47
NJN 10 German 2 16 28 19 14 77
NJN 17 U.S. 1 0
NJN 18 U.S. 2 1 1 1 2 5
PHX 3 German 1 10 16 8 7 41
PHX 4 German 2 29 41 56 58 184
PHX 11 German 1 13 17 12 11 53
PHX 12 German 2 19 20 18 18 75
PHX 19 U.S. 1 1 3 1 1 6
PHX 20 U.S. 2 3 6 10 6 25
SAC 5 German 1 20 14 7 7 48
SAC 6 German 2 5 13 3 1 22
SAC 13 German 1 12 12 9 5 38
SAC 14 German 2 11 11 7 6 35
SAC 21 U.S. 1 1 3 1 1 6
SAC 22 U.S. 2 2 2
SAS 1 German 1 10 14 12 16 52
SAS 2 German 2 14 40 22 20 96
SAS 9 German 1 20 25 16 12 73
SAS 10 German 2 17 44 34 35 130
SAS 17 U.S. 1 1 1 2
SAS 18 U.S. 2 1 1 3 5
WAS 7 German 1 15 14 10 10 49
WAS 8 German 2 19 17 9 8 53
WAS 15 German 1 22 17 8 8 55
WAS 16 German 2 11 26 6 6 49
WAS 23 U.S. 1 1 1
WAS 24 U.S. 2 1 4 5
947 562 462 301 710 626 543 4,151Total
Team Market Nr. Subjects Treatment(Partition)
Intervals
Total
 
 
 
 
 
7  Appendices 260 
Table A.VIII.2:  Overall number of trades (ex unit portfolio) for each World Cup team market. 
I 0 I 1 ∪ I 2 I 3 I 4 I 1 I 2 I 3 ∪ I 4
Number of trades
ARG 31 German 1 2 4 7 13
ARG 32 German 1 6 15 8 9 38
ARG 33 German 2 14 8 16 11 49
ARG 34 German 2 8 15 12 14 49
AUS 39 German 1 7 2 2 11
AUS 40 German 1 10 13 13 11 47
AUS 41 German 2 14 17 14 13 58
AUS 42 German 2 7 11 12 8 38
BRA 39 German 1 3 9 4 16
BRA 40 German 1 7 14 10 19 50
BRA 41 German 2 11 6 16 13 46
BRA 42 German 2 14 7 12 7 40
CIV 31 German 1 1 2 3 6
CIV 32 German 1 16 10 5 5 36
CIV 33 German 2 19 9 6 5 39
CIV 34 German 2 16 9 16 5 46
CRC 27 German 1 7 3 2 1 13
CRC 28 German 1 22 9 5 3 39
CRC 29 German 2 5 5 2 1 13
CRC 30 German 2 19 7 8 11 45
CRO 39 German 1 5 9 5 2 21
CRO 40 German 1 9 11 16 8 44
CRO 41 German 2 10 17 15 15 57
CRO 42 German 2 11 13 8 5 37
CZE 35 German 1 4 10 13 5 32
CZE 36 German 1 5 12 11 10 38
CZE 37 German 2 1 16 10 12 39
CZE 38 German 2 2 9 8 19
ECU 27 German 1 7 3 9 4 23
ECU 28 German 1 20 2 6 5 33
ECU 29 German 2 4 7 8 4 23
ECU 30 German 2 7 18 8 12 45
Intervals
Team Market Nr. Subjects Treatment(Partition) Total
 
to be continued on the next page 
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Table A.VIII.2 continued 
I 0 I 1 ∪ I 2 I 3 I 4 I 1 I 2 I 3 ∪ I 4
Number of trades
GER 27 German 1 2 4 7 12 25
GER 28 German 1 9 15 16 17 57
GER 29 German 2 2 15 5 22
GER 30 German 2 4 13 32 10 59
GHA 35 German 1 10 9 7 3 29
GHA 36 German 1 14 14 9 6 43
GHA 37 German 2 20 8 7 1 36
GHA 38 German 2 4 3 1 8
ITA 35 German 1 4 16 12 12 44
ITA 36 German 1 5 19 23 18 65
ITA 37 German 2 5 19 20 21 65
ITA 38 German 2 1 2 9 2 14
JPN 39 German 1 6 6 12
JPN 40 German 1 10 9 6 5 30
JPN 41 German 2 14 18 20 2 54
JPN 42 German 2 9 12 13 10 44
NED 31 German 1 2 3 5
NED 32 German 1 9 13 15 5 42
NED 33 German 2 17 12 13 14 56
NED 34 German 2 9 19 8 12 48
POL 27 German 1 3 6 4 1 14
POL 28 German 1 13 10 6 6 35
POL 29 German 2 8 9 4 2 23
POL 30 German 2 20 13 15 11 59
SCG 31 German 1 1 4 1 6
SCG 32 German 1 11 8 17 4 40
SCG 33 German 2 7 9 7 7 30
SCG 34 German 2 7 12 12 5 36
USA 35 German 1 9 18 3 1 31
USA 36 German 1 23 19 5 5 52
USA 37 German 2 10 9 10 1 30
USA 38 German 2 3 9 1 13
553 290 254 191 333 361 248 2,230Total
Team Market Nr. Subjects Treatment(Partition)
Intervals
Total
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Appendix IX:  Price charts in the NBA/FIFA study 
 
(see next page) 
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Figure A.IX.1:  Price chart (Chicago Bulls, CHI). 
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Figure A.IX.2:  Price chart (Cleveland Cavaliers, CLE). 
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Figure A.IX.3:  Price chart (Dallas Mavericks, DAL). 
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Figure A.IX.4:  Price chart (Denver Nuggets, DEN). 
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Figure A.IX.5:  Price chart (Detroit Pistons, DET). 
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Figure A.IX.6:  Price chart (Indiana Pacers, IND). 
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Figure A.IX.7:  Price chart (L.A. Clippers, LAC). 
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Figure A.IX.8:  Price chart (L.A. Lakers, LAL). 
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Figure A.IX.9:  Price chart (Memphis Grizzlies, MEM). 
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Figure A.IX.10:  Price chart (Miami Heat, MIA). 
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Figure A.IX.11:  Price chart (Milwaukee Bucks, MIL). 
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Figure A.IX.12:  Price chart (New Jersey Nets, NJN). 
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Figure A.IX.13:  Price chart (Phoenix Suns, PHX). 
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Figure A.IX.14:  Price chart (Sacramento Kings, SAC). 
7  Appendices 270 
 1*  2  2  2  3  4  5  5  5  5  6  7  7
0
50
10
0
15
0
Cu
rr
en
t p
ric
e
0 10 20 30 40
Trading time [days]
P(I0) [Treatment 2]
P(I0) [Treatment 1]
 1*  2  2  2  3  4  5  5  5  5  6  7  7
0
50
10
0
15
0
Cu
rr
en
t p
ric
e
0 10 20 30 40
Trading time [days]
P(I1) + P(I2)
P(I1 U I2)
 1*  2  2  2  3  4  5  5  5  5  6  7  7
0
50
10
0
15
0
Cu
rr
en
t p
ric
e
0 10 20 30 40
Trading time [days]
P(I3 U I4)
P(I3) + P(I4)
*) Numbers next
to vertical lines
indicate cumulated
no. of victories.
Team: SAS
 
Figure A.IX.15:  Price chart (San Antonio Spurs, SAS). 
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Figure A.IX.16:  Price chart (Washington Wizards, WAS). 
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Figure A.IX.17:  Price chart (Argentina, ARG). 
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Figure A.IX.18:  Price chart (Australia, AUS). 
7  Appendices 272 
 1*  3  7  10  10
0
50
10
0
15
0
Cu
rr
en
t p
ric
e
0 10 20 30 40
Trading time [days]
P(I0) [Treatment 2]
P(I0) [Treatment 1]
 1*  3  7  10  10
0
50
10
0
15
0
Cu
rr
en
t p
ric
e
0 10 20 30 40
Trading time [days]
P(I1) + P(I2)
P(I1 U I2)
 1*  3  7  10  10
0
50
10
0
15
0
Cu
rr
en
t p
ric
e
0 10 20 30 40
Trading time [days]
P(I3 U I4)
P(I3) + P(I4)
*) Numbers next
to vertical lines
indicate cumulated
no. of goals.
Team: BRA
 
Figure A.IX.19:  Price chart (Brazil, BRA). 
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Figure A.IX.20:  Price chart (Côte d’Ivoire, CIV). 
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Figure A.IX.21:  Price chart (Costa Rica, CRC). 
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Figure A.IX.22:  Price chart (Croatia, CRO). 
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Figure A.IX.23:  Price chart (Czech Republic, CZE). 
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Figure A.IX.24:  Price chart (Ecuador, ECU). 
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Figure A.IX.25:  Price chart (Germany, GER). 
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Figure A.IX.26:  Price chart (Ghana, GHA). 
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Figure A.IX.27:  Price chart (Italy, ITA). 
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Figure A.IX.28:  Price chart (Japan, JPN). 
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Figure A.IX.29:  Price chart (Netherlands, NED). 
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Figure A.IX.30:  Price chart (Poland, POL). 
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Figure A.IX.31:  Price chart (Serbia and Montenegro, SCG). 
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Figure A.IX.32:  Price chart (United States of America, USA). 
7  Appendices 279 
 
Appendix X:  Screenshot of the trading interface 
 
 
Figure A.X.1:  Screenshot of the trading interface for economic derivatives (taken from “Economic 
Derivatives. Options on economic statistics”, a presentation prepared by trading and 
sales groups within Deutsche Bank AG and Goldman Sachs). 
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Appendix XI:  Derivation of the regression model 
 
From (5.1) it follows that: 
 
Ntrueobs MMM /1)1( ⋅+⋅−= λλ . 
 
Thus, 
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And finally, the observed forecast error can be written as: 
 
[ ] ( )Nobstrueobs MMXMXM /1)1( −⋅−−−=− λ
λ . 
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